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Abstract
This thesis outlines a notion of selves as relational, multiple, embodied and imaginal, in 
contrast to the more dominant Cartesian framework in which selves have been 
conceived of and enacted as separate, singular, disembodied and literal. It shows how my 
practice as a management educator on a tw o year part-time postgraduate programme in 
People and Organisational Development and as an organisational change consultant in 
different contexts attempts, over time, to realise such a relational view of the way 
unique, contextualised, embodied selves emerge as I engage in and w rite about my 
practice with others.
The thesis represents a sustained inquiry into the dialectic of how I and others shape my 
practice and how my practice shapes me and influences others. It situates this inquiry 
within the traditions of action research. In addition, it will interrelate and engage 
critically with ideas from the fields of complexity theory, the psychology and sociology of 
the self, and postmodern thought.
I will both argue for and demonstrate that practice can be conceived of and carried out 
as an emergent, self-organising, relational activity. I will also indicate and show how I 
attempt to realise the holistic nature of practice, in which self, practice and context are 
intertwined, and where the traditional, separate boundaries between what is perceived 
as personal, professional and political are challenged and made more permeable and 
interconnected. I will do this by accounting for and presenting my thinking, learning, and 
description of and critical reflection on my practice using a number of different genres. 
These genres will include examples of autobiographical, narrative, scholarly, poetic, 
dialogical and journalistic writing and will illustrate and embody in writing different facets 
of my self. In giving ‘voice’ to  these different aspects of my self, I will further 
demonstrate the multiple, imaginal and relational nature of the self.
Tracking my unique form of relational emergent practice, as it has evolved over the six 
years of this thesis, using the method of writing accounts of my w ork and sharing these 
with people I have been working with in cycles of action and reflection (what I call in 
short ‘showing my w ork to  others’), will demonstrate the originality of this w ork as well 
as its contribution to both ‘living life as inquiry’ and to a ‘living educational theory’.
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Prologue:‘All the Fruit is Ripe’
Three Poems
In this prologue, I will initiate my thesis with reference to three poems.
Poem One
All the fruit is ripe, plunged in fire, cooked,
And they have passed their test on earth, and one law is this:
That everything curls inwards like snakes,
Prophetic, dreaming on 
The hills o f heaven. And many things 
Have to stay on the shoulders like a load 
O f failure. However the roads 
Are bad. For the chained elements,
Like horses, are going off to the side,
And the old 
Laws of the earth. And a longing 
For disintegration constantly comes. Many things however 
Have to stay on the shoulders. Steadiness is essential.
Forwards, however, or backwards we will 
Not look. Let us learn to live swaying 
As in a rocking boat on the sea.
Friedrich Holderlin 
Translated by Robert Bly ( 1980)
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Friday October 4th 2002 - “All the fruit is ripe, plunged in fire, cooked”
It is a glorious autumn morning, bright, mild and sunny, perhaps not too dissimilar to  the 
clear azure skies of early morning N ew  York on September I I th 2001. September has 
been exceptionally dry and mellow this year. A  further month of weather records 
broken, another indication of actual and impending global warming.
I’m sitting in my study at home, having exhausted most of the possibilities for distraction. 
My emails from the last tw o days are answered, the shopping is done, the silk shirt that 
had been languishing at the bottom of the laundry basket because it needs special 
treatm ent is in the washing machine, and the eaves of my desk have been pulled out to  
accommodate the papers and books I want to  refer to. The cleaner comes later this 
afternoon so it would be doubly stupid to  embark on a round of house cleaning as way 
of avoiding starting writing. I could not resist dusting the printer though.
I’m at a beginning -  there is a time in front of me that is both blank and full. I have 
created most of the next tw o months as a distinct space relatively free from the 
pressures and demands of normal w ork  to draw together the different writings and 
thoughts of the last five and a half years since I began the PhD programme at the 
University of Bath. This vacant space has been consciously chosen to coincide with the 
autumn. For the last six years I have become increasingly aware that I feel at my most 
creative, confident and exuberant in the autumn. This generally lasts through until the 
early w inter but, counter-intuitively, as the light returns in the mornings, my mood 
flattens, and my creativity becomes diminished.
I looked in the large grey file now sitting on my desk that I used to keep my early notes 
and papers from the CARPP programme in search of the starting date for the first 
workshop I attended. It was on February 6 & 7 1997, that is, in the last millennium. Since 
that time, over the sixty-eight months during which I have been engaged in the research 
that constitutes the basis for this PhD, much has happened. My second marriage has 
ended; I have moved house from living in a converted barn with twenty four acres of 
garden, fields and woodland to a semi-detached cottage in another delightful location; 
my older son has left home, first for five months in Mexico, and then very recently 
started University; my younger son has transformed from an uncooperative, rather surly 
pre-teenager into a charming, intelligent, thoughtful young man concerned with issues of 
globalisation and injustice; my father has had a number of minor health problems; a good 
friend’s husband has died of cancer: I have seen Greenland and China: and so on. And 
this is just my life. Little mention of world issues.
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I’m reminded of A rthur Frank’s (1995) notion that the postmodern condition is 
characterised by the potential to  experience life at a pace and range that is faster and 
broader than we can assimilate into our normal frames of reference. And yet the act of 
this writing is an attempt at an overall assimilation, an undertaking to  create a frame or 
frames of reference that can hold and link the varied accounts and stories of my 
research activities.
O ver the summer, I have thought about how to  create an overall form for my thesis, 
how to  engage in the sense making activity of connecting and relating the different w ork  
I have done so far, how to weave together a quilt from the patches of writing already 
created - to use a metaphor that was important in an earlier phase of my w ork at the 
time of transfer from MPhil to  PhD. As thoughts on this have incubated, and I have 
prepared myself for a time of writing over the autumn, Holderlin’s poem quoted at the 
beginning of this prologue has been re-awakened in my mind.
I came across and w rote down this poem in my journal over five years ago towards the  
early phase of my second marriage ending. It offered dark comfort then. I liked its 
acknowledging and facing up to despair and difficulty. O ver the summer it gradually re­
inserted itself into my consciousness, gently pressing for my attention. N ow  it seems 
appropriate to this autumn, to  the harvest, to  the smell of the curling smoke of the 
bonfire, to  the task of this writing.
Poem Two
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end o f all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time
TS Eliot, Four quartets ( 1943)
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I first properly, that is to say with due attention, came across these lines nearly ten years 
ago when I was working on a management development programme for Digital 
Equipment Company, at the height of their fortunes -  before they went the way of many 
corporations in the early nineties to be de-layered, down-sized, and then, the final 
ignominy, bought by a competitor. I used it as part of a presentation I did on the nature 
of learning at the end of a residential week being held at the Meon Valley Golf and 
Country Club. I actually found the poem then in Kolbs’ (1984) book ‘Experiential 
Learning’ where he uses it to  illustrate the cyclical nature of learning.
I have to  admit that I find myself dismayed at using it again. This is partly because since 
discovering them ten or so years ago these four lines of verse have reappeared and been 
quoted so many times in the different books and articles I have read that they have 
almost become a cliche. The other more potent source of dismay is the recognition of 
Eliot’s point about the repetitive spirals of life, and our endless recycling through its 
patterns.
This summer, on my way home from China, I was sitting in Shanghai airport reading the 
climax of Ian Mckewan’s (2002) brilliant new novel ‘Atonement’. The novel, amongst 
many things, is a very clever exploration and deconstructive subversion of the authority 
of the author’s narrative voice. Sitting in the airport departure lounge, I was gripped by 
an excitement in which the themes of his novel stimulated and overlapped with my 
nascent thinking about the themes and overall shape of my PhD.
Very close to  the end of the book, Mckewan’s narrator makes a similar point to Eliot, 
when she reflects in old age, reviewing the incidents of her life (p. 370);
“ It occurs to  me that I have not travelled so very far after all, since I wrote my little 
play. O r rather, I’ve made a huge digression and doubled back to  my starting 
place.’’
The relevance of these tw o quotes now is that I find myself both at an end and at a 
beginning. The end is marked by the completion of the phase of my research where for 
over five years, I have been writing relatively separate, self-contained pieces of text 
about my life, my ideas and my work. The beginning is the start now of the attempt to  
find and shape an emergent form to situate and connect these different pieces, to  select 
and emphasise some, take excerpts from others, and possibly reject others altogether.
A t the moment, all I have for externalised form is the three poems that comprise this
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prologue, many notes in the journal I have been using to record and jot down my 
thoughts on my thesis, and a loose idea of how to  structure my work. Previous 
experience, notably the twenty thousand words I w rote in three intense weeks last 
Novem ber on ‘ideas of the self, (when I had only one sheet of A4 notes to  guide me), 
give me confidence that it is in the actual writing itself that the form will emerge, rather 
than being given a priori. I’m also heartened by a recent session at the CARPP 
conference in Hawkwood this September in which Judi Marshall encouraged the 
participants in the workshop to use the writing process itself as an exploration of form, 
rather than as the realisation of a pre-given form.
In fact, it is this capacity to  w ork with an emerging form, and the relationship between 
the parts and an emergent whole, that is a large part of my interest in complexity 
theory, which will be a key resource for this thesis. This will be illustrated further in this 
thesis in my later accounts of working with self-organising processes in groups and 
organisations (chapter eight), and in the accounts of what I, following Whitehead (1993), 
understand to be the emergent values embodied in my educational practice (chapter 
seven). The writing of this thesis is a further example and exploration of self­
organisation, of the emergence of order and form from chaos (Prigogine, 1984) and the 




W e Are Running
running and 
time is clocking us 
from the edge like an only 
daughter, 
our mothers stream before us, 
cradling their breasts in their 
hands.
oh pray that what we want 
is worth this running, 
pray that what we are running 
toward 
is what we want
Lucille Clifton (1991)
For some of the time of my research I have been pre-occupied with the question ‘W h at 
is my practice?’ Influenced by my supervisor, Jack Whitehead, I have found it helpful to  
define part of my practice, the w ork I do on a two-year part-time postgraduate course, 
as an educator. I have come to prefer the term  educator rather than developer to  
describe this and other aspects of my work, for reasons that are explained later in this 
thesis in chapter three.
I heard a story a number of years ago, which links to the question of ‘what is my 
practice?’ It was told by Michael Mead, one of the key figures in the founding of a men’ 
movement in the nineties, at a workshop held at Darlington Hall, in Devon. I cannot 
now recall the exact details of the story but the salient point is that the heroine of the 
story is faced with a difficult and dangerous task involving a large and ferocious tiger. In 
order to cope with the task, which at first sight is completely beyond her, she sits every 
day and takes some time to perform the craft she has been trained in. Eventually she is
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able to  perform the task. In discussing the story Michael Mead pointed out that her daily 
task is her form of spiritual practice and that we all need to be grounded in some 
repeated activity which is consciously performed as ritual practice. This activity does not 
have to  take a conventionally spiritual form such as meditation -  it could be any simple 
activity or task. Michael Mead then asked each of the participants at the workshop to  
say what we thought our daily practice was. I could not find an answer to  this.
This story has stayed with me as I have thought about the question of ‘what is my 
practice?’ In the spring of last year (2001), when I was running in the woods alongside a 
stream in Southern Sweden, the answer to Michael Mead’s question about my practice 
occurred to  me. It was running. Ever since I was living at the age of twenty-one on a 
run-down estate in Kentish Town, I have been running. This has not been a consistent 
activity. Since my early runs amongst the parks of North London, I have had long 
intervals of not running. But over time the desire to  run has returned, and, with the 
recent thought of it as a form of practice, I have tried to  be more disciplined and 
thoughtful in my running and to see it consciously as a form of practice that helps 
ground and centre my being.
O ver the last eighteen months, running or some other form of exercise such as 
swimming or tennis, has become a more conscious, regular part of my life. I have tried  
to  do this daily and now miss it when I am unable to  do this. I have a regular running 
route along the old railway line, now a bridle path, close to  where I live. Following 
anxious sleepless summer nights I have run this path in the very early morning as dawn 
breaks, as well as at the more normal times of first waking and midday. I have run this 
path in every season, currently observing how the light and sense of space along the 
path changes as the rich colours and thick leaves of early autumn give way to the sparse 
leafless trees of early winter.
In England, I have run along another disused railway line near Durham, encircled the 
Dartington Estate in Devon many times, run around the village of Plympton where my 
father’s family have their roots, run near Cheltenham, run on the outskirts of Stroud 
and just outside Bath. I have run in Los Angeles, alongside the signs outside houses 
promising immediate armed response to  security alerts in the residential area where a 
good friend lives. Jet lagged, I have stumbled, fallen, and scraped my knees on the 
approach to the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco. I have run along the quiet 
country lanes and paddocks of Placerville, close to  Sacramento. I have run competitively 
with my sons around the perimeter of Stanley Park in Vancouver, (they won), and
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companionably with them in the spectacular setting of Jasper in the Canadian Rockies. I 
would have run in Alaska if I had not hurt my back carrying too much luggage. I ran 
slowly, whilst my back was mending, on the running machine in the cruise ship as it 
sailed past the magnificent glaciers and mountains of south east Alaska. I have run 
ruggedly along the water-front in Stockholm, alongside the canals in Amsterdam, and 
euphorically skipped over the rods of fishermen alongside the Marmara sea in Istanbul. I 
have run at minus twenty degrees centigrade along the only road in llilussat, Greenland 
from the hotel to the airport and back again. I have become soaked in sweat in the 
summer heat of Lijang, the UNESCO  world heritage site in the Yunnan Province, South 
W est China and enjoyed running in the temperate winter sun of the Mexican pacific 
coast. I have been recently drenched running along the local bridleway.
I mention this now, because, in the same way that my writing will go on to describe and 
illuminate the various trajectories of my w ork and life over the last five years and 
beyond, writing about my running above performs a similar function of literally tracing 
my steps over the same time.
In her book T h e  Four Fold W ay’, Arrien (1993) refers to different practices that can be 
used to develop what she calls ’’showing up and choosing to  be present”. Tw o of these 
practices are spending one hour in nature or out of doors every day and setting aside 
time for daily exercise. I have, after reading this, consciously tried to  use running as a 
way to develop my presence and also to  become more present to  myself. This theme of 
presence will be further outlined in chapter one as it forms an important part of my 
early inquiry process. I heard Guy Glaxton claim in a talk about developing intuition 
through meditation at Roffey Park in April 2002 that in doing meditation he realised he 
was not becoming any more enlightened but he was “having some damned good ideas”. 
Likewise, the activity and rhythms of running have not led in an instrumental way to me 
developing a stronger, more consistent sense of presence but I have found new insights 
and perspectives emerging spontaneously in my thinking when I run.
In a similar way, the discipline, rituals and rhythms of writing over the years about 
episodes of my life and my practice and experimenting with the styles of different writing 
genres have enabled me to become more present to the evolving meaning of my 




The prologue, apart from the final tw o paragraphs, was written in October 2002. It 
initiated and formed the first section of my entire draft thesis, which I completed in the  
autumn and early w inter of that year. As I indicated in response to the first poem in the 
prologue, the choice to  w rite  the bulk of my thesis in the autumn was a deliberate one 
to  capitalise on the creativity and optimism I feel at that time of year. The writing of a 
first draft last autumn over a three month period, mostly free from other w ork  
commitments, was also an opportunity to  allow the shape of the thesis to  emerge in the 
writing of it.
It is now early spring 2 0 0 3 .1 find, as I surmised in the prologue, that my mood has 
indeed flattened. Some of the confidence and exuberance of the autumn has diminished. 
A  different, yet familiar, voice is making itself heard and felt in my life and in this writing.
The purpose of writing a first draft, as well as showing it to  my supervisor, was also to  
continue and complete a final iteration of the form of practice that I have developed in 
the course of writing this thesis. I have described this as ‘showing my w ork to  others’, 
and it is more fully elaborated in chapter one. Later in this thesis, I refer to how I 
understand this activity of making my writing available to  others as an intervention into 
the ‘communities of practice’ (Wenger, 1998) that I am part of, which lead to  
unpredictable consequences and continuing re-definitions of myself and my practice in 
relation to  others, and of others in relation to me. Chapter one describes some of the 
consequences met at earlier stages of my inquiry of showing my w ork to  others.
Overall, responses to my first draft were very encouraging. Jack Whitehead, my 
supervisor w rote to  me on the 8th January 2003:
“W hat a treat you sent me to  read. I was startled and amazed by the 
transformation in your writings fo r your thesis, from the contributory fragmented 
writings I'd seen so far, with my difficulties o f perceiving a 'whole' within the parts, 
to  the captivating qualities o f your 'whole' thesis”
Patricia Shaw, Visiting Professor at Hertfordshire University, w rote in an email dated 
18th January 2003:
12
“ Have I said yet how impressed I am? I think this is really something, this thesis, all 
the more unusual because it really does succeed in not being a victory narrative, 
while being impressive. So it forces me to  ask what is it I am admiring? The erotic 
quality o f your fine intelligence brought to  bear on itself, unnen/ing at times in its 
riskiness, breathtaking in its scholarliness, downright ordinary at times, thank 
goodness, in the way it shows itself.”
Professor Ralph Stacey w rote in an email dated 3 I st January 2003, in a complimentary 
but less eulogising fashion
“ I think it is interesting and easy to  read which cannot be said about many PhD
theses.”
From showing the first draft to  others, it is clear that different people comment on it 
and interpret it in the light of perspectives that are meaningful to them. My supervisor, 
Jack Whitehead, focusses on my thesis as an example of ‘living educational theory’, and 
his responses have led me to strengthen this dimension of the thesis. Valerie Garrow, 
the Principal Researcher at Roffey Park, whose first degree was in French, commented 
that:
“ It is very 'Proustian' in its ability to  navigate various levels o f time and memory and 
is very much a reflection o f a post war generation striving for personal and material 
growth.”
Patricia Shaw comments:
“ I am struck that here is a piece o f research that circles around, displays, unpicks 
and finally moves beyond ideas o f narcissism and the narcissistic wound.”
In offering these quotes at this very early stage, I am not intending to forestall any 
critical reaction nor present the thesis prematurely as a ‘victory narrative’ (Maclure, 
1996). I use the quotes as an initial illustration of a process that has been developed 
throughout the thesis (and which will be further extensively illustrated in chapters seven 
and eight) of enabling the meaning of my practice, (in this instance, my PhD writing 
practice), to evolve through interaction with others (my local ‘community of practice’) in 
a way that aims to generate learning for me and others involved in my practice.
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The overall challenge facing me now is how to  integrate a w ork written between four 
and six months ago in a style that made conscious and extensive use of its own 
emergence over the time of its composition with the comments and thoughts generated 
by the writing, and also with the person I have become in my early spring incarnation.
I am, therefore, faced yet again and anew (as in TS Eliot’s four lines quoted earlier) with 
the multiple inquiries that are the preoccupation of this thesis and which have faced me 
throughout. These are:
•  H ow  to  account for the emergence of my practice and myself and the relationship 
between them over time?
•  H ow  to  do justice to  the continual, ongoing, shifting sense-making and complexity of 
the self as it is constituted in and constitutes the practices it is engaged in?
•  H ow  to give voice to  the different aspects of myself and illustrate in practice and in 
my writing the theoretical expositions of the self I will give in chapter three?
•  H ow  to make the form and style of this thesis congruent with its subject matter?
My intention is to retain the bulk of the material I w rote the previous autumn. The 
comments I have received so far, and the further thinking I have done, have led me, 
though, to restructure the material in different ways. This is to help more explicitly bring 
out and express the multi-voiced nature of the self that is theorised in chapter three and 
illustrated in subsequent chapters. In giving form to the different voices of my self and 
my practice in the thesis, I am aiming to  move beyond a narcissistic overly self­
preoccupied inquiry into a more general exploration of identity and the dialectical 
relationship between self and practice -  to  extensively explore the question that is the 
sub-heading of this thesis: H ow  do I and others create my practice and how does my 
practice shape me and influence others?
Part one of the thesis will outline the nature of the inquiries I have been engaged in over 
the six years of this thesis. Chapter one will indicate the methods and methodology of 
my inquiries and chapter tw o will begin to  account for my practice within the traditions 
of case-study, action research and theories of learning.
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Part tw o of the thesis will move on to  explore and give written expression to  the 
different voices involved in this inquiry. Chapter three will be an example of one 
particular voice -  ‘a scholarly voice’ - and will constitute a major example of 
propositional theoretical writing in the thesis. O ther chapters in part tw o will introduce 
tw o other significant voices -  a ‘critical/cynical voice’ (chapter four) and a ‘personal 
autobiographical voice’ (chapter five).
Part three of the thesis will focus on practice and stories of practice. A  different voice - 
a ‘reflexive, narrative voice of practice’ -  gives shape to  accounting for my practice. Tw o  
dimensions of my w ork will be outlined and critically explored in different chapters. The 
first, in chapter seven, will be my w ork as an educator on a part-time post-graduate 
programme in People and Organisational Development and will illustrate how I have 
developed my own ‘living educational theory’ (Whitehead, 1993). The second 
dimension, in chapter eight, will focus on my w ork as an organisational change 
consultant and how I have worked with self-organising processes in different 
organisational contexts.
Part four will bring together the different voices present in the thesis. Chapter nine will 
do this through exploring issues of epistemology and validity in relation to  the thesis. 
Chapter ten, the final chapter, will do this through offering concluding reflections on the 







In this chapter, I will give an overview of the shape and methods of my research in the 
form of a chronological account of the period from February 1997 unto the present 
(spring 2003), which is the span of time I have been engaged in the different inquiries 
constituting my research. For the purposes of writing this history, this account will be 
divided into six phases.
A t the end of the chapter I will present a short overview of my inquiry methods.
Section one: the Diploma phase: February 1997- March 1998
W hen I began the CARPP programme at the University of Bath, my interest was in 
attaining a PhD in order to pursue an in-depth programme of study in a number of areas 
that interested me. I wanted further to  develop my professional practice to encompass 
these areas in a way that gave greater satisfaction and purpose to my working life.
After attending the initial workshop on the programme in February 1997, I w rote the 
following passage as part of the first entry in the learning journal I was to keep for the 
next three years.
‘W ha t came across to  me most strongly from the first CARPP event in February 
was the importance o f choosing research that is significant and central to  my life. I 
would like the research to  provide a focus to  draw together the different strands 
that I am interested in.
These strands are;
•  complexity theory
•  archetypal psychology
•  organisations as religion - this could be a further image o f organisations to  be 
added to  Gareth Morgan’s ( 1997) list o f metaphors, which would help locate 
this idea in an attractive and rigorous theoretical framework.”
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A t the end of this first entry, I also w rote the lines:
“This question o f practice is extremely important, not just for the research but fo r 
my working life, as I want the research to  help lead me in a direction which can 
reorient my work. A t the moment I identify with the lines o f Dante’s ( 1949) 
poem;
“ In the middle o f the road o f my life 
I awoke in a dark wood 
where the true way was wholly lost.”
I don’t  know if it is too  much o f an extravagance to  hope that the research will enable the 
‘true way’ to  be rediscovered.”
In beginning the process of inquiry, therefore, I, like others, had multiple agendas; an 
intellectual agenda to develop my understanding in areas of theoretical interest; a 
practice-based agenda about developing my w ork  and finding a different niche for myself 
as an organisational consultant; and a personal agenda concerned with questions of 
purpose and meaning in mid-life.
In fact, the highly personal dimension of these multiple agendas, coupled with the break 
up of my second marriage, was to  pre-occupy me for at least the next tw o years. Having 
successfully completed the Diploma phase of the CARPP programme in March 1998,1 
took a year out of the programme. During this time, I had a major depressive episode 
(to use the terms of conventional medical psychiatry), and/or underwent crisis- 
breakdown-breakthrough (in the fram ework of a more optimistic humanistic and 
transpersonal psychology), and/or experienced ‘narrative wreckage’, to  use a term  of 
Frank’s (1995) that became highly meaningful for me.
Section two: rejoining and re-engaging February 1999 -  January 2000
In February 1999, I rejoined the CARPP programme, entering a supervision group under 
the direction of Jack Whitehead from the School of Education, comprised of people like 
myself mainly working in the fields of management and organisational development. A t  
this time, I wanted to  move beyond the primarily intensely personal and introspective 
preoccupations of the past tw o years, re-engage more with the external world, and 
develop my practice.
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In an entry in my journal then, dated 25 February 1999, I expressed this as follows:
“ But what I think I have now realised is that I am already doing the work that I need 
to  do, rather than having to  discover o r create a new direction. And with this has 
come a further realisation that my work and research on the CARPP programme 
can be about focussing on my current practice educating managers and how I can 
do this in a way that increasingly incorporates the interests I have.
So what I want to  write about is to  focus on my practice, my actual work with 
managers and organisations in all the different contexts that I am currently working 
in -  rather than exclusively on my inner world as I did in the research fo r the first 
fifteen months o f the CARPP programme. And I want to  think about the work I 
am doing, both before I do it, and also afterwards, in terms o f how it expresses the 
interests I have outlined. Then, rather than seeing my future w ork direction as a 
pre-defined state to  which I am heading, I want it to  emerge from what I am doing 
and the writing will help track and articulate this emergence.
And also rather than trying to  theoretically find a way to  link and synthesize the 
different interests I have, I will let them interact, and find a way o f bringing them 
together through practice rather than more abstractly through theory.”
A t the time, this represented a major, (and, in retrospect, rather obvious!), realisation 
that, rather then looking outside of myself for a sought after life and w ork path, the 
direction of my w ork and research could emerge from paying close attention to and 
exploring w ork I was already doing. In addition, rather than building a grand, masterly 
intellectual synthesis out of the original theoretical interests I had, and connecting them  
with the new streams of interests I had found in postmodern thought, action research, 
and theories of education and learning, I could discover the way these interests inter­
related through my practice. W ithout knowing it at the time, I was looking to institute 
an ‘epistemology of practice’ (Schon, 1995).
The above journal entry also presaged an insight I was to  w rite further about in my 
journal in a later entry, dated 23rd O ctober 1999;
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“ I am slowly seeing that it is possible to  really take this idea o f first person research 
and personal narrative seriously.
I do see that what is required and which excites me is to  find my original form and 
style fo r the PhD. Up until now I have still thought o f originality as lying in some 
brilliant new theory or theoretical synthesis but I can see that originality could be 
more personal, more genuinely unique, lying in the form and style o f representation 
o f knowledge as well as the content. Producing such a PhD could be a challenge to  
more conventional, traditional academic ways o f writing a PhD and involves risk.”
In fact, as part of the writing I have done subsequently, I have indeed written the kind of 
theoretical synthesis centred around ideas of the self, (located in chapter three of this 
thesis), that I was arguing against here. O ne difference from my original intention, 
though, is that this synthesis was completed in November 2001, after exploring different 
ways of writing about my practice and myself. In this instance, theory followed and 
emerged from practice.
So, on rejoining the CARPP programme in February 1999, I focussed my inquiries on 
writing different accounts of w ork I was engaged in, paying particular attention to how I 
was using and thinking about ideas from complexity theory and archetypal psychology in 
my practice. These writings, together with passages from my journal, and other more 
experimental writing such as a commentary on Jaworski’s (1996) book ‘Synchronicity: 
the inner path of leadership’, (which appears in this thesis in chapter four), formed the 
basis of the transfer from MPhil to  PhD paper I produced in January 2000.
In common with other people on the CARPP programme, the process of transfer was 
not particularly smooth or comfortable. Towards the end of the transfer meeting, a 
potential deadlock was produced resulting from the concerns raised by the tw o  people 
conducting the transfer that my w ork was not sufficiently developed in some areas. 
W hilst I generally accepted their arguments in this regard, I also thought that, compared 
with others’ w ork I had witnessed who had passed the transfer process, I had done 
enough work. Furthermore, the aim of my PhD. would be to  address their concerns 
raised, rather than tackling them at the transfer stage. In response to the impasse 
reached, I was given a choice. This was whether to self-assess my transfer paper as a 
pass at that moment, or do more w ork  to  address the concerns raised before passing 
the transfer process. I took a deep breath and decided to do further work.
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Some of the concerns expressed about my transfer paper were directed towards what 
was perceived as a lack of appropriate discipline and focus for my subsequent research. 
To address this, I sharpened the focus of my future inquiry into three main areas. These 
w ere expressed in the form of three questions with supplementary comments as 
follows:
1. How can I work more effectively with self-organising processes in groups to  
enable individual and organisational learning?
I need in my work to
- continue to  articulate my understanding o f these processes by relating them 
to  theoretical work in the field o f complexity
- write about how I work with them in my practice
- produce suitable evidence to  substantiate my claims about the impact o f my 
practice on others’ learning.
2. How can I work with individuals and organisations in a way which makes fuller 
use o f my and their creative imagination?
This question is founded on a critical perspective which will be further 
elaborated in my PhD. In short, this is about the way that much current 
organisational thinking and practice deadens the imagination. In terms o f my 
practice I want to  explore how to  use storytelling and metaphor in creating a 
different kind o f imaginative space for individuals and groups.
3. To what extent can I as an individual ensure that I am as fully present as I can 
be in the work that I do?
I think that being present is a necessary precondition to  working effectively in 
the areas outlined in questions I and 2.
In asking this question I am assuming that the key limitations to  my practice 
now, after the many trainings I have been through and the experiences I have 
had, are not skill and/or knowledge based. I am claiming that I have in place, at 
a high enough level o f competence, the necessary skills which are the basic 
building blocks to  be effective in my work - questioning skills, interpersonal 
skills, facilitation skills, consulting skills, presentational skills etc.
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To be more effective in my practice, I am interested in understanding and 
realising the conditions, which allow me to  utilise these skills and knowledge to  
the fullest. This links to  questions I have already been exploring in my writing:
- How do I manage the anxiety I often feel in work situations so that it is not 
disabling?
- How do I ensure I sleep well enough the night before I am due to  undertake 
a particular assignment so that I feel fresh, rested and available to  others the 
following morning?
- How do I create enough space and time fo r reflection, recuperation and 
reinvigoration in a busy, demanding and multi-facetted working life?
- How do I manage my time and my workload to  ensure that I am not 
overloaded and over pressurised so that the focus in my work becomes 
getting by, going through pre-established routines that I know will work well 
enough, ratherthan really being present to  the creative possibilities in 
different situations?
- How do I ensure that my ‘inner pre-occupations’ and issues in my personal 
life do not dominate my psyche to  the extent that that I am not available 
enough to  my external practice and to  engage in an external world o f 
others?
These three areas of inquiry were to provide the focus for the next phase of my 
research.
Section three: the m etaphor of the quilt: January -  February 2000
A t the time of transfer from MPhil to  PhD, the metaphor of making a quilt became 
central to  my thinking about the eventual form of my thesis. This metaphor had been 
suggested by reading Catherine Bateson’s (1990) book ‘ Composing a Life’ in which she 
says:
“ I believe that our aesthetic sense, whether in works o f art o r in lives, has 
overfocussed on the struggle toward a single goal ratherthan on the fluid, the 
protean, the improvisatory. W e  see achievement as purposeful and monolithic, 
like the sculpting o f a massive tree trunk that has first to  be brought from the 
forest and then shaped by long labour to  assert the artist’s vision, ratherthan 
something crafted from odds and ends, like a patchwork quilt, and lovingly 
used to  warm different nights and bodies.”
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This quote intimated a different way of conceiving my thesis. I saw that the separate 
pieces of writing that I had been doing so far, and intended to  continue, were akin to  
sewing different patches of a quilt. This raised the question of how the final quilt would 
be assembled from the different patches. Did I need to have a strongly held vision of the  
final quilt in order to ensure that the different patches I was currently making would fit 
well together into an aesthetic whole? O r  would the overall form of the quilt be 
suggested by the shape, colour and size of the separate, various and diverse patches? 
This question is fundamentally concerned with the relationship between the parts and 
the whole -  between the separate pieces of writing done over the five and a half year 
period of my research and the eventual, overall form of my thesis.
Henry Bortoft (1996), originally a post-graduate student of David Bohm, has a 
sophisticated way of viewing the relationship between the whole and the parts. He 
argues against the traditional, mechanistic scientific method of reducing the whole to  the  
sum of its parts. He does not, however, want to  assert a transcendental whole, which 
exists prior to or beyond the parts in a controlling, determining relationship. Instead he 
says:
“ If the whole becomes present within its parts, then a part is a place fo r the 
'presencing' o f the whole. If a part is to  be a place in which the whole can be 
present, it cannot be “any old thing". Rather a part is special and not accidental, 
since it must be such as to  let the whole come into presence. This speciality o f the 
part is particularly important because it shows us the way to  the whole. It clearly 
indicates that the way to  the whole is into and through the parts. The whole is 
nowhere to  be encountered except in the midst o f the parts. It is not to  be 
encountered by stepping back to  take an overview, for it is not over and above the 
parts, as if it were some superior, all-encompassing entity. The whole is to  be 
encountered by stepping right into the part. This is how we enter the nesting o f 
the whole, and thus move into the whole as we pass through the parts." (p. 12).
In response to  thinking about my thesis as akin to  crafting a patchwork quilt, and 
stimulated by Bortoft’s ideas about the relationship between the parts and the whole, I 
w rote, in the further w ork I decided to  do to complete the transfer process:
“This implies that the challenge fo r me is to  write about each o f the parts, (i.e. to  
create each o f the patches,) in such a way that the whole is revealed in them and 
that as this whole (the overall aesthetic pattern o f the final quilt) is glimpsed, the
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parts are more carefully selected and created and serve to  make the whole more 
visible.”
My experience throughout this research has been of being offered occasional glimpses of 
a ‘whole’ in an unpredictable manner, which I was not consciously seeking at the time. 
These have nearly always occurred when travelling, in the process of being between 
places, particularly on long railway journeys, or, on a couple of occasions, whilst waiting 
in an airport lounge as a result of my flight being delayed. These welcome glimpses 
helped me both sense the overall shape my w ork  was taking and gave me greater clarity 
about the next steps.
It is important to clarify, here, that I don’t  mean to suggest that it was always the same 
unchanging ‘whole’, like a Platonic ideal, that was glimpsed. W h at I experienced on each 
occasion this occurred was the sense of a formative, evolving ‘whole’, which was 
sufficient at that time to  enable me to grasp the meaning, direction, and shape the w ork  
was taking.
Section four: showing my writing to  others, January 2000 -  April 2001
Influenced by my supervisor, who was concerned that accounts of my w ork undertaken 
so far contained only my single voice, and by the growing versatility and ubiquity of 
electronic communication technology, I began to use email to send written accounts of 
w ork I had been engaged in to people who had been involved in the work, usually as 
clients. I also asked them for comments on the text sent. In so doing, I was aiming to  
enhance and create a further iteration of the cycles of action and reflection so far 
expressed in my writing, by using the writing to  make a further intervention into the 
systems and with the individuals I was working with, and then reflect on the effects of 
the intervention.
As I began to do this, I thought it might be informative for the people I was working 
with to  have access not just to the specific writing which referred to w ork undertaken 
with them, but also to  the wider context of my research. Simultaneously, I had also 
become interested in the educational possibilities offered by the Internet. This led me, 
with the help of a professional designer, to  create a web-site to  locate all my writing on. 
In addition, I wanted to explore the possibilities that a web-site offered via hyperlinks for 
non-linear forms of representation through connecting different pieces of writing both
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within the site and also for connecting my writing to relevant other sites. This web-site 
can be found on www.minotaursegg.co.uk. 
The web-site was created in December 2000. On it, I stated that:
“The purpose o f this site is to  explore the possibilities o f the web in creating a PhD 
such that:
•  The shape o f the PhD can take a more emergent, non-linear form
•  Others can access and engage with my writing
•  This site can be linked with other sites o f relevance and interest"
For the purposes of providing an introduction to  my PhD, w ork on the web-site, I 
formulated an overview of my inquiry practice together with the new guiding question 
that was now shaping my inquiry. This was described on the site as follows:
One overall question my PhD will be addressing is 'How do I constitute a practice 
and how does my practice constitute me and influence others?’
The writing will explore the dialectical relationship between my self and my 
practice through articulating the way that key autobiographical and work based 
experiences have shaped my practice (including my 'living values') as a 
management educator and organisational development practitioner. The major 
focus o f my study will be on the way my practice has evolved in the period 1997- 
2002 in which I have been engaged in my PhD inquiry.
The PhD will argue that in most traditional accounts o f management education and 
organisational development the real significance o f context (personal, political and 
ecological) is at best partially considered and at worst stripped away. This argument 
will build on Fritjof Capra's ( 1996) insight from the W eb o f Life that systems 
thinking is contextual thinking. I will also argue that omitting the significance o f 
context colludes with the denial o f certain aspects o f personal, political and 
ecological reality and privileges a more rational, linear, explanatory, imaginatively 
barren, and politically neutral account o f organisational life.
To counter the denial o f this reality I will aim to  write about my practice in a way 
that attempts to  articulate and demonstrate the significance o f the influences o f 
these dimensions on my work with individuals, groups and organisations. In doing
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this I want to  emphasise and substantiate the relevance o f narrative ratherthan 
explanatory and propositional accounts o f my practice.
Insights from complexity theory, in particular, the key concepts o f emergence and 
self-organisation will be used to  illustrate tw o  interrelated areas. One is my 
understanding o f and ways o f working with self-organising processes in the groups 
and organisations in the different contexts in which I am engaged. The other is to  
understand my practice itself as an emergent, unpredictable, self-organising process, 
which arises through interaction between myself and the significant other people 
which shape and define my practice.
In doing this, part o f the theoretical work will be to  develop a post-modern theory 
o f the self which emphasises relationship, multiplicity, process, embodiedness, and 
social and political constructedness in contrast to  the modernist concept o f self 
which is dominant in most writing on management and organisations as separate, 
monadic, singular, disembodied, and transcendent.”
Such a perspective on the self referred to  in the last paragraph above was written in 
October-Novem ber 2001, and is incorporated into this thesis in chapter three.
Shortly after creating the web-site, I started autobiographical writing. I decided to write  
tw o autobiographical passages, one relating to my first twenty-one years, and the other 
to  my second twenty-one years. O ne purpose of this writing was to uncover and to  try  
to  make more explicit the influences that had shaped me and the way I thought of my 
practice. This autobiographical writing is contained in chapter five of this thesis.
My inquiry practice was now evolving to  a point where I was showing the various 
accounts of my work, and also my autobiographical writing, to  others that were involved 
- in the case of my first piece of autobiographical writing, to my parents. In April 2001, 
on my web-site, I w rote a summary of the process of showing my w ork to others, 
entitled ‘Moving from individual reflection to  public discourse’. I will reproduce the 
summary here in full, as the next section, as it is still a succinct and relevant overview of 
this phase of my inquiry.
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Section five: moving from  individual reflection to public discourse
“In January 2000, I collected and edited together writing I had done whilst engaged in 
the first tw o years of the CARPP programme as a submission to the University of Bath 
to  transfer from an MPhil programme to a PhD programme. Some of this writing was 
highly personal referring to my experiences of separating from my second wife and 
subsequent depression. Some was more theoretical comprising traditional academically 
styled writing on action research and post-modernism. And some writing took the form  
of narrative accounts of my w ork  with individuals and organisations in management 
education and development. The best of this writing found ways of weaving together my 
personal narrative with descriptive accounts of my professional w ork with relevant 
theoretical frameworks.
A t the time of transfer, influenced by Ralph Stacey’s (2000) w ork on complexity theory, 
as well as Fritjof Capra’s ( 1996) central concept in The W eb  of Life of a network as 
being the defining feature of any living system, and social constructionist perspectives 
(Gergen, 1991), I was coming to a view of the self (and myself) embedded in a network  
of relationships that shaped both a personal life and a professional identity and practice. 
My writing arose from and was a product of my particular context of working and 
personal relationships. I also noted how in most accounts of w ork in organisations 
significant aspects of this context are omitted.
As part of the submission I made for the MPhil transfer process I stated that I would 
show my writing to  different people who formed important parts of this network. This 
included family, friends, colleagues, my boss, and writers whose w ork I had found 
particularly illuminating. I theoretically conceived of this as a further iteration of the 
action-reflection cycle at the heart of action research -  my writing was the fruits of my 
reflections on my personal situation, my w ork and ideas that I had found significant. The 
sharing of this writing was a further intervention into the web of relationships, which 
had generated that writing. A t the time too I was particularly taken with Judi Marshall’s 
w ork on ‘Living life as inquiry’ (see her chapter in Reason and Bradbury’s ‘Handbook of 
Action Research’, 2000) which seemed to question and dissolve some of the traditional 
boundaries between personal and professional identity.
Initially I had envisaged showing my collected writing in the transfer paper as a 
systematic process in which I gave people my writing all at the same time, asked them 
for written responses, and then conducted tape-recorded semi-structured interviews 
with them about their responses. In practice the process was more haphazard and the
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range, detail and depth of response hugely varied. My seventeen-year old son read the 
document slowly and thoroughly over a six-month period. Some people simply did not 
respond at all. This variety of response is much more characteristic of a living network 
than the kind of standardised and uniform response expected to give this part of my 
research traditional scientific validity. Each response was characteristic of my 
relationship with the responder and developed that relationship in idiosyncratic ways. I 
was, for example, heartened and impressed with the affirming response of my boss to  
reading material which I felt was disclosing of a period of personal crisis and which 
would in most organisations be viewed as an unwise political move to share with your 
‘superior’.
Although in theory I knew that such an action would generate unpredictable responses 
and unexpected emergent outcomes through both positive amplifying feedback loops 
and negative dampening loops, (to use the language of system dynamics), I was (of 
course) not prepared for the genuinely radical nature of this unpredictability. The most 
dramatic example of this was a new girlfriend, having read my writing, telling me starkly; 
‘You’re still in love with your ex-wife’, which led to the redefinition of my relationship 
with her and a renewed attempt at marital reconciliation.
The next phase of showing my w ork to others involved writing accounts of w ork I had 
been involved in and then sending it to the people I had been working with. The first 
time I did this was on a one-week programme on ‘Business and Sustainability’ I was 
facilitating at Schumacher College in April 2000. During the week I w rote a journal 
detailing my thoughts about the programme and then afterwards emailed it to  the 
participants on the programme. I was generally disappointed with the lack of response 
to my account though it did lead to  interesting discussions with tw o participants from  
the programme about the group dynamics that week which they said my writing had 
helped them to better understand.
In May 2000 I attended the annual conference of a European management Institute. I 
found myself very interested in the group dynamics of self-organisation at a number of 
sessions during the conference. On returning home after the conference I emailed my 
written reflections on these dynamics to  four people from the Institute who I had 
worked with and who had attended the same sessions. Again the replies were very 
varied. O ne person did not respond. Another detailed how they found my comments 
thought provoking. Another suggested I send my comments to  the Institute’s chief 
executive.
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In June 2 0 0 0 ,1 co-designed with tw o participants a residential on a MSc in management 
development for which I was the course director that had the theme; ‘the edge of chaos 
-an inquiry into creativity’. This residential occurred about sixteen months into a tw o- 
year part time programme. A fter the residential I w rote  a twelve-page account of my 
reflections on what had happened at the residential which I sent to  each of the seven 
participants. On this occasion I received some very thoughtful and detailed responses 
from all the participants. In September that year I w rote  and mailed to all the 
participants a further summarising comment on the responses they had sent me.
In the latter part of the year 2 0 0 0 ,1 w rote a long account of w ork I had been doing with 
a colleague over the period of twelve months with one organisation. I tried to write this 
account as genuinely as I could and refer to  the real and substantive issues within the 
organisation others and I were grappling with. I showed my colleague this account. I 
then made a serious, unwitting erro r of judgement. I sent the account to my PhD 
supervisor at Bath University and also to  a colleague at another University, without first 
checking with the organisation that it would be acceptable to do this. My colleague read 
my account and made some theoretical written comments giving her perspective on 
how I had worked with self-organising processes in this organisation. I then sent this 
account to  tw o people within the organisation I had good relationships with and had 
worked closely with, and included the comments of my colleague because I thought they 
were interesting and insightful. I wanted to  ask their opinion about whether my account 
enhanced their learning about processes of change within organisations and also 
whether they thought this account could, if suitably amended, be placed in the public 
domain. I then met with the tw o people concerned to  discuss my account. It rapidly 
became clear to me that in sending this account to  tw o people outside the organisation I 
had breached confidentiality. Internal organisational procedures were initiated and my 
involvement with the organisation was ended.
I refer to this incident not just to confess my naivety and foolish lack of appreciation of 
important organisational concerns around confidentiality but also to illustrate some of 
the political and ethical issues involved in the way I was conducting this approach to  
action research. I was deeply immersed in a discourse concerned with learning, sharing 
that learning selectively with others in dialogue, and developing both knowledge and 
working relationships through this. I was unforgivingly unrecognising of another 
important discourse, and its consequences, concerned with appropriate professional
29
behaviour, confidentiality, and reputation. And the latter discourse was the most 
powerful.
Now , at the time of writing, I have made one further foray into sending accounts of my 
w ork to others involved in it. In February 2 0 0 1 ,1 ran a one-day session on facilitation 
skills for another MSc programme in ‘People and Organisational Development’. I felt 
very satisfied with this day, as I believed it suitably addressed the multiple levels of 
facilitating issues in this group, demonstrating facilitation in action, providing 
opportunities for others to facilitate, and learning about the process of facilitation. I sent 
this account to  the participants on this programme and received one response only.
My main conclusion from carrying out this activity so far is a further demonstration of 
the significance of relational context. In situations where I had more ongoing and 
developed relationships with others, my written reflections generated a meaningful 
response. In other situations, others either had no appreciation of the context in which I 
was writing to them and/or did not have the time, interest or emotional investment to  
respond. And in the situation where I breached confidentiality, I grossly misread the 
context through holding the assumption that I was operating in a different context that 
could give a different meaning to my actions apart from breaking confidentiality. I also 
think I underestimated the potency of my account of w ork with this organisation in 
evoking strong defensive and protective reactions.”
Section six: further work, May 2001 - September 2002
In May 2001, I began w ork on the second part of my autobiographical writings, entitled 
‘My second twenty one years’, largely dealing with the time in my life when I had trained 
and practised as a psychotherapist. I sent this writing to the woman who had trained and 
supervised me. H er overall response was to  rebut my account, claim that it was 
defamatory, and make a number of key points to counter my writing. I responded by 
changing my account with regard to some of the points she made, and took out as much 
identifying detail as I could. I sent her this amended version. She replied in a brief letter 
that “the picture presented is a distortion of the truth” and also that “ I trust you have 
sought legal advice about defamation and the implications of the recently introduced 
Human Rights legislation”.
I took legal advice and further changed my account to  take out or alter the passages that 
I had been advised were most at risk of being seen as defamatory, whilst at the same
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time trying not to change or dilute the overall thrust of what I wanted to say. I also 
decided to  publish this third amended version on my web-site, but with limited access 
via a password only, in order to  give protected entry to  the more autobiographical and 
personal nature of the web-site, and to  minimise any risk of being sued for defamation. 
This autobiographical account, together with reflections on its writing and impact, are 
included in chapter five
In O ctober 2 0 0 1, 1 created a space of three weeks apart from my day-to-day w ork to  
w rite  a major theoretical paper on ‘ideas of the self. I saw this paper bringing together 
notions of the self that I was exploring in theory, through various readings, and in 
practice, through evolving a more relationally based practice in which I understood 
myself to  be embedded in, created by, and sustaining a network of relationships. This 
paper forms chapter three of the thesis. The thinking behind this paper then led me to  
w rite  another related paper on assumptions about organisational change which is 
included in appendix one.
In January 2002, I started w ork with a new cohort of seventeen participants as 
Programme Director for a tw o year part-time MSc in People and Organisation 
Development at Roffey Park. I saw this programme as a good opportunity to develop 
my inquiry practice further. I had already experimented with previous cohorts on the 
programme in writing about aspects of the programme, sending my accounts to  
participants on the programme, and receiving their responses. I now had the benefit of 
learning from the accumulated experience so far of showing and sending my w ork to  
others. I also had the opportunity to do this from the beginning of a two-year 
programme, which would allow my inquiry to unfold over time and also develop 
alongside the inquiries of the participants on the programme. A  detailed account of 
w ork with this MSc programme is given in chapter seven.
The last stage of my inquiry practice was to  distribute this draft thesis to my supervisor 
and a number of other people, including colleagues at Roffey Park, peers on the CARPP 
programme, students on the current MSc programme at Roffey Park, and family and 
friends. This was a further and final iteration of the process I have described as ‘showing 
my w ork to  others’, and was earlier described in the introduction.
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Section seven: inquiry methods
This chapter so far, through describing the different phases of my research, necessarily 
includes questions of methodology. Before going on in the next chapter to  look at 
different ways of accounting for my research, I want to  draw out and indicate here, at 
least in outline, the different methods that have informed my inquiries.
Initially, as outlined in the first phase of my research, my primary inquiry method was a 
journal. I kept this for three years. I did not attempt to  w rite this regularly at a 
prescribed interval, say, each week, but used the journal to  track my feelings and 
thoughts about what I experienced as significant incidents in my life. Also, during some 
of this period, I was experiencing what Frank (1995) calls a ‘chaos narrative’ -  that is, I 
was unable to  make coherent sense of what was happening to me -  and that precluded 
writing the journal in regular, prescribed intervals.
This journal, in the next phase of research, shifted to  include accounts of w ork I had 
undertaken. A t this stage, I was trying to  w rite about my w ork in a way that integrated a 
narrative description of the work, references to relevant theoretical material, and my 
personal context and feelings at the time. During this time, I also tape recorded 
conversations from the supervision group I was part of and transcribed these in my 
journal.
The next evolution of my methodology was to show my accounts of w ork to others, 
and create a web-site to both make my writings accessible to others and explore the 
non-linear forms of representation offered by the new web-based technology. During 
this period, I also taped and transcribed conversations with participants at the end of 
post-graduate programmes about my influence on their learning over the tw o years of 
the programme.
It is worth at this stage reviewing the creation and usage of the web-site. A t the time of 
its inception, I thought it would be an innovative and exciting way of taking my research 
forward, which promised much in the way of new learning possibilities. My experience 
has been that these possibilities have not been realised. On reflection, I think this is for 
tw o main reasons.
Firstly, I underestimated the w ork and financial investment involved in creating a 
complex, sophisticated, user-friendly site. I soon realised that building an innovative 
web-site, making extensive use of the creative non-linear possibilities of hyper-text and
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other features of the web, was a thesis and almost an occupation in itself. This was not a 
task that I wanted to continue to devote large amounts of time, energy and money to.
Secondly, the ‘traffic’ on my site was lower than I had hoped for. I had overestimated 
other peoples’ interest and time available to  read material on my site. Also, I did not 
have a specialised interactive facility to  allow the site to  help develop conversations 
between people. A t the same time, I was experimenting in other working contexts with 
using electronic based discussion groups and finding here, too, that people did not make 
use of them. I spoke with people working in the field of on-line learning. They told me 
that conventional wisdom was that on-line education in the form of discussion groups 
mostly only worked satisfactorily if it was made mandatory for students to  use 
electronic media.
O n the other hand, the web-site did help by serving as a focus for my w ork and inspired 
me to w rite more. It also did do what I had hoped for in a minor way. I occasionally 
received emails and comments from unknown people who had found their way to the 
site without direction from me. One of these was particularly encouraging. It said:
"That was the most interesting thing I have read fo r ages. I have just left an 
organisation after 10 years due to  intolerable working conditions. I have suffered ill 
health and been at the lowest I could imagine. Power wields in many forms; the 
kindness o f management can actually be overbearing and suffocating. Having 
rebelled and flipped in what can only be described as an abusive manner I am now 
persona non-grata. My superiors have been like Victorian Fathers/Husbands my 
rejection o f their 'kindness' has led them to  vehemently reject me. Your writings 
on the net were the only things that seemed to  understand where I was coming 
from. I am sure I am a part o f the problem, but when I have admitted this instead 
o f being met half way, I have been perceived as all the more manipulable. No-one 
has ever admitted they got their management style wrong. I look forward to  
reading more o f your stuff on the net.”
I also received one much less affirmative response briefly stating:
"Your page particularly the quotes has become cynical.”
As I began to receive less response from the web-site than I had anticipated, I started to  
withdraw energy from it. I then mainly used it to  continue to post w ork I had written, 
but no longer experimented with non-linear forms of representation.
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A t the same time as creating the web-site, I more consciously experimented with 
autoethnography as a research method. This was through writing tw o major 
autobiographical accounts to trace out and make more explicit the ways in which key 
events in my life had shaped my practice and how I thought about my practice.
The latter phases of my research, in working with a group of post-graduate students 
undertaking an MSc in People and Organisational Development, has been to  try and 
situate my inquiry alongside their inquiries. W hilst this has not technically been a form of 
co-operative inquiry, as Reason (1994) would define it, I have aimed to build 
collaboration, and initiate short-term joint inquiries such as: “H ow  does a design group 
of participants, together with me as the Programme Director, w ork  collaboratively to  
create residential events together?” In this phase, I have evolved what I consider to be a 
unique form of participative inquiry, inquiring ‘alongside’ others (Delong, 2002), tailored 
to  my particular working contexts and emerging from the history of my research 
practices.
Finally, I would see the act of writing itself, especially exemplified in the writing of the 
draft and its current redrafting, as an important research method. Both Atkinson (2000) 
and Richardson (2000) argue for the positioning of writing, not as a way of reporting 
data or theories already known, but as an active form of knowing and knowledge 
construction in its own right. In addition, having circulated the draft thesis to others, 
who constitute the different networks of relationships or, in W enger’s (1998) terms, 
‘communities of practice’ I am involved with - my family, colleagues and my boss at 
work, my supervisor, members of my PhD supervision group, other participants on the 
CARPP programme, recent contacts at the ninth ‘emerging inquiries conference’ -  has 
been a further and final iteration of the method I have evolved of showing my w ork to  
others.
Having outlined the different methods of my inquiry practice, I want to consider, in the 
next chapter, the question of how, in addition to  the account given in this section, my 
w ork can be represented.
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Chapter Two  
Accounting for my practice
Section one: reflections on chapter one
The previous chapter offers an overview of my research in the form of a historical 
account with developmental overtones as it describes the thesis from birth to  maturity. 
This is one possible form of giving an overall account, of making sense, of the processes 
of my inquiries. It has the merit of showing how the research has unfolded over time. It 
thereby illustrates W in te r’s (1998) point, in comparing action research with 
conventional social scientific inquiry which aims to discover general, timeless truths, 
that:
“ For action research, in contrast, time is a friend. The progress o f one’s inquiry over 
time -  noting what happens as different things occur, as the situation develops: all 
this is essential to  the learning process.’’ (p. 63).
The account is able to locate the evolution of different phases of inquiry at different 
times, and indicate how one phase is connected to  and emerges from another. It offers a 
logical, chronological framework, which is helpful for the initial purposes of organising 
this thesis, in situating different parts of my writing, which were composed at different 
times, within an overview and easily understandable shared frame of reference.
Yet, the account in chapter one was not easy to  write. Partly, this was because in writing 
it, I was traversing my recent history and re-reading in my journal accounts of events 
from the past six years, which contain and re-awaken painful memories. Also, even as I 
w rote it, I was concerned that I might be creating an account which, to quote the 
overview of my PhD on my web-site, by,
“ Omitting the significance o f context colludes with the denial o f certain aspects o f 
personal, political and ecological reality and privileges a more rational, linear, 
explanatory, imaginatively barren, and politically neutral account o f organisational 
life.”
In response to turning my own critique above upon the account in chapter one, I would 
argue that, even with the traditional, explanatory historical account of chapter one, I
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have included aspects of personal context that would normally be excluded. In addition,
I recognise that, of course, any account, chronological o r otherwise, will be necessarily 
partial, incomplete, and, will privilege some features rather than others. W h at I am 
aiming for eventually is to produce a multi-layered account of my inquiries, to  create 
movement, inter-connection and cross-referencing within the thesis that adds 
dimensions of richness and complexity to  this initial starting point to  give the text what 
Lather (1993) calls ‘rhizomatic validity’. (This will be further elaborated in chapter nine) 
In short, and in other words, to  create what Geertz (1973) would a call a ‘thick 
description’ of my inquiries, o r Denzin (1997), following Marcus (1994), would describe 
as a ‘messy text’.
Section two: my writing as case study
W riting this thesis poses many challenges. H ow  to account for and represent the 
meaning I have made, and now make, of the different inquires that have shaped my 
research? W h at kind of shifts of practice and enhanced areas of professional capability 
can I claim to make over the period of this research? W h at have I learnt from the 
activities of the past six years? These challenges are epistemological and aesthetic as well 
as personal.
In posing the third question in the above paragraph about learning, I am en route to  
articulating an insight that has slowly germinated in me as I have sat down to create this 
thesis. This insight is the, (now rather blindingly obvious!), conclusion that what I am 
grappling with is how to account for my learning in the past six years. This question is of 
interest not only from a personal standpoint. As my work is centrally concerned with 
aiding the learning and development of others, (whether as individuals, teams and 
organisations), then in studying and reflecting upon the processes of my own learning 
over time, I may gain insight and be able to  put forward more general ideas about how  
others learn too.
In posing this question about my own learning, and considering its relevance and 
applicability to  how others learn, and what this therefore implies for my practise as an 
educator and developer of others, I necessarily become engaged in creating a particular 
kind of theory of learning and development, grounded in my own life and practice. This 
is what I understand Jack Whitehead (1993) would describe as my own “living 
educational theory”. Such a ‘living educational theory’ is attended to  and more fully 
articulated in chapter seven of this thesis.
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I also want to  draw on Simon’s (1996) w ork here, from her paper entitled T h e  paradox 
of case study’, in which she argues for the validity of case study as a research method. 
She claims that, “by studying the uniqueness of the particular we come to  understand 
the universal.” In support of this, she also cites Macdonald and W alker’s (1975) 
comments on case study as the ‘way of the artist’ where they state;
“Case study is the way o f the artist, who achieves greatness when, through the 
portrayal o f a single instance locked in time and circumstance, he communicates 
enduring truths about the human condition.” (p. 3).
W hilst I am not wanting to  make the inflated claim that my thesis will communicate 
“enduring truths about the human condition”, I will want to claim for my thesis, that 
through offering accounts of my practice, reflecting on these accounts and linking them  
together, it is possible to  create valid knowledge. I see this as an example of what 
Lyotard (1979) might call a ‘modest narrative’. W hilst this knowledge arises from and is 
situated in my particular circumstances and context, it can also be valid for others, in the 
sense that they can engage in it and learn from it. In fact, one test of this thesis will be its 
capacity to generate learning and knowledge for others. This point will be returned to  
during a fuller discussion of validity in chapter nine.
Simon argues that the creation of a case study, if well done, has a similar power to that 
of art in challenging us to see situations freshly. For her, and for this thesis too, the 
point of social scientific research is not so much to offer solutions but to  stimulate 
thinking. I doubt, therefore, that people reading this thesis will find ready-made solutions 
to  their own complex unique work-based or life issues, but my intention is that their 
thinking about themselves and their practice will be stimulated through engaging in the 
accounts and sense-making I offer.
Towards the end of her paper, Simon discusses the paradoxical nature of case study. It 
is precisely because case study is paradoxical and resists easy resolution that, like the art 
of Magritte, or a Zen koan, it does not allow the mind to settle on the familiar and 
habitual but encourages it to  think again. As Proust (2002) said: "The real voyage of 
discovery consists not in seeking new lands but in seeing with new eyes." Near the end 
of her paper, Simon concludes:
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“ Paradox is the point o f case study. Living with paradox is crucial to  understanding. 
The tension between the study o f the unique and the need to  generalise is 
necessary to  reveal both the unique and the universal and the unity o f that 
understanding. To live with ambiguity, to  challenge certainty, to  creatively 
encounter, is to  arrive, eventually at ‘seeing’ anew.” (p. 238).
I find this discussion of paradox noteworthy. It is the same features of tension, ambiguity 
and contradiction, which are embodied in paradox, that Simon refers to, that I have 
found useful in structuring the thinking about ideas of the self that appears in the next 
chapter of this thesis. These same features too characterise the nature of the conditions 
described by complexity theorists as ‘the edge of chaos’ (Waldrop, 1994) - conditions 
which are believed to lead to  learning, creativity, change and evolution. The significance 
of paradox will also be further discussed in chapter eight.
Section three: questions of representation
To return to  one of the questions posed at the beginning of the previous section: how  
do I account for and represent the changes in my practice in the six years I have been 
actively inquiring into it? This is not just a purely personal question and challenge but 
touches on the profound epistemological issue that Denzin (1997) and Ken Gergen 
(1999) refer to as the ‘crisis of representation’, brought about by the challenges of post- 
structural thinking to the correspondence theories of language. (A fuller examination of 
the nature of this challenge will be given in the next chapter.)
O ne potential, and tempting, form of representation is what Lather (1993) refers to as a 
‘victory narrative’, and which forms the basis of many published accounts of individual 
and organisational change. W hen I began my PhD, I hoped for and longed to  be able to  
create a ‘victory narrative’. I envisaged the final form of my PhD being able to  tell a 
story, which would link the themes of complexity theory, archetypal psychology, 
sustainable development and my daily practice into a seamless and innovative whole. In 
doing this, I would become established as a successful consultant working in the area of 
organisational change and sustainable development and simultaneously forever banish 
the sense of lack of purpose, anxiety, and associated sleeplessness, that intermittently 
accompany my work. Yet, at the end of this six-year period, I still suffer from sleepless 
nights, question the overall purpose and validity of my work, and experience the 
seasonally based cyclical pattern of periods of spring flatness and autumnal creativity that 
has become increasingly recognisable and familiar to me. Furthermore, the shape of my
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future w ork is taking a very different direction to  the one envisaged six years ago, as I 
have become increasingly drawn to  the possibility of doing VSO or other forms of 
international volunteer work.
So I cannot claim a simple ‘victory narrative’. Neither am I writing, to  use Lather’s 
(1993) other evocative term, a ‘narrative of ruin’. The overall motif of my story is 
neither heroic accomplishment nor tragedy, though it certainly could claim to have 
dimensions of both of these. During the early phases of my research, for example, as a 
result of my separation and divorce, I experienced, the ‘ruin’ caused by a profound, in 
Frank’s (1995) notable phrase, ‘narrative wreckage’. O ver the period of the research as 
a whole, I have also experienced definite feelings of achievement in relation to  my work  
and life as a whole.
Overall, in reviewing this nearly six year period in my life and making sense of my life 
journey, (to use an obvious and common metaphor), over this time, I am faced with the 
paradox, that the beginning and end of the ‘journey’ are both similar and different. There  
is change and there is persistence. This resonates with the four lines of Eliot’s poem in 
the prologue. The cryptic lyrics of Bob Dylan’s song ‘Love Minus Z ero ’ (1965) also come 
to  mind. “She knows that there’s no success like failure. And that failure’s no success at 
all.”
In re-reading and re-thinking the different accounts over the six years of my research 
inquiries, I can see that clearly some changes have occurred whilst simultaneously some 
issues, for example my insomnia, have remained the same. The immediate question that 
surfaces is how to account for the changes -  but re-framing the question to account for 
the stability of certain patterns, especially in the face of, (for example, my insomnia), 
repeated attempts to  change the pattern, is equally testing. W e  are habitually 
accustomed to try to explain and understand change yet stability and persistence are 
potentially equally mysterious. This is an example of the paradoxical nature of identity 
and difference, continuity and transformation, which forms a key theme in the w ork of 
Ralph Stacey, Doug Griffin and Patricia Shaw (2000), discussed in chapter eight.
W hilst recognising that my practice has unfolded and evolved over time, and has 
included feelings of achievement, I hesitate to make the all-encompassing claim that it is 
better now than it was six years ago. I want to avoid falling into the deeply rooted 
enlightenment-based set of assumptions that changes over time are following some form  
of linear, staged, development towards a progressively higher stage of evolution. Such a
39
view of change and rationally based progress has become western culture’s central, 
dominant ‘victory narrative’. For this reason, and for others outlined in the following 
chapter, I have become wary of using the word ‘development’ to  characterise my w ork - 
though I am conventionally described as working in management and organisational 
development - as it seems very difficult to  free it from its associations with linear 
progress, ever onwards and upwards.
In thus rejecting conventional, linear, stage-based models of development to explain and 
represent this overall account, for example Torbert (1995) or W ilber (2001), the 
challenge still persists of how to represent the movement of my thinking and practice 
over time. A t this stage, this can still only continue to  be raised as a question. It cannot 
be answered a priori. The unfolding of the writing culminating in the eventual form of 
the thesis will necessarily offer an answer.
This points to  the important notion, touched on at the end of chapter one. Rather than 
the thesis representing the writing up of a body of knowledge that exists and has been 
created independently of its representation in this writing, the process of writing, as 
Atkinson’s (2000) article claims, “has become a form of research in itself, and that this 
research, in turn, has become a form of reflective practice.” In so doing, I notice as I 
write, that this form of reflective practice then spontaneously feeds my future practice. 
To give a recent example: in writing the draft thesis, I had a number of consciously 
unsolicited ideas about how to organise a session on postmodernism and research 
methods that I led in m id-Novem ber 2002 on a postgraduate programme.
In her article, Atkinson goes on to  make a comment about research as writing that is 
highly pertinent to  this thesis.
“The research here lies not in what I did or what I found, o r even how I 
interpreted what I found, but in the shifting and transforming knowledge 
engineered by the process o f critical thought and writing. A t the point o f writing, it 
is the critical dialogue with myself and within myself which drives my knowledge 
forward.” (P. 160).
Similarly, Richardson (2000) describes the process of writing itself as a ‘method of 
inquiry’ and as an additional, or alternative, research practice.
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To help further this exploration of representation, sense-making and accounting for my 
practice, I will turn next to the tw o inter-related fields of action research and theories 
of learning. The following tw o sections of this chapter are not an attempt to  give a 
comprehensive overview of these respective fields, but more to  locate my research 
within particular theoretical perspectives on and traditions in learning and action 
research.
Section four: action research
In his opening words on 19th September 2002 to  outline his view of action research at 
the ‘9th emerging approaches to  inquiry’ conference held at Hawkwood, Peter Reason 
commented that “there is no difference between action research and life processes.” He 
w ent on to  describe action research as “a way of living life”, and pointed to the w ork of 
Judi Marshall (1999, 2001) and Torbert (2001) as particular exemplars of this tradition 
within action research. W orking in a similar tradition, Geoff Mead, (2001), a colleague 
on the CARPP programme, has successfully completed his PhD, basing his thesis on the 
notion of “realising my scholarship of living inquiry”.
My thesis, like Geoff Mead’s (2001), is also an example of ‘living life as inquiry’. This form  
of inquiry has its own disciplines and rigour. As Judi Marshall (2001) states:
“ Each person’s inquiry approach will be distinctive, disciplines cannot be cloned or 
copied. Rather each person must identify and craft his o r her own qualities and 
practices. The questioning then becomes how to  do them well, how to  conduct 
them with quality and rigour appropriate to  their forms, and how to  articulate the 
inquiry processes and sensemaking richly and non-defensively.” (p. 433).
Chapter one outlines the evolution of my practices of self-reflective inquiry from the 
more introspective method of journal keeping to  a more outer-directed approach of 
engaging others in my inquiry through sending people the reflections on my w ork with 
them and developing a web-site to  make my research more public. The particular forms 
of my inquiry questions have evolved in the context of my life as a whole. These 
questions are not compartmentalised to  a separate professional area of my life -  they 
are deeply embedded in my psyche and the questions shift simultaneously with the 
movement of my psyche and ‘life-world’.
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I have also indicated, in the prologue, how the activity of running and daily exercise, over 
time, has become an increasingly conscious and disciplined form of meditative practice. 
Some of my best ideas come unbidden whilst running. The discipline of this practice is 
aimed, rather ambitiously, at developing my presence through increasing my sense of 
physical, bodily self-awareness and, more modestly, at the benefits and pleasures of 
physical exercise.
Turning now, more broadly, to  the overall field of action research, Peter Reason and 
Bradbury (2001) point to the plurality of approaches and practices constituting action 
research, (of which ‘living life as inquiry’ is one), and the range of paradigms and 
epistemologies underpinning it. They describe action research as “ a family of 
approaches to inquiry which are participative, grounded in experience, and action 
oriented”, (p. xxiv).
Thinking about these dimensions of action research in relation to  my own work, my 
inquiries over time have become increasingly participative in the form of practice they 
have taken. Even when at their most introspective and potentially solipsistic, they are 
underpinned by a view of self that is participatively co-created in its relations and 
interactions with others. Likewise, I have wanted to ground my research in the actual 
experience of my practice, to  discover my own unique way of theorising about the 
relationship between theory and practice as it applies to my work. My research is action 
oriented in that it is seeking both to  develop both my own practice and also to effect 
the network of relationships or ‘communities of practice’ in which my inquiries are 
situated.
W ithin the plurality and diversity of approaches to action research, Peter Reason and 
Bradbury (2001) identify “three broad pathways” of first, second and third person 
research/practice.
First person practice is described as:
The ability o f the researcher to  foster an inquiring approach to  his o r her own life, 
to  act with awareness and to  choose carefully and to  assess effects in the outside 
world o f acting. First person research practice brings inquiry into more and more o f 
our moments o f action -  not as outside researchers but in the whole range o f 
everyday activities.”
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My research as described in this thesis is an example of first person research. It is 
inseparably linked to my life. I have wanted to make the connections between the 
evolving forms of my inquiries and my life more transparent, to be able to  inquire and 
w rite  in a way that, as Denzin (1997) puts it, makes “public that which modernism kept 
hidden and repressed”. I am aiming, as I say in the web-based overview of my PhD, to  
demonstrate the point that all thinking and inquiry is contextual by situating my own 
thinking autobiographically, socially, politically, culturally and geographically.
In doing this, I have subverted and blurred traditional boundaries between the personal, 
the professional and the political. I have faced the unexpected consequences of this. This 
has been in, at times, heated and, at other times, more good-natured argument with my 
supervisor about the boundaries between education and therapy. More seriously, this 
has also resulted in tw o instances I have already mentioned. O ne was being thrown out 
of a valued and professionally significant client-system I had been working in over a 
sustained period of fifteen months, and losing the relationships and the economic 
revenue I had carefully built up. The other instance was of being informed that the 
autobiographical account of my psychotherapy training was potentially defamatory. Both 
these instances dramatically illustrate a comment that Peter Reason made in his opening 
address to the ninth ‘approaches to  emerging inquiry’ conference. He said, of action 
research, that; “when it gets real’, it gets dangerous.” This echoes Foucaults’ argument 
about praxis needing to be dangerous to  be valuable and for it to  be based on the 
Graeco-Roman tradition of parrhesia o r ‘truth-telling’ (Flynn, 1994). I have tried to make 
the consequences of such potentially dangerous ‘truth-telling’ the further subject of my 
inquiries, and, through reflecting on the unpredictable outcomes generated by these 
responses, engage in additional cycles of action and reflection.
In choosing to write this thesis, mostly, in the first person, and in the tradition of first- 
person inquiry, I am, in Jack W hitehead’s (1993) terms placing the ‘I” at the centre of my 
inquiry. My thesis also instantiates what Denzin (1997) says about qualitative research. It 
“discovers what has always been known: we are our own subjects. H ow  our subjectivity 
becomes entangled in the lives of others is and has always been our topic.” W hilst 
agreeing with the thrust of what Denzin is saying here, I explore in the next chapter 
how our subjectivity itself emerges from and is co-constituted in this entanglement with 
others. Alongside thinking of this thesis as a ’messy text’ (Marcus, 1994) and/or a ‘thick 
description” (Geertz, 1973) and/or in terms of the metaphor of a patchwork quilt, it can 
also be seen as the account of many entanglements.
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W riting  mainly in the first person raises an immediate objection in my mind. H ow  do I 
know that my thesis will not be irretrievably self-obsessed and self-absorbed, and of no 
interest o r value to  anyone beyond myself? This objection is partly answered by the 
earlier discussion in this chapter about the value of an in-depth case study offering 
insights and knowledge that can be generalised. It will be more fully explored in the 
discussion of validity and quality in chapter nine.
A  further issue raised through the attempt to  contextualise my research, to locate it in 
my life, is the impossibility of doing this in an exhaustive way. My account, as already 
indicated, is necessarily partial, incomplete, and selective. W hy, for example, did I refer 
in my opening lines in the prologue to  September I I th and global warming but not the 
current policies of the N ew  Labour Government? H ow  do I know whether I am picking 
out the key or most significant features of context? The answer to this is that I do not 
and cannot. Complexity theory shows the impossibility of tracing direct cause and effect 
linkages in any complex adaptive system.
In emphasising the first person nature of my inquiries, and also agreeing with Judi 
Marshall’s (1999) philosophy of ‘living life as inquiry’, the question is raised as to how  
inquiry, in that case, is different from life. W h at have I been doing in the last six years 
that is different from just living my life and going about my daily w ork as a consultant and 
educator? I have tw o main responses to  this question. The first is that my inquiry 
practice has taken forms that would not normally have been an intrinsic dimension of 
my professional and personal life -  this includes journal writing, reflective writing on 
different w ork projects, and, especially, evolving as part of my practice, sharing my 
writing with others. The second response, of which the first is the embodiment, is the 
definition of research, which is offered within the title of Skilbeck’s (1983) article that, 
“research is systematic inquiry made public”. It is the public sharing of accounts of my 
practice and writings that enables me to  make a distinction between my research and 
my life, whilst at the same time claiming that they are completely bound up with one 
another.
My research cannot, however, be subsumed entirely under the first person category. 
Peter Reason and Bradbury (2001) define second person research as addressing “our 
ability to inquire face-to-face with others into issues of mutual concern, for example in 
the service of improving our professional practice both individually and separately. 
Second-person inquiry starts with interpersonal dialogue and includes the development 
of communities of inquiry and learning organisations”, (p. xxvi).
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This is the form of inquiry that is most embodied in the w ork I have been doing with 
successive cohorts of postgraduate students on the MSc programme in People and 
Organisational Development at Roffey Park, which is more fully described in chapter 
seven of this thesis.
Third person research is concerned, according to Peter Reason and Bradbury (2001), 
with building strategies to “create a wider community of inquiry involving persons who, 
because they cannot be known to  each other face-to-face (say, in a large geographically 
dispersed corporation, have an impersonal quality. W riting and other reporting of the 
process and outcomes of inquiries can also be an important form of third-person 
inquiry.” (p. xxvi).
Part of my aim in designing and building a web-site was to  create the possibility of more  
third person inquiry practice. Although, in general, as I have explored, I do not consider 
the web-site to have been hugely successful, one of its benefits and satisfactions was 
receiving the occasional unsolicited mail from someone who had come across the site 
offering their comments, both favourable and critical, on my work.
I am arguing here for my research to  be considered as its own unique form of integrated 
first, second, and third person research fulfilling Peter Reason and Bradbury’s point that 
“the most compelling and enduring kind of research will engage all three strategies.”
In a recent draft paper, Judi Marshall (2002) has enriched her view of first person action 
research and ‘living life as inquiry’ by linking them to the notion of ‘living systemic 
thinking.’ In this paper, she explores both theoretically, and through an example, what it 
means to live systemic thinking. She says;
“Thinking systemically, to  me, includes: often holding in mind ideas o f 
connectedness, system properties and dynamics, persistence o f patterns, and 
resilience; respecting emergence and unfolding process; believing that often parts 
cannot change unless there is some kind o f shift in system pattern, but/and that 
sometimes parts can change and influence change in the wider system; and it 
means typically experiencing oneself as part o f any system I am seeking to  
understand, not apart.” (p. I)
In a similar vein, I offer this account of my research as my attempt to ‘live systemic 
thinking’. I have over time, come to  understand - and my intention is that this thesis will
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embody this - the thrust of my research as exploring what it means in theory and 
practice to live out a relational, network-based, systemic view of the self.
I have, so far, unsurprisingly - as they have influenced me the most - used predominantly 
the thinking about action research of the teachers on the CARPP programme. Turning 
now very briefly to  a description of action research by W in te r (1998), he says that 
“action research is about seeking one’s voice, an authentic voice, a voice with which to  
speak one’s experience and one’s ability to learn from that experience.” It is the 
challenge of this thesis to find my ‘authentic voice’, o r ‘voices’, (as I prefer and which will 
be elaborated in the next chapter), which includes finding a unique representational 
form -  the theme that this chapter is articulating and circling round. W inter, too, in the 
above outline description of action research, makes explicit the link with learning, which 
will be the subject of the next section.
Section five: theories of learning
As I indicated earlier in this chapter, beginning, over the summer of 2002, to mull over 
my overall thesis led me to realise that the overall course of my practice these last six 
years, and my writings about this, potentially constitute a theory of learning. Despite my 
already stated reservations about writing a ‘victory narrative’, the thesis make some 
claims about the nature of my learning over time. I don’t  believe that over six years I 
have learnt nothing -  that would indeed be a remarkable ‘narrative of ruin’. I will 
continue by indicating a number of different perspectives on learning that are helpful in 
clarifying and articulating the nature of the learning that I have been engaged in.
The first of these is Connelly and Clandin’s (1995,1999) metaphor of a ‘professional 
knowledge landscape’. In looking at how teachers become knowers - of themselves, 
their situations, their practice and their learning - they say, (1999), echoing my own 
views of context-dependent knowledge, that “they realised that knowledge was both 
formed and expressed in context.” Like many others in an action research tradition, 
they are interested in practical, rather than traditional, abstract propositional forms of 
knowing. In their case, this is how teachers acquire the practical knowledge that shapes 
their practice and defines their identities as teachers, and enables them to accomplish 
what Schon (1983), writing of professionals in general, calls ‘artistry-in-action’. This 
notion of different forms of knowing is an important one and will be elaborated further 
in chapter nine in the section on epistemology.
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Clandinin and Connelly (1995) suggest that:
“ Understanding professional knowledge as comprising a landscape calls fo r a notion 
o f professional knowledge as composed o f a wide variety o f components and 
influenced by a wide variety o f people, places, and things. Because we see the 
professional knowledge landscape as composed o f relationships among people, 
places and things, we see it as both an intellectual and a moral landscape.’’ (p. 4-5).
Connelly and Clandin (1999) see this landscape as, like all landscapes, existing over time 
and “having a history with moral, emotional and aesthetic dimensions”. In addition, and 
as further elaborated in the next chapter, this professional knowledge landscape is 
constructed and expressed in the form of stories, what they call ‘stories to live by’.
I warm to this idea of a knowledge landscape. It suggests a sophisticated, subtle, more  
interdependent, notion of knowledge and learning that has an ecological sensibility, in 
which knowing, context and identity are deeply bound up with one another, in contrast 
with more instrumental ideas of knowledge existing independently of the knower and 
their life situation. Such a view of a ‘professional knowledge landscape’, coupled with 
postmodern critiques of traditional privileged forms of knowledge and knowing, has 
encouraged me to include references to  poems, talks, songs, films and novels in this 
thesis. As I indicated in the prologue, reading Ian Mckewn’s (2002) novel ‘Atonement’, 
and his cleverly worked questioning of the authority and agency of authorship, 
stimulated my thinking about this thesis just as much as any theoretical w ork on 
postmodernism. It will also encourage me to  include aspects of my relationships with 
the living people I know whose ideas appear in this text as they, too, are significant 
aspects of my knowledge landscape. Otherwise, they would be included in this thesis 
only as a few disembodied lines of reference in the bibliography. In fact, I have already 
begun to refer to  authors that I know by using their first as well as their surname.
From this perspective, then, the thesis is a description of the evolution of my current 
‘professional knowledge landscape’. This landscape is not fixed, but like any landscape, is 
different according to from where it is experienced. Although I was writing this part of 
the thesis over a period of three months, from October to December 2002, to lend my 
landscape at that time stability and apparent solidity, it is forever changing, being actively 
and constantly revised as I write, liable to revert from order to  chaos, and open to  
significant amendment and transformation as it both unfolds and encounters subsequent 
experiences. Accounting for this knowledge landscape involves situating it in time,
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showing its connection to the stories and accounts that are part of it, and giving an 
indication of the key experiences and cultural influences that have shaped it and 
continue to shape it. That is the primary reason why the autobiographical material is 
included in Chapter five.
Another body of theory about learning which recognises the interweaving of learning, 
meaning, identity and context is the w ork of Lave and W enger (1991) on ‘situated 
learning’ and W enger (1998) on ‘communities of practice.’ Lave and W enger provide a 
rigorously social and practice-based theory of learning. They do not see learning as the 
internalised acquisition of propositional knowledge by separate, autonomous individuals. 
Instead they see learning arising from the improvised activity and lived experience of 
individuals participating in their social worlds, from, therefore, being socially and 
culturally situated in time and place. Hence their notion of ‘situated learning’. This 
implies, in their words (1991), an “emphasis on comprehensive understanding involving 
the whole person rather than “receiving” a body of factual knowledge about the world; 
on activity in and with the world; and on the view that agent, activity, and the world 
mutually constitute one another.”
This view fits very well with the perspective outlined in section four of the next chapter. 
This section, like Lave and W enger (1991), also theorises a relationally based self, in 
which self, other, and the world co-create one another.
This importantly suggests, as Hanks foreword to ‘Situated Learning’ (1991) says, in 
resonance with Judi Marshall’s (1999) philosophy of ‘living life as inquiry’, that ‘learning is 
a way of being in the social world, not a way of coming to know about it.” Such a view  
makes no distinction between ontology and epistemology. Being and knowing are 
inseparable. This is a profound challenge to  the Cartesian epistemology which has 
dominated western thinking since the seventeenth century in which the knower, the 
world and the process of knowing and learning are conceived of as separate activities, 
and which gives pre-eminence to rational cognitive processes of learning and knowing. 
This theme will be taken up again in chapter nine.
This view also locates learning in the social processes or what W enger (1998) later 
called ‘communities of practice’ that individuals participate in. As W enger says:
48
“W e all belong to  communities o f practice. A t home, at work, at school, in our 
hobbies - we belong to  several communities o f practice at any given time. And the 
communities o f practice to  which we belong change over the course o f our lives. In 
fact, communities o f practice are everywhere."
From this perspective, this thesis is an account of my ongoing relationship with the 
various ‘communities of practice’ I am involved with and the effect of the interventions I 
have made in those communities by sharing my written reflections about aspects of my 
participation in these communities. These communities and networks include; a family- 
based community of my tw o ex-wives, sons, parents, sister and her family; a Roffey Park 
Institute community of peers and my boss; the community of people I have engaged with 
through participating in the CARPP PhD programme; the different communities of 
participants and staff that have formed different cohorts of the tw o year part-time 
postgraduate programme in People and Organisational Development at Roffey Park; the 
organisational community of the client organisation I was stopped from working with 
due to  breach of confidentiality; various temporary communities on courses at 
Schumacher College; the historical grouping who were part of the psychotherapy 
training and supervision practice I refer to  as ‘the Community’ in Chapter four; the 
community of people I grew up with in my adolescence in Upminster. In section five of 
the next chapter, I will argue, too, that what we call ourself is actually not a singular self 
but made up of plurality of different selves including imaginal and imaginary others, akin 
to an internal ‘community of practice’ in conversation and dialogue with one another.
So, to return to the point made by Atkinson (2000) in the previous section of this 
chapter, writing this thesis is a continuing engagement and dialogue between aspects and 
members of that internal community, the results of which are then placed in the public 
domain.
The point about learning I am leading towards here follows exactly Lave and W enger 
(1991). My learning is deeply rooted in my participation in these diverse communities, 
and this thesis represents the learning that has emerged from this participation.
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Section six: a dialogical postscript
How was that last chapter?
W ell, if the first was difficult to  write, that was more so.
Why was that?
I think it’s partly to do with the complexity and inter-related ness of the ideas I am 
grappling with. Partly, also, the frustration and tension common to any writing where I 
am struggling to articulate my ideas, find an ‘authentic voice’ and not fall into what I see 
as traditional, academic writing emphasising abstract propositional knowledge, whilst at 
the same time, because this is a PhD thesis giving due weight to  academic standards and 
conventions.
So how much o f that last chapter was ‘authentic?
W ell, of course, that prefigures a debate about the nature of authenticity, which will be 
held in the next chapter. It leads into the social constructionist and postmodern 
critique of overly, individualistically focussed humanistic notions of authenticity and 
associated notions of the romantic self. And, also, what criteria are we using to  delineate 
‘authenticity’? If I had supplied more of the gritty emotional details of the ‘narrative 
wreckage’ referred to  in the previous chapter, would that have been more authentic? 
W h at is the genre or discourse, which is attempting to define authenticity here?
I thought I was asking the questions?
You were. The form is shifting. There are not just tw o voices at w ork here with simple 
rules that one asks the questions and the other responds.
Oh I get it. You are trying to do this in a multi-voiced way to create a different 
representational form for your thesis. And show what you called in section five of this 
chapter your internal ‘community of practice’ at work. Very clever (supposedly). Who 
are you trying to impress?
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I see the ‘critic/cynic’ has made his entry. This voice is well-known to me. He will appear 
more strongly later in the thesis in chapter four when he offers his review of Jaworski’s 
book on ‘Synchronicity’. William Blake spoke about this critical aspect of the psyche, 
seeing it as an internalised destructive feature of the industrial age. Others have named 
it as ‘the internal critic’, seeing it responsible for the corrosion of self-esteem.
Didn’t you miss the references to Jaworski and Blake there?
I wondered if it was possible to w rite  this short section without academic references. 
Why?
Because as soon as I bring referencing in, that suggests a style of writing I think of as 
‘academic’, which leads me to be constrained in my writing as I try to  conform to what I 
perceive to  be the demands and protocols of that style.
Poor thing. Did the little Gollum lose its precious authentic voice?
N o w  you are turning nasty. You remind me of Michael Foot’s famous description of 
Norman Tebbit as an “untrained polecat.”
Shouldn’t you reference that too?
And how do we know that you are not making that phrase up?
Oh I see. You are trying to bring in the question of valid knowledge and link it to 
the chapter on epistemology and validity.
Who are you?
I am the fourth voice. I could be described as the meta-voice or witnessing 
aspect of the psyche. Call me Geneva (after the type-face).
Very pretentious and overly self-referential don’t you think? Or is this an example of 
‘transgressive validity’ you are going to refer to later?
Who is the ‘you’ that you are asking there?
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Isn’t all this getting very tedious? I think you are losing the plot. And also wouldn’t you 
be better doing this in colour rather than different type-faces?
You have tw o good points there. I guess the ‘critic is not always simply destructive. In 
the Hindu tradition, creativity and destruction go together. To  return to the point 
about authentic writing in this chapter. There are definitely points when the writing 
flowed and I felt that the crafting of the writing was more creative, something distinctive 
was emerging, and I was not just summarising o r regurgitating others’ opinions -  this is 
w h a t! would describe as an ‘authentic voice’. And this voice was not separate from or 
opposed to the voice of more traditional academic writing. It drew on this voice and 
was clearly more than this voice. It is as if all the different voices are tributaries to a 
river and at times come together to flow o r the voices are all speaking in different 
rhythms and occasionally their rhythms synchronise for short times. I connect this 
notion of authenticity to Jung’s idea of individuation. This provides a further way of 
viewing the movement over time in this thesis as an individuating process. Jung saw 
individuation as the psyche’s striving for wholeness, and in those instances of authentic 
writing, together with the embodied feelings of intellectual, imaginative and emotional 
excitement, the form and purpose of this thesis, which is constantly in flux, is glimpsed 
and becomes momentarily available in its current manifestation. W hen this happens it is 
wonderful and I understand why people like to and want to  write. A  few moments of 
that are worth a lot of graft and heart-ache.
Couldn’t the whole thesis be like that?
I’m not sure. That would be very demanding. And I think some of the more traditional 





Chapter Three  
Ideas of the Self
If you’re compelled to  find some cause that causes everything you do -  why, then, 
that something needs a name. You call it “ me” . I call it “you.”
Minsky (1985)
Introduction
The last section of chapter tw o introduced and gave expression, through dialogue, to  
the different voices that surfaced after writing chapter tw o of this thesis
This chapter will offer the theoretical grounds for viewing the self as plural, diverse and 
multi-vocal (as demonstrated in the concluding part of chapter two) in contrast to more 
conventional ideas of the self which view the self as singular and uni-vocal. As well as the 
singular-plural polarity, the chapter will also examine three other polarities that are 
significant in understanding the nature of the self. These polarities are separate- 
relational, cognitive-embodied, and concrete-fictional. This chapter will assert that 
dominant views of the self, including both theoretical and popular understandings, 
emphasise and privilege the singular, separate, cognitive and concrete pole of the self. 
Such a view of the self is the basis of most conventional theory and practice in 
management and organisational development.
The following argument in this chapter will be written within the discourse and 
traditions of academic, propositional knowledge. W orking within both the constraining 
and enabling contours of this discourse allows me to give expression to  a particular 
voice. I refer to this as my ‘scholarly voice*. The w ork of this voice is expressed in the 
next eight sections. This voice, through its argumentation, serves to legitimate the 
existence of other voices. W hilst it will be the dominant voice in the following chapter, 
its aim is to  clear the ground for the introduction and validation of other voices. These 
will be heard in the rest of the thesis.
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Section I . “The way we live now” - “ not everything is about you” (or 
m e)
W e  live in a western culture that promotes, champions and celebrates the individual 
self. W e  have inherited and actively perpetuate this tradition, which stresses the capacity 
and capability of self-determining individuals to  use their own rationality in the exercise 
of freedom of choice. The revolutions and philosophers of the enlightenment, 
particularly Descartes, Locke and Kant, were pivotal in the development of this tradition 
through opposing the surrendering of individual viewpoint to  the dogmatic 
predetermined views of the feudal structures of Church and State. Instead, individuals 
were seen to be both equal and free to make autonomous rational progressive 
decisions. This tradition of individual rationality is an important aspect of a combination 
of technological, economic, cultural and institutional features characterising western 
society which has been described as modernity (Giddens, 1990; Jameson 1984).
In recent decades, beginning primarily in the nineteen sixties, not only was this emphasis 
on the freedom of the individual self continually re-affirmed, but the individual was also 
to  be freed from any further restrictions constraining its development and expression. 
Such restrictions were both external, in the form of social barriers and oppressive 
prejudicial definitions and practices, and internal, in the form of self-imposed limitations. 
Undoubtedly, much of this emphasis on the increased freedoms of the self is important, 
especially in the challenge to sexist and racist definitions and social practice. A t the same 
time, this highly individualistic emphasis, characterised by Margaret Thatcher’s notorious 
assertion that, “there is no such thing as society”, has other more problematic 
consequences and implications.
Some of these consequences are notably brought together by Chistopher Lasch (1979), 
in his book T h e  Culture of Narcissism’. In this prophetic book, Lasch provides an 
analysis and critique of American society at the time he was writing, based on the 
concept of the ‘narcissistic’ personality type. In deliberately borrowing the word  
‘narcissism’ from a clinical psychoanalytical tradition, Lasch uses it to  mean a great deal 
more than basic selfishness and self-preoccupation, though those are tw o of its 
distinguishing features. He believes that the narcissistic personality is a m irror of our 
times -  it reflects the dominant way in which he thinks society is reproduced in the 
individual personality. The narcissistic personality as a diagnostic category is described 
as; concerned with appearances, overly driven to  impress others, both dependent on 
others for self validation, yet at the same time fearful and resentful of this dependence, 
and living with a sense of an impoverished inner life and a deeply repressed rage. A
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further significant feature of the narcissistic personality for Lasch is their relationship 
with time. Lasch is deeply concerned by the exaggeration of a tendency he believes has 
always been part of American culture - a determination to  throw  off the yoke of an 
oppressive past, leading to  a consequent denial of the past. He says:
‘T o  live for the moment is the prevailing passion -  to  live fo r yourself, not fo r your 
predecessors o r posterity. W e are fast losing the sense o f historical continuity, the 
sense o f belonging to  a succession o f generations originating in the past and 
stretching into the future. It is the waning o f the sense o f historical time -  in 
particular the erosion o f any strong concern fo r posterity -  that distinguishes the 
spiritual crisis o f the seventies from earlier outbreaks o f millenarian religion, to  
which it bears a superficial resemblance.” (p. 5)
Lasch sees the development of narcissism as a prevailing pattern of personality 
organisation arising from the continuing relentless culture of competitive individualism 
coupled with a general crisis and malaise in western life. He was writing soon after the 
American defeat in the Vietnam W a r and before the recent much vaunted recovery and 
growth of the US economy and its domination of the new global economy. He also sees 
American society characterised by a decline in the key role of the family in socialisation 
and the increased dependence on the state and other organisations for child rearing and 
other social functions that formerly lay with the family and local community. W riting an 
afterword to  his book in 1990, Lasch summarises the overall aim of T h e  Culture of 
Narcissism’ as an attempt to “explore the psychological dimension of long-term shifts in 
the structure of cultural authority.” (p. 238).
In an important overall statement about the changes he is writing about, Lasch says that:
“ Economic man has himself given way to  the psychological man o f our times -  the 
final product o f bourgeois individualism. The new narcissist is haunted not by guilt 
but by anxiety. He seeks not to  inflict his own certainties on others but to  find a 
meaning in life.” (p. xvi).
Lasch’s w ork is significant, I believe, because he is making explicit the links between the 
workings of contemporary forms of capitalist social and economic organisation and the 
nature of the self that emerges in these conditions. He also demonstrates how new 
forms of emancipation couched in therapeutic language have their roots in historical 
traditions linked to the rise of the western liberal elite. He wants to  show that the 
“contemporary climate is therapeutic not religious” (p. 7), and that, therefore, therapy is
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replacing religion as the means to  personal salvation. This form of salvation is defined 
very much in terms of individual self-fulfilment, which marks a withdrawal from the civic 
arenas of life and a retreat from the political struggles of the sixties, and dovetails well 
with the demands of consumer capitalism forever increasing expenditure.
Reading Lasch now, twenty-two years after the original publication of his book, much of 
his w ork still seems acutely relevant and uncannily prescient in anticipating and 
articulating certain cultural trends, which have become increasingly marked since 1979, 
the beginning in Britain of Margaret Thatcher’s rule as Prime Minister. Others, too, have 
commented on these changes, notably the journalist Tom  W olfe  (1982), who was seen 
to  catch the mood of the whole decade in his description of the seventies as the “me 
decade”. And the “me decade” did not end with the seventies. Offering an overview of 
recent decades in a very interesting leading article in the Financial Times Weekend  
section on November 3/4 2001, Richard Tomkins claims that: “By consensus, the I980 ’s 
was a decade of greed and excess”. Although, at the end of the eighties, there were  
hopeful predictions made for a move away from the Gordon Gekko mentality of “greed 
is good”, and a return to  some of the sixties values in the nineties, what actually 
happened was that, according to  Tomkins:
“Almost unremarked, the nineties turned into one o f the most repulsively 
narcissistic decades in modern times. Even more than the 1980’s, it was the “ me" 
decade: the era o f the atomised individual who was encouraged to  believe the 
pursuit o f self-interest was good because it was what made the market work most 
efficiently, and the market knew best.”
Lasch’s concerns have been taken up in a different way by the environmental movement, 
which has come into prominence since 1979. ‘G reen’ economists echo his critique of a 
hedonistic living for the moment and emphasis on short-term satisfaction with no 
concern for the future o r past by linking this to  its powerful economic reinforcement 
through the quarterly reporting measures driving the global economy and resulting in 
environmental exploitation and degradation. In the report, entitled ‘O u r Common 
Future’ (1987), of the W orld  Commission on Environment and Development, which 
became known as the Brundtland Commission, sustainable development is defined as 
“development that meets the needs of the present world without compromising future 
generations to  meet their own needs.” Similarly, Native American traditions are also 
often contrasted to the prevailing short-term, live-for-the-moment mentality, with their 
emphasis on taking decisions with the interests of the next seven generations in mind.
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Following the events of September I I th2 0 0 1, there is a new and different crisis from the 
crises Lasch was writing about, evident in American and western confidence. Yet the 
signs of a deepening malaise were clearly present before this. Peggy Noonan, a former 
speech w riter to  Presidents Reagan and Bush Sr., and a respected Republican thinker, 
w rote  a remarkably prescient article in 1998 which prophesised a terrorist attack on 
N ew  York, which she calls “the city that is the psychological centre of our modernity, 
our hedonism, our creativity, our hard-shouldered hipness, our unthinking arrogance.”
In this article, which appeared in The Times Review Section on O ctober 16th 2001, she 
compares the lifestyle of wealthy America to  living in “the gilded state-rooms of the 
Titanic.” Much contemporary serious American literature and film (for example, 
‘American Beauty’, T h e  Pledge’) contains the theme of a profound festering anxiety and 
corruption at the heart of America, not so far below the surface of its brash economic 
confidence. In the beginning episode of the much acclaimed Sopranos TV  series, Tony 
Soprano, the Head of the N ew  Jersey Mafia, is talking about his panic attacks to his 
psychiatrist, D r Melfi, in their first session together.
Tony Soprano: “ It’s good to  be in something from the ground floor. I came in too  
late fo r that, I know. But lately I’m getting the feeling that the best is over."
Dr. Melfi: “ Many Americans, I think, feel that way.”
Tony Soprano: “ I think about my father. He never reached the heights like me. But 
in many ways he had it better. He had his people. They had their standards. They 
had pride. I tell you, what have we got?”
In A. M. Holmes latest novel (2000), ‘Music for Torching’, she offers a savage and 
insightful dissection of contemporary, affluent, alienated, intelligent, savvy, meaning- 
seeking, self pre-occupied, middle-class America. The book culminates in a terrible 
tragedy, aggravated by the narcissistic preoccupations of the leading character, whose 
wife is initially despairingly, and then with growing anger, asserting to  him throughout 
the novel the phrase -  “not everything is about you”.
Yet it is probably in the growth of the therapeutic sensibility, and its penetration into all 
aspects of cultural life, where Lasch’s writing appears most prescient. Self-development 
is very much in the ascendant. It has moved from the marginal fringes of the 
psychotherapy world and the back pages of the Sunday supplements to become 
embedded in mainstream culture. In fact it is now big business.
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O ne of the main areas in which self-development has become more actively present is 
the workplace. N o t so long ago, despite the dissemination and acceptance of work- 
related stress as an everyday and widespread occurrence, it was still considered 
stigmatising and potentially career-limiting at w ork  to  admit to suffering from stress - a 
sign of inability to cope. To  admit to needing help to  sort out stress related problems 
would not have been the sensible thing to do. Yet now, it is deemed perfectly acceptable 
for every self-respecting senior executive to  seek help from a personal ‘coach’, who can 
provide a sympathetic ‘listening ear’, and help develop him or her to  their full potential.
And, at the same time that the helping dimension of human communication, and possibly 
friendship itself, has become increasingly professionalised in the roles of counsellor, 
coach and therapist, the culture as a whole has become more psychologically oriented 
and suffused with the language of psychotherapy and heightened emotionality. The 
popular reaction to the death of Princess Diana was considered to  be a watershed in the 
development of a greater emotional expressiveness within British public life. Since 
Gazza’s famous tears in the world cup game against Germany in 1994, the coverage of 
sport has increasingly drawn attention to  the intense feelings of players and spectators. 
There is a famous photograph of the footballer Stuart Pearce, which was used in a bill­
board advertising campaign, looking like a Francis Bacon painting after he redeemed an 
earlier miss in a crucial game by scoring an important goal in a penalty shoot out.
Football coverage shows highlighted moments, extended through slow motion replay, of 
extrem e emotion to the accompaniment of mood-enhancing music. Tennis players now, 
having won an important game, in their immediate post-match interview, are asked less 
about their technique and more about what they were feeling at a particular crucial 
point in the game.
In the leisure industry, holidays are now a further chance for self-improvement. This is 
most explicit in centres that market themselves as combining a holiday, often in the sun, 
with a personal development workshop. But the marketing of all kinds of holidays offers 
an experience, which is designed to  appeal to and cultivate the desire for self­
development of the participants.
In the business world, too, the hot topic a few years ago, riding on the backs of at least 
tw o decades of management self development texts, was ‘emotional intelligence’ 
(Goleman, 1996). Effective managers, it was claimed, were not necessarily those who 
were the smartest as measured in IQ  points but those who were emotionally literate 
and sensitive to  their own and others’ feelings. Managers are exhorted to  complete
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questionnaires and undertake training programmes to develop their capacity to express 
their own feelings and empathise with others.
In literary and artistic worlds, the contemporary mode is confessional. Tracey Emin 
produces an embroidered tent with the names of all her past lovers on display called 
“Everyone I have ever slept with 1963-1995”, and is short-listed for the Turner prize in 
1999 by showing us her bed. Books about his childhood of appalling abuse by Dave 
Pelzer - considered by the literary reviews of the Sunday newspapers to  be poorly 
written - leap into, and remain in, best-seller lists. Billy Connolly brings out a biography 
written by his wife detailing his traumatic childhood, that rocketed to  the top of the best 
seller lists for non-fiction. The novelist Hanif Kureisha, speaking in an interview in the 
Independent Review on 19 July 2 0 0 1, said:
“ I figured out about the time that I was writing Intimacy that it wasn’t  irony that 
was the modern mode: it was confession. The exemplary paradigm for modern 
communication was somebody speaking at a meeting o f Alcoholics Anonymous.”
Tim Adams, writing in the Observer on 11 November 2001, contrasts the socially 
engaging w ork of Trollope, Eliot and Hardy writing in 1875 to the dearth of social or 
political vision in nearly all recent British, though curiously not American, fiction. He  
says, about British literature as a whole: “The devolution of attention from public to  
private space has been the great shift of consciousness of the last century.” The 
immediate focus of his article is on the current adaptation of Trollope’s novel, T h e  way 
we live now’, to the television screen. Adams amusingly comments that the pervasive 
voice of contemporary English fiction should be summed up instead as “H ow  I feel 
now”. He concludes:
“The impetus in contemporary English fiction seems not political but solipsistic. The 
preferred form o f our imaginative culture is the memoir, and we like our novels to  
appropriate that voice, to  return us to  our childhood. It is a version o f the same 
self-absorbed rhetoric that fills our television screens: rooms full o f disconnected 
people sharing secrets o f their damaged selves. It is, no doubt, something to  do 
with the way we live now.”
The therapeutic and the personal confession, thus, no longer exists within the private 
domain of the analyst’s couch or priest’s confessional box but has, as Lasch and others 
have indicated, migrated into everyday life, appearing on daytime television and the ever- 
increasing varieties of the latest television format, reality TV.
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In a British culture, especially, genuinely suffering the ill effects of centuries of stiff upper­
lipped emotional suppression, this widespread emphasis on self-development and 
greater emotional expressiveness appears liberating and unequivocally a good thing. Yet, 
as a brief glance at any serious thinking in philosophy, economics, sociology or 
psychology will indicate, notions of ‘self and ‘development’ are not so apparently 
straightforward. W h o  exactly is this self that is being developed? And what does 
development imply? Both the concept of ‘self and ‘development’ contain a host of taken 
for granted assumptions which usually remain hidden and accepted and masquerade as 
‘common sense’ or the way things just simply are. In the rest of this chapter, I want to  
first, briefly, critically examine ideas of ‘development’, and then go on to  explore, in 
much greater depth, ideas about the ‘self. I aim, overall, to  show that there is a 
dominant way of thinking about the self which shapes the way identity is constructed 
and experienced and privileges certain aspects of experience over others.
Section 2. Development
“Life without Limits: Clarify what you want, Redefine your Dreams,
Become the Person you want to be”
Book Title by Lucinda Bassett 2001
I will take ‘personal development’ to  be synonymous with ‘personal growth’. It seems to  
be self-evident that personal growth and development are to be valued. In the field of 
management development, opportunities for development are prized and are often a 
sign that the recipient is being ‘fast-tracked’ and groomed for higher positions.
Yet, in other disciplines such as business and economics, notions of growth and 
development are being seriously questioned (Schumacher, 1975; Henderson, 1978,
1995: Ekins 1986; Sachs 1995), and re-framed (Hawken, Lovins & Lovins, 1999). 
Wolfgang Sachs (1995) opens the introduction to  a collection of articles critically 
examining development with the words: “The last forty years can be called the age of 
development. This epoch is coming to  an end. The time is ripe to w rite its obituary”
(P- I)*
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Although economic growth is at the heart of most orthodox economic thinking and 
believed to be the engine of the global economy, this model of ever-increasing growth is 
now being challenged, especially from within the environmental movement. Beginning 
with the Club of Rome report on the ‘Limits of G row th’ (Meadows et al, 1972), and 
continuing through to the many contemporary voices raised in opposition to  
globalisation, there is a heightened awareness that resources are not infinite, that the 
planet, in Herman Daley’s words (1989) has a ‘limited carrying capacity’. Moreover, 
critical analyses of globalisation (Korten, 1995, 2000; Henderson, 1999; Klein, 2000) 
point out that the ideas and practices of economic development embodied in 
organisations like the W orld  Trade Organisation are not politically neutral. Models of 
growth and free trade favour some interests, particularly those of large multi-national 
companies, whilst claiming to  be in the interests of all.
O th er writers (Hillman, 1995; Bleakley, 2000) critique growth and development from a 
different but related perspective by arguing that humanistic models of personal growth 
and development form a psychological ideology that is well-suited to  the ever-expanding 
growth models of economic capitalism. Bleakley, suggests that:
“ Personal growth is paradoxically aligned with capitalist economics, in which 
‘experience’ is transparently ‘owned’ and ‘expressed rather than interrogated as a 
construct o f humanistic psychology and its technology o f counselling.” (p. 14).
Strongly influenced by Foucault’s (1981,1987,1988) w ork on ‘self-surveillance’ and 
‘technologies’ of the self, Bleakley is urging his readers to take a critically reflective 
perspective on how the underpinning assumptions of humanistic psychology create a 
discourse which shapes and defines human subjectivity in a particular way. W ith  the 
result that much-beloved concepts such as authenticity, empowerment, and self- 
actualisation, which are meant to encourage greater individual freedom, become, 
instead, part of a system of self-subjugation and an ideology that neatly dovetails with 
capitalist free-market economics.
James Hillman, in his book ‘Kinds of Power’ (1995), also critiques naive notions of 
growth, which see growth as basically about getting bigger and better. He argues that 
these simplistic ideas of growth and development “teach psychological capitalism: how  
inferiorities are overcome and impairments integrated into an ever-growing ego that is 
getting it all together. Developed personalities can do what ever they want. They take 
charge of their fates.” (p. 47).
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In this passage, Hillman is making an important link between a mode of psychological 
thinking which stresses that people can be whoever they want to be, which, to my mind, 
reaches its apotheosis in some forms of neuro-linguistic programming, and a highly 
individualistic, rather macho, self-determining, grabbing the world by the ‘scruff of the 
neck’ view of human agency. This view of human agency is still a very active force in 
shaping managerial culture -  witness the many stories of the self-made man, of the 
executive who single-handedly turned the organisation around -  and which furthermore 
serves to  justify the huge salaries and bonuses of senior managerial talent. In illustration 
of this, Cystal’s study in 1991, wittily titled ‘In Search of Excess’, showed that the 
average American CEO earned more than 160 times the average American worker, 
compared with a differential of 20 times in Japan, a more collectively oriented society.
Alongside the usual optimistic, positive notions of growth which imply increase, 
evolution, progress, integration, temporal succession in stages, and self-generation, 
Hillman wants to  add the darker, shadow aspects of growth -  deepening, intensification, 
shedding, repetition and emptying. He does not want to lose or reject the idea of 
growth, which he thinks represents an important archetypal human desire. Rather, he 
wants to  enrich and re-vision it by including those aspects which are often silenced and 
denied.
Having begun, now, to  question notions of ‘development’, I want to  move on to look at 
what kinds of ideas of the ‘self inform mainstream thinking and practice.
Section 3. Outline of Argum ent
“The test of a first rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in mind and
still retain the ability to function
F.Scott Fitzgerald
The overall thesis I want to advance and elaborate in the remainder of this chapter is 
how conventional ideas of the ‘self which form part of the dominant mainstream 
intellectual, social and cultural discourses serve both to  construct our sense of, and 
shape our experience of, our-selves. My argument, in summary, will be that the 
dominant underlying frame of reference and way of thinking about the self suggests that
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the self is separate, singular, primarily cognitive, and concrete. These views of the self 
pervade our everyday discourses. They become what Berger and Luckman (1966) call 
‘plausibility structures’, that is part of a natural, common-sensical, taken-for-granted 
reality. In so doing, they camouflage and strip away the inherently aesthetic, social and 
political processes of self-creation. In contrast to  this dominant view of the self, there  
also exist ideas of the self, both contemporary and historical, which emphasise the 
relational, pluralistic, embodied and fictional nature of the self.
The term  discourse here arises from the w ork of Foucault (1980), and is defined by Burr
(1995) as “a set of meanings, metaphors, representations, images, stories, statements 
and so on that in some way produce a particular version of events.” Foucault’s w ork  
shows how societal discourses define what forms of knowledge are held to  be true and 
valid at any time. Those people who control discourse thereby control knowledge. A t  
the same time the dominant knowledge determines who is able to  take up positions of 
power. In his analysis, power and knowledge are intertwined.
I want to go on to outline and contrast a number of opposing ideas that can be used to  
understand the nature of the self. These oppositions are; separate vs relational; singular 
vs plural; cognitive vs embodied; and concrete vs fictional. My argument will be that 
habitual and, what could be called ‘normal’ ideas of the self, favour and privilege the first 
element in each of these oppositions. In so doing, they constellate a particular view of 
the self. Such a view of the self is not neutral but serves the dominant social and cultural 
ideology, and is a key part of what Gramsci (1971) calls cultural hegemony. This is not 
therefore just a matter of academic hair-splitting and competing theoretical ideas. Ideas 
of something as dear and close to people as their self are very powerful in shaping the 
way that we come to  organise our experience and construct the worlds we live in. As 
we construct our worlds, so we construct our selves. Similarly as we construct our 
selves, so we construct our worlds. In constructing a self through the way we come to  
think of ourselves, through the ideas, constructs, images, and metaphors we use, and the 
way this all fits into an overall discourse, certain aspects of experience are emphasised 
and others left inarticulate and difficult to voice.
A  few words here, too, are useful about how to think about the kinds of binary 
oppositions that I want to  explore. In traditional Aristotelian logic, which has become 
the main logical form in W estern thought, it is necessary for contradictions to  be 
eliminated. It is logically impossible for the self to  be both one thing and its opposite, 
both separate and relational, for example. Yet it is precisely this deeply paradoxical,
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logically contradictory nature of the self that I wish to  advance. I want to suggest that 
understanding the nature of the self requires an understanding and acceptance of 
paradox - not just one central paradox, but a multitude of paradoxes. By using 
propositional logic to  get rid of paradox, or to collapse paradox into one side of the 
polarity, theories of the self are limited to  a way of thinking which tends to be overly 
linear, one-sided and unable to  appreciate, comprehend and account for the full 
complexity and mystery of the self.
In the field of organisational theory, some authors (Stacey, Griffin and Shaw, 2000; 
McKenzie, 1996) have embraced paradox in their thinking and writing about 
organisations. They point to recent well-established and highly reputed thinking in the 
‘new’ sciences of complexity. This shows that many different kinds of physical, natural 
and social phenomena, from chemical reactions to stock markets, do not just exist in 
logically exclusive opposing states - neither just ordered nor disordered, stable or 
unstable. They also have the capability to exist in a condition in which they are both at 
the same time. This condition, according to  W aldrop’s book ‘Complexity’ (1992), about 
the different people working in the emerging new sciences generically described as 
complexity, was given the evocative name ‘edge of chaos’ by Chris Langton, a computer 
scientist who had invented the computer game of Artificial Life. The ‘edge of chaos’ 
condition is contrasted with the tw o other possible states in which living systems can 
exist -  stability, in which a system repeats itself over and over again, and disintegration 
in which the system falls apart. In fact, complexity theorists argue, it is precisely this 
paradoxical capability to be both structured and unstructured, to contain opposites, to  
live at the ‘edge of chaos’, that give living systems their capacity to learn and change.
I will return to the idea of paradox as helping to define the nature of the self at the end 
of this chapter, (in section 8), having explored each of four significant oppositions - 
separate vs. relational, singular vs. plural, cognitive vs. embodied, concrete vs. fictional. 
For now, I will turn to the first of the oppositions I want to explore -  separate vs. 
relational.
Section 4. Separate vs. Relational
It seems to  be self-evident that we exist as separate beings, possessing an internal world, 
which can be clearly differentiated and set apart from the external world. I feel myself to  
be distinct and apart from the world and others who I meet. It is also typically assumed 
in western popular culture that this sense of having a separate interior self is a natural
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given, part of the human condition, true across all cultures and across time. In addition, 
this sense of separateness is highly valued and positively connoted, particularly for men. 
People are admired for being independent, for being their own person, for not being 
readily o r easily influenced by others.
Yet as some cultural critics have pointed out, this emphasis on a separate, independent, 
individual self is historically a relatively recent phenomenon. Jonathon Dollimore (2001), 
following Jacob Burckhardt (1990), locates the birth of a distinctive view of the individual 
in the Renaissance. Dollimore is not claiming that, historically, individuals did not exist 
before the Renaissance, but he understands the emergence of the Renaissance individual 
as an intensification of certain qualities. These qualities are; the quest for knowledge, the 
quest for power, a heightened sense of individuality, and a heightened sense of self, 
which is, furthermore, experienced as problematic.
These qualities find a prototypical, masterly artistic expression in the complex and 
enigmatic figure of Shakespeare’s (1988) Hamlet. Hamlet, through his acute and often 
agonising self-consciousness, embodies a distinctively modern consciousness. He says;
“W hat a piece o f work is a man! How noble in reason!
How infinite in faculty! In form and moving how 
express and admirable! In action how like an angel!
In apprehension how like a god!”
Furthermore, in Hamlet, Shakespeare provides the maxim for the entire quest of 
twentieth century humanistic psychology when he uses Polonius’ parting advice to his 
son, Laertes, to say; “Above all else, to thine own self be true.”
Others (Gergen, 1999; Lyons 1978) see the Enlightenment rather than the Renaissance 
as the primary source of contemporary beliefs about the self.
W ithin the enlightenment tradition, Tarnas (1991) and Zohar (1990) have indicated the 
crucial and especially influential role of Descartes in elaborating the philosophical 
grounds for the modern view of the self. Descartes, heavily effected by the sceptical 
crisis in French philosophy of his time, wanted to  establish an indisputable foundation for 
knowledge. He wanted to create a complete science of nature based on certainty and to  
develop a method, which would guarantee scientific knowledge founded, like 
mathematics, on self-evident first principles. Descartes thought that, although
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everything could be systematically doubted, what clearly was not in doubt was the 
doubting subject itself. Cogito ergo sum.
As Tarnas says:
‘‘Here, then, was the prototypical declaration o f the modem self. Established as a 
fully separate, self-defining entity, fo r whom its own rational self-awareness was 
absolutely primary -  doubting everything except itself, seeing itself in opposition 
not only to  traditional authorities but to  the world, as subject against object, as a 
thinking, observing, measuring manipulating being, fully distinct from an objective 
God and an external nature.” (p. 280).
There is an interesting irony expounded by Sheldrake (1988) at the root of Descartes’ 
formulation of his philosophy. For his view of a new science did not arise out of the 
systematic, analytical, deductive method he proposed as the ‘foundations of a marvellous 
science’ but came to  him at the age of twenty three in an extraordinary concentrated 
intuitive vision. This was confirmed the following night by a remarkable dream in which 
the ‘Angel of Truth’ appeared to him and revealed that mathematics was the sole key 
needed to  unlock the secrets of nature.
Zohar (1990) shares Tarnas’ (1991) view of the important role of Descartes in shaping 
the modern sense of the self and also, like Tarnas, points to the equally significant 
influence of Newton in shaping a world-view, which stresses the fundamental 
separateness of the self. She says that:
‘‘Cartesian isolation was further underpinned by Newton’s physics, where the 
concept o f matter as consisting o f so many separate and indivisible balls 
complemented Descartes’ separate and indivisible minds.” (p. I I I ) .
Capra too in his book “The Turning Point’ (1982) argues for the critical role of Newton  
in setting out the grounds for the worldview which has dominated the last three  
hundred years. He says, of the synthesising power of N ew ton’s thought:
‘‘Before Newton there had been tw o  opposing trends in seventeenth century 
science; the empirical, inductive method represented by Bacon and the rational , 
deductive method represented by Descartes. Newton, in his Principia, introduced 
the proper mixture o f both methods, emphasising that neither experiments 
w ithout systematic interpretation nor deduction from first principles will lead to  a 
reliable theory.” (p. 50).
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Zohar goes on to  show how this Cartesian-Newtonian tradition exerts a strong 
influence throughout western thought not just in scientific thinking and methodology but 
also throughout subsequent philosophy. She sees a direct philosophical lineage from this 
tradition to  the twentieth century existentialist masterpieces of Heidegger’s (1962) 
‘Being and Tim e’ and Sartre’s (1956) ‘Being and Nothingness’.
In Sartre’s work, especially, and most starkly illustrated in his novel ‘Nausea’ (2000), we 
encounter the ultimate isolation and alienation of the individual self. This then receives 
further artistic refinement and expression in the w ork of Samuel Beckett who explores 
with sparse precision the despair, absurdity and futility of such a self. As Tarnas (19 9 1), 
says concluding his overview of the development of the western worldview; “In the four 
centuries of modern man’s existence, Bacon and Descartes had become Kafka and 
Beckett.”
Amidst this isolation and separateness, the modern existential hero is born. This is the 
person who, alone and adrift on a sea of meaninglessness, has the rugged courage to  
face this without illusion and craft his o r her own meaning and values onto an alien 
impenetrable world. Such thinking is popularised in popular culture through images of 
the lone outsider in films -  now, in America at least, no longer just alone on his horse, 
but, as Putnam’s studies (2000) indicated, ‘bowling alone’ too. Clint Eastwood rides into 
town, loyal to nothing and nobody, apart from his own finely-honed and deeply felt 
sense of justice. The result is usually devastation.
Female writers (Gilligan, 1982; Marshall, 1984, 1995; Tannen, 1990) have pointed out the 
gendered nature of these conceptions of the self, indicating how they stress what have 
been traditional masculine characteristics of heroic assertion and steely independence in 
contrast to more female qualities of receptiveness and connection. Scheman (1983) 
takes this further by pointing out the origins of gendered concepts of the self as both 
overall philosophy and individual identity in childrearing:
“The view o f a separate, autonomous, sharply differentiated self embodied in liberal 
political and economic ideology and in the individualist philosophies o f mind can be 
seen as a defensive reification o f the process o f ego development in males raised 
by women in a patriarchal society.’’
In a similar vein, eco-feminists (Griffin, 1978; Merchant 1980; French, 1985; Shiva 1988; 
Spretnak, 1991) have pointed out the radically patriarchal nature of the fundamental
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assumptions underpinning the Newtonian-Cartesian worldview, what Jonathon Porritt 
(2000) calls the “dark roots of modern science” (p. 25). These writers all emphasise the 
links between patriarchical society and a scientific worldview that sees nature as, wild, 
uncontrollable, threatening and female which therefore, out of fear, needs to be 
controlled, and results in both the oppression of nature and of women.
The set of assumptions forming the Cartesian-Newtonian worldview then matures in 
the eighteenth century into a, by now triumphalist and ascendant science, dominated by 
what Willis Harman (1988) describes as “an ontological assumption of separateness”, 
the gulf between subject and object, between inner and outer, between the observer 
and the observed. Hobbes further articulates this view of the isolated individual 
competing for scarce resources, and this receives further elaboration in Darwin’s theory 
of evolution.
Zohar (1990) also outlines how the continuing influence of Newton and Descartes, and 
the modern scientific worldview catalysed by them, massively effect Freud’s w ork and, 
through him, the whole twentieth century history of psychology and psychotherapy. 
Freud’s primary model of the human being is that of the separate individual, governed by 
instinctual drives and desires. Clearly, Freud was influenced by nineteenth century 
science and many of the metaphors he uses to  describe the human psyche, for example 
hydraulics, are borrowed from contemporary mechanistic scientific thinking of the time.
For Zohar, this means that “our present psychology of the person rests almost entirely 
on a model of the self as a thing which exists in isolation” (p. 138).This is further 
reinforced by the growth and impact of medical psychiatry as a scientific discipline, 
which emphasises the person as a separate physiological system, and reduces 
psychological issues to  biochemical functioning.
This tradition of psychological thinking initiated by Freud reaches its zenith in the work  
of the psychoanalysts Klein, Fairburn and Guntrip who established the ‘object relations’ 
school as a distinctive psychoanalytic tradition. Under the influence of a scientific 
worldview, which stresses the separateness of the subject and the split between subject 
and object, key interpersonal relationships such as a baby’s relationship with its mother, 
become relationships conceived with external objects, which are then internalised.
Yet, as Stacey (2000) points out, alongside this dominant tradition in psychoanalysis, 
which focusses attention on the separate individual, co-exists a different, less
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mainstream tradition, which emphasises a more relational-oriented psychology. This has 
as its basis a very different view of human beings. Rather than seeing individuals as 
distinct psychological entities, relationship psychology, as Stacey terms it, insists on a 
perspective, which sees individuals as constructed through the relationships they are 
part of. W ithin the psychoanalytic tradition, Stacey sees relationship psychology 
represented in three distinct areas; the intersubjectivity theory of Stolorow, A tw ood  
and Brandschaft (1994) which does not see people as objects affecting one another but 
subjects interacting with one another; the detailed observational w ork on mother-baby 
interactions by the child developmental psychologist Stern (1985, 1995); and the group- 
analytic theory inaugurated by Foulkes (1948) and more radically developed in the w ork  
of Dalai (1998).
In the field of sociology, Stacey (2000, 2 0 0 1) shows how the w ork of Mead ( 1934), Elias 
(1970, 1989) and Bahktin (1986) contribute to a perspective which does not, like most 
psychological theorising, as I have been arguing, give primacy to  the individual. N o r does 
it, conversely, like other traditions in sociology, make social structure the determining 
force in shaping individual agency. Stacey is developing an argument in which he wants to  
no longer constitute the individual and the social/organisational as accounting for 
separate and different levels of phenomena. The individual is social through and through. 
The w ork of Mead ( 1934) shows that even when the self feels at its most private and 
interior, it is engaged in a silent conversation with itself, usually called thinking, which is 
socially rooted. In Mead’s work, thinking and self-consciousness are only possible by the 
self being able to become an object to  itself, that is to experience itself from the  
viewpoint of the other. Self and other are mutually created. Mind is not therefore a 
property of an individual but emerges in and through social relationships. In fact, mind is 
the very internalisation of those social relationships. Furthermore, in Stacey’s view, the 
social has no separate, independent existence apart from its manifestation in individuals 
and their interrelationships. Stacey wants to  shift his thinking away from the long 
running debate in sociology about whether individual human agency or social structure is 
primary. Even conceiving the argument in terms of primacy is to fall into a way of 
thinking that separates out the individual and the social into different levels.
Another related set of ideas in sociology and philosophy, which have profoundly 
challenged the idea of a separate self are social constructionism (Gergen, 1985, 1989, 
1991, 1996, 1999,'Harre, 1979, 1986; Shotter, 1993). This builds on the seminal w ork  of 
Berger and Luckman (1966) in their exploration of how reality does not exist 
independently ‘out there’ but is socially constructed, maintained, and transformed. Social
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constructionist thinking, too, draws particularly on the different ideas of language 
developed in the second half of the twentieth century, originating with Wittgenstein 
(1953) and also in French post-structural analyses of language as a system (Saussure, 
1974: Derrida, 1978, 1981).
Theorists within this tradition point out that, particularly since Wittgenstein’s later w ork  
(1953), in which he emphasised the role of language, not so much as a truthful m irror of 
life but as, in Gergen’s (1999) phrase, ‘the doing of life’, it is no longer possible to retain 
a simplistic conception of language as having a one-to-one representational relationship 
with the world. This one-to-one relationship between language and the world, called a 
representational theory of language, with language conceived metaphorically as a m irror 
or picture, is at the centre of the Enlightenment’s view of language. Such a view of 
language then leads to the further claim that what language is doing as a form of 
communication is accurately transferring knowledge and truth between people. John 
Locke (1835/1959) claimed that words are “signs of internal conceptions”. They are 
“marks for the ideas within the individual’s mind whereby they might be made known to  
others and the thoughts to man’s mind might be conveyed from one to another.”
Gergen (1999) summarises W ittgenstein’s (1953) work neatly with the view that that he 
replaces the underlying metaphor of language as a picture with the metaphor of language 
as a game. W ords have no intrinsic meaning, but find their meaning in their specific use, 
in particular ‘language games’.
The assumptions that what language is doing is simply describing and representing an 
already existing external world, and accurately conveying these descriptions to others, 
are shown, by these thinkers, to  be highly problematic, and has major implications for 
the nature of, and grounds, for valid knowledge. Denzin (1997) calls this the ‘crisis of 
representation’ which he sees as one of three major crises facing the social sciences - 
the other tw o are the crises in legitimation and praxis. Gergen (1999) also sees 
developments in postmodern philosophy as occasioning a profound crisis in western 
enlightenment-based views of truth, objectivity, knowledge and morality as well as the 
self.
All this points to the generative role played by language and conversation in shaping not 
just social realities but also individual identities. Shotter (1989), shows how, in English, 
the use of the pronoun “I” encourages us to  develop a sense of self bounded by our skin 
and located inside ”as something unique and distinct from all else that there is”. Using
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the w ork of Bakhtin ( 19 8 1, 19 8 4 ,1986 ,1993) and Voloshinov ( 1976 ,1986), Shotter is 
advocating what he terms a dialogical view of the self. He says ( 1999);
“Thus, adopting this dialogical o r relational view o f people’s psychic life suggests 
that people’s ‘inner lives’ are neither so private, nor so inner, nor so logical, orderly, 
o r systematic as has been assumed. Instead our ‘thinking’ not only reflects 
essentially the same ethical, rhetorical, political, and poetic features as those 
exhibited in the dialogical transactions between people, out in the world (Billig,
1996), but it does not go on wholly inside us as individuals either.”
Harre (1979) also argues that language shapes a particular view of identity and human 
agency through the domination in language of the logic of individuals making active 
choices in their environments. Radical deconstructionist analyses of language (Derrida  
1981) emphasise the nature of the text as a whole in the construction of meaning and 
subvert the idea of the intentional subjectivity of the author of a text as the source of a 
text’s meaning. Again this is another strand of thinking that is undermining the notion of 
a separate autonomous rational subject standing apart, in this case from language. In the 
famous words of Derrida ( 19 8 1);
“There is nothing outside o f text.”
So, rather than the starting point of thinking being the separate individual, as Descartes 
conceived, social constructionists insist on relationship as primary. It is only in 
relationship that meaning, thought and identity are created. Campbell (2000) has pointed 
out that in this emphasis on relationship, social constructionism is very similar to  the 
body of thought that has come to be described as systems thinking. Systems thinking 
shares with social constructionism the key shift in focus from separate autonomous 
parts to  relationships, processes, wholeness and interconnection (Capra, 1982, 1996).
Perhaps the arena in which systems thinking has been most fully elaborated in a form of 
practice for working with people is the field of family therapy. Here systemic ideas are 
used to w ork  with the way a whole system, a family, functions to shape the reality for its 
members and define certain behaviours of individuals in the family as problematic which 
therefore require help. This contrasts to other interventions, which would focus solely 
on the individual who is the holder of the problem. In fact, an important spur to the 
development of a more systemic view of family relationships was provided by the 
realisation that, when social workers, child psychologists, and psychiatrists tried to
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separately treat one member of a system whose behaviour had been defined either by 
the family or an external agency as a problem, that person’s behaviour often became 
more dysfunctional. The treatm ent needed to be of the system of relationships whose 
functioning as a total system was creating difficulties for one or more of its members.
It is, though, not even necessary to  develop a sophisticated relational theory of the self, 
as Stacey (2000, 2 0 0 1) does, or to  master the intricacies of critical poststructural textual 
analysis, o r to  subscribe to a systemic view of family life, to  render problematic the 
common-sense, folk-psychology notion of a separate self. Indeed, most child 
psychologists think that the establishment of a distinct sense of self is not a preordained 
given but a key developmental milestone fraught with potential difficulties. Initially, a 
new-born baby is in symbiotic union with its mother. It does not have a separate sense 
of identity apart from its mother. Many mothers, too, do not experience themselves as 
entirely separate from the baby but as part of a wider mother-infant dyad. O ver time, 
with an appropriate nurturing environment or ‘good enough’ parenting in W innicott’s 
(1971) terms, the child learns to  differentiate itself from its environment and achieve a 
separate sense of identity. This process is not one with a guaranteed successful 
outcome, however, and the developing child can experience and sustain many threats 
and wounds to its identity on the way. There is evidence (Mackewn, 1997), for example, 
that an increasing number of people seeking counselling and psychotherapy can be 
described as having a ‘fragile self-process’ and/or would meet the diagnostic criteria for 
disorders of the self such as borderline personality disorder or narcissistic personality 
disorder.
Babies do not, therefore, arrive in the world with a pre-formed sense of self. Neither 
are they the complete tabula rasa primed for social conditioning that unreconstructed 
behaviourists think. They may have genetic, biological and personality dispositions and 
preferences, which will, as Stern’s (1985,1995) experimental infant observation work  
demonstrates, actively organise their interaction with others, rather than simply 
passively responding to, and being shaped by, their caregivers
This all points to the significance of boundaries in defining what is self and what is other. 
It also points to the fluid, permeable nature of this boundary, rather than the notion of a 
boundary as a sharp dividing line -  more like the boundary of a cell-membrane or 
coastline than the rigidity of a metal container. In moments of intimacy with others, or 
deep connection with the natural world, o r in states of altered consciousness, or
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mystical experience, these boundaries can more or less radically dissolve giving a 
different and often expanded sense of self to  our normal day to  day identities.
The boundary between self and other is not therefore a pre-existing given but is built, 
maintained, sustained and altered in and through interaction with others. It is profoundly 
shaped by the wider cultural context it is part of. As Trompenaars and Hampden Turner 
(1998, 2000) and Hofstede (1984) show in their w ork on cultural differences, different 
cultures construct identity and draw lines around the definition of self and other in very 
different ways.
The idea of an ever-changing, more o r less permeable boundary, between self and other 
finds expression in Gestalt psychology in Fritz Peris’ (1976) concept of the ‘contact 
boundary’. In their book on the life and w ork of Fritz Peris, Clarkson and Mackewn 
(1993) say, (their emphasis); “ The contact boundary contains and separates the person 
from his environment while at the same time being his point of contact with the 
environment” (p. 56). In this concept of the ‘contact boundary’, as Clarkson and 
Mackewn expound it, we find the paradox which is at the core of this whole section; 
that is, the boundary functions both to  give a sense of separate identity, and 
simultaneously is the focus of relationship with the external world. This is echoed in 
Bakhtin’s comment (1984); “A  person has no internal sovereign territory, he is wholly 
and always on the boundary: looking inside himself, he looks into the eyes of another or 
with the eyes of another.”
The same theme of a self-constituted boundary is found, too, in a very different field, in 
Maturana and Varela’s (1980) idea of ‘autopoiesis’, a Greek term  which means self­
making. From their w ork (1980) with the simplest autopoietic system, a living cell, they 
suggest that a defining characteristic of all living systems is their network-based 
organisation in which each part of the network participates in the production and/or 
transformation of the other parts. And a significant part of any system thus created is its 
boundary, which defines the system as a distinct whole. “In a living system”, Maturana 
and Varela (1980) claim, “the product of its operation is its own organisation” (P. 82).
From this and their w ork on processes of cognition, they are proposing a radically 
different way of thinking about the organism and its relation to  the environment. Instead 
of the traditional Darwinian view which stresses the adaptation of organisms to their 
environment, which presupposes separate organisms existing apart from their 
environment, they suggest that as well as being effected or perturbed by their
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environment, organisms simultaneously make themselves and create their environment. 
In so doing, to  use their poetic turn of phrase (1987), they ‘bring forth a world”.
This rethinking in biology of the relation between an organism and its environment, 
which parallels the traditions in psychology I have been setting out above that are trying 
to  rethink the relationship between self and other, receives further theoretical 
exposition in Lovelock’s (1979, 1991) Gaia hypothesis. In this intriguing and bold 
hypothesis, Lovelock puts forward the idea of the earth and its atmosphere as a 
complex self-regulating living system in which life and the conditions for the existence of 
life co-create one another. In the words of Lynn Marguiis (1989), Lovelock’s long term  
collaborator;
‘‘When scientists tell us that life adapts to  an essentially passive environment o f 
chemistry, physics, and rocks, they perpetuate a severely distorted view. Life 
actually makes and forms and changes the environment to  which it adapts. Then 
that ‘environment’ feeds back on the life that is changing and acting and growing in 
it. There are constant cyclic interactions.”
In their conception of Gaia, therefore, Lovelock and Marguiis, like others in this section, 
are challenging the way an organism and its relationship with its external environment 
have, from Descartes onwards, come to  be defined. Instead of seeing the organism as 
distinctively separate from its environment, they draw attention instead to  the 
relationship between organism and environment which mutually and simultanously forms 
both of them.
James Hillman’s words, from his foreword to  ‘Ecopsychology’ (ed. Roszak, Gomes & 
Kanner, 1995), pointedly entitled ‘A  psyche the size of the earth’, provide an acute 
summary and re-statement of the argument I have been elaborating;
‘There is only one core issue fo r psychology. W here is the "me"? W here does the 
"me” begin? W here does the "other” begin?” (p. xvii)
Hillman goes on to eloquently state and further extend the position I have been 
articulating so far.
“ For most o f its history, psychology took fo r granted an intentional subject: the 
biographical "me” that was the agent and the sufferer o f all "doings’. For most o f its 
history, psychology located this "me” within human persons defined by their
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physical skin and their immediate behaviour. The subject was simply me-in-my 
body-and-in-my-relations with other subjects. The familiar term that covered this 
entire philosophical system was "ego” and what the ego registered were called 
"experiences” , (p. xvii)
Like others who want to challenge the way psychology has traditionally conceived of the 
self, Hillman stresses how such a definition of self narrows and restricts thought and 
experience. It also, following on from Descartes’ original and highly influential 
postulation of soul not existing in nature and being only present in human beings, leads 
to  disconnection and alienation from nature and the external world. The material world  
is stripped of soul and becomes, in the words Whitehead (1925) used to describe the 
mechanistic philosophy that ensues from this worldview, “ a dull affair, soundless, 
scentless, colourless: merely the hurrying of material endlessly, meaninglessly” .
For Hillman, if we can no longer locate soul in nature, no longer experience the anima 
mundi, it becomes possible to perpetrate and legitimise environmental damage to  
nature, and, in doing this, simultaneously our own lives become more soulless. In the 
words of the Leonard Cohen ( 1968) song, on a related idea; “ W e  forget to pray for the 
angels and the angels forget to pray for us.”
Hillman extends the argument about the boundaries and separate boundedness of the 
individual self by not just including and rethinking the inter-subjective domain as the 
inextricable intertwining of the social and the individual, as Stacey does, but also by 
taking the further audacious step of including the self within the natural and non-natural 
external world. N o t only is he challenging the well-worn dualism of self and other, but 
also questioning the related dualism of inner and outer.
Hillman’s project is to re-vision psychology and move it out of the consulting room and 
into the world. Psychology is also ecology. He is concerned with the excessive 
preoccupation of psychology with the individual self and its experiences that can lead to  
the domination of psychology by, and its restriction to, the theories and practices of the  
ego. Hillman, though, does not just have an overly narrow, cognitive, experimental, 
quantitative, quasi-scientific, positivistic psychology in his sights. He mounts a 
determined assault on the whole edifice of humanistic psychology, with its emphasis 
following Maslow (1962), of authenticity, self-actualisation, and the solely inner journey 
of personal discovery of an essential or ‘true ’ self.
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In his desire to bring psychology and the self out of its internal preoccupations, away 
from its attempt to excavate, as in an archaeological dig, a person’s deep self. Hillman 
says, in the same preface;
“ Moreover, an individual’s harmony with his or her “own deep self’ requires not 
merely a journey to  the interior but a harmonising with the environmental world. 
The deepest self cannot be confined to  ‘in here’ because we can’t  be sure it is not 
also or even entirely ’out there’! If we listen to  Roszak., and to  Freud and Jung, the 
most profoundly collective and unconscious self is the natural material world.”
In this section I have brought together and outlined the w ork of a number of writers  
from different disciplines, all of whom are grappling with the legacy of the Cartesian 
worldview, and trying to find other ways of thinking about the self which emphasises its 
relational rather than separate character. These theorists are not denying that the self 
exists apart from and independently of others; what they are trying to show, however, is 
the paradox of how this very separateness and distinctiveness can only be constituted 
through relationship with others.
In the next section I want to focus on the second opposition outlined at the beginning of 
this chapter: that of singular vs. plural.
Section 5. Singular vs. plural
‘7 cannot understand the mystery but 
I am always conscious of myself as two.
Do I contradict myself?
Very well then I contradict myself,
I am large, I contain multitudes.”
Walt Whitman ( 1992)
Alongside the commonly accepted, linguistically shaped view of a distinct, separate self, 
as discussed in the previous section, goes the closely linked notion of a singular, 
coherent, centred self. W e  think of ourselves as one continuous person, not many 
disparate people. As with the idea of a separate self, though, recent thinking in many 
disciplines is challenging the idea of a single, unified self and emphasising instead the
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multiple, decentered nature of the self. Even if we accept that it is self-evident that we  
experience ourselves in a unitary manner, there is still the question, that has intrigued 
hard-headed neuroscientists as well as speculative philosophers, as to  how this unity 
arises from the diversity of our sense making modalities.
W ithin both science and psychology many theories of the brain and personality see the 
operation of the whole in terms of the parts they are composed of.
In neuroscience, influential models of brain functioning have suggested major sub­
divisions of brain functioning. Levy-Agresti and Sperry (1968) formulated the, by now  
well known, thesis of horizontal divisions of right and left brain-hemispheres, which each 
show distinct and different cognitive abilities and overall processing styles. Divisions can 
also be organised on a vertical axis. MacLean (1990) put forward a model of the triune  
or three-fold brain, conceived in evolutionary terms as the successive layers of reptilian, 
mammalian and neo-mammalian brain. In addition to  these tw o forms of spatial division 
within the brain, there is significant evidence for different temporal forms of 
organisation. It is now thought that these temporal forms of organisation based on 
oscillatory patterns of neurone activity are the key to how the brain integrates its 
different modalities Lancaster, in an article on how unity of experience arises from the  
‘multiple brain’ (1999), says;
“As suggested already, the contemporary emphasis on dynamic binding in temporal 
terms adds an additional dimension o f multiplicity to  the spatial one inherent in 
these models. Systems integrated within an oscillatory coherent pattern in one 
moment may be divergent in the next, and such systems may include neurones 
both within and across the hemispheric and time boundaries." (p. I 37)
These broad spatial and temporal divisions, and also evidence from brain damage in 
which very specific brain functions can be lost, point to the brain and central nervous 
system being a modular system with a high degree of local autonomy. The central 
unsolved problem then still remains in the field of neuroscience as how to account for 
the felt unity of experience in the world that co-exists with the experimental evidence 
for the multiplicity of the modular brain.
In the field of psychology, many theories of personality are theories of the self or 
personality rather than theories of selves o r multiple personalities. Yet, within many 
influential theories of personality, an overall unity is conceived as forming different parts.
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In Freud’s theory of psychic structure, the major sub-divisions are id, ego and superego. 
Berne (1961), in his attempt to make ideas from psychoanalysis more accessible in the 
form of his theory transactional analysis, writes about the three major ego-states of 
adult, parent and child, which differ in verbal language, attitude, non-verbal behaviour 
and emotional states. O ther writers refer to  sub-personalities (Assaglioli, 1965; Rowan, 
1990) and sub-selves (Martindale, 1980; Shapiro, 1976). All these theories, though, tend 
to  combine the different parts and integrate them into one single coherent self, with the 
ego o r its equivalent at its center. In the famous phrase of Freud, summarising the 
purpose of psychoanalysis, “where id was, there shall ego be”.
So although many authors recognise multiplicity of parts, there is still a predominating 
influence in their theories in these parts being integrated into a coherent whole under 
the rule of the rational ego. Moreover, such integration under the ego’s dominion, what 
Freud and others call ‘reality testing’, is generally assumed to  be an indication of healthy 
psychological functioning.
In their article (1999) on ‘Postmodern culture and the plural self, Rappoport, 
Baumgardner and Boone, explicitly connect this form of psychological theorising to the 
underlying assumptions of modernity, which as I have argued earlier in this chapter, bear 
the continual hallmarks of Cartesian thinking. They say;
“ It is no mere coincidence, moreover, that virtually all modem systems, whether 
social, economic o r psychological, have been characterised by the value placed 
upon vertical, hierarchical, integration. This is one o f the features o f modernity that 
distinguishes it from the postmodern emphasis on diversity.” (p.96)
In contrast to the unifying, vertical, hierarchical integration we have become familiar 
with in both our organisational forms and our theories of organisation, it is possible, as 
Rappoport, Baumgardner and Boone suggest, to  think about the organisation of the self 
in terms of horizontal and decentralised processes. This is, interestingly, similar to the 
different ideas of organisation arising from the complexity sciences, in which, as Capra
(1996) says, the basic metaphor for the organisation of living systems is the self- 
organising network. I will return to  the parallel between complex systems and 
postmodern thought later in this section.
Rappoport, Baumgardner and Boone further argue that in its critique of foundationalism 
and deconstruction of all meta-narratives, postmodernism paves the way for an
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epistemological pluralism characterised by a profusion and proliferation of many 
narratives, that cannot all be linked together under the umbrella of one overarching 
theory. Indeed, Lyotard (1984) defines the postmodern stance as this ‘incredulity 
towards all meta-narratives’. Likewise, on a psychological as well as an epistemological 
level, ideas of a core or singular self as the foundation for existence are replaced with 
multiplicity, diversity, flux and transformation. Postmodernism as a set of theoretical 
ideas is complemented by shifts in contemporary society, as exemplified by figures like 
Madonna and Bill Clinton, which encourage an ongoing shifting of, and experimentation, 
with identities, although I don’t  think Osama Bin Laden would align with this trend.
Rappoport, Baumgardner and Boone use Gergen’s (1991) thesis of ‘the saturated self, 
to  argue that, with the proliferation of technologies of communication in the twentieth 
century, people are exposed to  a myriad of diverse influences which can potentially 
effect their identity. This leads to  what they call simultaneous as well as serial pluralism. 
By this, they mean that we can be different people not only in the different sequential 
stages of our lives as developmental psychologists notably Erikson (1950), and their 
popularisers like Sheehy (1984), have shown, but also engage in a range of different 
identities at any one moment. Others in a similar optimistic vein, such as the 
postmodern feminist, Dona Haraway (1991), have indicated the emancipatory potential 
of electronic technology and the realm of cyberspace for the development of alternative 
non-sexist identities.
Rather than see the plurality of selves constituted in post modernity as problematic and 
a possible pathological indication of schizoid fragmentation, Rappoport, Baumgardner 
and Boone prefer to  view this multiplicity as adaptive, necessary in a rapidly changing 
society. In a rather chilling phrase reminiscent of the calculations of investment bankers, 
they refer to  the benefits of “a dynamic portfolio of alternative self-concepts”. As an 
example of such benefits, they cite the empirically based w ork of Linville (1987) as 
evidence that people with multiple and more complex self-concepts are better able to  
deal with stress.
Having indicated how the overall thrust of postmodern thinking supports the idea of a 
plural self, I now want to connect this movement in philosophy with the emergence in 
science of the study of complexity. This emerging field and its inter-related disciplines 
have been described by George Cowan, the founder of the Santa Fe Institute, the most 
significant inter-disciplinary centre for the development of complexity, as ‘the sciences of 
the twenty-first century, ” (Waldrop, 1992).
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In his book ‘Complexity and Postmodernism’ (1998), Cilliers explicitly links key ideas 
from postmodern thinking with the new sciences of complexity, particularly the 
connectionist approach to cognition. Some of these postmodern ideas, particularly 
Gergen and Denzin’s identification of the ‘crisis of representation’ occasioned by the 
critique of language have already been outlined in this chapter. Cilliers makes extensive 
reference to Saussure’s (1974) and Derrida’s (1976) w ork on the nature of language.
Cilliers is keen to rescue postmodern thinkers, notably Derrida and Lyotard, whose 
w ork (1984) ‘ The Postmodern Condition’ he considers as one of the ‘classic texts’ in 
defining postmodernism, from the charges levelled against them that their theories lead 
to  nihilism and encourage a relativistic ‘anything goes’ attitude. By contrast, he says:
“ My argument is that post-structuralism is not merely a subversive form o f 
discourse analysis, but a style o f thinking that is sensitive to  the complexity o f the 
phenomena under consideration” (p. 22).
He believes that there are significant affinities between the post-structural analysis of 
language, especially the w ork of Derrida ( 1978, 19 8 1), and the way connectionist 
approaches in cognitive science (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986) adopt a distributed 
approach to the modelling of brain functioning through neural network simulations. His 
overall argument is that the dynamics which generate meaning in language that are based 
on a system of relationships and their differences, as outlined by Saussure (1974), then 
critiqued and further developed by Derrida (1976), can also be used to describe the 
non-linear dynamics of complex systems in general.
Cillier wants to show that Saussure’s notion of a sign as the basic unit in language and 
the idea of a node in a network are functionally equivalent. Meaning, deriving from  
language, can only be understood as a property of the relations between signs and not as 
an intrinsic property of the sign itself. Derrida argues against a one-to-one 
correspondence between a word and its meaning, what he calls a ‘metaphysics of 
presence’. Summarising this view, Cilliers says:
81
“ Meaning is the result o f an interplay between all the words (or, rather, all the 
signs) in the system. It is an effect o f the dynamics within the system, not o f direct 
relationships between components o f the system and objects in the world. This 
does not deny all relationships between the world and the system. To the contrary, 
the success o f the system depends largely on the effectiveness o f the interaction 
between the system and its environment" (p. 80).
Cilliers points to  the capacity of models of neural networks to  embody distributed 
representation. This is related to  holographic ideas of brain functioning. Certain 
functions, for example memory, are not located in one part of the brain but are 
distributed across the system as a whole. In the notion of distributed representation, 
Cilliers finds an important shift away from the conventional representational model of 
the world that has dominated cognitive psychology. This is parallel to  the shift away 
from the assumed representational nature of language to the different view of the 
meaning of language developed by the postmodern critique.
Cilliers takes the radical view that the idea of distributed representation undermines the 
very notion of representation itself. In models of neural networks, distributed 
representation removes the need for a central processor or co-ordinating agency. This 
could be located either from inside the system, what the philosopher Daniel Dennett 
(1991) has aptly called a ‘Cartesian Theatre’ or Arthur Koestler (1976) termed ‘the 
ghost in the machine’, or from an external designer position outside the system. Studies 
of complex adaptive systems show that the system itself has a distributed self-organising 
capacity. There is no need to posit a central function that carries out this role 
independent of the other parts of the network.
I am exploring Cilliers arguments here because I think they make fruitful linkages 
between tw o very influential contemporary areas of thought and further connect with 
the theme of this section and the chapter as a whole. W e  have become very familiar 
with thinking of the self as having its separate centre, a unified command structure, 
which processes and sifts through thoughts, ideas, feelings, bodily sensations, memories, 
fantasies and then makes executive decisions. N o t only is this the dominant model we 
have of our selves but it is institutionally embodied as the main model of organisation 
and decision-making in most western social organisational structures. This is illustrated 
by Stacey’s w ork (2000), in which he critiques and shows how the main frame of 
reference for strategic thinking and strategy formation is based on a view of 
autonomous, individual senior executives making rationally-based strategic choices to
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create long-term strategic plans. These plans are conceived of separately from their 
implementation, and then require implementation as a further stage.
W h at happens if we drop this idea of a centralised decision making ego, as individuals 
and within organisations? If we give up the controlling fantasies such a conception 
assumes? If we no longer need the illusions of security and certainty such a self-concept 
offers? If we accept that the voice of the ego is not a grand unifying ‘meta-narrative’ but 
only one of many narratives we could use to  speak about ourselves?
T o  summarise and connect the argument of this section with the previous section. In 
the words of Derrida (1983);
“The modern dominance o f the principle o f reason had to  go hand in hand with 
the interpretation o f the essence o f beings as objects, an object present as 
representation (Vorstellung), an object placed and positioned before a subject. The 
latter, a man who says T, an ego certain o f itself, thus ensures his own technical 
mastery over the totality o f what is.”
Having, so far in this section, explored concepts from postmodern thinking and 
complexity to  illustrate ideas that challenge the conceptualisation of the self in unitary, 
singular terms, I now want to turn to a different tradition, which also emphasises the 
multiple nature of the self.
I have already mentioned the w ork of James Hillman at the end of the previous section 
in connection with his attempt to revision psychology to encompass ecology by 
relocating the boundaries of the separate self. Closely linked to  this project is another of 
the themes in his writing which is an insistence on honouring the full multiplicity of the 
psyche. As Thomas Moore (1989) points out, Hillman chooses to use the more 
provocative word polytheistic, rather than a milder word like polycentric or 
multifaceted, for this multiplicity. This is a deliberate choice to contrast with forms of 
monotheism and monotheistic thinking which Hillman, like Jung, sees dominating 
psychology. Hillman (1975a) quotes the words of Jung (1970 Vol. 13) in support of his 
position;
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“W e lack all knowledge o f the unconscious psyche and pursue the cult o f 
consciousness to  the exclusion o f all else. O ur true religion is a monotheism o f 
consciousness, a possession by it, coupled with a fanatical denial o f the existence o f 
fragmentary autonomous systems “
Hillman wishes to extend Jung’s imaginative division of psychic life into the realms of 
animus and anima figures to include the full range of figures present in Greek mythology. 
Hillman (1975a), like other thinkers and artists, including Freud, Picasso, Heidegger, 
Joyce and Stravinsky is advocating a psychological “return to  Greece”, as he believes 
happened in defining cultural moments, including the flowering of the Italian Renaissance, 
the Romantic revolt against the restrictions and excesses of rationalism, and in the 
culture of ancient Rome. He is arguing for a polytheistic archetypal psychology in which 
each of these G reek mythological figures is allowed psychic autonomy to  represent and 
express the many, varied aspects of the psyche. As Moore (1989) says in his 
introduction to  a selection of passages from Hillman’s w ork entitled ‘Many Gods, Many 
Persons ;
‘The psyche is not only multiple: it is a communion o f many persons, each with 
specific needs, fears, longings, styles, and language. The many persons echo the 
many gods who define the worlds that underlie what appears to  be a unified 
human being." (p. 37).
And, like others in this chapter, but from a different standpoint, Hillman is adamant that 
these figures populating the psyche are not to be put under the single-minded rule of 
the heroic ego. This opposition to  the potentially inflated dominion of the ego is 
pertinent to both theory and practice. In theory, Hillman is countering the tendency of 
much psychological theorising to reinforce the ego’s perspective, by ignoring, trivialising 
or denying other realities and psychic voices. In his practice, Hillman wants to develop 
Jung’s method of ‘active imagination’ as a way of engaging with, and more crucially, 
allowing an autonomous existence to the other figures in the human psyche.
He points out that it is precisely the Herculean and heroic nature of the ego, as one part 
of the human psyche, to assume for itself, what I called earlier in this section, the unified 
command structure of the psyche. He then makes the thought-provoking point that, 
when the ego is overly successful in its endeavour to  deny and suppress the voices of 
other aspects of psychic life, the effect on the psyche as a whole is, in another of Freud’s 
famous phrases, a “return of the repressed”. That is, the other aspects of the psyche
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refuse to  be banished and return in symptoms often experienced by the ego as 
disturbing and troublesome. Paradoxically in trying to repress multiplicity, hold itself at 
the centre of the psyche, and hold the psyche together, the ego creates the very 
conditions for psychic fragmentation it is trying to guard against. In the much-quoted 
tw o lines from the W.B.Yeats poem (1924), “The Second Coming”;
“Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.”
In fully honouring multiplicity, Hillman wants to resist simplistic interpretations of Jung’s 
idea of individuation, what he calls (1971), “the popular vision of individuation from  
chaos to  order, from multiplicity to  unity, and where the health of wholeness has come 
to  mean the one dominating the many.“
He is not, as people make a similar claim against postmodernism, advocating moral 
relativism. He wants to overturn the assumed moral superiority of monotheism and 
offer instead the model he finds in Greek mythology of “disintegrated integration”, that 
is to  emphasise the paradox of the singular and multiple nature of the self. He quotes 
approvingly Lopez’s dictum: ’’The many contains the unity of the one without losing the 
possibilities of the many.”
Again we find another paradox - of the one and the many - at the heart and conclusion 
of this section. This is the paradox that also appeared at the beginning of this section in 
the discussion on brain functioning -  how, in Lancaster’s (1999) words “to reconcile the 
seeming unity in our experience of the world with the evident multiplicity of the 
modular brain”. In the next section I will explore the third of the oppositions shaping 
this chapter - that between a cognitive self and an embodied self.
Section 6. Cognitive vs. embodied
“I f  the body had been easier to understand, nobody would have thought that we had a mind”
Richard Rorty. ( 1980)
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The first section in this chapter argued that Descartes was a pivotal figure in the 
development of modernity as a whole and the shaping the modern self. His philosophy 
established the isolated thinking subject as the sole certain ground of all human 
knowledge. Cogito ergo sum - 1 think therefore I am. In section four, I focussed on the 
implications of this for the hugely influential way in which the subject was defined apart, 
and constituted separately, from the external social and natural world -  the 
subject/object dualism.
In this section, I want to  focus on the implications of Cartesian philosophy for its 
structuring of a further highly influential dualism into enlightenment thinking and from  
that into western sensibilities, that of the mind and body. Descartes made a fundamental 
and profound separation between the mental experience of the thinking human subject, 
which he called res cogitans, and the world of matter, which included both the external 
world of nature and the human body, termed res extensa. Res cogitans was made of a 
spiritual substance and nonmaterial in nature. Res extense existed in physical extended 
space and was subject to  the laws of geometry and mathematics. And, for Descartes, 
like New ton after him, these mathematical laws were God-given metaphysical truths. 
Descartes said, as translated by Wallace (1910); “The metaphysical truths styled eternal 
have been established by God, and like the rest of his creation, depend entirely on him.”
Summarising Descartes’ dualism, Tarnas (1991) says:
“ Hence on one side o f Descartes dualism, soul is understood as mind, and human 
awareness as distinctively that o f the thinker. The senses are prone to  flux and 
error, the imagination prey to  fantastic distortion, the emotions irrelevant fo r 
certain rational comprehension. On the other side o f the dualism, and in contrast 
to  mind, all objects o f the external world lack subjective awareness, purpose, or 
spirit.’’ (p. 278).
I have already posited the human alienation, disenchantment of the world, and grounds 
for an exploitative relationship with nature leading to  the current environmental crises, 
that such a philosophy can lead to. In this section I want to focus on the implications for 
the view of the relationship between mind and body that this position creates and 
explore alternative ways in which different ideas of the self conceive the body/mind 
relationship. I am not here setting out to  analyse in depth o r to solve the body/mind 
problem. That has long been, and is likely to remain, the subject of much philosophical, 
linguistic, psychological, neurological, biological and biochemical inquiry. I am interested
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though in setting out the views of some of the thinkers who are trying to  overcome the 
legacy of the Cartesian worldview which still tends to shape the frame of reference in 
which this debate is conducted.
O f all the, what I have been calling the natural and common-sense ideas of the self - the 
mesh of concepts that emphasise its separate, singular, cognitive, and literal nature 
which unreflectively create the habitual ways we have come to  experience ourselves -  
the idea of a primarily cognitive self has been the most contested. The whole field of 
humanistic psychology and psychotherapy has developed in part as a reaction against the 
primarily mental, verbal and insight based formulations and focus of traditional 
psychoanalysis and the positivistic assumptions and methods of conventional academic 
and experimental psychology.
Jung and Reich are tw o significant figures who have been influential in moving psychology 
significantly away from a focus on the rational cognitive self. Though originally pupils of 
Freud, they both ultimately broke, not just their personal relationship with Freud, but 
also with the underlying Cartesian, nineteenth century scientific and mechanistic world 
view that continued to shape Freud’s thought throughout his life. For Reich, body and 
psyche were functionally identical. His w ork (1949) on the formation of character 
structure indicated how psychological structures are both rooted in the body in the 
form of muscular tensions and simultaneously expressed in aspects of personality. 
N either the body nor the personality attitudes, behaviours and emotions were primary 
in terms of causing the other -  they were created simultaneously through the 
interaction of the developing child with its family and wider environment. Likewise, Jung 
thought there was a common reality underlying both the physical world of matter and 
the human psyche. Richard Grey (1996) summarising Jung’s worldview, says: “ In the 
Jungian universe, not only are the physical and psychic aspects of reality mutually 
conditioned by an underlying transcendental level, but both are mutually codetermined 
on the physical level” (p i4). Jung, using the terminology of the alchemists, first called 
this underlying reality the Unus Mundus. He later changed his description to the 
‘objective psyche’.
A  whole proliferation of integrative, body-based and transpersonal psychotherapies, as 
well as spiritual practices which link eastern meditation with western psychology, have 
now sprung up which emphasise the holistic nature of psychological life and aim to w ork  
with the physical, behavioural, emotional and mental dimensions of the self. Similarly, in 
the field of complementary medicine, practitioners are challenging the Cartesian
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inheritance of the primarily mechanistic model of the body, which remains the dominant 
paradigm in conventional medicine, and emphasising instead the links between physical 
illness and mental and emotional health.
As I indicated in section one of this chapter, these more holistic ideas have moved from  
the fringes of the culture to the mainstream. Most people now think of their mental, 
physical and emotional health as related. And yet, especially within the field of cognitive 
psychology, and embedded in many of the underlying assumptions underpinning 
organisational theory, present for example in the w ork of Senge (1990) with his 
emphasis on ‘mental models’, we encounter the primary model of human functioning as 
a form of information processing that privileges rationality and representation.
W ith  the development of sophisticated computer technology, such models are no 
longer crudely, mechanistically based on the metaphor of the clock, as was popular 
following Descartes, but are based on analogies drawn from digital technology. It is 
ironic, as shown by Capra (1996), in his discussion of the history of cybernetics, that 
initially computer technology was developed using, as its basis, an understanding of how 
the brain and human nervous system operated. Then the principles underlying the 
technological innovations in the design of digital computers were fed back to become 
the prevailing model of human mental functioning. In this way the machine metaphor, 
albeit a digital rather than clockwork machine, re-established itself as the central 
organising metaphor for the brain.
Capra says, writing about the development of open systems thinking and cybernetics in 
the fifties and sixties:
‘‘The computer model o f mental activity became the prevalent view o f cognitive 
science and dominated all brain research for the next th irty years. The basic idea 
was that human intelligence resembles that o f a computer to  such an extent that 
cognition -  the process o f knowing -  can be defined as information processing, i.e. 
as manipulation o f symbols based on a set o f rules, (p. 66).”
Such rule-based systems, as well as being adopted by Artificial Intelligence researchers, 
linguists in the Chomskian tradition and cognitive scientists, have also been influential in 
the development of thinking about complexity. Computer simulations of bird flocking 
behaviour show how complex patterns of behaviour can be generated from the 
continual iteration of a few simple rules applied to a number of independently acting
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agents. This has led some people to  uncritically use these kinds of analogies and 
simulations to explain complex human behaviour. As Stacey (2000, 2001) and Stacey, 
Griffin and Shaw (2000) show, this approach leads to an instrumental application of ideas 
from complexity theory to organisational life which simply reinforce the existing 
paradigm of engineered design and control, rather than seeing the potential in thinking 
from complexity to reshape the way we think about and act together in organisations. 
Models developed in complexity largely from computer simulations cannot be simply 
and un reflectively imported into the domain of human behaviour without considering 
and confronting the distinctiveness of complex human systems.
The w ork of Maturana and Varela ( 1980, 1987) offers a very different view of cognition 
to  models based on information processing. Such models, as I have been arguing in this 
and the previous section, are based on the manipulation of symbols according to rules 
which involves mental representation of the world within the internal world of the 
subject. Thus an independent subject engages in a process of cognition or knowing that 
enables the world to be represented in the mind of the subject. The subject, their mind, 
the act of cognition and the external world are all pre-given and independently 
conceived. In addition, for Descartes, as I have shown, and for many following him, the 
nature of the mind of the cognitive subject is radically different from the matter of the 
external world, which is being apprehended in the act of cognition.
The theory of cognition proposed by Maturana and Varela links with their work  
mentioned in section four of this chapter on autopoiesis. This is defined as the capacity 
of living systems to continually create and sustain their pattern of organisation through a 
network of self-organising production processes in which each part of the network  
participates in the production of other parts of the network. Many different structures 
can be specified by the same overall pattern of organisation. Capra (1996), interpreting 
the w ork of Maturana and Varela, says that, in their way of thinking: “Cognition is the 
activity involved in the self-generation and self-perpetuation of autopoietic networks. In 
other words, cognition is the very process of life” (p. 259). A  living system and its 
environment are therefore inextricably linked. Changes in the environment trigger 
structural changes in the living system through stimulating a rearrangement of the 
connectivity between the different parts of the network. This is referred to by Maturana 
and Varela as the ‘structural coupling’ of a living system with its environment.
Perception, o r cognition, does not internally represent an external, independently 
existing reality but specifies and shapes a reality through its own internal self-referencing 
circular organisation, that is, it ‘brings forth a w orld’. A  living system, because it already
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has its own organisation, specifies which perturbations from the environment are 
potential triggers for change.
These ideas, as I also said in section four, challenge the Darwinian idea of an organism 
largely adapting to and reacting to its environment. They are also close to Reichian ideas 
of character structure (1949), mentioned at the beginning of this section. Reich saw 
character structure as arising from the continual ongoing process by which initial 
biological and personality dispositions of the person shape the way they interact with 
their environment, notably the key care givers in that immediate environment, and then 
the environmental response further shapes the individual’s disposition and behaviour. 
O ver time these repeated interactions generate overall patterns of relationship between 
the individual and their environment, which become internally structured into the 
personality organisation of the individual on both a physical and psychological level. 
Character structure is therefore a living embodiment of the individual’s life history, 
which shapes but does not rigidly determine their future. The phenomenon, in which 
individuals recreate patterns of behaviour even when these are clearly dysfunctional and 
not consciously sought after, is well known to  therapists and is often what brings people 
to seek therapeutic help. In transactional analysis it is called the individual’s life-script, an 
overall organising narrative that the individual has created to make sense of their early 
experience, which is generally at a subconscious or unconscious level and functions to  
perpetuate the story they have told about themselves by reliving the basic dynamics of 
the story in their relationships with others and the world.
Returning to Maturana and Varela’s work, and summing up what he calls their ‘Santiago 
theory’, Capra says;
“ Cognition is an integral part o f the way a living organism interacts with its 
environment. It does not react to  environmental stimuli through a linear chain o f 
cause and effect, but responds with structural changes in its nonlinear, 
organisationally closed, autopoietic network. This type o f response enables the 
organism to  continue its autopoietic organisation and thus to  continue living in its 
environment. In other words, the organism's cognitive interaction with its 
environment is intelligent interaction. From the perspective o f the Santiago theory, 
intelligence is manifest in the richness and flexibility o f an organism’s structural 
coupling.’’ (p. 262).
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I have gone into this at some length because, in the w ork of Maturana and Varela, I 
glimpse the groundwork and framework for a radically different view of the world. W e  
are deeply habituated to thinking in the Newtonian-Cartesian framework of mental 
models of representation, direct linear relationships between cause and effect, and in 
which the process of cognition is divided between an already existing subject and a pre­
given external world. It is therefore difficult to find an alternative language and 
framework, which indicates the way that in the process of knowing, mind and the world 
are simultaneously created. W e  constantly have to  counter the influence and the central 
metaphor of the dominant frame of reference, which Varela et al ( 19 9 1) vividly 
characterise as “a cognitive agent parachuted into a pre-given world.”
Again to  quote Capra in support of the above paragraph:
‘The Santiago theory provides, in my view, the first coherent scientific framework 
that really overcomes the Cartesian split Mind and matter no longer appear to  
belong to  tw o separate categories but are seen as representing merely different 
aspects, or dimensions, o f the same phenomenon o f life” (p. 170).
It is evident from this discussion that the process of cognition, which is simultaneously 
the process of knowing, which is also the process of life, is much broader than thinking.
It involves the domains of perception, emotion and action. In fact, Varela (1991) 
describes cognition as ‘embodied action’. This linking of knowing with embodied action 
has profound consequences for epistemology and helps pave the way for an 
epistemology of practice.
Also, this theory, by broadening cognition to  include the whole range of human 
experience, does not, in consequence, thereby restrict cognition to the brain. The entire 
structure, and all parts, of the body participate in cognition. This point is dramatically 
illustrated by the w ork of Candice Pert (1998) on peptides, a group of sixty to seventy 
macromolecules. In this work, Pert and her colleagues showed that peptides function to  
facilitate the interconnection of what had previously been thought of as three separate 
bodily systems -  the nervous system, which has traditionally been associated with 
cognition, the endocrine system, associated with regulation and the immune system, 
associated with the body’s defence system. Pert proposes that, through the linkages 
created by peptide activity, these three systems are in effect one single psychosomatic 
network. She boldly states (1989): “ I can no longer make any distinction between the 
brain and the body,” and; ‘‘W h ite  blood cells are bits of the brain floating around in the 
body.” Pert further discovered that, in Capra’s ( 1996) words, “peptides are the
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biochemical manifestation of emotion”, and that it may even be possible that each 
specific peptide mediates a particular emotional state. As peptides are present 
throughout our bodies, particularly at points where the brain is connected to the 
different sensory systems, this indicates that all our perceptions, thoughts and bodily 
functions are emotionally coloured.
This is very close to  Damasio’s neuroscientific w ork in which he highlights ‘Descartes 
Error’, as his book (1994), is titled, by showing that thinking never occurs in isolation 
apart from feeling and that thoughts are always coupled to and coloured by emotional 
states. Descartes separate realm, the res cogitans, of mental life, is not the watertight 
compartment he had postulated. Damasio links emotional states to  the many different 
rhythms of the body, such as the rhythms of inhalation and exhalation, heart beating, 
brain wave oscillations, of digestion. He provides a direct link between the life of the 
mind and the life of the body, and therefore, like Varela, suggests that thought is always 
embodied. He also argues that, as living bodies have the capacity to resonate with one 
another -  we are all familiar with being effected by other peoples’ emotional states -  
people are always being influenced, whether they are aware of it or not, by the physical 
bodies of others.
Having in this section explored the cognitive vs. embodied dimensions of ideas about the 
self, I want now to  move on to discuss the final of the four oppositions that offer the 
framework for this chapter -  concrete vs. fictional.
Section 7. Concrete vs. fictional
A man is always a teller o f tales; 
he lives surrounded by his stories and 
the stories o f others; he sees everything 
that happens to him through them, 
and he tries to live his life as 
i f  he were recounting it
Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea
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The fictional nature of the self is, perhaps, the dimension of the self that is least familiar 
to  what I have called the common sense view of the self. W e  tend to  think of ourselves 
as concrete, definite and essential. W e  talk about discovering our real o r true selves. 
W e  believe that we possess a distinctive personality. W e  think that the descriptions we  
use of other people and ourselves, as extrovert, shy, cunning, happy-go-lucky, 
rumbustuous, moody etc refer to  something solid and distinctive. In this, of course, we  
are encouraged by the philosophy, marketing and methods of the whole industry of 
psychological and personality testing and measurement which takes it as axiomatic that 
each individual possesses something called personality which can be measured and 
assessed quantitatively.
A t the basis of this characterisation of the self as personality which can be assessed 
along a number of dimensions, usually quantitative, lurks what we can call, following 
previous comments in this chapter, a modernist perspective on the self. This assumes 
that the self is separate and exists independently of the way it is being measured. In 
other words, that measurement is simply transcribing an objectively given unequivocally 
existing phenomenon, the self, rather than having an alternative constructionist 
understanding that the process of quantification and the theoretical assumptions behind 
this, are actually creating the self in its own image.
W hat, though, if the ideas we have of ourselves are fictions? W h at if we consider that 
the ways we describe ourselves and others are thought of as stories that we tell to  
ourselves and/or others, imaginative creations, rather than an empirically based 
description of something that exists independently of the telling of it? W hat if the 
approach to understanding the self was derived from literature and the novel rather 
than through scientific objectification, measurement, and assessment?
These are not necessarily new questions but they are now surfacing in a number of 
academic and professional disciplines as people explore the consequences of a narrative 
approach to the self in both theory and practice.
In the field of family therapy, an approach called narrative therapy has grown up based 
on the w ork of Michael W h ite  and David Epston. In their book, “Narrative Therapy’, 
(1996), Freedman and Combs develop an approach to therapeutic practice based on 
two, what they call, ’guiding metaphors’. These metaphors are ‘social construction’, 
which has been outlined already in section four in this chapter, and ‘narrative’. “Using 
the narrative metaphor”, they say, “ leads us to think about people’s lives as stories and
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to  w ork with them to experience their life stories in ways that are meaningful and 
fulfilling.” Overall, Freedman and Combs characterise the fundamental shift in the way 
they now think about their therapeutic w ork as the move from systems to stories, 
which they see as a discontinuous paradigm change, not just an evolution of the systems 
based approach that had previously shaped their thinking and practice.
Freedman and Combs, like others influenced by a postmodern perspective, link their 
tw o  ‘guiding metaphors’ by arguing that the way realities are socially constructed is 
through language, and, in particular, through the way people use language to  tell and 
retell stories to  themselves and one another. These stories express and embed social 
and political relationships. Freedman and Combs state that: “People are born into 
stories; their social and historical contexts constantly invite them to tell and remember 
the stories of certain events and to  leave others unstoried” (p. 42). Stories are not 
neutral. They positively connote or privilege certain actions, understandings, qualities 
and meanings and simultaneously devalue others. In their practice, Freedman and 
Coombs encourage their clients to surface and explore the stories that have come to  
shape their lives and the way they experience themselves. Then, as appropriate, 
especially if people have come to absorb and internalise oppressive stories about 
themselves, which are often gender and/or race based, their therapeutic practice enables 
people to retell their story.
From a thorough-going postmodern perspective, all theories are different kinds of 
stories. Science is not, therefore, from this perspective, the pinnacle of human 
knowledge and favoured overall model for assessing the grounds and claims for 
knowledge in all disciplines. Science, rather than being an overarching ‘metanarrative’, in 
the sense that Lyotard (1984) speaks of, which subjugates all other forms of knowing to  
its own criteria, is one of many narratives, each of which have their own autonomous 
ways of establishing validity. Science happens to  be a particularly compelling story 
because the technologies deriving from the story work. Challenging science on the basis 
that it is one of many possible stories, rather than the master-story, is not to  deny the 
efficacy of technology. As Gergen (1996) says; “It is not technological capability (or 
“knowing how”) that is called into question by postmodern critique, but the truth claims 
placed upon the accompanying descriptions and explanations (the "knowing that”)”. W e  
live in a world of many realities, many truths and therefore many stories.
To  recap the argument of this chapter in the terms being discussed in this section, (i.e. 
to  retell, in brief, the story I am telling). The dominant story that has been told about
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the self - once upon a time there was a modernist self that thought cogito ergo sum - is 
one that emphasises the self as a separate, singular, unified, thinking, concrete entity. 
Alternatively, we can tell other stories, and construct other theories, which tell the 
story of the self as a relational, multiple, decentred, embodied, fictional process. By 
elaborating the fictional dimension of the self, I am drawing attention to the storied 
nature of the self. I prefer to use the word ‘fictional’ as an alternative to the word  
‘concrete’ in preference to ‘storied”, because it brings into play the creative role of 
imagination, which I will return to  towards the end of this section.
I intend to  build on the arguments already made in this chapter that we do not approach 
an already existing external reality but are engaged in both creating and making sense of 
that reality. A  primary mode of making sense of the world, par excellence, is to  use 
stories. W e  describe our experience in narrative terms. Many writers in the different 
fields of philosophy, education, religion, organisational theory, sociology and psychology 
have argued that the narrative mode is uniquely suited to being able to make sense of 
our experience.
For one thing, the narrative mode is temporally based. It provides a way of making sense 
of lived experience over time. The philosopher Paul Ricouer (1980) said that temporality 
is ’’that structure of existence that reaches language in narrativity and narrativity is the 
language structure that has temporality as its ultimate referent.” In other words the 
experience of living through time and the experience of living through story are 
intimately related and interdependent.
Similarly, the reality of the experience of time is an important part of the w ork ( 1962) of 
Dewey, the philosopher and educationalist. Dewey saw individuality, with its inherent 
possibilities for novelty and unexpectedness, as only possible over time. He says; “The 
human individual is himself a history, a career, and for this reason his biography can be 
related only as a temporal event.” Interestingly the scientist, Prigogine (1984, 1997) has 
made the way that mechanistic scientific thinking has erroneously discounted time one 
of the central arguments in his critique of the prevailing philosophy of science in which 
he stresses the irreversibility of time, the unidirectionality of ‘time’s arrow ’ as he terms 
it, in contrast to the way normal science assumes that its laws are timeless and eternal.
Following Dewey’s lead, other educational researchers have stressed the role of story in 
education. Dixon and Stratta (1986), view narrative as a primary act of mind and an 
essential way of making sense of human experience. Connelly and Clandinin state
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(1990) “humans are storytelling organisms who, individually and socially, lead storied 
lives.” In their more recent w ork  (1999), they say, in reviewing the way they have come 
to  understand the newly emergent studies of teachers as knowledge creators:
“ Increasingly, as our work progressed, we came to  see teacher knowledge in terms 
o f narrative life history, as storied life compositions. These stories, these narratives 
o f experience are both personal -  reflecting a person’s life history -  and social -  
reflecting the milieu, the contexts in which teachers live.” (p. 2).
In religious studies, there is a branch of theology called narrative theology. Michael 
Novak has argued (1971) that religion “is the telling of a story with one’s life” and that, 
therefore, “in this weak sense, all men and women are religious.” The bible has been 
made into a film called T h e  Greatest Story ever told’. Don Cupitt, a postmodern 
theologian, also takes the view (1991), that, “because we live in language and live in time, 
we must tell stories”, and that, “a human being is entirely culturally formed, and made of 
stories through and through.”
The sociologist A rthur Frank (1995) has written persuasively about the kinds of stories 
that are told in illness. He shows how the stories told about illness reflect the different 
interests of those telling them. He is keen to restore to those who become ill the voice 
of their own story, which speaks of their unique experience. He sees this being taken 
away from them by the dominant voices in narratives of illness, those of the medical 
professions. He terms the dominant medical voice, which emphasises the active heroic 
role of the doctors and the ‘w onder’ drugs of the pharmaceutical companies, and the 
correspondingly passive role of the patient in their own treatment, as the ‘restitution 
narrative’.
He argues, using a marvellously eloquent turn of phrase, that at times of serious illness, 
people are subject to ‘narrative wreckage’. That is, the story they have so far been 
making of their life is seriously and irrevocably disrupted by major illness. Frank’s writing 
is largely about physical, often life-threatening illnesses, such as cancer, but I think his 
reasoning is applicable to the wider context of significant psychological as well as 
physical trauma.
A t the stage of the immediate onset and identification of illness, and in a condition of 
‘narrative wreckage’, people are very vulnerable to  the interpretations and definitions of 
their illness, offered and advocated by those assuming authority in this field, the medical
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experts. Frank, points out that the nature of serious illness is such that, by so thoroughly 
breaking apart the pre-illness narrative, a period is occasioned in which people find it 
difficult to make any coherent, meaningful sense of their experience. He calls this type of 
story a ‘chaos narrative’, which, by definition, resists being brought into any orderly 
form. An innovative literary example of this is provided by Glen Duncan in his powerful 
and disturbing novel, ‘Love Remains’ (2000). Although writing about the rape and near­
murder, rather than physical illness, of Chloe, one of his tw o leading characters, Duncan 
tries to convey Chloe’s experience, through the splintered nature of his writing in the 
third section of the novel. It is a mark of his skill as a w riter that he is successful in 
imaginatively recreating for the reader, as they struggle to make sense of the almost 
incoherent fragments of text, the appalling and chaotic nature of her experience.
In contrast to the tw o narratives so far defined, the ‘restitution narrative’ and the 
‘chaos’ narrative, Frank adds a third narrative, the ‘quest narrative’. In this narrative, the 
meaning-making of the illness is returned to  the agency of the person with the illness, 
rather than lying with the medical agencies. Frank says:
“ Only in quest stories does the teller have a story to  te ll Restitution stories
are about the triumph o f medicine: they are self-stories only by default. Chaos 
stories remain the sufferer’s own story, but the suffering is too  great for a self to  be 
told." (p. I 15).
The narrative shape of the quest story that emerges in illness and its aftermath is often 
described as a journey. Frank compares this narrative structure to that found in Joseph 
Campbell’s (1972) classic w ork on T h e  Hero W ith  a Thousand Faces’ with its three 
stages of departure, initiation and return. Frank is careful, though, not to over­
romanticise illness or to turn quest stories into traditional heroic narratives with their 
emphasis on the ability of the individual person to  pull through by an effort of individual 
will and/or determination. He, also, in echoes of section five in this chapter on 
singularity and multiplicity, says: “Falling into the hubris that one’s voice can ever be 
entirely one’s own is only one of the failures that quest stories risk”(p. 135). For Frank, 
like Freedman and Coombs, there is a social, political, and ethical dimension to  story. Its 
emancipatory power lies in its potential to  tell other stories that the mainstream 
narratives, as identified with the medical professions in Frank’s work, make marginal o r 
obliterate. Frank says: “Post-colonialism in its most generalised form is the demand to 
speak rather than being spoken for and to represent oneself rather than being
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represented, or in the worst cases, rather then being effaced entirely” (p. 13). As I have 
been arguing, stories are a prime medium in which to  speak and represent oneself.
The psychologist Jerome Bruner has also written extensively ( 1986a, 1986b, 1987, 1990) 
on the theme of narrative knowledge. He argues, in opposition to those who see mental 
life as essentially akin to information processing, (as was discussed in the previous 
section), that there are tw o fundamentally distinct modes of thought, which he calls the 
‘paradigmatic mode’ and the ‘narrative mode’. These modes of thought function not just 
in the realm of purely mental activity but as ways of experiencing and making sense of 
the world, and also as forms of memory. The paradigmatic mode ( 1987) “leads to good 
theory, tight analysis, logical proof, and empirical discovery guided by reasoned 
hypothesis”. The narrative mode leads to “good stories, gripping drama, believable 
historical accounts.” He connects the narrative mode to  the way we actually live our 
lives. “A  life as led”, he says (1987), “is inseparable from a life as told.”
Bruner (1990) distinguishes five key features of narrative expression. These are, first, 
what he terms, its ‘inherent sequentiality’, which is closely related to the idea of 
temporality, discussed earlier. Narrative creates meaning over time, not necessarily in a 
linear, chronological way but through linking different constituent parts into an overall 
sequence. This sequence is commonly called the plot. The second feature of narrative is 
its capacity to  treat fact and fiction on equal terms. The overall power of the story, as 
exemplified by the Latin American magical realist writers, is not diminished by the 
coincidence of truth and falsity, as judged by the methods and logic of empirical science. 
The third feature of narrative is that it, in Bruner’s words, “specialises in the forging of 
links between the exceptional and the ordinary.” Bruner understands this as one way in 
which any culture has to  handle the dilemma of being able to create overall norms and 
also deal with exceptions to those norms. The fourth feature of narratives is their 
dramatic quality and for Bruner, following Burke ( 1945), drama relates to what is (p. 50) 
“morally valued, morally appropriate, or morally uncertain.” Finally, the fifth feature of 
narratives, and what also gives them their power and relevance as a way of organising 
experience, is their ability to  use language, what Bruner calls the ‘power of tropes’. In so 
doing, a story creates itself so that it has to be interpreted. Its meaning cannot be 
deduced o r inferred by logic alone. It is always ambiguous, open to  different 
interpretations.
Having outlined the w ork of a number of thinkers who have understood the idea and 
construction of the self as a storied self, and also explored the w ork of others who have
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legitimated and contrasted narrative forms of knowing with more traditional forms, I 
want to  turn, as I have in other sections, to the w ork of James Hillman to elucidate 
further the fictional nature of the self. I will outline his ideas in some detail as I think 
that, of all the writers in this field, his w ork stands firmly against the dominant Cartesian 
tradition and clearly and rigorously articulates the multiple, decentred and fictional 
nature of the self.
I have already indicated that Hillman, although describing himself at times as a depth 
psychologist, has a very different vision of psychology than most other psychological 
theorists - whether Freudian, cognitive, humanistic, transpersonal developmental or 
behaviourist. One of his aims is to restore soul to psychology. Hillman, in a tradition 
which follows Heraclitus, Plato, the neo-Platonists, Ficino and Jung, has a very particular 
understanding of soul. In his book ‘Revisioning Psychology’ (1975), Hillman comments on 
three features of soul;
“ First, soul refers to  the deepening o f events into experiences; second, the 
significance soul makes possible, whether in love o r in religious concern, derives 
from its special relation with death. And third, by soul I mean the imaginative 
possibility in our natures, the experiencing through reflective speculation, dream, 
image and fantasy -  that mode which recognises all realities as primarily symbolic 
o r metaphorical.”
It is the connecting of soul with imagination and Hillman’s view of the imaginative 
foundation of all realities, scientific and otherwise, that he refers to as the ‘poetic basis 
of mind’, that I want to explore further.
In his book, Healing Fiction (1983), when reviewing the case histories of Freud, the 
founder of modern psychology, Hillman argues that, essentially in these case histories, 
Freud is writing fiction. He thinks psychoanalysis, and psychology in general, practices an 
enormous misplaced literalism, which takes ideas advanced by Freud in the literary form  
of his case studies, and reifies them into the abstract generalisations and over-literalised 
diagnostic categories of an empirical science. He understands Freud, in order to  gain 
acceptance within the medical establishment for his w ork at the time he was writing, as 
having to  bridge two worlds -  the world of the humanities and the world of the sciences 
-  and in so doing, Freud creates a new genre, the case history. The case history has to  
be both a literary construction, (and it is no accident that Freud’s major award in his 
lifetime was the Goethe prize for literature), and a scientific treatise. And Freud deploys
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in his case histories all the rhetorical devices of a good storyteller. It is these narrative 
techniques and style, which makes the case histories such intriguing and compelling 
reading. In other words, Freud is creating these case studies as stories, and “ever since”, 
as Hillman says : “W e  are all in this field of psychotherapy, not medical empiricists but 
workers in story” (p. 9).
Hillman wants to take case history as fictional story seriously and to examine case 
history using the methods developed by novelists and literary critics. Hillman quotes EM 
Forster ‘s w ork on ‘Aspects of the novel’ (1927) to explain the difference between story 
and plot. Forster said that;
“A  plot is.. .a narrative o f events, the emphasis falling on causality. “The king died 
and then the queen died,” is a story. “The king died and then the queen died o f 
grief,” is a plot. A  story answers what happened next, a plot tells us why.”
Having differentiated story from plot, and emphasised the role of plot in explaining 
human intentions, Hillman now makes a number of bold moves. The first is to argue that 
in Freud’s and others’ psychological case histories, the plot is equivalent to the main 
psychological theory that the case study is demonstrating. The case histories are 
assembled and the details crafted together to provide as their underlying plot the 
theories advanced by the author. “And Freud’s plot”, Hillman says (p. 10), "was 
absolutely economical: no loose ends. This economy in plot is called elegance in 
theorising.” Hillman contrasts the Freudian plot, which always has the same answer to  
the question ‘why’ with the Jungian plot of individuation that is much more varied and 
multiplistic. In other words, and this is Jung’s, amongst others, criticism of him, Freud is 
too  reductive. The complexity of human life is reduced to one dominating story, the 
struggle between the life and death instincts, the kind of grand unifying story capable of 
explaining everything, that the postmodernists, following Lyotard (1984), would term a 
‘metanarrative’.
Having shown that Freud was engaged in the double task of writing both story and 
science, Hillman makes a further point about Freud’s writing, which is important because 
it bears on the nature of validity:
100
“ But for us who read him, it is important to  bear in mind that our fundamental 
unease with Freud’s theory is not that it cannot be verified but that it does not 
satisfy. W e fail to  fall fo r it not because it empirically fails as a hypothesis about 
human nature, but because it fails poetically, as a deep enough, embracing enough, 
aesthetic enough plot fo r providing dynamic coherence and meaning to  the 
dispersed narratives o f our lives’’ (p. I I).
Although this is not the main focus of his argument, Hillman is making a significant point 
about different kinds of validity, which is echoed in ideas about different modes of 
knowing. He is saying that we do not reject the Freudian enterprise from the criteria of 
what constitutes good science, as others, notably Popper (1959) have done, by claiming 
that psychoanalysis fails to meet the test of falsifiability, but from other criteria, which 
are narrative, aesthetic and hermeneutically based.
Hillman goes on to make a second bold move. This is to identify plot with myth.
He says that Freud, too, in his formulation of the Oedipus complex, identified plot with 
myth, but, in so doing, limited all the potential stories, all the twists and turns of Greek  
mythology to  this one myth only of Oedipus. Hillman does credit Freud, though, with 
making this move to myth. He says that Freud, “placed mind on a poetic basis. He 
understood that the entire narrative of a human life, the characters we are and the 
dreams we enter, are structured by the selective logic of a profound mythos on the 
psyche” (p. 11).
Hillman is therefore suggesting, like others in this section, that psychological theorising is 
a form of story telling which finds a distinctive expression in the case history. In addition, 
by linking story to plot and thereby to  myth, Hillman is tracing the archetypal roots of 
these stories, and locating them in a very different tradition to  the postmodernists. He 
sees the diagnostic categories of psychiatry as offering particular stories to people that 
may offer a coherent way of organising their experience and so telling their story. He 
points out that, as well as offering by and large pejorative, potentially oppressive stories 
these categories also take themselves literally, that is they fail to  recognise the fictional 
basis of their origins and assume they are factual, real accounts and explanations of 
behaviour. For Hillman this is the real danger of these diagnostic categories. N o t so 
much the way that they fit their patient into a prevailing story, o r overall discourse, to 
use Foucault’s term, but that they disguise the essentially poetic or imaginative basis of 
mind. The injury is to the soul and the imagination as much as the dignity and self-worth 
of the individual.
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Hillman wants to show how, since the beginning of psychology with Freud, all 
psychology in its nature is fictional. He wants to see through the ways that psychology 
and other theories construct their worlds and point out the archetypal structures that 
lie at the basis of this. He is advocating a psychological attitude to the world, not in the 
normal way we might understand this, but as a stance that links imagination with soul- 
making. He points out that by claiming that all psychology is fictional, it does not 
thereby render it invalid or ineffective. Like others interested in what they might call re- 
storying lives, o r what others again might term  re-framing, and what he would call re- 
imagining, Hillman wants to ask the further question generated from this perspective - 
what are the kinds of fiction that heal?
Part of his answer is provided when he says (p. 17) that; “Successful therapy is thus a 
collaboration between fictions, a revisioning of the story into a more intelligent, more 
imaginative plot, which also means the sense of mythos in all the parts of the story.” 
Therapy is therefore healing when it promotes the telling of a richer, more intelligent 
story, which has its roots deep in relevant cultural myths. I think Maturana and Varela, 
using a very different language could be making a related point when they say, as 
explained by Capra (1996), and quoted already in section four; “From the perspective of 
the Santiago theory, intelligence is manifest in the richness and flexibility of an organism’s 
structural coupling.”
Hillman points out that therapy, rather than encompassing the entire range of genres 
within which stories have been situated, tends to  limit itself to  four main kinds of story 
that can be told; the epic, comic, detective and social realist story. Speaking self-critically 
on behalf of psychotherapy, he says: “W e  take what comes - no matter how passionate 
and erotic, how tragic and noble, how freakish and arbitrary - and turn it all into one of 
four modes” (p. 18).
Here, as elsewhere in his work. Hillman is arguing for the fluidity, indeterminacy and 
multiplicity of imagination and arguing against its reduction and typification in this case to  
four main stories, but this could equally well be against any of the many models, which 
attempt to  neatly categorise human experience.
The other part of his answer to the question of what fiction heals, is provided in his 
overall view of therapy. For Hillman, therapy is not so much focussed on cure as a final 
goal but is a way to reawaken the imagination, to pick up and re-create the oral tradition
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for story telling, to  re-story life. He thinks that people who have a history and childhood 
culture of story telling are in “better shape” than those who have not been so exposed. 
Like followers of the German philosopher and educationalist, Rudolf Steiner, he believes 
the imagination is stimulated differently through words than from the moving pictures of 
film and television. “Pictures we perceive with our sense perception”, he says, “images 
we imagine”. He refers to  Edward Casey’s w ork  (1974) on the phenomenology of 
imagination to  argue that image is not rooted in the specific content of what we envision 
but is linked to  the overall way we see. W e  can see from different perspectives but we 
limit ourselves in the range of perspectives available and we are, furthermore, often 
unaware of how the perspective we see from frames what we are seeing.
For Hillman, the forms, which organise our imagination and therefore our approach to  
the world, including ourselves, are the archetypes as put forward throughout Jung’s 
work. Hillman links these archetypes to the different Greek gods. Again, he is indicating 
the mythological basis of thought by linking the archetypes to the cultural mythology, 
which has shaped western thinking from the Greeks onwards. He is suggesting that the 
genres in which we tell our stories, and in which psychology writes its case studies, are 
shaped by the particular God informing and underlying the perspective. He says, about 
this, in relation to his colleagues in psychology, that:
“The idea that there is a god in our tellings and that this God shapes the words 
into the very syntax o f a genre is not new in literary studies even if it might come 
as a shock to  my colleagues who really believe that they are only writing clinical 
accounts o f facts.” (p. 23).
He further puts forward the highly interesting suggestion that the structure of narrative 
itself favours the perspective and concerns of the ego because narrative is almost always 
cast in the genre of the hero archetype. He takes this idea from a paper by Patricia 
Berry (1982), in which she argues that;
“The most important difficulty with narrative: it tends to  become the ego’s trip.
The hero has way o f finding himself in the midst o f any story. He can turn anything 
into a parable o f a way to  make it and stay on top. The continuity in a story 
becomes his ongoing heroic movement.”
This theme is echoed in Maclure’s (1996) notion of the ‘victory narrative’. It is also 
nearly always present in accounts of organisational change. The heroic leader, senior
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management team, consultant, or even whole organisational system as hero, seizes their 
destiny and transforms itself. It is ever-present too  in self-help manuals and the personal 
accounts, which often go side-by-side with these manuals, telling of extraordinary 
achievements and the overcoming of obstacles from an initial position of acute 
disadvantage. This is not to  subvert or trivialise courage, but rather to  look with a more 
critical awareness at the overall narrative stance, which configures a perspective in 
which courage plays such a crucial role.
I have gone into Hillman’s ideas at length because his writing places imagination at its 
heart. It profoundly connects to the theme of this section where I am arguing that the 
ideas we have of ourselves are fictional constructs. That is fictional not in the rather 
pejorative sense that word can carry of meaning untrue or a lie, but fictional in the sense 
of being a w ork of imagination.
In her original, thought provoking and inspiring book, ‘Invisible Guests’ (1986), Mary 
Watkins works with Hillman’s and others’ ideas to  critically explore the way key 
theorists in developmental psychology such as Freud, Piaget, Vygotsky and Mead have 
conceptualised and understood the purpose and development of the imagination. 
Although not writing within or referring to a postmodern tradition, and not mentioning 
Kuhn (1970), she constructs a strong case for the relativisation of human knowledge, 
and argues that all so called data o r empirical facts are inevitably theory-laden. W ithin  
her own field of developmental psychology, she contends that all observations of child 
and adult development are inherently rooted in a theory, which selects, directs attention 
to, and interprets, what is deemed relevant and significant. She quotes approvingly 
Kaplan’s (1981) view that “there is no single “developmental course” or “sequence” in 
an individual’s life. W ith  different teloi, the relevant developmental “sequence” will be 
different.” In other words each theory chooses as its focus what that focus and purpose 
considers significant but then tends to universalise what is always a partial perspective. 
So, for example, Piaget’s theories want to universalise the development of logic as the 
primary developmental task for the child turning all children into ‘budding scientists’, 
whereas for Freud the demands of adapting to an unsympathetic reality is the overriding 
purpose of maturation.
She shows how nearly all the major theorists in developmental psychology share an 
overall perspective, which devalues imagination. The ideas of Piaget, Freud, Vygotsky and 
Mead, all highly influential developmental theorists, tend to see imagination in childhood 
as being superceded by a developmentally more mature mode of thinking, in which
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Watkins says (p60), “development coincides with increasing realism.” Imagination is seen 
as a primitive, inferior mode which occurs en route to the superior mode of logical 
abstract reason (Piaget) or a defensive mode of psychic functioning developed to  
compensate for the frustrations encountered in facing a harsh reality (Freud) o r as way 
of testing and rehearsing alternative solutions before acting (Mead). Watkins follows the 
argument developed in earlier sections of this chapter in arguing against representational 
theories of reality, what Hillman calls (1975) ‘the naturalistic fallacy’, in which the images 
conjured up in imagination are judged according to  how well they copy external reality. 
In contrast, Watkins says: “As soon as we allow that the image represents something 
other than the external, realism is no longer the measure, but rather the fit between the 
symbol and the symbolised" (p. 60).
Watkins, like Hillman, refers to Casey’s study (1976) of the phenomenology of 
imagination. Casey argues that imagination tends to be theoretically conceived in one of 
three ways. First, and most commonly, following Plato, as subordinate to  other faculties 
where, as Watkins says, “images are only imitations of imitations”. Secondly, as a 
“mediator between perception, sensation and intellect (Aristotle, Hobbes, Kant)”; and 
thirdly, in German Romanticicism, as “superordinate to all faculties including reason 
itself.” Casey, himself, rather than being caught up in trying to  argue for the correctness 
of one of these views, makes the more interesting move of contesting the basis on 
which imagination is being hierarchically ordered, either at the top or the bottom. He  
wants to develop a perspective on imagination in which it is (p. 19) “nonderivative, as a 
phenomenon to be evaluated in its own terms”. He wants to resist the idea of creating a 
unilateral relationship between imagination and other faculties. Watkins says (p. 49) that 
his approach to imagination leads to a way of “finding a multiplicity of relations among 
imagining, remembering, feeling, knowing, and sensing.” In the next line, she goes on; 
“W e re  all instances of imagining to be forced because of a prejuge du monde into a 
single continuum of value, the multiplicity would be falsely narrowed and homogenised.”
Watkins, too, like the other theorists mentioned in section five, is arguing for the 
multiplicity of the self, in which imagination is neither primitive and inferior nor superior 
but is both one of many modes and capable of shifting, different relations at different 
times with other modes. She, like Mead, Vygotsky, Bahktin and Shotter sees the mind or 
psyche as inherently multiple and dialogically structured. She wants to  value the 
dialogues with others that are imaginatively constituted in their own right and not just 
see such imaginary dialogues as a way station to a more reality-based logical o r social 
functioning. W hilst valuing Mead for his recognition of the way that self and other are
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dialogically built into mind, she is critical of how, in his theory, the multiplicity of 
dialogue with many different others, real and imaginary, becomes developmentally 
transformed into the singular ‘generalised other’. Hence Mead follows others in 
privileging a singular, albeit socially derived, unity. She says, in her critique of Mead:
“ For Mead, imaginal others symbolise absent actual others; the imaginal is an 
internalisation o f social reality, whose purpose is adaptation to  and preparation for 
social reality. When the imaginal is seen in this way, as merely a station between 
tw o  moments o f time in social reality, other functions o f imaginal others are surely 
neglected. Looked at in other ways, particuiarisation o f the other is at the same 
time a refining o f the symbol” (p. 56).
Watkins, like Hillman in following Jung, wants to take seriously the idea of the imaginal 
other, and grant autonomy to such figures. She refers extensively to the w ork of many 
novelists and poets who talk about how, if their w ork is to  have greater complexity, 
insight and aesthetic integrity, the characters in their w ork  cannot be completely ruled 
by them but need to  develop their own independence. Wallace Stevens (1978) poem, 
“Credences of Summer”, states that “the characters speak because they want to  speak.” 
Gorky ( 1920) also says that Tolstoy criticises him on the basis that: “Most of what you 
say comes out of yourself, and therefore you have no characters, and all your people 
have the same face.” Dostoevsky was devastated, and also fearful of the censor, when 
his character Ivan, in the Brothers Karamazov, developed a compelling and systematic 
argument against the existence of God. In the same vein, Watkins also refers to the 
trend in twentieth century novels to move away from a narrative, which centralises an 
omniscient narrator. Both these tendencies are beautifully illustrated in John Fowles’ 
(1966) well-known novel, “The French Lieutenants W om an’, in which rather than 
determine her overall fate as author, Fowles creates tw o alternative endings for the 
main character.
Watkins is a fierce advocate for the autonomy of the psyche’s imaginal figures. She does 
not want them reduced theoretically or in practice to the ego’s projections and thereby 
colonised or reabsorbed as part of ego or self. By allowing them their own existence as 
genuinely and radically other, they can therefore, as Mead shows through the dialogic 
way in which self and other are co-created, influence the self. As Watkins says (p. 68): 
“These imaginal persons bring us up as surely as our parents, not simply as substitutes 
for our parents, but as companions in imaginal worlds.” The human capacity to  
personify, to create these kinds of imaginal figures, is not a process which, as
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psychoanalysis would lead us to believe, is necessarily superceded in maturity. In fact, 
Watkins sees the development of increasingly differentiated, more complex figures as a 
sign of psychic health. H er developmental telos and focus is not the passing away of 
these figures either into a reality-oriented process of imageless logic nor their 
integration under the rule of the ego but a greater tolerance for the multiplicity of the 
psyche with greater facility for dialogue between the different figures. For Watkins, 
therefore, the self is not established with the ego at its centre, as in humanistic and 
Freudian psychology, but, is instead defined, in a suggestive and subtle phrase, as “an 
organisation of perspectives”.
Watkins is careful to  show how her perspective does not lead, as psychoanalytically 
oriented theorists could suppose, to either a fracturing of the self or an increase in 
multiple personality disorders. In fact, she argues that the problematic issue within 
multiple personality disorders is precisely that the different personalities do not engage 
with one another. They exist separately. In contrast, Watkins wants to encourage 
dialogue and relationship between the different personalities including the ego. She says:
“ It is paradoxical that the illness o f multiple personality is problematic precisely 
because o f its singleness o f voice at any one moment, not because o f its 
multiplicity. Improvement starts when dialogue and reflection between the selves 
begins to  happen, when there is multiplicity in a single moment o f time, rather than 
multiplicity over time.” (p. 104).
I have outlined Watkins ideas and quoted her at some length, as I did Hillman, because I 
think they both show that as we take imagination as a valid, important mode of being in 
the world, as we allow autonomy to the figures that imagination personifies, as we  
become more cognisant of the multiplicity of figures within us, and as we allow the ego 
to  become less central, we fundamentally, as is the theme of this chapter, revision and 
re-imagine ourselves.
Watkins resonates with the postmodern stance that has also been outlined in this 
chapter, when, in talking about the consequences of decentering and relativising the ego, 
she says: “Truth becomes redefined: it is not the province of a single voice, but arises 
between the voices at the interfaces of the character’s multiple perspectives” (p, 118). 
Like Gergen and others, she is making truth a relational rather than absolute property. 
Truth is to be found in relationship - not just in the self s relationship with other selves 
but also within the internal relationships and dialogues that are possible within a more
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fictionalised, less literal self, one, which can hold opposites together -  for example, both 
the ‘unbearable lightness of being’ and the darkness of Saturnian melancholy.
In Watkins’ encapsulating statement in the preceding paragraph, we have indeed come a 
long way from Descartes’ vision of over three hundred years ago urging us to find truth 
and certainty in the solitary functioning of the isolated individual mind. Rather than this 
tradition culminating in the rampant individualism of unregulated market economics, or 
the extrem e anguish of existential despair, or the depths of the postmodern nihilistic 
abyss, o r the narcissism of a celebrity obsessed culture, we can find a way out of the 
restrictions of modernity through perspectives’ like W atkins and others in this chapter, 
which indicate and celebrate a more relational, multi-facetted, embodied, and imaginative 
sense of the self.
Section 8. Concluding comments
The preceding sections have explored and outlined different ideas about the self. In 
doing this, I have used four oppositions - separate vs. relational, singular vs. plural, 
cognitive vs. embodied and concrete vs. fictional. These oppositions have provided a 
framework to situate and organise material from many different sources, not just 
psychology but also philosophy, sociology, literature, linguistics, science and popular 
culture. These oppositions have further been used to structure my overall argument in 
that I am claiming that the first of each of these oppositions is emphasised in the 
dominant discourses about the self, both at an everyday folk-psychology level, and also 
in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that underpin this discourse.
It is tempting to argue that instead of a separate, singular, cognitive, concrete self, what I 
want to put forward is the notion of a relational, multiple, embodied, fictional self. And 
to  some extent, I do indeed want to  put this forward. The danger, though, of such a 
position is that the first term  of all four oppositions is simply replaced by the second 
term. From this we can create the kind of table that will be very familiar to readers of 
management literature contrasting one usually outmoded style of management or way of 
working o r organisational culture or organisational form to another more favourable 
contemporary style.
108







Ego in charge Ego relativised
Hierarchical Networked
Cognitive Embodied




The problem with such a table and this way of thinking is that it remains within the 
either/or framework of traditional Aristotelian logic, which I referred to in section 
three. A  point Watkins (1986) makes is very relevant here, when she is talking in the 
context of different views of art and their relationship to developmental psychology and 
imaginal dialogues:
“These theories are not presented as incompatible viewpoints to  be chosen 
between, but as perspectives which allow us to  see more o f the complexity o f the 
phenomenon o f art. Indeed, this is our own aim with respect to  imaginal dialogues 
-  not to  pit one theory against another with the hope o f taking a last fall, but to  
see if we can begin to  move freely among viewpoints which have been banished 
from our developmental theorising, as well as those sustained by our present 
conceptions.” (p. 59)
Likewise, I am putting forward these alternative perspectives on the self not just to ‘pit’ 
one against the other, and re-privilege their relations, but to suggest instead that these 
genuinely contradictory perspectives on the self point to something very important
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about the self -  its essentially paradoxical nature. That is, within the self, separateness 
and relationship, singularity and multiplicity, cognition and embodiment, concreteness 
and fictionality, all simultaneously co-exist.
In attempting to understand the nature of the self we are faced with these and other 
paradoxes. In Zohar’s (1990) work, for example, the paradox of self as both ‘particle 
and wave’ is the main paradox to receive attention. O th er paradoxes are; that the self is 
both, in Watkins (1986) phrase, “the organisation of perspectives” and the different 
perspectives themselves; that the self is both at the centre and at the boundary; that the 
self is both the organising principle and the result of its organisation; that the self is both 
the process and the product of itself. Moreover, as I outlined in section three, from the 
perspective of complexity theory, it is precisely these paradoxical qualities that lend the 
self its vitality, its capacity to change, to  learn, to adapt, to  self-organise to  create new 
emergent forms for itself at the “edge of chaos”.
It is, finally, this fundamentally paradoxical quality that helps retain the essential mystery 
of the self, which means, as Heraclitus says of the soul (Wheelwright, 1959);
“You could not discover the limits o f the soul, even if you travelled every road to  
do so; such is the depth o f its meaning.”
Postscript
Having largely written this chapter in November 2001, I followed my practice of 
‘showing my w ork to others’ and sent this writing to a number of people. The responses 
were very positive.
Patricia Shaw, Visiting Professor at the University of Hertfordshire, commented:
“This is an impressive chapter, quite a tou r de force. So densely inten/voven that it 
is difficult to  pick apart and I wouldn’t  want to. The really interesting thing is how 
this relates to  other parts o f your writing. Are you going to  make some explicit 
connection or let them stand side by side? Anyway it is meaty, stimulating stuff. You 
manage to  ‘review the literature,’ usually so dull, in a racy, provocative’ passionate 
way, with real fluency.”
110
Andy Smith, my colleague and room-mate at Roffey Park first referred to a quote from a 
novel he had been reading:
“And he who wields the white wild magic gold 
is a paradox -
fo r he is everything and nothing,
hero and fool,
potent and helpless -
and with one world o f truth o r treachery
he will save or damn the Earth
because he is mad and sane,
cold and passionate’
lost and found
The Chronicles o f Thomas Covenant The Unbeliever -  Stephen Donaldson
He then went on to say:
It just so happened I was re-reading these books when I got your paper and it 
seemed to  me there were lots o f connections. Although I have to  say the books 
are lightweight compared with your effort. Cos, w ow  you certainly know how to  
pack it in. W hat I mean is there is so much content in each sentence and it all or 
most o f it to  me made sense to  me. But I’m not sure my speed reading techniques 
would work on this piece!
I think this is an incredibly thought provoking piece which brings together a whole 
range o f thinking and disciplines. I just thought it was an immense effort. I am pretty 
convinced by your arguments and it also caused me as your writing always does to  
reflect on my on practice and selves. Here are some o f my thoughts as they 
occurred.................... ’’
My supervisor Jack Whitehead commented, in an email dated 23rd November 2001:
“ Really enjoyed your chapter on Ideas o f the Self. Very powerful,
Clearly argued, exciting ideas, a most scholarly approach to  engaging with 
the ideas o f other. A  real treat.
You brought me to  the edge o f what can be communicated through 
propositional discourse. You pointed out the limitations o f propositional, 
scholarly discourse, in creatively engaging with the tensions, conflicts, 
paradoxes and contradictions in your opposites.”
As well as responding appreciatively when I showed him the writing in this chapter, Jack 
Whitehead also posed a challenge that gave me great food for thought and which 
continues to reverberate throughout this thesis.
His further question about this writing was:
‘Til be fascinated to  hear if it does help you to  move onto being able to  
say what is important to  you in your practice (as educator). Let's check 
out the validity o f my thinking that it won 't help you at all! I reckon 
that a move onto being able to  say what is important to  you in your 
practice as an educator will require a creative break with your 
propositional (mind) into a different epistemological and ontological 
relationship with your bodymind.”
I will return to this challenge later in chapter six after I have introduced other voices in 
addition to the ‘scholarly voice’ of this chapter.
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Chapter Four 
Multiple Voices of the Self
Introduction
The previous chapter gives an extensive theoretical argument for perspectives on the 
self which emphasise its relational, multiple, embodied and fictional nature in contrast to  
dominant perspectives on the self largely originating in the world-view of modernity 
which focus on the selfs separateness, singularity, cognitive basis, and concreteness. This 
thesis will now go on to explore how I have tried to  w ork  with and realise these less 
dominant perspectives on the self in my practice.
One important area in which I go on to examine working with a more relational, 
multiple, embodied, fictional sense of the self is in my practice as an educator and in 
working with organisational change. This will be illustrated in chapters seven and eight.
A  further area to  explore this sense of the self is through the medium of the writing of 
the thesis. The previous chapter, as already noted, is written in one particular voice -  
what I have termed my ‘scholarly voice’. It is, though, only one possible voice, albeit a 
powerful and dominating one in academic discourse. I appreciate the sweep and 
intellectual rigour of this voice. Its value further lies in being able to argue for the 
existence and validity of other voices. A  ‘polyphony’ of voices (Bahktin, 1984) can then 
be used to  structure the thesis, in which the different voices, indicating different forms 
of awareness and expression, are given equal weight. Tw o of these additional voices will 
now be introduced. The first, in the remainder of this chapter is a ‘critical/cynical voice’, 
which has already made a brief entry in the dialogical postscript in chapter two. The 
second voice to be introduced will be a ‘personal autobiographical’ voice in chapter five.
These different voices whilst being aspects of the w rite r’s individual psyche 
simultaneously have a social and collective dimension. They find expression using 
different genres, which shape and give form to their particularity. The ‘critical/cynical 
voice’ can be located within the style and forms of expression of a certain kind of 
contemporary journalism and fiction writing. Likewise the ‘personal autobiographical 
voice’ can be located within the general area of autoethnography and confessional 
writing.
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In this and the next chapter, I will mostly let each voice speak for itself, with some short 
commentaries in the following sections. Connections and linkages between the voices 
will be made in chapter six.
Section one: the Critical/cynical voice’
This voice has already been introduced in the imaginary dialogue at the end of chapter 
two. He will be given a full head of steam and the rights to  an exclusive platform in the 
following book review. This was written in March 1999, (apart from the quote by Roy 
Keane, which was inserted later as it seemed so apt).
A review of ‘Synchronicity: the Inner Path of Leadership’ by Joseph Jaworski
(1996)
The only thing that goes with the flow is a dead fish Roy Keane (2002)
Its coming to America first,
The cradle of the best and of the worst 
It's here they got the range 
and the machinery for change 
and it’s here they got the spiritual thirst 
It’s here the family’s broken 
And it’s here the lonely say 
That the heart has got to open 
In a fundamental way.
Democracy is coming to the U.S.A.
Leonard Cohen, from his album The Future’ ( 1992)
I had heard of this book from a number of sources. I had previously taken it off a friend’s 
bookshelf and flicked through it, but he had told me he did not rate it very highly so I 
did not pursue reading the book at that time. But I kept finding references to it, so 
eventually went up to  the Learning Resource Centre at Roffey Park Management 
Institute to see if they had a copy. Surprise. Surprise. You go searching for a book 
entitled ‘Synchronicity’ and you find that tw o copies have just arrived that very day. 
Clearly the universe was trying to tell me something.
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So I read the book, very avidly in fact. I read it on the train, I read it at home, I read it in 
cafes, I read it at work. I kept thinking that someone would come up to me and say 
’Excuse me. I couldn’t  help but notice what you are reading. I’m the author of that book. 
Do you mind if we sit down and have a chat.’ O r  else, I imagined that, whilst immersed 
in the book, I would look up and gaze into the eyes of the most beautiful woman in the 
world, and without saying a word we would just know that we were predestined to  
meet, that we would be married within the year, have four beautiful and unusually gifted 
children (two boys and tw o girls), and she would give up her highly paid job as a fund 
manager working for George Soros and retrain as a missionary. Unfortunately none of 
this happened.
Overall, I found the book very moving and stimulating. In places it moved me to tears, at 
other times I was prompted to anger. I thought this is in many ways a wonderful and 
unusual book, it gives importance to  all the things I care about but why, putting aside my 
own envy and jealousy, does it leave me feeling slightly queasy?
The book documents in a highly personal way the author’s life-journey from being born 
the son of ‘the Colonel’, a Colossus indeed (very difficult to be born into such a wealthy 
family with such a brilliant and enormously respected father who would later become 
chief prosecutor for the W atergate trials), through to dazzling early career success in 
building a prestigious law practice, and then on through divorce, mid-life crisis, meetings 
with remarkable men and the odd woman (who he marries), to  setting up the leadership 
institute that would save the world. And then onto working in a senior management 
position as head of worldwide scenario planning with Shell, that well known paragon of 
corporate virtue and foresight -  this was after all written pre-Brent Spar and no amount 
of clever scenario planning and jetting all over the world to meet key people in tune 
with the Zeitgeist is going to predict the warped actions of a few tree-hugging misfits 
from Greenpeace.
Along the way the author is blessed with conversation and acquaintance with some of 
the leading intellects of the age; David Bohm, Peter Senge, Francisco Varela, and 
anybody who is anybody in the leadership business - John Gardner, Rosabeth Moss 
Kanter, W arren  Bennis, Mayor Tom Bradley, and Uncle Tom Cobbley and all (except 
he’s not American so possibly wouldn’t  make the list).
Actually, sarcasm aside, the book is at times very touching, and the questions the author 
is grappling with are extremely important and some are difficult to  convey in words.
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W h at does it mean to live differently? W h at does it mean not to live and act out of the 
traditional, mechanistic, instrumentalist, W estern worldview which privileges doing and 
achieving far beyond being? W h at happens when we try to act more in accordance and 
in participation with emergent and unfolding processes and dynamics in groups and 
organisations? H ow  can we create real dialogue within and between the institutions 
which govern our lives? H ow  can we see the world more holistically when our thinking 
is so entrenched in creating separation and division?
So what is the problem? W hy do I feel queasy?
W ell, first, there is the problem of what I see as the huge unaware, cultural bias in the 
book. A t times it reads as if it is American leadership that is going to save the world. On  
page 92, in an important early meeting with John W . Gardner, Joe says
“ I finished by telling him that what I envisioned was larger in scope than discovering 
and developing leadership fo r our country. I told him that I thought the world was 
on the threshold o f a golden era, and that what we did as citizens o f this planet 
would determine whether we could make it, that we were truly at a turning point, 
and that American leaders could play a pivotal role in the human race making this 
transition.”
It’s onwards, upwards, ever-optimistic, towards the rosy new prosperous dawn of what 
later, when Joe gets to  w ork on his preferred scenario, increasingly looks like unfettered 
deregulated free trade and market liberalisation.
Joe Jaworski, from his humble origins as an everyday WASP, has stumbled upon some 
very different ideas about the world and how human beings can act in the world, which 
Eastern cultures have been articulating over the last tw o millenia, though to be fair there  
is the passing nod to and occasional quote from Lao-Tzu. And in a breath-taking piece of 
marketing, these ideas are getting re-packaged as this radically new (predominantly 
American led) approach to  leadership which the rest of the world can’t  help but follow.
Tellingly, one of the comments on the back cover from Dee Hock flogging the book
says, “  Synchronicity is the story of one man’s journey toward the place we must all
go in the century ahead” (my underlining). In this brave new world of emergence and 
possibility there is this prescribed place that we all have to go to. Please M r Hock may I 
be excused. Clearly it is our inescapable destiny to  follow this new version of the
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American dream, to  join Joe Jaworski and all the tin men on the yellow brick road to  
Utopia.
I can’t  help thinking that it’s a shame and no coincidence that in all the wonderful people 
he came across in his global travels Joe did not have a meaningful encounter with an 
ardent, post-modern, gay Eastern European feminist who could have deconstructed his 
heroic quest for world leadership. But then she probably would not have been young, 
beautiful and heterosexual unlike the future Mrs Jaworski whom Joe does 
synchronistically encounter at O ’Hare airport in Chapter 13.
And whilst on the theme of quest, Joe wheels in another Jo, a certain Joseph Campbell, 
to  help out and provide mythological justification for his life purpose and leadership 
curriculum. Clearly, (and after repeated viewing of Star W ars), we are all engaged in the 
hero’s quest, going through the three stages of hearing the call and departing, suffering 
the trials and ordeals, and finally returning and reintegrating to  society. So let’s take this 
description of the hero’s journey, which normally will have its own unique rhythm and 
timing for each person, and build a programme around it. It’s the new spiritual 
whistlestop tour of the world. If it’s Tuesday it’s not Paris but the supreme ordeal. O K  
folks, time to move onto reintegration, the programme’s nearly at an end.
So this new packaging of the American dream might understandably be some cause for 
the queasiness, but what else?
W ell, there is a major problem around assigning meaning to  the events Joe encounters. 
Clearly, Joe thinks he is on a roll or ‘in the flow’and participating in the unfolding of the 
universe and his pivotal role within the universal scheme of things. This is experientially 
validated, for him, by the sense of doors opening and what Joe calls ‘predictable 
miracles’. The universe is cooperating with Joe to help him fulfil his destiny. But I’m not 
so sure it’s so easy and unequivocal to assign a sense of larger meaning to  one’s life. In 
his book, T h e  Spiritual Tourist’, Mick Brown amusingly describes travelling in India on 
the ashram trail and having the continual conversation when meeting strangers about 
the meaning behind their meeting and how it is an expression of God’s (or a more local 
guru’s) purpose. It is very easy and also a potential route to  full-blown paranoia as well 
as genius and mysticism to be constantly seeing the interconnectedness and wider 
purpose behind everything.
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And there is an assumption that if we are fulfilling our destiny, participating in the 
universe’s unfolding, that will be a benign process, heading towards greater democracy 
and, yes, surprise, surprise, towards those American Constitutional ideals of freedom  
and self determination. H ow  marvellous when the universe itself starts to  market the 
American dream. Microsoft and Coca-Cola get to sponsor God, and, better still, in a co­
created universe, God is also sponsoring Microsoft and Coca-Cola.
In another important early meeting with Charles Kiefer and Peter Senge, Joe summarises 
Kiefer and Senge describing ‘metanoic organisations’ as
“  these organisations operate with a conviction that they can shape their
destiny. The climate created within such an organisation can have profound effects 
upon people particularly by nurturing an understanding o f and a responsibility for 
the larger social systems within which the individual and the organisation operate. 
In such an organisation, individuals aligned around a common vision can have 
extraordinary influence in the world.” (p. 94)
Yes, I can buy that, but not the implicit assumption that this is then equated 
automatically and unproblematically with goodness and virtue and, as said earlier “basic 
beliefs in freedom and self-determination.” (p. 94). Joe is very excited by all this talk of 
‘metanoic organisations’ and tells Charlie and Pete;
"  their concepts were highly aligned with the fundamental themes o f the
Leadership Forum: that at the heart o f effective societal leadership is a deep sense 
o f purposefulness; that there is extraordinary power in a group committed to  a 
common vision; that successful leadership depends upon a fundamental shift o f 
being, including a deep commitment to  the dream and a passion fo r serving versus 
being driven by the pursuit o f status and power ” (p. 94).
Yes, great! This is all good stuff, as American as apple-pie and motherhood. But, a cheap 
point, what about Hitler? N o w  there was a man with vision and commitment, who saw 
himself as fulfilling a larger destiny, tied up with the destiny of his race. O K , so maybe he 
wasn’t  so hot on dialogue but he sure knew how to create alignment. Probably all 
manner of ‘predictable miracles’ occurred to  him, many extraordinary coincidences, all 
those doors opening, which must have convinced him that he was indeed a man of 
destiny.
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W h at is completely lacking in this account of leadership is any real recognition and 
analysis of power and power relations. It is a fundamentally asocial, ahistorical, critically 
unreflective account of leadership and organisations. There is only one place in the book 
where some of the real political problems and preoccupations of people in organisations 
surface. That is on page 128 where Joe says;
"This incompleteness in me also resulted in my attracting some key people around 
me on whom I ultimately couldn’t  rely -  people whose deeper interest was not in 
the forum, but in their own agendas.”
But note that Joe sees this as a personal problem, an ‘incompleteness’ in him, rather 
than a wider social and political problem. O r  else the issue is framed (p. 129) as 
‘incoherence in the organisation’, so that it is only a matter of getting everyone truly 
aligned again, ideally through deep dialogue. This ignores the political dimension of 
organisational life, which emphasises that individuals and groups will have different 
interests and agendas, and that all this talk of coherence and alignment serves as an 
ideology to mask and obfuscate real differences. Also, as writers like Pascale and Stacey 
have pointed out, conflict and lack of coherence can lead to unexpected creativity and 
innovation.
But Joe does not want to lose his sense of everyone being aligned with a universal 
purpose. W h o  knows, it might be bad for business. And this brings me onto my final 
reason for discomfort with the book.
Assuming that we may indeed be able to act in a different way which is more ‘in flow’ 
and participating in life’s unfolding rather than trying to bend our lives to a 
predetermined plan, and, let’s face it, this is not easy, it takes more than a few chance 
airport meetings or encounters with the natural world to do this -  in many religions this 
is acquired through years of disciplined spiritual practice. So, assuming that we can do 
this, even if only for those short-lived wonderful moments of epiphany -  if Joe had his 
way w e’d be in flow the whole time - what then is our relationship to this wider sense 
of what is beyond us, beyond our egoistic concerns, beyond the human altogether? And 
what attitude does participation with the beyond generate in us?
And this is the source of my last discomfort. For Joe, it appears to be part and parcel of 
the experiences he has had that he expands into them, rather than vice versa. On page 
57, reflecting on his mystical moment with the ermine up a mountainside, and other
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watershed experiences, he says; “ I continued to  have similar experiences where my 
sense of identity expanded to  include God and the entire universe.”
Hey Joe. You don’t  think you might be getting a little grandiose here? You’re expanding 
into God, rather than God and the universe penetrating and filling you. Having nurtured 
cultural imperialism elsewhere in the book, now we are getting into psychological 
imperialism - the western ego’s on the rampage again. And this underlying grandiosity is 
a constant theme in the book. Joe’s temptation is to see the universe operating through 
him, to  be affirming him in his role of creating the leadership institute that will save the 
world.
And this theme reaches its ultimate expression in the final chapter of the book. Here  
Joe teams up again with Peter Senge and she-who-is-foredestined-to-become-his-editor- 
even-though-many-others-would-kill-for-the-honour, Betty Sue, to  participate in a 
conference on learning organisations and communities at Mount Washington Hotel, 
Bretton W oods, N ew  Hampshire. This venue, of course, is seriously endowed with 
significance (those ‘predictable miracles’ are having a ball). For Joe, Bretton W oods is a 
symbol of post-war partnership, an expression of generosity of spirit of the victors, the 
birth of a new world order ushered in by (p. 188) ‘the currency stability that was badly 
needed for reconstruction.’ He seems blissfully unaware of other readings of this 
historic event as the beginnings of an oppressive, dollar-dominated global economy.
Peter Senge, too, is determined to get in on the act of giving world-importance to  his 
and his audience’s work. He says,
“Just to  say the obvious, that's why we’re here. Something special is happening 
here, and it’s happening at many places all over the world. When the world leaders 
came here in 1944, they came with a sense o f purpose and did extremely 
important work. And important work is taking place in this room at this very 
moment.’’ (p. 195).
Anyway, not content with the symbolism of the birthplace of the new post-war world  
order, Joe also wants to bring in the Nuremberg war trials, his father, and the question 
about what enabled many ordinary Germans to go along with the horrors of the 
holocaust. And this leads us to  the final hubris when he says;
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. J  discovered that this is the work I intend to  do. It is also the work Peter is 
doing: to  discover how to  transform institutions as well as the individual human 
heart to  ensure that this kind o f pain doesn’t  continue to  occur in the world again 
and again.” (p. 194)
Do they really think they can do this? This is the ultimate human arrogance; to  believe 
they can unlock the mystery of the human heart, to  continue unquestioningly the whole 
enlightenment project, to  bring light and order into the world. W here  is the proper 
recognition and respect for the dark, for the shadow, for Dionysus as well as Apollo?
Section two: com m entary
A  friend, on reading the above, referred to  the style of the review as my ‘Loaded’ voice 
(after the male magazine). This is a critical, ironic, clever, cutting, cynical, sneering voice 
very much to be found in certain kinds of contemporary journalism. This comment 
helped me see the collective as well as the idiosyncratic dimension of this voice. I am not 
just articulating a personal point of view and form of expression in this voice but also 
expressing a style and phenomenon of the times we live in -  a pervasive sense of 
cynicism.
Bourdieu, the French sociologist, provides a profound and far-reaching perspective from  
which to  understand the prevalence of cynicism. His short book ‘Acts of Resistance’ 
(1998) is a collection of talks in which he argues against the way that neo-liberalism, the 
current dominant economic orthodoxy, assumes an inevitable, naturally based order and 
is no longer seen as a set of social and political choices that can be challenged and 
opposed. In an argument echoing that of the first section of chapter three, he claims that 
neo-liberal economic discourse is a ’’programme of methodical destruction of collectives 
(neo-classical economics recognises only individuals, whether it is dealing with 
companies, trade unions o r families).” Bourdieu claims that current economic thinking, 
by basing itself entirely on mathematical model of the rational individual, sets out to  
destroy the public, collective dimension of life and the social and political gains that 
societies have made in the last hundred years o r so. In this context, he says, occurs “the 
imposition, everywhere, at the highest levels of the economy and the state, or in 
corporations, of that kind of moral Darwinism, which, with the cult of the ‘winner’ 
establishes the struggle of all against all and cynicism as the norm of all practices.” (His 
emphasis).
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I find Bourdieu’s comment on cynicism here very illuminating. It helps shift what I 
generally experience as a uniquely personal voice, more habitually directing its venom 
into self-criticism, into understanding this as a form of internalised social expression, 
which has arisen in the particular context of a dominant view of market economics that 
also impacts many other realms of life
Section three: the personal autobiographical voice’
Section six of chapter one describes how a ‘personal autobiographical voice’ became a 
significant voice in the writing of this thesis. In the same way that my ‘critical/cynical’ 
voice can be understood as a form of both self and social expression, ‘my personal 
autobiographical voice’, as well telling the unique story of phases of my life history, 
draws on the established literary genre of personal autobiography, and, as an example of 
a social scientific research method, can be situated within the field of autoethnography.
In the first six months of 2001, I w rote two autobiographical accounts to  help clarify 
what had shaped and influenced my self, my values and my practice. These tw o accounts 
are contained in section one and section three of the next chapter. Sections tw o and 
four of chapter five offer some commentary on the responses generated by showing 




“Autoethnography is an autobiographical genre o f writing and research that displays multiple 
layers of consciousness, connecting the personal to the cultural. Back and forth ethnographers 
gaze, first through an ethnographic wide-angle lens, focussing outward on social and cultural 
aspects of their personal experience; then, they look inward, exposing a vulnerable self that is 
moved by and may move through, refract, and resist cultural interpretations.
Ellis & Bochner (2000)
Section one: my first twenty one years
I f  we are ignorant o f our past, 
we will be obliged to declare that 
everything durable in our society was 
constructed by ghosts and consequently 
we ourselves are nothing more than the 
souls o f the departed.
Without the culture o f tradition, we would 
not have the tradition of culture.
We would be orphans of imagination
Carlos Fuentes
I was born in Farnborough, Kent in January 1954. A t the time my father was away in 
Andover completing his national service in the RAF and my mother was living in 
Chislehurst. 1954 was also the year, according to Naomi Klein in her book ‘N o  Logo’ 
(2000), that Marlboro man was launched - “the longest running ad campaign in history.” 
In common with many young men I would grow up to  be influenced by the image of 
rugged ness, self-sufficiency, and isolation the brand offered as a role model of 
masculinity. Indeed, when I started to smoke in my adolescence, I rapidly graduated
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from the coarseness of Players No. 6 through to  the gold embossed refinement of 
Benson & Hedges and onto the cool of Marlboro.
My birth was long and difficult. W hen I finally emerged into the world I had to  be put 
into an incubator for a number of days. The effort and pain of my birth so appalled my 
mother that she decided she did not want to  go through it again until my father 
persuaded her to  have another child some nine years later when my sister was born. I 
have no recollection of my mothers’ pregnancy then - no memories of her growing 
larger, no memories of talking about a new member in the family. My sole memory of 
this time is my father answering the phone at home, after my mother had given birth at 
hospital, and being given news of the new arrival and telling me my mother had had a 
baby girl. My sister was called Dilwen, an unusual Welsh name, named after a friend at 
school my mother had known and liked.
I have very little sense of continuous memory of the first ten o r so years of my 
childhood. Perhaps nobody does. There seems to be a blanket of fog immersed over 
that time. There are of course snippets, fragments of memory. For example, my first day 
at school, the thrill of holding hands with Susan, my new friend from the Council estate 
at the bottom of the hill, as we were lined up in pairs to go into the canteen; the strange 
new smells of school dinners, wax crayons and sandpits. I recall the smell and texture of 
the old blanket, that I used to  wrap around my feet to help me sleep, which I called 
‘cosy’ and which later I understood from reading W innicott (1971) as the major 
’transitional object’ in my childhood. I can remember the times I would explore the 
corners of our small back garden to look for snails and other insects to put in the 
vivarium I had acquired. Occasionally now a small detail in my current life will grasp me - 
the particular shade of a toy, the soft glow of a fairy light display at Xmas - and re-evoke 
a feeling from my childhood, not a concrete memory attached to  a specific incident but a 
lived connection from the present back to  the past, bodily felt as an opening in my chest, 
a sense of depth and continuity for which I am grateful.
\
I do not imagine this sense of fragmented memory is unusual. It went along too, in my 
case, with no strong sense of family history across the generations, little sense of 
rootedness, of wider cultural location. My mother was an only child and had lost her 
mother in 1940 when she was a young girl. H er father eventually came to live with us 
for a few years until his death in 1961 but he remains a shadowy figure, kindly but 
indistinct. My father by contrast conveyed a much stronger sense of family history. His 
family were from the W est Country and for a number of generations had lived in and
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around Plympton St Maurice. His father was a plumber and a number of his relatives 
were local dignitaries -  I would be taken to visit his aunts and uncles and be shown the 
splendid mayoral chain his uncle’s position merited. W e  would over a number of years 
visit his family in Devon for the summer holidays, motoring down in our new car (a 
temperamental Ford Popular before we acquired the more reliable Ford Escort) and 
spending hours stuck in traffic on the Honiton by-pass. His parents lived in a smallish 
terraced house, a short walk away from the main shopping street in Plympton. His 
mother cooked the most wonderful Cornish pasties, with a thick ridged pastry crust and 
the perfect combination of peppery minced beef, potato, turnip and carrot that I have 
never been able to find again.
For most of my childhood we lived in a typical three bedroomed semi-detached house 
in a newly built suburban estate in Upminster, Essex, on the outskirts of London. This 
estate had been built on what I assume now was farmland. Towards the end of my 
teenage years the N orth  Eastern corner of the M25 was being constructed to encircle 
the whole of Upminster within the London orbital ring. Today standing in the local park, 
bordering on woodland, where I played endless games of ‘runouts’ with my 
schoolfriends, you can hear the constant low roar of the traffic. Most of the roads on 
the estate were named after British rivers. W e  lived in number two, Forth Road. O u r  
house bordered onto the local school’s playing fields. Emerging from the greyness and 
bleakness of post war austerity, the estate was helping cultivate the rising middle class 
that my parents were aspiring to. It was situated between the Council blocks of flats at 
the bottom of the hill and the larger detached houses at the top of the hill, one of 
which, in 1967, we moved to.
The infant and junior schools I attended were tw o streets away, a short walk up Forth 
Road, and down Severn Drive. I could walk there with the other children from the same 
side of my street without having to  cross a road. Very recently, visiting the 
neighbourhood of streets around my old house, the area became re-animated with 
memory. The fog cleared to reveal a landscape criss-crossed with incident and desire. 
This landscape was no longer the revelation of suburban mediocrity and dullness I have 
tended to stereotype it as. Each house, intersection of streets and recreational area, 
evoked the recall of events and people such as; a fight between my and a neighbour’s 
dog; my country dancing partner who lived at number ten Forth Road and who was the 
source of my first crush; my lengthy but eventually successful attempt to climb every 
one of eight trees in the local park; the shocking occasion when a man exposed himself 
to  my best friend’s sister and forced her to  masturbate him.
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I don’t  remember either being especially happy or unhappy as a child. I was certainly 
upset and horrified by the incident involving my friend’s sister and my mind became filled 
with wild and unpleasant imaginings of the horrors that lurked in the woods. I led what 
seemed to  be a relatively normal life amongst the other normal families in that area. I’m 
sure David Lynch, amongst others, would see such ‘normality’ differently. N o  doubt, in 
the English equivalent of Twin Peaks, underneath this veneer of suburban respectability 
and aspiration to affluence, the human psyche continued to manifest its manifold, less 
conventional, possibilities -  they were though, mostly, well hidden from view. My father 
worked hard, achieving steady promotions from engineer to  overall plant manager at the 
Proctor and Gamble factory he worked at in Grays Thurrock and played golf at 
weekends. My mother stayed at home and cooked and cleaned and had coffee with her 
friends. Everybody around us seemed the epitome of a normal family apart from a girl 
down the road in my latter years at junior school achieving the stigma of becoming a 
child from a ‘broken home’. A fter thirty-five years, this ‘girl’ recently re-contacted me 
through Friends Reunited; she is now living near N ew  York, working as a conference 
organiser. H er own marriage has just ended, and she is morning the loss of many people 
she knew who were killed in the W orld  Trade Buildings on September I I th.
I did well at school and was earmarked to  take the scholarship exams for the nearest 
D irect Grant School. In my last year at Junior school, together with the son of my 
parents’ closest friends, (who was by then my best friend), I received extra tuition from  
the headmaster of our junior school. W e  would go together to see him at his house 
about a mile away towards the centre of Upminster. The timing of our visits there 
meant that we missed T o p  of the Pops’ which was rapidly becoming the important TV  
event of the week and therefore these additional lessons were tinged with resentment 
at both the demands of the extra w ork and also missing our favourite programme - 
video recorders were still about a decade away.
As well as a few pupils taking the scholarship exam, the whole of the eldest class at 
junior school also took the eleven plus. Part of the preparation for this era of exams was 
M r Troughton, our teacher, devising quizzes in which the entire class would stand at the 
front of the classroom and be asked quick-fire questions which would eliminate the 
people who were slowest to answer. The deselected pupils would return to their desks. 
There would be a number of rounds of this game, the numbers of pupils growing smaller 
each time culminating in a final between tw o  people. Doing well at this, which I usually 
did, resulted in gold stars being given to the house one was placed in. I was in Pentyre 
house.
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My friend and I duly took the scholarship exam to Sir Anthony Browne’s school in 
Brentwood. To  my chagrin he obtained a scholarship and I did not but I did well enough 
in this exam and my eleven plus to warrant being given a place at Brentwood which was 
funded by the local council. I also recall being helped in my eleven plus by my 
headmaster -  the selfsame man who had provided the extra tuition -  surreptitiously 
giving me the answers to  the only question I could not do on the maths paper. Looking 
back, this was the moment I can trace my disillusionment with academic objectivity to - 
an early example of Habermas’ (1972) point that one cannot detach knowledge from  
human interests.
I duly attended Sir Anthony Browne’s school at Brentwood. This, in contrast to the 
informality and innocent friendliness of my previous schools, was a major ‘culture shock’ 
and I was unhappy for most of my six years and one term there. The school was for 
boys only and, although taking a mixture of fee paying and council funded places and also 
boarding and day-boy pupils, was modelled on a traditional English public school. In fact 
my school seemed to have absorbed all the petty tyranny and deep rooted cruelty of the 
English public school system with none of its richness and eccentricity of tradition. W e  
were required to refer to  our classmates by our surnames, so my best friend was no 
longer ‘Matthew’ but ‘Scales’. I remember my first Latin lesson in which the Latin master 
demonstrated the declension of the verb ‘amare’ (to love) by beating out its various 
tenses on the back of one of my class mates until the boy was reduced to tears (and 
then had to suffer the ignominy of further taunting from his fellow pupils as a ‘cry-baby’). 
Likewise I remember gym lessons in which the gym teacher, living up to  the caricature 
of sadistic gym teachers at public schools, would entertain himself by getting the whole 
class to  hang by the arms from wall bars in a crucifixion-like pose. The first tw o who 
dropped to  the ground would be caned. Similarly, at the beginning of the lesson, the last 
person to get changed from their ordinary school clothes and into the gym would be 
caned. W hen I saw Lindsay Anderson’s film ‘If  in the late sixties it was immediately 
recognisable - it could have been set at my school.
To  attend the school I was required to travel on the school bus, a journey of about five 
miles. These journeys where the children often ran riot, ignoring the attempts of an 
elderly retainer to keep order, were full of teasing and tormenting. It was important not 
be different, not to attract attention, to have a mannerism which could be picked on, or  
to  be a ‘jewboy’ or a ‘queer’ o r a ‘swot’. Any weakness was seized on by the boys, 
including myself, grateful for the opportunity to be the perpetrator rather than the 
victim of abuse. The school was run on strictly hierarchical lines with the masters overall
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in charge, then the prefects, then the older boys lording it over the younger boys and so 
on down the line. The worst place to be was therefore in the youngest year, the second 
form, and the only escape seemed through endurance and gradually over time 
progressing through the system, becoming a third form er then a fourth form er then a 
fifth form er and so on. And then in the sixth form, as if by some secret and inexplicable 
mandate to  behave more humanely, we stopped referring to one another by our 
surnames and began using first names.
The abuses of such schools and their role in creating an emotionally damaged patriarchal 
elite have been well documented, including more recent revelations of widespread 
sexual abuse, as well as parodied in films such as ‘If. Thankfully, too, much has been done 
to  change the worst excesses of this form of education. W h at was described as 
‘character building’ is now seen for what it is -  straightforward cruelty. I am still awed 
and appalled at the remarkable capacity of such systems to recreate themselves. In 
common with all abuse, the abused, in this case the younger and weaker boys, over time 
grow up to be the abusers and perpetuate the tradition. Any public attempt within the 
system to show kindness, by the younger and/or newer teachers or the pupils 
themselves, is seized on as a sign of weakness o r being a ‘queer’. And I still find echoes 
of this dynamic, albeit in much more sophisticated forms, at the senior levels of some of 
the organisations I have worked with, especially those who have drawn their 
membership from the English public school system
I survived at this school, propped and pumped up my self-esteem by being good at 
exams. Every month every individual in each class was tested and graded and the results 
publicly displayed. I did well in these internal league tables and then in my GCSE O -  
levels. As I had no clear view myself which subjects I wanted to  pursue at A-level, my 
father arranged for me to see a careers advice service in London. Here I was (further) 
tested and, despite showing no aptitude for anything practically scientific, was 
recommended to take physics, chemistry and maths, which I duly did.
Then, in 1969, I entered the sixth form and found myself being called ‘Paul’ rather than 
‘Roberts’ by my fellow sixth formers. Also, as the different yearnings of adolescence 
made themselves felt, I began to  consider that there might be more to life than the 
endless passing of exams and the regular ennui of watching “Saturday night with the 
Stars’ followed by ‘Match of the Day” on Saturday evenings. A t the same time the after­
glow of the sixties was making significant inroads into my school. Many of the Upper 
sixth form grew their hair long and developed a lively alternative music and drugs
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subculture within the school. I decided that I wanted to branch out -  partly to meet girls 
who were becoming an increasingly unreachable mystery at my single sex school. I 
plucked up courage and asked a boy outside my school who I vaguely knew, if I could 
attend a local youth club with him. To  my surprise he readily agreed. It turned out that 
he no longer attended the youth club I thought that he did, which some of my older 
school fellows also attended and which had a reputation for sixties influenced ‘sex- 
drugs-and-rock-and-roir. He was instead now a regular visitor at the Upminster 
Methodist youth club. So I donned what I hoped was a suitable outfit and went with 
trepidation into this brand new world of mixed gender teenagers. Unexpectedly, and 
happily, I found a number of people at the Methodist youth club from my old junior 
school with whom I had lost contact in the intervening years. I quickly found a ready 
home within this group, not realising that all of us at that time were looking for such a 
home, and was soon spending increasing time outside school establishing myself in this 
peer group. Soon I was going to  parties with my new found and re-found friends and as 
time went on we even evolved a name for ourselves -  the ‘Upminster Fun Gang’. One  
of my friends had a talent for mimicry and nicknames and I found myself surrounded by 
friends with epithets like ‘meat,’ ‘goon’, ‘lean’, and ‘haggis’.
A t our height I imagine this group was a fairly formidable presence. W e, like every gang 
of teenagers, certainly thought we were. Anywhere between ten and twenty of us would 
meet at Upminster station after school -  we attended a variety of schools and the 
station provided a common and convenient meeting point. W e  spent hours hanging 
around the station, street corners (in the summer), and drinking endless cups of instant 
coffee in those houses, including mine, whose parents would give us admittance. 
W henever I now listen to Bruce Springsteen’s song, ‘My Hom etown’, I am impressed 
with his capacity to capture in the music and lyrics this deeply felt sense and memory of 
the place we grow up in.
In 1969,1 discovered rock music, bought my first LP (Disraeli Gears by the Cream), 
learnt which music was cool and rapidly graduated from the Beatles through to Bob 
Dylan and The Incredible String Band, then matured into the west coast psychedelic 
acid-rock of Jefferson Airplane and the Grateful Dead, culminating in the zany surrealism 
of Captain Beefheart. I learnt to  smoke and experimented with the whole range of 
cigarettes from Woodbines to Sobranie Cocktails. A t the same time opportunities for 
further experimentation were becoming available. A  newish member had joined our 
group, nicknamed ‘puscle’ (God knows why), who was an accomplished guitarist and had 
interesting contacts into the more illicit aspects of the rapidly evolving youth scene.
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‘Pustle’ established himself as the local pusher of choice and soon we were all scoring 
our ‘quid’ deals off him and learning the arcane rituals of joint making. It took a few  
occasions for anything to  happen for me with cannabis and it was and remained always a 
mixed experience with the benefits of heightened sensory awareness but the drawbacks 
of inducing an underlying anxiety and mild paranoia that I imagine was always potential in 
me.
There was also an innocence and prankster quality about our group. Led by one of our 
more audacious members, we would raid the local golf course, collect all the flags, and 
use them to w rite messages on the fairway. W e  would fill in mail order forms for our 
local cannabis supplier and get them sent to his home address under the name of Mr. P. 
Usher. W e  would ring up random names in the phonebook and play them brief spoken 
snatches from Captain Beefheart’s ‘Troutmask Replica’ album such as “ A  fish eating 
dough in a polyethylene bag is fast’n’bulbous. G ot me.”
The end of the sixties drug-influenced Zeitgeist began to  exert a stronger pull on me. I 
read T h e  Doors of Perception’, Aldous Huxley’s (1970) book on his experiences with 
mescaline, discovered Timothy Leary’s exhortation to “tune in , turn on and drop out”, 
and borrowed T h e  Tibetan Book of the Dead’ from Upminster library. Some of my 
circle had already tried or w ere considering trying LSD and I decided to  join them. My 
first trip was not especially notable apart from one point. W hilst crossing the large 
recreation ground with two friends, I bumped into a group of ‘skinheads’ (who were not 
well disposed to the ‘hippy’ movement and its local representatives). The situation 
threatened to turn nasty until one of the skinheads, a boy who had a reputation for 
being particularly ‘hard’, recognised me from our days at junior school together and for 
some unfathomable reason decided to leave us alone.
A t school I was becoming less interested in my science A-levels, ostentatiously carrying
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around the latest LP’s I was listening to -  the more obscure the better - and attempting 
to  grow my hair long. This meant trying to stay out of the way of the headmaster who 
was trying to rigorously enforce the school policy on hair not growing over ears or over 
collars. The school, in an attempt to  bring itself into the twentieth century, and enable 
its pupils to  mix with the opposite sex, started having discotheques. A t one of these, a 
girl from one of the tw o sister schools based in Brentwood threw  herself from the 
upper storey of one the main school buildings whilst under the influence of LSD and was 
seriously injured.
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This, predictably, initiated a wide-scale inquiry and sweep-net into the extent of drug 
involvement within the school, which quickly led to  a number of expulsions. The police 
became involved and one evening, whilst I was at home waiting for the start of Monty 
Python’s Flying Circus, there was a phone call for my father. From this, he told me 
gravely that the police wanted to  interview me in connection with allegations that I had 
been involved with other pupils in smoking cannabis. He insisted that I tell him the 
extent of my involvement with drugs and the people who also took drugs with me. I 
told him everything.
A  week o r so later I went with my father to be interviewed by tw o Brentwood based 
policemen. It transpired they had interviewed another boy who had said, accurately, that 
I had smoked cannabis with him at the Shepton Mallett pop festival. This was the only 
direct evidence they had and I strenuously denied this allegation. The police skilfully 
worked their good guy/bad guy routine on me and I was getting close to confessing 
everything when one of them, (the good cop), said; “W e  realise your headmaster is a 
very ruthless man’. A t this point I realised that if I admitted to smoking cannabis I would 
be summarily expelled from the school and so resolved to continue denying the charges.
Sometime later my father was rung by the police and told that they would not be 
pressing charges. I also subsequently learnt (I forget from where) that the reason I was 
not expelled from school was that it was thought I had a strong chance of attending 
Oxford or Cambridge. As the number of pupils reaching Oxbridge was a key 
performance indicator for D irect Grant Schools, it was therefore in the best interests of 
the school for me to remain. I occasionally wonder what course my life would have 
taken if I had bowed to the interrogatory pressure of the police, confessed and been 
expelled.
A t the time I found and still find this a shameful incident. I could see that it effected my 
father deeply and he was concerned that I had ruined or nearly ruined a promising 
future. He made me agree to  not continue to be involved in any way with the drug 
scene and to  stop seeing the friends I had who were involved. I reluctantly agreed to  
this. A t the same time my identity was very wrapped up in the group of friends I had, 
and what I can only think of as the spirit of the sixties. I secretly continued to be 
involved with the friend I had told my father I would not see and continued to smoke 
cannabis. In the summer of 1971 I was offered a lift to  the Isle of W ight Pop festival at 
which Jimi Hendrix was the star attraction. My parents would not allow me to attend 
this so I bundled up the clothes I needed for the event, threw  them out of an upstairs
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window, climbed out of the window and ran away to  the Isle of Wight. I did at least 
have the decency on arrival at the Isle of W ight to  ring my parents and tell them where I 
was.
Despite all these distractions from my studies, and my disenchantment with school life, I 
continued to w ork hard, revise thoroughly for my A-level exams, and obtained very high 
grades. This meant that at the end of the sixth form I stayed on for another term  to  
take the Oxbridge exams. I was now in the seventh form, the school elite, one of a 
group of about twenty boys. O f these twenty, only tw o of us, myself and another boy 
also distantly implicated in the school drug scandal, did not hold positions of 
responsibility as prefects. I have often thought about the ambiguity of the position I had 
here and the way it has continued to be a theme in my life -  both part of the privileged 
white Oxbridge male elite yet also outside, critical, simultaneously drawn to and 
despising of it. Years later at a psychotherapy training workshop, someone described me 
as a ‘maverick’, a word I liked and took to heart as it positively connotated what I still 
generally wondered could be outdated adolescent rebellion.
I continued on the path that others, primarily my father, had mapped out for me -  when 
I was younger and more impressionable he had taken me on visits to Cambridge. I duly 
passed the entrance exams for Oxbridge and was accepted at Sidney Sussex College, 
Cambridge, to read Natural Sciences commencing in September 1972. This meant that I 
had most of what is now referred to  as a ‘gap year’ to  occupy myself with.
For the first part of this year I worked in a laboratory at a pharmaceutical company in 
Dagenham, a few tube stops westwards of Upminster along the District line. W hilst 
doing this, I met up one evening at a party with a form er friend at Brentwood who was 
spending his ‘gap’ year living in Manchester before going on to read Classics at Oxford. 
He was doing community w ork  and working on a radical non-violent Christian magazine. 
This obviously had a huge impact on me as I decided to go and stay with him in 
Manchester. I do not recall letting him know I would do this. I just hitch hiked to  
Manchester one day and turned up at the address he had given me which was the house 
from which the magazine, T h e  Catonsville Road Runner’, was produced. I think he must 
have been surprised by my unannounced and unexpected arrival but this could not have 
been so unusual in that milieu. I was welcomed, found a spot for my sleeping bag in the 
living room, and became part of the collective producing the magazine. I also joined my 
friend in voluntary w ork at the various community projects he was engaged in; serving 
meals to  old people in the Hyde area, working with gypsy children as part of Manchester
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University’s community action group, and helping run an adventure playground in the 
now notorious Moss Side area.
From the spring through to  the summer of 1972, I stayed in Manchester, at first 
continuing to sleep on the living room floor in my friend’s house, and then moving to  a 
rented room in a nearby house with my girlfriend from Upminster. She had joined me 
that summer to w ork in another adventure playground near Old Trafford. During this 
time I was exposed to  radical political thinking and practice. The poverty and rawness of 
life I encountered in Salford and Manchester were a long way from the comfort and 
blandness of suburban London. It had a romance to it, an energy, edge and excitement 
that was absent in my home life.
I entered Cambridge University full of the experiences, ideals and ideas I had 
encountered in Manchester. I stumbled across the plethora of Marxist, socialist and 
anarchist student groups I met selling their wares at the ‘Fresher’ fairs. I was drawn to  
the political ideology of these groups but simultaneously put off by the forms of 
organisation they embodied which seemed as despotic and rigid as the structures they 
w ere committed to change. Later, I saw the parallels between these radical secular 
groups and the millennial or religious cults who provided such good field work  
opportunities for post-graduate sociology students -  a point further brought home to  
me by the experience of a friend who joined one of the more extreme Marxist groups. 
This group became convinced there would be a military coup in England. My friend 
subsequently fled England warning of this imminent seizure of power and then returned 
somewhat shamefacedly when the coup did not materialise.
I soon became disinterested with the science degree I had started out on and changed 
course at the end of my first year to Social and Political Sciences. This provided a more 
amenable home for me both in the companionship of the kindred spirits who were also 
studying for this degree and also in the opportunity to legitimately engage with the 
wealth of ideas in psychology, sociology and political philosophy that constituted the 
syllabus.
As well as pursuing my academic studies and interests in radical political action I 
continued my experimentation with drugs. Coexisting with the more official world of 
the University and its traditions of academia, the debates of the Union, sport, and 
alcohol inspired japes was a strong and heady mix of sixties inspired radicalism and 
alternative subculture. These different alternative worlds reinforced and overlapped one
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another. Many members of the socialist society had long hair and smoked the odd joint 
or two.
I became particularly friendly with tw o fellow students at my college. As in my earlier 
adolescence I had a need to find a peer group to establish myself and find an identity in a 
suitable milieu. The three of us had the same badge of long hair and regularly smoked 
cannabis together. In the second year we decided to take LSD together.
My experience of the ‘trip ’ this time was very very different than the previous occasion.
I think we were sold a particularly pure and powerful brand of the drug, which was 
easily available in Cambridge at that time. W e  took the drug in our rooms and then 
moved out into the college grounds. It was a warm sunny day. I started to experience 
psychedelic hallucinations as the trees, grass and buildings shape-shifted. Although I had 
read extensively about the effects of LSD, and knew in theory about its capacity for ego 
dissolution, I was not prepared psychologically for its full impact. I had assumed it would 
be like donning psychedelic glasses and their equivalent for each sense through which 
the world would appear, sound, smell and taste differently but that I would remain 
psychologically and ontologically unaltered. I thought it would be like a kind of Disney 
theme park for the mind.
Very quickly the hallucinations became unmanageable. I experienced multiple layers of 
hallucinations, dreams within dreams within dreams and so on, that I later saw cleverly 
portrayed in Buneul’s film, “the Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie’. I had not 
appreciated the power of LSD to undermine the normal, consensually validated sense of 
reality we take for granted and which we generally depend on for anchoring and 
security. LSD suggests the unnerving possibility that everything we think is real could be 
a hallucination -  if this is so, then how do we know the world we think we arrive back 
to  after o r during the ‘trip ’ is not just another illusion? As the hallucinations took full 
grip it became more difficult to  remember that where I was and that what was 
happening to me was due to the effects of the LSD. In other words, hallucinations and 
reality merged. A t one point, whilst trying to  pull myself back into the room I was in, 
rather than being lost along the successive trackways of the hallucinations I was engulfed 
by, I succeeded with extreme mental effort in getting back into the room. I then realised 
in horror that I was looking at myself through the eyes of one of my friends. I genuinely 
believed I had re-entered his body instead of mine.
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There was building w ork going on in the college at this time. I became convinced that I 
had died, killed by the scaffolding collapsing on me. I had the full Timothy Learyesque 
experience of seeing my life flash before me, saw my parents at my funeral, distraught 
that I had died in such a manner. I felt my life essence detach itself from the earthly 
relationships I had formed and prepared myself to  move onto the next level of 
existence. A t the same time as I experienced the intense relief and beauty of this 
release, I also saw the full array of subsequent stages of existence laid out like Jacob’s 
ladder in front of me and understood the insignificance of the one step I had taken. I felt 
my life essence dissolve into a river flowing around a figure I later recognised from  
Hindu mythology. I experienced being brought before God to  account for my life and 
await his judgement of whether I was going to  heaven or hell. In ‘reality’ at that time I 
was being taken from one college room to  another. W hen the doors of the room I was 
being taken to were opened and I saw and felt the warmth of the lit gas-fire within I 
became convinced that I was being led to hell and ran off.
Gradually the full force of the ‘hallucinations’ subsided. I felt the relief of returning to a 
world that was apparently familiar, though at one point in my return I thought I was in a 
different world, which was identical to  the world I had began in apart from being an 
exact m irror image. Everything was reversed. A fter I recovered from the awfulness of 
this realisation I remembered thinking that if this were the case then I would just have 
to live in this new world and better get on with it.
O ne of the (many) problems with LSD is that it is difficult to assimilate such an 
experience as I sketch out above within one’s normal frame of reference and to know  
what kind of existential status and validity to ascribe to it. Mainstream western culture 
has successfully marginalised and denigrated such experiences, labelling them as 
psychotic episodes or the consequence of a drug induced illusion. A  number of years 
later, reading in a journal an account by the Reichian bodywork psychotherapist David 
Boadella of his attempts to help his son recover from the nightmare of a bad ‘trip ’, I was 
struck by his description of the LSD experience as being like ‘gate-crashing heaven’. And 
of course it could equally well be hell that is gatecrashed. He makes the further point 
that in many traditions these experiences would be gradually and extensively prepared 
for. Others would act as guides qualified to  help explore these realms. Their spiritual 
significance would be understood and able to be absorbed within the culture as part of a 
valid rite of passage. Typically in the west we are looking for chemically available instant, 
ideally painless, enlightenment. One pill, thanks to the Swiss chemist A lbert Hofman’s 
accidental discovery in 1938, and the C IA ’s subsequent interest in the potential of the
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new discovery as a truth serum to  aid interrogation o r as a means of disabling an 
enemy’s civilian population by poisoning their water supply -  as described in Martin Lee 
and Bruce Schlain’s well researched book ‘Acid Dreams’ (1986) - and all those years of 
discipline, necessary blind alleys and hard graft can be by-passed. The problem of course 
is that the discipline like any spiritual practice has a purpose in its own right and is simply 
not just a means to  an end which can be substituted for by contemporary pharmacology.
It is impossible to  know how this LSD experience has effected me in the long term. 
Certainly it opened my mind to the precariousness and lack of solidity of our normal 
sense of reality. It indicated there are huge areas of normally invisible experience that 
are occasionally glimpsed in daily life and made more accessible through the altered state 
of consciousness offered by the drug. It confirmed Hamlet’s admonition that;
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt o f in your philosophy”
It provided a multi- facetted and bewildering experience of another realm which I have 
come to  think of, for want of a better word, as ‘spiritual’. I appreciated existentially what 
I was beginning to understand intellectually through reading Berger and Luckman’s 
(1966) T h e  Social Construction of Reality’ and attending Anthony Giddens’ lectures 
about the socially determined nature of identity and the competing knowledge grounds 
for social theory. It provided a shattering, mysterious experience I have continually tried 
to  understand and orient myself too.
So apart from radical politics and LSD how else did Cambridge effect me? A t the time I 
was mostly oblivious to the splendour and sublime beauty of the place, seeing instead 
economic privilege and the bastion of the ruling class. Returning there in Easter 1984 to  
attend a conference at St John’s College, I walked along the banks of the river Cam early 
one bright spring morning. The buildings and their grounds were so exquisitely beautiful, 
it almost took my breath away. But for the three years I was there I barely noticed such 
beauty. I graduated with a 2(1) degree, slightly disappointed that I had not got the First 
one of my tutors thought I was capable of. A t the time too I was not enthralled with the 
quality of the educational experience I had received -  at what was meant to be the 
pinnacle of academic excellence -  but was not yet able to articulate the nature of my 
dissatisfaction.
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I considered staying in the academic world to  do research and a PhD, which I now find 
myself doing twenty five years later, but my political ideology at the time was insisting 
that I did some so called ‘real w ork ’. I joined some of the group of friends I had been 
living with in my final year at Cambridge and came down to London to  find a suitable 
property to  squat in.
Section two: working with ‘my first twenty one years’
The bulk of the above autobiographical writing was done during a holiday in Lanzarote 
with my parents and sons in January 2001 and completed in February of the same year. 
The account remains almost entirely as I first w rote it, apart from now dating a number 
of references and making some minor grammatical changes.
Reacquainting myself with it, after a gap of tw o  years, I’m pleasantly surprised by the 
quality of the writing. I think it meets the criteria to be outlined later in the thesis in 
chapter nine of being a ‘good read’, being engaging - at least it re-engaged my interest 
again - and situating my early autobiography in a wider social and political context. It has 
a relatively traditional chronological form at but I like the way that pointers to a future 
self are occasionally layered into the writing. It was written primarily as an experiment in 
autoethnography (Okely & Callaway, 1992), to  indicate the influences that have shaped 
my life, with a focus on as, Denzin (1997) describes, “those events, narratives and 
stories people tell one another as they attem pt to make sense of the epiphanies or 
existential turning-points in their lives.” (p. xvii)
A fter I had written this in February 2 0 0 1, I somewhat nervously showed the text to my 
father, and also said that I proposed to include it on the web-site that was being 
designed for my PhD. I wanted him and my mother to read it first, and consider their 
response, before placing it in the public domain. Despite the trials and tribulations I 
thought I had inflicted on my parents, and the youthful rebellion of my teenage years, in 
later life, and especially following the birth of my tw o sons, I had developed a good 
trusting relationship with my parents. W e  had, though, never really discussed the 
incidents in my teenage years relating to  my drug taking and interview by the police, and 
I had not spoken to my father about my experiences with LSD. These areas still felt raw, 
painful and potentially taboo. In response to  reading the text, my father sent me the 
following email on 5th March 2001.
Paul,
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As promised, I will make some comments on the contents o f your draft 
autobiographical introduction, and try to  articulate some concerns.
1. Do not underestimate people's strong reaction to  the written word. It assumes 
an importance far greater than speech - it is "bread and butter" to  the legal 
profession! - and there is no opportunity to  soften o r amplify your message.
2. A  large part o f the introduction deals with your experimentation with drugs as 
a meaningful influence in your formative years, and very little with sex and your 
relationships with girl friends. I was a bit surprised by this.
3. Because the drug culture is still regarded with suspicion, fear, and criminal in 
nature by society, and particularly the Establishment, your writing will provoke 
strong reaction, given the proposed public exposure over the internet. This will 
effect you, the boys and your business contacts, i.e. your family and career. I 
hope I am not being fanciful when I suggest that comments such as "Do I want 
my organization to  be influenced by a person who has experimented with 
drugs", o r "Does your father encourage you to  try drugs?" could arise.
4. I think you should omit names and references which could identify specific 
individuals - I believe you have already decided to  do this.
5. Do you propose the same degree o f detail and frankness relating to  your later 
life? You will need to  evaluate the effects o f public scrutiny on your family, ex 
wives, friends and business colleagues.
Reading this, I feel it all sounds negative. It comes from my concern with the 
possible effects on your relationship with the boys, and your career. Ultimately you 
have to  decide what risks you are prepared to  take from exposure o f your 
previous experiences and thinking. The account was absorbing and very well 
written. Persevere, I know you will get there in the end.
Love Dad
As I had come, over time, to place great faith in my father’s judgement, I decided to  
amend the account, take into account the inaccuracies identified by my parents, take out 
references that identified other people, and de-emphasise but still include the
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experimentation with drugs. As well as receiving this email in response, sending my 
father this account also led to us broaching in conversation the difficult areas of my past.
As I was now even more aware of the potentially controversial nature of some of this 
material, I asked the chief executive at Roffey Park (who was previously D irector of 
Research at Ashridge) for her opinion of this autobiographical writing. She was already 
familiar with the themes and methods of my research inquiries as I had shown and 
discussed with her the MPhil transfer document submitted in January 2000.
Furthermore, given a recent experience at that time, (referred to in chapter one), 
where a breach of confidentiality occasioned by showing an account of my w ork with 
one organisation to my supervisor and professional colleague had led to  my expulsion 
from X Y Z  organisation that I had been working with and, which was at that time a 
major client of Roffey Park, I was particularly concerned not to  take actions which might 
damage the reputation of Roffey Park.
As on the previous occasion of showing her my work, I was warmed by the 
perceptiveness, generosity and affirming nature of her response. In an email of I st April 
2 0 0 1, she wrote:
Paul
You have probably realised that my delay in responding fully to  your message 
means that I have been struggling a bit so I hope you won't mind if this note takes 
you through my thinking.
First, I loved reading what you have done already. You have a wonderfully direct 
and honest style that is engaging I think because o f the way it triggers memories for 
the reader o f things shared o r not shared. For example..........
Then I worried about your honesty - and the fact that I was eavesdropping not just 
on your experiences but also on those o f others. O f course, I don't know whether 
the identities o f others are disguised or, indeed, whether they are willing for their 
experiences to  be broadcast. This is the dilemma o f all writers and individuals are 
driven in different ways. On the other hand we depend on diaries and similar 
narratives for a real understanding o f social history.......
These thoughts lie at the back o f my mind as I think about you continuing your 
story on the web. I don't think there is anything written thus far that compromises
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Roffey in any way but I guess (and I am guessing) that as your story develops your 
life and Roffey becomes more intermingled. This could become very difficult, 
especially if, as in the recent situation, it involved clients, colleagues o r work 
processes and standards within Roffey more widely. (W e talked briefly at this point 
when you gave me the new paper on 'showing my writing to  others'.)
On the other hand - we must be on the third one by now - Roffey is a strong 
place where difficult and sensitive matters are confronted so we should be able to  
face up to  this and for some individuals it might be positive and helpful. I think this 
is the nub. Individuals will be interested and find meaning in what you say.......
Val
I have reproduced sections of her reply as I think it helps to  validate my inquiries vis-a- 
vis the criteria put forward at the end of chapter nine, especially the line where she says; 
“Individuals will be interested and find meaning in what you say.”
As a result of her response, I decided to publish an amended version of the account on 
my web-site, which was only recently up and running. The account in this thesis is the 
original not the amended account. I decided to make this original account publicly 
available in the thesis after reading, in January 2002, Christopher Bache’s (2000) 
extraordinary book ‘Dark Night, Early Dawn’ and following my subsequent 
correspondence with him.
Christopher Bache’s book is a scholarly, rigorous, experientially based account of his 
sustained experimentation and description of over thirty in-depth sessions of non­
ordinary states of consciousness. He writes within an established tradition of 
experiential inquiry into different states of consciousness and with a background steeped 
in religious study and thought. His writing gave me the courage to take my LSD 
experience more seriously, to  stand up for it, and, by locating it within the field of 
transpersonal psychology, helped me think more productively and creatively about my 
own experience. The ideas in his book connected powerfully, too, with ideas of the self I 
had been writing about tw o months earlier (now in chapter three).
Reading ‘Dark, Night, Early Dawn” astonished me. It demonstrated that it was possible 
to  w rite in both a personal and a philosophical way about different states of 
consciousness. I found many echoes in the book with my own experiences and had a 
number of questions and points I wanted to  raise with the author. As a result, I sent him
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the following mail, dated I I th January 2 0 0 2 .1 include most of the email as it represents 
the articulation of important aspects of my thinking as I attempt to  link the ideas in 
Christopher Bache’s book both with my own experience and with my own thinking 
about complexity. It shows, too, the development of my thinking in a live, dialogical, 
conversational way in interaction with another’s writing rather than the more abstract 
propositional style evidenced in other parts of this thesis. This, importantly, illustrates 
further the practice at the heart of this thesis of generating learning and knowledge in a 
relational context. In this case, significant aspects of the context include the 
foregrounding of my LSD experience through writing ‘my first twenty one years’ and 
also the particular network of relationships leading me to  read ‘Dark Night, Early Dawn’, 
and enabling me discover the author’s email address.
Dear Chris
I came across your book 'dark night, early dawn' via a friend who had been 
recommended it by Peter Reason.
I am currently doing an action research based PhD with Peter Reason at Bath 
University. I asked Peter if he had your email as I wanted to  write to  you about 
your book
First o f all I think you have produced a remarkable book. When I was about 
twenty, I had a very powerful experience with LSD, which I have ever since been 
trying to  better understand and assimilate.
Over the years I have read many things which have helped me better understand 
the nature o f the experiences I had when I took LSD. Reading your book, though, 
has really helped provide a coherent intellectual and spiritual fram eworkto situate 
the experiences I had, and I wanted to  thank you very much fo r doing this.
There are some points from your book I wanted to  ask you about and/or 
comment on
I . First o f all I find some o f the experiences you recount truly extraordinary. 
W here they echo my own experiences with LSD I can follow you, but some o f 
them go way beyond mine. I wanted to  ask you, as you are not explicit in the 
book - are the sessions you describe induced by LSD or some other
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psychoactive drug? I imagine they are as they are so far away from everyday 
consciousness
2. One area in the description o f your sessions that I find hard to  follow (eg p. 
219) is in your positing o f some kinds o f transcendental cosmic beings who 
have intentionally created the world and where the world is unfolding 
according to  a 'cosmic plan'. Also on p. 221 you talk o f "'the dynamics o f 
humanity's awakening as movements initiated and orchestrated by a single 
integrating intelligence".
Because I have read extensively in complexity theory and find it a useful and 
compelling framework, I find it hard to  accept this vision o f a planned universe, 
which unfolds according to  the intentional acts o f a supreme being/agency. I think 
it could look like this in retrospect as when one looks back at ones life and sees a 
pattern that one does not consciously experience in the living o f a life, but I don't 
think that we can therefore attribute a causal agency at work determining in 
advance one's life pattern. I think the thrust o f thinking in complexity is to  indicate 
that life unfolds through complex, self-organising, emergent processes which are 
always inherently unpredictable
I wonder, if as you try to  describe the phenomena you experienced, you revert to  
a language and way o f thinking which posits a certain kind o f intentional agency - in 
the same way that organisational theory (which is my area o f work) often likes to  
see the transformation in an organisation as resulting and stemming from the 
actions o f an exceptional leader with a brilliant strategy. I do think it is difficult to  
write outside the framework o f this way o f thinking because we are so deeply 
conditioned by it.
Again you say on p. 222; "What I had previously seen simply as individuals 
reincarnating in order to  clear individual karma, I now experienced as a highly 
centralised decision to  cleanse the human mindfield o f its collective karmic legacy in 
order to  prepare humanity fo r what is coming....it was the deliberate movement o f 
the divine being that was evolving itself through the experiences o f our species "
I wonder if again you are positing some causal agency that is over and above the 
living systems in which it is embedded.
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I think there is a good argument to  make from complexity about the emergence o f 
properties o f a whole system that are different from its parts (eg the existence and 
properties o f a species mind, in the same way that individual consciousness can be 
seen to  be the emergent property o f the collection o f neurones in the physical 
brain) but I don't think the properties o f the whole exist apart from and determine 
the parts. I think you give causal primacy to  the whole and imbue it with an 
intentionality which is emergent rather than planned. I also wonder if you over 
personify this by describing it as a being or as Divinity ratherthan as a distributed 
presence embedded in all the parts o f the system
3. The other area I am less convinced about is what I think is your essentially 
optimistic vision arising from the ecological crisis. Like you, and others, I am 
increasingly concerned about the increasing erosion o f many life systems and 
their supporting systems on the planet. I guess too like in any crisis, such as 
within an individual, a marriage, o r an organisation, the crisis has the potential 
fo r growth and transformation. But I fear that history indicates that the effects 
o f the coming crisis are more likely to  precipitate a variety o f fascism as a form 
o f social organisation as people become more fearful and insecure than to  lead 
to  more enlightened forms o f social organisation.
I know you do acknowledge that there will be great suffering ahead. Perhaps I have 
less confidence and have not had the kinds o f experiences that have led you to  
have faith in a more awakened outcome to  this process.
I hope you experience the comments I make as attempts to  engage you in 
dialogue ratherthan as critical points. I really enjoyed and was hugely stimulated by 
your book, and was heartened to  see that it is possible to  combine a rigorous 
intellectual approach with profound experiential work.
I think the comments I make too  are part o f my attempt to  link the work you have 
done into frameworks that I am working with and find useful in situating my life and 
work
I would be pleased to  correspond further with you about this if you have time and 
the interest to  respond
Best wishes Paul Roberts
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In his email response of 6th February 2002, Christopher Bache gave an extremely full 
reply -  over 2500 words. W hilst I would dearly like to  reproduce this here as I think it 
is extremely interesting, I can see that for the purposes of this PhD it may be 
inappropriate to extensively quote someone else’s work. I was delighted to receive such 
a considered and informed response to  my questions. This prompted a further email 
from me in reply dated 17th February 2002. Again I reproduce the email in full to  
indicate the elaboration and interweaving of ideas occasioned from our correspondence.
Chris
Thanks for your very full and thoughtful and thought-provoking response to  my 
comments on your book. I thought I would respond to  some o f the points raised 
in your mail. If this stimulates you to  respond further, I would welcome that but all 
in its own time.
And thanks too for answering the question I asked you about the exact origin o f 
your experiences so frankly. I was also intrigued by a comment you made in your 
book about needing to  stop your sessions for a while because o f the strain they 
were placing your family under.
I can see your point about the ideas o f emergence, self-organisation and 
unpredictability which are arising in complexity and which offer a challenge to  the 
traditional Newtonian-Cartesian scientific paradigm being applicable primarily to  the 
'normal' space-time universe and that other perspectives outside our usual ideas o f 
space-time can exist. This does make sense to  me. I think the difficulty here is 
knowing on what basis then to  think about how these very different ideas can have 
validity. Because I can see that such ideas cannot be validated within the normal 
frames o f reference. Someone like Karl Popper the philosopher o f science would 
argue too  that such ideas cannot be open to  falsification. I think it is because you 
have had such profound experiences in your sessions that you can know the 
experiential validity o f these ideas. But how then to  communicate and persuade 
others who have not had such experiences and who would claim and thereby 
dismiss that your experiences are simply drug induced confusion.
Certainly my own major experience with LSD, many years ago now, (and I think 
that this one time I had a particularly pure form o f the drug), showed and 
convinced me, (and I was completely and frighteningly unprepared fo r this), that it 
is possible to  experience the world in a fundamentally different ontological way. I 
had thought that taking LSD would be like having a set o f wild and different
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psychedelic perceptual shifts - I had not appreciated how the LSD experience 
would change the nature o f myself and the basis o f the ground o f my experience. 
And I have not been able to  dismiss these experiences as merely hallucinatory - 
there was a quality to  them o f being real in an entirely different way that we usually 
think o f reality - and I have continued to  find aspects o f these experiences echoed 
in writings about mystical experiences.
And I can see that because I did not experience the kind o f purposeful intelligence 
you describe it is hard fo r me to  follow you there. I wonder about how you find 
this with others. You must have had such unusual and extraordinary experiences 
that it must be hard to  communicate them to  others in ways that others can make 
sense o f - though I think your book, at least for me, is successful in doing this. On 
another level, and this is something that I have found difficult myself, I also wonder 
how easy you find it to  assimilate these experiences into our more normal 
everyday lives o f making a living, being with friends and family etc. I seem to  
remember from your book that you also engage in a regular spiritual practice, 
which I imagine must be important to  ground the experiences in a more everyday 
reality.
I think you make an excellent point about the evidence from reincarnation casting 
huge doubt on our traditional views o f consciousness and not seeing consciousness 
as being primarily rooted in and determined by matter. Again my own experience 
with LSD indicated to  me that reincarnation could be a real possibility.
Also I agree with you that one encouraging idea we can take from chaos and 
complexity is the possibility o f rapid overall system change triggered by a small 
change in part o f the system (the 'butterfly effect'). It is interesting to  see how in 
the field o f management and organisational development where I work the ideas 
from complexity are being absorbed into mainstream ideas about organisation (the 
new steps to  create business success) and coming across for the most part as 
business as usual.
I also find it interesting how some o f these ideas are surfacing in both popular and 
intellectual culture. For example, when I saw the film 'The Lord o f the Rings', it 
seemed to  me that one implicit message in it, as exemplified by the figure o f Frodo 
Baggins, is that one apparently small act o f love or courage can spiritually transform 
a world.
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Also I am currently reading the trilogy o f books by Phillip Pullman - 'Northern 
Lights', 'The Subtle Knife' and 'The Amber Spyglass'. These are meant to  be for 
children but they are wonderful, intelligent and hugely creative novels. In fact in 
England, Phillip Pullman has just received a major literary prize. In these novels, he is 
exploring themes such as our relationship with our souls, the existence o f other 
worlds to  our own, and other non-human forms o f intelligent consciousness that 
humans can interact with.
So I can see that these themes are surfacing in many ways and I'm glad to  hear that 
you remain optimistic!
W ith  best wishes Paul Roberts
A t this point the correspondence ended as I did not receive a further reply to this email.
These were not the only ramifications from this autobiographical writing. In 2001, 
around the turn of the year, prompted by a conversation in a group of chief executives I 
was working with, I registered with the Friends Reunited web-site. One of the more 
immediate responses I had was from Bob, who had also been a member of the 
‘Upminster Fun Gang’. W e  quickly struck up an extended email correspondence, 
swapping memories and relaying any current news of people from that time. Encouraged 
by his shared interest in this period from our common past, I sent him a copy of ‘My 
first twenty one years.’ I found his response encouraging and noted how it had 
stimulated other memories for him. In an email dated 24th February 2002, he said:
“ Read your bio. last night, for someone who was there, albeit fo r a short time, I
found it incredibly atmospheric Those nicknames....will always remember
Lean, but had forgotten Tim "Goon", Graeme" Haggis" and especially" Puscle". I too  
cannot remember how he got that one, or the fact that he was an accomplished 
musician even though we spent a lot o f time in that big house o f his next to  the 
station ”
“Was working in Upminster one day during last summer and had an hour to  kill so 
I parked in the Tithe barn car park and sat in the middle o f the Rec...Jeez it all came 
flooding back, endless long hot summer days when we lived over there playing 
football and cricket o r just lazing about 'til it got dark. Could see your house and 
the distant oil refinery chimney that [NAME DELETED] used to  scream" Barad
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D 'ur on the horizon” at when it was dark and we were coming home from the 
Masons Arms.”
I find these lines of Bob’s wonderfully evocative. (If this were being read now on my 
web-site, there would be a hyper-link to the sound of Bruce Springsteen’s ‘My 
Hom etown’.)
Consequent to  mine and Bob’s correspondence, and with the aid of the Friends 
Reunited web-site, we began to make contact with other people from our teens. This 
surfaced and brought to  life the network of relationships, which had exercised 
considerable vitality and influence in our teens -  at least for me, and I began to  see for 
others too. O ver a year the momentum of this grew, greatly facilitated by email, and 
culminated in tw o reunions in August and September 2002 both held at the Masons 
Arms in Upminster, the pub we used to frequent. The reunion was a strange experience 
-  I found the juxtaposition of the past and the present bewildering and enchanting. Some 
of the people I had not seen for thirty years were instantly familiar. Others were  
completely unrecognisable. As I spoke with people, images of them in their teens 
morphed onto their current features and I could see mannerisms and aspects of 
personality in the present that I recognised from the past. The most interesting 
conversations were those where, alongside the inevitable narrative curiosity of 
discovering how everyone’s’ lives had unfolded, there was some mutual reflection on the 
meaning of that time in our lives.
I also sent my autobiographical writing to tw o old friends who were unable to make the 
reunion. One of them replied in an email dated 20th September 2002
Diane and I have both read your "autobiography" and it is better written than many 
o f the manuscripts she brings home from her work as a publisher. It bought back 
many memories o f Upminster. I never had the disjunction and recognition that you 
had, as my parents still live there and I visit every couple o f weeks.
I had forgotten that you lived in Forth Road, but now I remember playing in your 
bedroom with you and Matthew, [you had a tape recorder] Do you remember 
much o f the Cruise to  Bergen, Copenhagen & Amsterdam? So [NAME DELETED] 
cheated in your I I plus! Amazing! I remember Mr Troughton's quizzes. I think I was 
quite good & enjoyed them tremendously.
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It is important to understand that I did not w rite this first part of my autobiography with 
the intentions of renewing acquaintance with my teenage friends in mind. W h at I am 
pointing to  here is the unfolding, unplanned consequences of engaging in the writing, 
which includes the power of the writing to both evoke my past and re-stimulate 
connection for me, and its power to evoke others’ memories and feelings too. If I had 
not written this autobiography, I’m not sure that I would have registered with Friends 
Reunited and then diligently, consciously, and with interest, followed up the contacts 
made. Again I am not claiming that the writing directly caused this complex pattern of 
interactions to  develop; it was one significant strand in a complex web of mutual 
influences.
Having felt the value of this initial autobiographical writing, I embarked, later the same 
year, on the second part of my autobiographical writing. This is reproduced next.
Section three: my second twenty one years
I n  a time of faith, scepticism is the most intolerable of all insults”
From “The W ar and the Intellectuals” 
by Randolph Silliman Bourne & Carl Resek ( 1999)
Early Career Moves
In London, in the summer of 1975, just at the onset of punk rock, I joined together with 
the friends and girlfriends of friends of my final year in Cambridge to help set up a 
squatting community, literally a stone’s throw  from Clapham Junction station. Then, it 
was a neglected rundown area, still at pre-gentriflcation stage - no trace of the French 
bakeries, Italian coffee shop, branch of Oddbins and huge Blockbuster Video, which now  
line the entrance to the station. Half of the street that was the foundation of the local 
squatting community was made up of boarded up, semi-derelict, three-storey terraced 
Victorian houses. Fortunately one of my friends was highly practical, and entering these 
houses, re-establishing the electricity and gas supplies, and doing the necessary building 
repairs was surprisingly straightforward.
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In relatively little time we had initiated a thriving squatting community, made up of a 
mixture of ex-students like ourselves and local homeless people. W e  had considerable 
ambitions for our community. W e  took a group of children made up of the official 
residents of the street and the squatting community away on a camping weekend. Later, 
when I did a similar activity as a social worker, and had to negotiate the various 
bureaucratic systems to do something similar, I appreciated better the informal 
community w ork we had accomplished. W hen the council finally got around to  
repossessing the houses, we were in the middle of constructing a brewery in one house 
and had plans for a cinema in the attic of the same house.
Looking for suitable w ork in line with my social and political ideology and aspirations at 
the time, I obtained a job working for a small voluntary organisation called ‘Homeless in 
Britain’. My main role was to  be a member of a team of six people collectively sharing 
the running of a hostel for forty-five single homeless women in the middle of Soho. The 
hostel had been set up in the wake of the famous TV  documentary about female 
homelessness, ‘Cathy Come Hom e’, and aimed to offer a very different kind of milieu 
for homeless women than the more traditional strictly rule bound and regimented 
regimes typically set up by organisations like the Salvation Army. There were very few  
rules in the hostel, in fact only tw o that I can remember -  no drug pushing and no 
violence.
Its governing spirit was taken from tw o sources. O ne was a form of late sixties social 
w ork practice called ‘radical non-interventionism’ - who were we as middle class social 
workers to tell others how to  live their lives? This drew its rationale and inspiration 
from the growing influence of radical leather-jacketed academics carving out the field of 
sociology of deviance, a key figure of which was notably parodied in Malcolm Bradbury’s 
(2000) novel, T h e  History Man’. The other source was the Zen Buddhism of one of the 
founders of the hostel, a man called David Brandon (1976) who w rote an interesting 
book called ‘ Zen in the A rt of Helping.’
It is easy to  mock the pretensions and naivety of this approach but at the time it was a 
genuine attempt to do something innovative and part of the way in which the influences 
of the sixties were challenging and changing social w ork practices. And, in its own way, 
the hostel actually worked. W om en who, because of their behavioural idiosyncrasies, 
would not have found accommodation elsewhere, and many of whom had been thrown 
out of and banned from other hostels, could live amongst the anarchy and craziness 
which formed daily life at the Soho hostel.
149
A t first this w ork was exciting and interesting. I was immersed in a very foreign milieu 
and experiencing at first hand and trying to put into practice the ideas of R.D. Laing and 
the other anti-psychiatrists I had encountered at University about not labelling people as 
mentally ill and questioning accepted definitions of madness. Basically, though, I was a 
young man with a head full of ideas and not enough emotional resources to cope with 
the extrem e lifestyles of the women I was working with. O ne day in the kitchen, the 
drunken son of one of the residents held an empty milk bottle poised over my head for 
a few minutes, engaging with me in a macho ‘chicken* game of would I dare him to  dare 
to  smash it over my head. Fortunately good sense prevailed over machismo and 
eventually the stand-off was ended by a large Nigerian resident who had taken control of 
the kitchen storming him from behind, and the tw o of us hustled him out of the hostel 
front door. I had helped precipitate this encounter by unwittingly walking towards him 
pointing the knife in my hand that I had been using to  peel potatoes. Another day, when 
fortunately I was not on duty, a woman threw  herself onto the Soho street from the top  
storey of the hostel and killed herself. O ver time I found it increasingly difficult to  cope 
with such experiences. I had a growing sense of flatness and disillusionment which led 
me to change jobs and w ork for the South London Family Services Unit, another 
voluntary organisation. I was a social w orker with a small but specialised caseload of 
what were then called ‘multi-problem’ families, (now less pejoratively referred to as 
‘families suffering from chronic stress’), in the London boroughs of Lambeth and 
Southwark.
A different kind o f course
O ne of my form er colleagues in the hostel, who I had became quite friendly with, had 
talked to  me about a part-time diploma course he was attending at a higher education 
institution. In September 1977, I enrolled on this programme. I was part of a new intake 
of about sixty people doing this course in a variety of different formats -  through 
evening attendance, day attendance, residential weeks and residential weekends when 
the entire course group came together.
I loved this course. For the first time in my life I experienced another possibility for 
education - that it could be liberating. The course grew out of the humanistic psychology 
movement of the sixties, particularly sensitivity group training and encounter groups. It 
was based on a philosophy of experiential learning, encouraging participants to  find out 
about interpersonal behaviour, self awareness, group dynamics and emotional 
expression through the experience of being and working together in groups. The course
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was a crucible in which psychology, psychotherapy, politics, spirituality, feminism, artistic 
expression, and personal development met and mingled, not in a theoretical way, but 
through the lived interaction of the people involved. There was a wild, mould-breaking 
aspect to  the course. I remember vividly my first encounter with one of the tutors and 
how he side-stepped my every expectation of what a teacher might be like. He  
eventually left teaching to be a drummer in a punk rock band, which achieved some 
short-lived success and notoriety.
The other tw o teachers on this course were also very influential in my life. O ne became 
my wife and mother of my tw o sons. The other became my therapist, trainer and 
supervisor over the next fifteen years. And not just the teachers were life changing.
Soon after starting this course, with tw o other men from the course, I moved into a 
hard-to-let council flat on a run-down estate in the Kentish Town area of North  
London. Some London councils were experimenting at the time with changing the social 
make-up of their more run-down and least popular estates by letting property, to  groups 
of single people that families on their housing waiting lists did not wanti; These tw o men 
became my closest friends. One of them still is.
The course was an initiation to a life-long journey of, for want of a better word, 
personal development and exploration of the relationship between individuals, groups 
and organisation. It showed that learning could be involving, absorbing, personal, 
political, risky and exhilarating compared to  the abstract, mainly detached theorising I 
had encountered at Cambridge. The course was constituted as a two-year part-time 
programme. The intake I had joined was its final year because the Institution it was 
located in was trying to rid itself of its past radical image and, under the leadership of a 
newly appointed vice-chancellor, rapidly disbanding all the courses that had helped 
promote such an image. The students on the final year of the programme were  
determined to continue the course for a further year and were successful in finding a 
new home for it at an adult education centre, where it continued to run for the next 
seven years or so.
Bioenergetics
The course was also an introduction to the different humanistic psychotherapies, which 
w ere gaining ground and establishing their own distinctive psychological tradition in 
opposition to the longer established schools of behaviourism and psychoanalysis. One of 
the teachers on the course was training in bioenergetics, a powerful therapeutic method
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coined by Alexander Lowen, an American doctor who was trained by W ilhelm Reich. 
Reich had been one of Freud’s original circle in Vienna, but, like many of that circle, 
eventually fell out with Freud and set up his own school of therapy. Reich, in many ways 
and especially with his holistic perspectives on physical and mental illness, was ahead of 
his time, and trying to overcome the basic mind-body dualism which he saw still at the 
heart of Freud’s work, despite its revolutionary exploration of the unconscious and 
sexuality. Reich’s (1949) fundamental development of Freudian theory was to  suggest 
that there were links between the way that psychological character is formed and 
muscular patterns of expressing and holding tension in the body. For Reich and his 
followers, such as Alexander Lowen (1979) and Stanley Keleman (1985), we are our 
bodies as much as our mental processes. A  skilled bioenergetic practitioner could read 
the emotional biography and key internal and external conflicts of a person from their 
body in a similar way as an expert forester could read the life history of a tree from an 
examination of the cross-section of its trunk.
In terms of method, bioenergetics led to an emphasis on ‘bodywork’, that is working 
with the body to release and contain tension, as well as engaging with the traditional 
‘talking cure’ pioneered by analysis. It also led to a view of emotional life as the primary 
medium in which to engage and work therapeutically. Reich (1948) saw many of the ills 
of western civilisation, most controversially cancer, occasioned by the repression of 
feeling and the denial of the body. Alexander Lowen (1977) had developed a set of 
physical exercises which were designed to help put a person more in touch with their 
body and to facilitate greater emotional expressiveness which could be done individually 
and also in ‘movement’ groups.
The course provided exposure to  this method and its practise by one of the teachers. 
For the purposes of this writing I’ll call her Simone. As practised by Simone, 
bioenergetics offered a powerful way of breaking through barriers that other therapies 
seemed unable to effect. Like the Heineken ad, it refreshed the parts other therapies 
could not reach. Simone was starting to  gather around her a number of people both on 
my year of the course and from previous years who wanted to  pursue their own 
therapy with her and many of whom also wanted to train with her. One of the men in 
the flat I was living in had started therapy with her and I decided to  follow in his tracks. 
Thus began a process that was to be central in my life for the next fifteen years.
W hilst I was beginning therapy and going through the tw o year group-work course 
programme, I continued to w ork at the South London Family Service Unit, based near
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Camberwell Green. I did further training in play therapy with individual and small groups 
of children and also family therapy at the Maudsley hospital. My w ork involved a 
caseload of about a dozen families who typically were in poor housing and had low  
income as well as finding family relationships problematic. Fortunately I was never placed 
in a situation where I had to decide whether to take a child away from its parents into 
the care of the local authority; the closest I came to this was helping a young teenage 
girl leave her father and return to her mother in Ireland. The atmosphere at the Unit 
where I worked was generally good. The Tory press was only just beginning its 
onslaught on the social w ork profession using a few well-documented cases where social 
workers had failed to protect young children adequately. A t the Unit, though, there was 
still an optimistic mood and the belief that our w ork could and did make a difference.
W hilst continuing as a social w orker I was becoming more involved in the world of 
therapy and bioenergetics. As well as attending regular individual therapy, I also joined a 
movement group, which met once a week on a weekday evening. I started a 
relationship with Carmel, (again not her real name), one of the full-time lecturers on the 
group-work course in 1978, and moved in to live with her about a year later. Carmel 
was starting to practice as a psychotherapist. She was close friends with Simone, and a 
founding member of a training group Simone had set up. Carmel was also instrumental 
in helping start the organisation Simone set up, in which she became a leading figure.
In mid-1979 I also joined Simone’s training group. My social world was now revolving 
around the people I had met on the group-work course and others involved in 
bioenergetic training and therapy. Many of the people in this world had backgrounds in 
left wing and community politics, were exclusively white and heterosexual, typically in 
their twenties/early thirties and were mostly working in the professions of social work, 
community w ork and teaching.
In mid-19 8 0 ,1 left my social w ork  role after three years with no immediately clear sense 
of what I would do next. I saw a vacancy for a job with a local authority Social Services 
Departm ent at a newly opened Children and Family Centre working with young people 
at risk of receiving custodial centres from the Court. Carmel was keen to move to  be 
nearer to  Simone, who was now living in this part of England, so when I was offered the 
job we moved out of London at the end of 1980. Initially we lived in a house that was 
attached to the Centre where I was based but in the next year we bought a house 
together. W e  were the first people to move out of London to  be geographically closer 
to  Simone and her family. O ver the following years more and more people who were
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part of the group clustering around Simone moved to  this part of the country. A t the 
same time this group began to develop a distinct identity and acquire a name -  I’ll call it 
T h e  Community’ for this account.
The Community*
Given what subsequently happened in my relationship with Simone and other people in 
“The Community”, it is not so straightforward and easy now to  convey the excitement 
and sense of purpose I felt through my involvement with T h e  Community’. The  
experience of bioenergetic therapy with Simone opened up my emotional iife to  me in a 
way I had never before experienced. I discovered deep reservoirs of rage in myself that I 
was previously unaware of and also a longing for fuller and more authentic contact with 
other people. I felt much more physically and emotionally alive. For the first time in my 
life I felt part of a genuine closely knit community (or tribe) in which I had a place.
I realised that some of my earlier political interests and motivations were rooted in 
personal unhappiness and, like many of my generation who made a similar discovery, 
shifted my attention from the outer world of class relations and capitalist exploitation to  
my inner world and its preoccupations. And at the same time, I strongly believed in the 
possibilities of this kind of therapy for social as well as individual transformation. A fter 
all, Reich had been an early member of the German communist party before they threw  
him out because they thought his emphasis on sex education for working class youth 
was diverting the masses from their historically destined role in the class struggle and 
the creation of a socialist society. This was, too, the era in which feminism had 
transformed the political arena, in which the personal was also being defined as the 
political, and in which working on one’s personal development could still be construed 
as political action - Stephen Covey and his seven habits for highly effective global 
capitalism were still a decade away. In her book, ‘N o  Logo’, (2000), Naomi Klein charts 
a similar personal journey when she reflects on her own experience as a student activist 
in the eighties. She points out how the identity politics of the seventies and eighties 
switched focus away from the external manifestation of corporate and political power to  
issues of gender and race representation in the media.
Furthermore, within therapy I had experiences that could best be described as spiritual, 
touching on the transpersonal dimension of existence, the movement beyond the 
limitations of a bounded primarily ego-based sense of self to  a sense of wider connection 
with the natural and social world. These experiences offered some further grounding of
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my earlier LSD experiences. In one therapeutic session, I had an intensely felt vision of 
the planet to  which I felt intrinsically connected, like the famous picture taken on the 
first moon landing of earth seen from outer space. And most significantly within T h e  
Community’ I felt that my w ork had greater meaning through being part of something 
bigger than just myself and my career ambitions. A t the time I found this beautifully 
expressed in a book called ‘Man on the Threshold’, (1985), by Bernard Lievegoed, a 
Dutch anthroposophist, in which he talks about the ‘modern mystery path’;
‘The human being does not have to  attempt this path alone. It can also take its 
course in a group o f people who are connected in their life o f will through working 
together, which at the same time signifies a shared destiny. I once called such a 
community a ‘responsibility community’. Each alone takes his own path o f 
development in such a community, but in this he depends heavily on the others. All 
consider it their path o f development to  be awake to  what the other could and 
should do. This can be expressed in words o r by creating situations in which the 
other can become creative, and this applies mutually. An archetype o f such a 
community is the Pentecostal community o f the disciples, o r ‘The Community’ o f 
the Round Table o f King Arthur.”
More recently I have seen the same point expressed by Mike Daisey (2002) in his 
extremely entertaining and perceptive account of his three years with Amazon in 
Seattle.
‘ ‘I can’t  tell you how exciting, how stirring it was to  be in the thick o f something so 
deadly earnest, to  be given permission to  invest myself in a group. These people, 
my co-workers, were serious about our work, and everything was on the line.”
(p. 48).
Simone was herself part of a training group run by a charismatic therapist. This woman 
had set up a community outside London, all of whom were deeply involved with her 
own form of bioenergetic practice. Simone seemed both drawn to  the vitality and talent 
of this woman and at the same time uncomfortable with some of the dynamics of the 
group she had created around her. Simone was determined not to repeat the same 
mistakes she saw her own trainer making - to  become a western therapeutic guru with a 
band of largely unquestioning devotees. To  this end a lot of time, energy, and money 
was taken up in T h e  Community’ exploring the power dynamics between people and 
our transferential relationships with Simone. W e  were constantly ‘working on’ our own 
feelings about and relationships with one another.
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An important part of T h e  Community’ became an ongoing ‘couples group’, in which I 
participated for five years. This was a forum which individuals attended as couples and 
explored their intimate partner relationships. It was a powerful forum for generating 
closeness between its participants as the issues raised in each couple relationship had an 
immediacy and resonance for everyone in the group.
O ver time, as more of the people within this community started practising as therapists, 
the size and apparent importance of our w ork  grew. W ith  a female colleague and fellow  
trainee, I set up and co-led a one-year evening course in group dynamics at an adult 
education centre, loosely based on the group-work course I had attended. From 1983- 
8 8 ,1 co-ran a therapy group with the same colleague that drew most of its membership 
from the people completing the group dynamics course. O ther people too who were  
members of Simone’s training group were setting up their own practices as individual 
and group therapists. People were also creatively applying this w ork to other areas -  
singing and voice work, drama, single sex groups, workshops on family relationships. In 
1984 and 1985, there were tw o large residential summer workshops held, first for about 
60 people and then for 100 people, over the period of a week. These w ere very 
powerful events for both participants and those of us involved in putting on these 
events.
A t the same time as our w ork was developing, our lives were becoming increasingly 
entangled. By and large I welcomed and embraced this entangled involvement. One of 
the people who had taken on running the original group-work course at its second 
home, and who had developed a significant psychotherapy practice of his own, once 
described T h e  Community’ as akin to a therapeutic community who did not physically 
live together. Through participating in groups and training workshops together and 
sharing problematic and intimate issues in our lives, strong bonds of friendship were  
generated. The therapy itself, with its potential for deep emotional catharsis, led to  
people being strongly moved and affected by one another’s ‘w ork ’. Before this 
involvement with T h e  Community’, I had not felt, nor have felt subsequently, such a 
strong connection and identification with a group of people.
This pattern of close and intense involvement is common to many psychological 
traditions, even more traditionally conservative psychoanalytically based training 
programmes. Janet Malcolm describes this in her book, ‘Psychoanalysis: The Impossible 
Profession (1981)’. She writes of a N ew  York emigre analyst:
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“ Her entire life was taken up with psychoanalytical concerns: during the day she 
saw patients, at night she went to  meetings at the Institute, and when she and her 
husband went out to  dinner or entertained at home it was always with analysts. 
O ther people fall away she explained. There is less and less to  talk about with 
people on the ‘outside’ who don’t  look at things the way analysts do.” (p. 83).
Simone saw herself, in common with nearly all practitioners of humanistic therapy at the 
time, as going beyond the strictly delineated boundaries and unnecessary over­
formalised restrictions of traditional analysis. It was possible to  be friends with her, to  
have dinner together, to  be her patient, to  be her supervisee and trainee, to  be in a 
‘couples’ group with her as the leader, and at times to w ork as colleagues together. I 
thought that we were part of the brave new world challenging and redefining traditional 
therapeutic practice.
And at the same time we believed we were aware of the potential dangers of this 
situation. Simone had first hand experience of the dynamics, which centred around her 
trainer, which seemed uncomfortably close to being a form of cult. In fact, this trainer 
appeared in national newspapers a few years ago through her involvement in a custody 
case in which she was accused of running a cult. There was, though, a strongly held 
belief in ‘T h e  Community’, that if one could fully make conscious and express the 
feelings involved in dynamics of power, authority, dependence, counter-dependence, 
rivalry, envy and jealousy, and if one could fully own and be responsible for one’s 
negativity, (defined as the particular ways each person tried to  control and hold on to 
their natural life energy), limiting blocks could be broken through, and the energy held in 
negative behavioural, physical and emotional patterns could be liberated for creative 
purposes.
W ithin T h e  Community’, the methods used to  w ork with people in a group setting 
w ere often confrontational. A  group would typically begin with Simone asking who 
wanted to  ‘w ork ’ that day and follow the ‘hotseat’ pattern of therapeutic engagement, 
generally credited as deriving from Fritz Peris (1969), the founder of Gestalt psychology, 
who had influenced a whole generation of humanistic therapists in the Gestalt and 
encounter movements. This necessitated the person who wanted to ’ w ork ’ usually 
standing in the centre of the group and having the attention of Simone and others in the 
group. O ther people in the group would be encouraged to respond with their feelings 
to  the unfolding ’w ork’ of the person. Sometimes this could lead to a series of angry 
encounters between people, involving a lot of shouting and occasional physical
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confrontation. A t other times, it led to  moments of extraordinary tenderness and 
compassion.
Some initial reflections on leadership and followers
Looking back now, I think that, as a group, and like many other groups, we were  
unconsciously living out a deeply ingrained, western cultural myth of redemption and 
salvation. Bioenergetic theory replaced Christian ‘original sin’ with a more optimistic 
view of the inner core of human nature. David Boadella, a leading theoretician and 
practitioner of bioenergetics, with whom both Simone and Carmel were in training and
S'
supervisiorn(yith for the first five years of T h e  Community’, liked to challenge the 
underlying pessimism of orthodox Freudian and Kleinian psychoanalytical theory by 
claiming that “joy was the most deeply repressed human emotion”. Personal salvation 
lay in rediscovering this inner core of love and joyful life-affirming energy which meant 
working through the outer layers of social conditioning and defensive patterns which 
were deeply built into the body and personality.
Simone was a charismatic, powerful and immensely talented therapist. She had an 
extraordinary gift for enabling people to find places in themselves of genuine depth of 
feeling, and was hugely creative in working with people’s energetic bodily and 
psychological processes to uncover forgotten past experiences of both trauma and joy 
to  create possibilities for change in the present. Jungian theory suggests that, as with any 
gifted therapist, there was a shadow-side to  this capacity. A  Jungian commentator I read 
later, (and whose w ork I can no longer unfortunately find!), noted that the ‘god-like’ 
capacity to w ork at a deep level with peoples’ fundamental life issues raises the 
temptation for a particularly gifted therapist to identify themselves with the divine. 
Simone was believed, by herself and others, to know the ‘truth’ about a person or 
situation. Some of the stories that informally circulated in T h e  Community’ were  
stories, which proved Simone’s perspective and/or intuition to  be unfailingly correct. 
There is no doubt that some of us in T h e  Community’, and certainly at least myself, 
wanted to believe that Simone had access to a truth ordinarily denied to most people.
In his highly readable and thoughtful study of gurus, ‘Feet of Clay’ (1997), Antony Storr 
writes about a number of figures he regards as gurus. These range from benevolent 
figures such as Jesus and St Ignatius of Loyola to  destructive cult-leaders such as Jim 
Jones and David Koresh, and include central figures in the history of psychology such as 
Freud and Jung. He defines gurus (P. xi) as “teachers who claim special knowledge of
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the meaning of life, and who therefore feel entitled to  tell others how life should be 
lived.” He suggests that one distinguishing feature of a guru is their claim to  have 
discovered and to know the ‘tru th ’. Alongside this is allied huge conviction and great 
certainty. Storr says, in exploring the dynamics of the guru-disciple relationship; 
“Certainty is hugely seductive, and certainty is offered by all successful leaders: it is an 
important part of their charisma.” (P. 2 17).
Storr thinks it is a feature of all leaders to  be idealised. He uses the key psychoanalytical 
concepts of transference and projection to  describe ways in which leaders are both 
intensely loved and hated. Interestingly, too, he suggests that this emotional dynamic 
based on idealisation may be necessary for adults to continue to learn. This is similar to  
an email comment Peter Reason made on 15th August 2 0 0 1 in response to reading this 
account that;
“ I have come to  believe (from experience) that the role o f all great teachers is to  
let you down. That is the point, in a way, you learn enough to  integrate into your 
own way o f being, you find the shortfalls o f the most supposedly enlightened 
person, and you move on.”
Developments within The Community*
Between 1979 and 1988, I participated whole-heartedly in my therapy, training and 
supervision with Simone and the development of T h e  Community’ as a group of 
practising therapists. All my significant relationships were mediated in this environment. 
In October 1982, my first son was born -  a profoundly moving home birth with a 
private midwife at which Simone was also present. She and her partner became my son’s 
godparents. In June 1984, Carmel and I were married in the local church, a few hundred 
yards from where we lived. W e  were the second pairing in the ‘couples group’ to get 
married and in the next years many others within the ‘couples group’ were married. 
These became significant events in ‘The Community’s’ social calendar. People ‘worked’ 
on their plans for their weddings in the ‘couples’ group’, and the weddings themselves 
usually occasioned a wealth of feelings and responses, which would surface in the 
different groups that Simone and others led.
In 1985 my second son was born. In contrast to  the long drawn out labour of his elder 
brother he was almost delivered in the car on the way to the hospital. Just over a year 
after his birth, I left my wife as I had fallen in love with the woman I had been running a
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therapy group with. My attraction to her and feelings for her had been growing for a 
number of years, to  the point where I thought she was the love of my life and that I 
could no longer stay with my wife. I lived for a short while on my own in various bed-sit 
arrangements and then went to  live with the woman I had fallen in love with. O ur 
relationship could not stand the guilt and anguish I felt about leaving my young sons and 
marriage, and within a year our relationship had ended. In late 1987, I returned home to  
live with my parents for a short while - a humbling experience for someone in their 
early thirties -  before buying a house on my own.
Prior to  and during this period of acute personal turmoil, other significant events had 
been happening in T h e  Community’. Simone had split up with her partner, a good friend 
of mine, who, consequent to  the ending of their relationship, moved to Los Angeles. A  
baby who was a very similar age to  my second son died tragically. Tw o of the leading 
therapists with substantial individual and group practices, who were working under the 
umbrella of ‘the Community’, ceased their practices amidst accusations that they were  
intimidating o r exploiting their patients.
In the autumn of 1987, Simone decided to  disband T h e  Community’ and to no longer 
continue working as a therapist, trainer and supervisor. She had become disillusioned 
with what she was trying to achieve in T h e  Community’ partly due, in her mind now, to  
the activities of tw o of the leading therapists that she had trained. She later moved home 
with her new husband to pursue a different career before then returning to practice as a 
psychotherapist.
Second marriage and expulsion from Eden
In the years subsequent to the official ending of T h e  Community’, I continued to work  
as a freelance consultant. I had left my w ork at the Children and Family Centre and set 
up my own practice as a psychotherapist and freelance consultant. I began training and 
consultancy working mainly in the public sector, offering courses in group-work, 
working with young people, management training, and then extended my w ork to  
management training in the private sector. The ending of T h e  Community’ was not a 
major blow to my working life as I was finding it increasingly difficult managing the joint 
demands and different schedules of a psychotherapy practice and freelance consultancy. I 
decided to focus solely on working as a trainer and consultant and started attending 
conferences and networking with others in this field.
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A t one of these conferences, I met tw o people who had recently set up on their own as 
independent consultants and who lived together. W e  got on well, and in subsequent 
meetings, decided to create an informal association between us. From 1986, I started 
working fairly frequently with Anna, the female partner of the two. O ver time we 
became friends, and then, following the ending of the relationship I had left my first wife 
for and the ending of her partnership, lovers. In 1989 we decided to live together.
A fter T h e  Community’ had officially been disbanded I continued my friendships with 
many of the people who had been part of it. A t the same time I also started attending 
workshops at a psychotherapy training institute in London. The workshops I attended 
w ere part of a Gestalt training programme for therapists and organisational consultants. 
They were run by Camilla, another charismatic and extremely gifted female therapist. It 
was illuminating for me to  experience someone else w ork therapeutically. This other 
person seemed to be able to evoke the same depth of feeling and opportunities for 
personal transformation that I had experienced with Simone through the use of 
methods that were less confrontational. Also there was a much greater diversity of 
people at this other training Institute than I was used to  from T h e  Community’ -  a 
wider age range, people from non-white ethnic groups, and a significant gay presence. 
There is nothing like participating in another culture or ‘tribe’ to throw  light on one’s 
own culture and tribal affiliations -  some of the taken for granted assumptions I had 
formed in T h e  Community’ began to  open themselves up for questioning.
In December 1990, one of my two best friends from the time of our flat sharing in 
Kentish Town was married. This was the occasion for a falling out between him and me, 
on one side, and the third member of our original trio. O ur friend felt that my other 
friend had not shown sufficient acknowledgement of his past involvement in T h e  
Community’ at his wedding. This led to a major split between the three of us, which has 
never been healed. I felt that my friend had the right to choose the wedding he wanted, 
which led to  a terrible row  with the other friend.
During this time I was also planning to be married for the second time. This row  with 
my friend, who I had asked to  be my best man, marred the build up to my wedding. I 
already had conflicting feelings about getting married for a second time. I drove down to  
Wales and spoke to Simone about these feelings. She advised me not to go ahead with 
the wedding, based on my own doubts and the background of recently leaving my first 
marriage and subsequent ending of the relationship I had then started. This led me into a 
state of extreme inner conflict and consequent difficulties with my partner. W e  spent
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tw o days in which the colour seemed to drain from the world. On the third morning we 
woke up to a bright, clear, frosty, blue-skied w inter morning. My partner suggested 
going to  a local church to  pray about our situation. I decided to go to  the church in 
which I had previously been married. From that moment I had an unexpected sense of 
grace about the unfolding events of the day. A  chain of events happened which led to my 
partner and I finding a vicar who was prepared to marry us in church, despite both of us 
being divorced. I believed that from a situation, which had appeared irredeemably 
blocked, and beyond the resolution of the individual and joint wills of my partner and I, a 
miracle had occurred. This helped give me the confidence and faith to  go ahead and 
marry again.
Prior to  my second wedding, I had seen the French film ‘Romualdo and Juliette’. This 
tells the story of an unlikely romance between Romualdo, the white already-married 
managing director of a large French business, and Juliette, the black cleaning lady that 
cleans his office at night. Towards the end of the film there is a wonderfully romantic 
wedding scene in which Romualdo and Juliette celebrate their marriage in the company 
of her children, his first wife and her new partner, and their many friends. Somehow for 
my wedding I hoped to achieve a similar resolution of the schisms around me. I was, 
unrealistically, hoping for another miracle.
For our wedding in April 1991, my partner and I invited many people, including Simone, 
from T h e  Community’ that I was still friendly with and people from the other training 
Institute that my partner knew well, as well as our immediate families of origin. Two  
different groupings met and mingled that day though the people from the other Institute 
had a distinctly less tribal image and sensibility than T h e  Community’. Immediately after 
our wedding my partner and I went to N ew  York for our honeymoon. W hen I returned 
I quickly realised that all was not well. My ex-wife told me that unexpectedly from her 
point of view a number of people who had not spoken to her for a while had contacted 
her and been critical of my wedding and me. She warned me to look after myself.
A  few days later a letter arrived in the post from Simone. She had sent a copy of this 
letter to  all the people involved in T h e  Community’ who had attended my wedding. 
Three days before receiving this letter I had met a friend from T h e  Community’ who 
had told me warmly how much he had enjoyed the wedding. On meeting him again a 
few days later after he had received the letter he now told me that Simone’s letter had 
enabled him to see the situation differently.
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T o  give a sense of this letter, I reproduce three major parts of it below, with the names 
changed.
“The form and content o f your wedding and reception made it quite clear to  me 
that you have already made the decision to  go down a path which denies the body 
o f experience you have gained with me. The group you have chosen to  join are 
making you feel powerful by indulging you. You have gained a place in this group 
by using this body o f experience learned with me as a power ploy and they have 
allowed you to  do so, either because they do not recognise it o r because it suits 
them. You obviously preferthis kind o f power to  facing the reality o f who you are. 
Your marriage ceremony was an example o f this self-deception and indulgence.
The function o f a church ceremony is to  provide a structure in which you are 
reconciled to  a higher authority, God’s authority, and thereby create a healthy 
balance between your deeper self and your ego. You have vowed before god, 
witnessed by your community o f friends, in a state o f full awareness and 
consciousness to  love and cherish Carmel ‘til death do you part. You are entitled 
to  be forgiven for having failed to  keep your vows. You are entitled to  God’s 
blessing and help with your commitment to  Anna. You are not entitled to  
manipulate that structure in the church service to  suit yourself. Unfortunately your 
vicar indulged you in this.”
“ I am angry because I have made it quite clear to  you what I thought about this 
and you ignored my advice while at the same time implicating me in your decisions. 
This pretending to  seek my opinion and then using it politically is an abuse o f me 
personally and goes against everything I have been teaching.
Your reception showed that while you wished to  pay lip service to  encompassing 
both ‘the old Community’ and your new one you are not able to  do so. There was 
no feeling o f celebrating together nor any place for everyone to  do so had the 
feeling been there. Had there been any doubt about it your own speech revealed 
that your new priorities lie in power seeking, self-indulgence and denial o f the 
truth.”
“ I cannot allow you to  continue attempting to  deceive me and those in ‘the 
Community’ who are trying to  live their lives respecting the learning gained during 
the years we worked together. You have already caused enough confusion and 
hurt amongst them. You have chosen a different and opposing path to  them and 
you must take it openly and alone, not try  to  have your cake and eat it. You have
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found people who are prepared to  acknowledge the kind o f power you seek and 
this is obviously how you see yourself becoming your own man. In my opinion, 
obviously, it is superficial and your gains from it will cause damage to  you and those 
around you. I can only warn you o f the dangers and tell you there is no point in 
continuing to  seek my advice as you have been doing over the past tw o years and 
ignoring it.” .......
The effect of the letter on me was devastating. For years I had believed that Simone 
spoke with the voice of ‘truth ’ and had identified my ‘higher self, (to use the conceptual 
framework of psychosynthesis), with her. The letter then became an attack from this 
‘higher self. Fortunately not everyone from T h e  Community’ unquestioningly accepted 
the letter. A  few people said that their experience of my wedding was different and 
questioned Simone’s motivation in sending such a letter. These people probably helped 
save my sanity. In addition, Carmel, my first wife was hugely supportive, an extremely 
generous act, given the circumstances in which I had left her.
The experience of receiving this letter resulted in great turmoil and confusion and led 
me slowly and agonisingly to review my whole experience of T h e  Community’.
Incidents I had been uncomfortable with and had pushed to the periphery of my 
awareness came back to me. I could see patterns of interaction where people who had 
been close to Simone and very involved in T h e  Community’ seemed suddenly thrust a 
long way from her and others’ orbit. O ne obvious and common way to  describe these 
dynamics is scapegoating. I read a book called ‘the Scapegoat Complex’ (1986) by Sylvia 
Brinton Perepa, a Jungian analyst, which I found very helpful. She says:
‘‘Scapegoating, as it is currently practiced, means finding the one o r ones who can 
be identified with evil o r wrong-doing, blamed for it, and cast out from ‘The 
Community' in o rd e rto  leave the remaining members with a feeling o f 
guiltlessness, atoned (at-one) with the collective standards o f behaviour. It both 
allocates blame and serves to  ‘‘inoculate against future misery and failure” by 
evicting the presumed cause o f misfortune.” (p. 9)
As I continued to painfully think about what had happened, I also had to contend with 
what I now saw as my own role in participating in the dynamics of scapegoating of 
others. O ver a long time I had to rethink my involvement with T h e  Community’. I had 
to  try and sort out what was valuable and what was problematic, and try to  come to 
terms with a sense of shame engendered by the accusations in Simone’s letter. This was 
a painful but necessary awakening. A  number of years later, I watched a television
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documentary about a British woman who had been part of Bhagwan Sree Rajneesh’s 
inner circle first in Poona and then in the utopian community he set up in Oregon. 
Bhagwan was an Indian guru with a huge western following who blended eastern 
mysticism and spiritual disciplines with western personal growth psychology. He 
achieved notoriety through his advocacy of greater permissiveness in sexual relations 
and through his growing accumulation of Rolls Royces, eventually numbering ninety- 
three. This British woman had been accused of conspiracy to murder by the authorities 
in Oregon after Bhagwan himself had fled T h e  Community’. She was eventually 
convicted and spent a number of years in prison in America. She talked candidly about 
the way she realised afterwards how she had become involved in something destructive, 
and spoke movingly about how she was reconciling herself to  this without devaluing and 
dishonouring the idealistic part of herself which had been drawn to the teachings of 
Bhagwan.
People who did not know the history of my involvement with T h e  Community’ were  
simply appalled if I showed or told them about the letter Simone had written. To  them  
the letter was so obviously abusive that they could not really understand why I took it 
seriously and let it have such impact on me.
To  conclude, and give additional context to, the more personal part of this story, I 
should add that I separated from my second wife in 1998, after nearly seven years of 
marriage. W e  were divorced in early 2001 and remain friends. W hilst I do not in any 
way want to  attribute the break up of my marriage to the effect of Simone’s letter, I do 
think it cast a dark cloud over the early years of our marriage.
An Archetypal Story
It has taken and is still taking me a long time to assimilate my experience of T h e  
Community’ and Simone’s letter. I have found that the w ork and writing which 
emotionally and intellectually has most helped me to understand what happened and 
make sense of it all is from a Jungian perspective. Somehow here the profound 
understanding of archetypal structures and dynamics and of the implacable movements 
of the individual psyche and collective unconscious seem to do justice to the complexity 
and depth of my experience. In a book called ‘Psyche at work; workplace applications of 
Jungian analytical psychology’ (1992), one of the editors, Murray Stein, comments that;
‘W e  face the situation that the unconscious is powerfully projected onto
organisational life, and that what we meet there is also the spirit o f the
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organisation’s unconscious. Both are often uncontained and therefore potentially 
exceedingly dangerous for the individual’s emotional stability.” (p. 6)
He goes on:
“W hen we enter an organisation and our unconscious becomes activated by our 
relationship to  its other members and structures, we typically enter into a state o f 
unconscious identity with some part o f it, with a role, a function, o r a position. This 
identification is most likely based on an archetype that the group psyche needs to  
have represented and enacted, and the individual’s unconscious is ready to  identify 
with the needed archetype and to  participate in it. Jung called this state o f 
unconscious identification participation mystique (1948, par. 253). This refers to  a 
state o f nondifferentiation between subject and object, in this case between oneself 
and an aspect o f the organisation. As psyches mingle and merge, the person begins 
enacting an archetypal role offered, o r even demanded, by the group unconscious.” 
(P- 9)
This kind of analysis draws attention to  the unconscious dimension of group and 
organisational life, and to the power and force of these archetypal dynamics. It was part 
of the belief system in T h e  Community’, or at the least what I believed, that we could 
overcome these, that we could bleach and nullify the organisational shadow in the white 
heat of emotional catharsis.
In the last ten years, I have been keenly interested to read and hear about a range of 
situations in which idealistic communities have encountered difficulties. A  distinctive 
feature of these situations is the utopian nature and explicitly psychological and spiritual 
characters of these settings. W hen I attended a conference on ‘Buddhism and 
Psychology’ held at Dartington a number of years back, once this subject was opened up 
at one of the workshops, everyone had a story to tell of different communities beset 
with problems related to the dynamics of leadership and membership.
In Andrew Harvey’s recent book (2000), T h e  D irect Path’, he tells of his disillusionment 
with M other Meera, a young Indian woman he had met and become a disciple of in 1978. 
In a previous book, T h e  Hidden Journey’, he had written eloquently and movingly of his 
profound spiritual experiences with M other Meera and his deep devotion to  her, a book 
which he says had helped turn Mother Meera into a ‘worldwide cult’. He recounts how 
when his split with her became public, he received death threats and was denounced by 
form er colleagues and friends. He likewise refers to  being involved with a leading and
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highly respected Tibetan Buddhist in 1990 and collaborating with him on a project about 
T h e  Tibetan Book of the Dead’. He subsequently heard in 1994 that eleven of this 
teacher’s woman pupils were suing him for sexual abuse.
Similarly in the UK, there was the well-publicised account of a charismatic young Church 
of England vicar. He had developed a significant youth following at a time when young 
people were increasingly uninvolved in organised religion, had introduced many 
innovations to the traditional church service, and had been hailed by leading figures such 
as the creation spiritualist Matthew Fox. He was then forced to resign because of 
inappropriate sexual relationships with a number of his close female followers.
I recently attended a workshop on the healing power of ritual, held on the Borders of 
Scotland. W hen I briefly told the story of my involvement in T h e  Community’ to  a small 
group of participants on the workshop, it triggered the sharing of similar stories by 
three other participants who talked about their lengthy involvement with a spiritual 
community based on the w ork of Gurdjieff.
To  be clear at this point, I am not saying that T h e  Community’ was identical to  any of 
these groups and communities mentioned above. Talking now, ten years on, to a 
number of people who were involved with T h e  Community’ what is striking is the range 
of experience, and the very different sense that people have made of their involvement. 
Although we were all participating in the same community, what people took and learnt 
from their experience was radically different. Each person constellated a particular set of 
dynamics, or, following Stein earlier, each individual’s unconscious interacted with the 
group unconscious in a very specific way. For some people, undoubtedly, it was a 
positive, life-affirming and life-changing experience. For others, including myself, I believe 
it was both highly developmental and simultaneously very wounding.
The commonality and frequency of occurrence of these stories begs the question as to  
what is at work in these phenomena. Beyond my individual story, in what way are these 
also archetypal psychological and spiritual stories of our times? W h at do these stories 




Many social commentators have pointed out that since the fifties there has been an 
increased breaking down of the traditional sources of authority which have helped bind 
people together. Institutional sources of authority such as the monarchy, government, 
organised religion, the professions, the media and the family have come under increasing 
scrutiny and questioning. O ther people point to the dominance of a materialist ideology, 
erosion of traditional communities through increased social mobility, and growth of a 
consumer society, which further fuel the vacuum of potential meaninglessness and lack 
of deep identity. This is fertile ground for any group or movement offering an awakening 
of powerful group or tribal identity and spiritual sense of purpose. Antony Storr (1997), 
writing about Jonestown, the utopian settlement Jim Jones established in Guyana, says 
that:
“ It is evident that some people who had been alienated from conventional society 
felt themselves part o f a new community in which they were for the first time 
accepted and valued.” (p. 10).
Storr also cites evidence from someone involved with David Koresh who was a survivor 
of the FBI siege at Ranch Apocalypse, saying that:
“ He told William Shaw that the months he spent at the ranch were the happiest 
days o f his life. "'W e were one big family.” He says. “W e all believed in the one 
belief, and agreed on the same points. W e were all one community.” (p. 16).
Beyond this sociological explanation, I think that it is too simplistic to then blame the 
leaders of such groups solely for these destructive patterns of behaviour. The followers 
also, play a key part, which is not to deny their vulnerability, o r to suggest that victims 
are responsible for and inevitably collude in their own victimisation. Storr (1997), again, 
makes some significant comments about the role of the followers. He says:
“This is a danger effecting all esoteric groups. Just as disciples reinforce a guru’s 
belief in himself and his mission, so disciples reinforce each other’s beliefs and 
allegiance. Esoteric groups become mutual reassurance systems, confirming each 
disciple’s conviction that he o r she has special insights as to  how life should be lived 
which are denied to  the ordinary person.” (p. 121).
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In the book already mentioned, T h e  Scapegoat Complex’, the author indicates the more 
active dimension of being a scapegoat by pointing out the characteristics of people who 
are likely to  be scapegoated. This is shown in the personality dynamics and personal 
biographies, which can lead some people to carry the scapegoat role for a family, group 
o r community.
Focussing on the relationship between the leaders and followers, and the overall social 
context of their interaction, rather than just making the leader culpable, or emphasising 
the gullibility, vulnerability and/or lack of strength of character of the ‘disciples’, gives a 
further dimension of understanding to  the dynamics of these situations.
James Hillman (1975b), in a brilliant essay written in 1964, on the archetypal patterns of 
betrayal, points out that betrayal is necessary for the psyche to  grow beyond the blissful 
but naive unquestioning security represented mythologically as existence in the Garden 
of Eden. He says;
“W e are betrayed in the very same close relationships where primal trust is 
possible. W e can be truly betrayed only where we truly trust -  by brothers, lovers, 
wives, husbands, not by enemies, not by strangers. The greater the love and loyalty, 
the involvement and commitment, the greaterthe betrayal.”
“ For we must be clear that to  live o r love only where one can trust, where there is 
security and containment, where one cannot be hurt o r let down, where what is 
pledged in words is forever binding, means really to  be out o f harm’s way and so 
to  be out o f real life. And it does not matter what is this vessel o f trust -  analysis, 
marriage, church or law, any human relationship.”
Hillman is arguing for the necessity, possibly the inevitability, of betrayal. Betrayal is a 
contemporary rite of passage. Those of us who looked for a certain and everlasting 
security of meaning and identity in the groups we helped create needed to have the 
carpet pulled up from under us.
Likewise I think it is too conveniently simplistic to label and explain all these phenomena 
as cults. Some people on hearing about my experience in T h e  Community’ suggest that 
I had joined a cult. One of the definitions of a cult in W ebster’s Third N ew  International 
dictionary is “a usually small or narrow circle of persons united by devotion or 
allegiance to  some artistic or intellectual, programme, tendency or figure”. By this
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definition I would have been a cult member but then this definition could include as cults 
my local film society, supporters of Plymouth Argyle football club etc etc.
Cults are generally defined and thought of as operating in a coercive manner. In his 
book, ‘Combatting Cult Mind Control; Protection, Rescue and Recovery from  
Destructive Cults’, (1988), Hassan says that;
“A  destructive cult distinguishes itself from a normal social and religious group by 
subjecting its members to  persuasion o r other damaging influences to  keep them in 
the group” .
Hassan, in trying to differentiate further between ‘destructive cults’ and ‘normal’ social 
groups, goes on to identify ten distinguishing features of ‘destructive cults’, as follows;
•  The doctrine of the group is taken to  be reality; the theories and idea which are 
used to understand the world are taken to be a literal description of the world
•  Reality is reduced to  basic polarities; good vs. bad, us vs. them
•  Members are made to  feel special; to  be part of a chosen community
•  The self must submit to the group; absolute obedience to authority is expected; 
Hassan says;
“ Leaders o f different cults have come up with strikingly similar tactics for fostering 
dependency. They transfer members frequently to  new and strange locations, 
switch their work duties, promote them and then demote them on whims -  all to  
keep them off balance. Another technique is to  assign impossibly high goals, tell 
members that if they are “ pure” they will succeed, and force them to  confess 
impurity when they fail.”
•  N ew  members are encouraged to model themselves on older members. Hassan 
says;”
One reason why a group o f cultists may strike even a na'fve outsider as spooky or 
weird is that everyone has similar odd mannerisms, clothing styles, and modes o f 
speech. W hat the outsider is seeing is the personality o f the leader passed down 
through several layers o f modelling.”
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•  Cults create a strong sense of community but happiness within this community is 
conditional and dependent on good performance
•  Cult members are manipulated through fear and guilt; problems are always the fault 
of the individual cult member
•  Life in a cult is an intense series of highs and lows; Hassan says;
“ Life in a cult is a roller coaster ride. A  member swings between the extreme 
happiness o f experiencing the “tru th ” with an insider elite, and the crushing weight 
o f guilt, fear and shame. Problems are always due to  his inadequacies, not the 
group’s. He perpetually feels guilty fo r not meeting standards.”
•  Cult members relationship to time is changed; the past is rewritten, the present is 
especially urgent and the future is a time of significant reward or punishment
•  There is no legitimate way to  leave the group and a belief that if people do leave 
terrible consequences will befall them.
Certainly some of this list rings true of T h e  Community’. There was a definite sense of 
‘us’ and ‘them’, of who was in the ‘w ork ’ and who was not. I believed, with some 
justification, that our leader Simone had extraordinary powers and that I was part of a 
special grouping. For some of the time Simone was the leader of T h e  Community’ she 
was not receiving external supervision. There were very little checks and balances on 
the exercise of her power. Many of us thought she did not need supervision, and, 
besides, given her abilities, there was nobody capable of supervising her. There was a 
sense that difficulties with the way people experienced T h e  Community’ were due to  
the individual’s ‘negativity’ rather than expressing a genuine criticism and unease with 
the set up. It seemed difficult to  be in T h e  Community’ and also to  participate in other 
therapies. Eventually people either left T h e  Community’ or parted from their other 
therapeutic involvements.
And yet T h e  Community’ was not a cult in the more usual sense that word has come to  
mean. Though Simone thought of her w ork as ‘re-parenting’, we were not discouraged 
from contact with our families of origin as in some ‘classic’ cult settings. Many people 
had friends outside T h e  Community’, though many also as time went on, found their 
main friendships within T h e  Community’. Neither did Simone encourage the kind of 
sexual license and experimentation that other groups favoured, and that some cult 
leaders endorsed or prescribed.
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O ne difficulty with Hassan’s list is that the dividing line between a ‘destructive cult’ and 
so-called ‘normal’ social behaviour is not so sharp. Looking at the list, it could equally 
read as a description of cabinet government under Margaret Thatcher -  famous quotes 
from her include, “Is he one of us?” and “There is no such thing as society” - as of Sun 
Myung Moon’s Unification Church. The list is also not so far removed from  
organisational cultures I have encountered o r heard about anecdotally, such as ‘The 
M irror Group’ under Robert Maxwell. In fact Hassan’s quote about how leaders foster 
dependency sounds like the HR practices of some well-established global corporations.
The point I am keen to make here is that the dynamics of so called ‘cults’ are not so 
different in kind from the dynamics of ordinary social and organisational groups. It may 
be convenient to project all our craziness and destructiveness onto these cults whilst 
maintaining the comforting illusion that normal groups and organisations are free of such 
irrationality.
Concluding Reflections
As I w rite and conclude this piece I hear, in my mind’s ear, Jack Whitehead, my PhD 
supervisor, asking what relevance it has to my contemporary professional practice.
Overall, my experience in T h e  Community’, as well as providing a long-term training in 
the method and theory of one particular school of psychotherapy as was intended, has, 
more importantly, led me to think deeply about the nature of the self, the dynamics of 
leadership and followership, the shaping and maintenance of group identity, the creation 
and development of organisational cultures, the nature of the unconscious in individuals, 
groups and organisations and the relationship between the individual and the 
social/cultural dimensions of life. As much of my current professional practice involves 
working with groups in an organisational setting, over short and long term  time periods, 
these considerations are not insignificant.
The positive side of the training I did receive in ‘the Community’ has been to vastly 
increase my awareness of the emotional dimension of individual and group process and 
show me its power and importance.
In terms of my practice when I w ork with groups, I am now highly sensitised to  
processes of scape-goating and aim to do what I can to  mitigate against this. I 
deliberately avoid setting myself up as or being cast into a ‘guru’ role. I am very cautious
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about offering any one interpretation of a person or situation, which claims to  be an 
exclusive or deeper truth - this has stimulated a keen interest in post-modernism. I am 
keen to help provide many perspectives for people from which to make sense of their 
experience.
I have also undergone a shift from the optimistic world-view of humanistic psychology 
and the associated enlightenment-based beliefs in progress, rationality and the human 
capacity to  shape and control one’s destiny (which is the basis of the dominant ego- 
centred psychology informing much current management and organisation development 
practice) to a greater appreciation of, and respect for, the many-sidedness of the human 
psyche in both its individual and collective manifestations.
Section four: working with ‘my second twenty one years'
The above account was written between April 2 0 0 1 and May 2002. It is the third 
version of the account and is unchanged from its final third formulation apart from  
adding date references to  authors mentioned, and adding the third paragraph to the 
‘concluding reflections’. Having worked closely with the content for over a year, and due 
to  its highly personal nature, I still find it difficult to  stand back from the writing and 
assess it.
The intention of the writing is to  follow W right Mills (1959) recommendation, that:
“When biography and history are joined, when the issue confronted by the self is 
shown to  have a relationship to  and bearing on the content and ethos o f a time, 
then self-study moves to  research.” (p. 15)
I also initially wanted to consciously use the writing as an opportunity to make sense of 
my experiences within ‘the community’, and to  see if any kind of reconciliation with 
‘Simone’ were possible. I therefore sent ‘My second twenty one years’ to  Simone’, with 
a covering letter dated 20th June 2 0 0 1. In part of the letter, I said (the name of the 
organisation has been changed here to  ‘the community’):
“Throughout the last ten years I have had many thoughts about your letter and 
what happened in ‘the Community’. I also imagine that you too  have continued to  
think and reflect upon that time in our lives. When we last met -  I guess it was 
about five years ago -  I left thinking that you had not really deeply examined what
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you were doing in sending me such a letter. There was no sense o f remorse about 
it from you, that it might have been highly unethical, nor I thought any real 
acknowledgement from you o f its potential fo r damage to  me. N or did I think 
there was any reflection from you -  at least any that you were prepared to  admit 
and share with me -  about the potentially destructive effects o f ‘the Community’. I 
thought this effectively led to  an impasse between us.
I still wonder about what view you now hold o f this time -  if your perspective has 
shifted at all - and whether there is any room at all for some kind o f reconciliation 
between us. Part o f my motivation in sending you this document is the possibility 
o f opening up some genuine dialogue between us about what happened. I can also 
envisage the possibility that this document, which is the closest I have come to  
being able to  articulate my thinking about ‘the Community’ and my involvement in 
it may lead you to  decide not to  engage further with me. O f course the document 
is not all encompassing or perfect -  it is hard to  do full justice to  the intensity and 
complexity o f that time in our lives.”
In her registered letter back to me, dated 7th July 2001, Simone rebutted my account. 
She said that:
‘‘For the avoidance o f doubt, I want to  make it clear that your account is seriously 
deficient and I refute your interpretation o f events. You attribute motivations and 
feelings to  me that I know not to  be true. Much o f what you say in this account is a 
travesty o f the things I was trying to  teach.”
She also made some specific points about the writing, and said that although I was not 
using their real names the main characters in the account were easily identifiable.
As a result of her letter, I amended the account and created a second version to  take 
into account some of the points Simone had raised and remove all geographical 
references and other details that helped identify people. I regretted this somewhat 
because it went against the arguments I had been making in my research about the 
importance of context but thought it necessary to do. I sent her this second version, 
together with another covering letter, dated 1st November 2001. In the letter, I said:
“ I think you make some valid points in referring to  some o f the omissions in my
account. Some parts o f my account, particularly my relationships w ith  I have
deliberately kept brief as I thought it would be an unwelcome intrusion on their
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privacy to  say more. I also think these relationships are less relevant to  the overall 
theme in the writing which has emerged as an exploration o f issues concerning 
leadership, groups and organisational culture, based on reflections on my own 
experience in ‘the Community’.
I have now amended the account to  include some o f the points you raise because I 
think their inclusion gives a more rounded account. As I said in my earlier letter to  
you, no account can be exhaustive and will always be partial. If you want to  add 
some comments alongside what I have written to  give a more inclusive account I 
am willing to  include them. I have also made greater effort to  disguise peoples’ 
identities by removing specific references to  ”
H er response to this second letter was brief. In it, she said: “The picture you have 
presented is a distortion of the truth and I do not give you my permission for 
publication”. (I had not asked her permission!). In addition, she stated: “ I trust you have 
sought legal advice about defamation and the implications of the recently introduced 
Human Rights legislation.”
My response to what I perceived as a threat of legal action was to seek legal advice 
about my account. To  my surprise, I found that parts of it could indeed be seen as 
potentially defamatory. I had naively assumed that freedom of speech together with 
academic freedom meant that it was possible to w rite such accounts without fear of 
legal action. I thought long and hard about what to  do. Should I go ahead and publish this 
account on my web-site and risk a legal action? Should I drop the idea of making this 
account public at all? W h at was my motivation in all this anyway and what was I trying to  
accomplish? Was I just motivated by a desire for revenge or was I concerned with 
redressing an injustice? O r  was this desire to  make the account public enormously 
narcissistic and inappropriately self-disclosing? W as it desirable anyway to make such an 
intimate account publicly available on a web-site?
Eventually, and after a number of conversations with friends, I decided to  amend the 
account and create version three, which is the version in this thesis. This represents an 
attempt to take out or change what could be perceived as the parts of the account most 
at risk of being described as defamatory, w ithout though overly diluting the thrust of 
what I wanted to say. I also decided to create a password-protected part of my web-site 
for both of my autobiographical writings as I realised that I did not want people viewing 
this material outside the context of any form of relationship with me. I was then able to
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include the earlier unedited version of ‘My first twenty-one years’ on the site as I could 
restrict access to who saw it. 
I have showed different versions of the account to  friends, colleagues from a peer 
support group at work, and other people who were involved in ‘the Community’. 
I reproduce selected passages from their comments below, to offer further indication of 
the writing being a ’good read’, and of the ability of my text to  stimulate others’ thinking. 
From Andy Smith, a colleague at Roffey Park:
“ I was gripped and found myself leafing through the pages to  get to  the end.”
“ Page 9 -  Initial Reflections -  This stuff had real resonance fo r me although I don’t  
think my experiences o f a ‘community’ have been as profound o r long lasting at 
least. I think there is an archetype here.”
From Suzanne Penn, also a colleague at Roffey Park:
“Thanks for the privilege o f reading your work .
Like others you mention, your tale o f The Community’ reminds me o f a number 
o f personal examples o f how a group like this operates. My dad is part o f a 
religion (Christadelphian - interestingly the Church o f England refer to  it 
as a cult) which in my experience has exactly the same issues - some seem to  
have the power o f 'excommunication' in an organisaiton that is supposed to  
be 'leaderless'. I even know o f similar letters being written to  the one you
received by those in the centre o f pow er  I found the paper personally very
powerful - has led me down some trains o f thought that I had not considered 
previously....”
From Steve Tarpey, another colleague at Roffey Park:
“ I was interested, intrigued, at times downright fascinated by the narrative 
but I'm not sure how much detail is included to  support the subsequent 
(equally fascinating) analysis, o r as a form o f catharsis for you. Neither 
rationale is 'wrong', but if it is the latter then it does raise questions 
about your purpose in making this a 'public document'.”
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From Geoff Mead, a co-member of my PhD supervision group:
“You write beautifully with real "narrative truth". The writing is direct 
and convincing and very evocative.”
From Professor Petruska Clarkson:
“ I read it immediately upon receipt and was very moved by your wise and
reflective account. Thank you fo r sharing it with me I'm very happy that your
writing is progressing so well; you write logically, informatively, clearly and with 
feeling.”
From Jonathon Kemp who I met at the workshop referred to  in the text held in the 
Borders area:
“Thank you for your letter o f explanation and the interesting 
account o f your personal journey
“ It was striking, and to  a certain extent reassuring, to  hear that what I 
(we) had experienced in our own 'cult' situation was not unique.
Obviously it is also in the very nature o f cults that they foster a sense o f 
exclusivity and elitism, as if one is part o f the chosen few that hold a 
very special truth that sets one apart from the 'outside' w orld  ”
From Val Hammond, the chief executive at Roffey Park:
“ Immediately engaging as usual causing reflections and insights.
I wondered fo r example about whether there is a link between the desire 'to 
do good/bring about change' and the propensity for involvement with
cult-like organisations. This came because your story reminded me o f .......
Is there a link, does one lead onto the other o r is it just a coincidence?”
“  The references to  wider society, eg political references and to  the cults
elsewhere help to  set your experiences in a context and I think the 
interplay o f different 'tribes' might be worth exploring more - the 
anthropological approach I suppose.
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It is good to  see increasing references to  emerging philosophical and 
scientific thought at the end and some sense o f where you are going. In a 
way I feel I am reading a book - o r a life - as published as a part series 
which is rather odd and yet it is like life. Some o f this 'hanging in 
space' will disappear when you have completed it as even something as simple 
as an index provides a framework and I can't at the moment decide if it is 
o f consequence.except to  say its a good read!
More feedback, Jane had one word for it 'riveting' (I hope you are OK about 
her reading your paper as she reads everything that comes to  me unless it is 
marked otherwise.)"
I am offering excerpts here as further evidence of the way that the evolving practice of 
showing my w ork to  others has generated learning and further insight. Such learning 
does not happen independently of my relationships with others. Learning and the change 
in relationships occur together. For example, the risk of showing my chief executive the 
different autobiographical accounts I have been writing for inclusion on my web-site, and 
her thoughtful responses to them, have helped bring about, I believe, an increasingly 
trusting and respectful relationship between us.
Section five: postscript
This chapter has given expression to  my ‘personal autobiographical voice’ through two  
accounts of different stages of my life. In these accounts I have wanted to  demonstrate 
the value of a form of representation and knowledge making different from traditional 
propositional knowledge. This form is highly subjective and cast in a narrative mould. It 
is, to  refer back to the arguments of section seven of chapter three, an illustration of the 
self re-creating itself through story o r fiction and using the genre of autoethnography in 
which to accomplish this.
My aim for the reader is that it should be an ‘evocative narrative’ as described by Ellis & 
Bochner (2000).
"The usefulness o f these stories is their capacity to  inspire conversation from the 
point o f view o f the readers, who enter from the perspective o f their own lives.
The narrative rises or falls on its capacity to  provoke readers to  broaden their 
horizons, reflect critically on their own experience, enter empathetically into worlds
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o f experience different from their own, and actively engage in dialogue regarding 
the social and moral implications o f the different perspectives and standpoints they 
encounter.” (p. 748).
The responses quoted in sections tw o and four, together with other conversations 




I w rote  the account of ideas of the self in chapter three in an almost exclusively 
propositional form. Although emphasising story in section seven of chapter three, and 
multiplicity in section five, the form of writing is in the traditional, singular, uni-vocal, 
impersonal, academic mode, appropriately ‘sandbagged’ with references. Occasionally 
another voice briefly interrupts and makes an aside (e.g. the comment on Osama Bin 
Laden on page 80). This is the same critical/cynical voice presented in chapter four. But 
my overall ‘scholarly voice’ in chapter three is primarily disengaged, abstract and 
theoretical - what Shotter ( 1999) refers to  as a “monological-retrospective-objective 
style of writing (or aboutness-writing for short).”
It is interesting to  contrast this with the tw o sections of autobiographical writing in 
chapter five. Here the style and overall genre can be described as personal-confessional.
I had not appreciated until after writing the autobiographical sections in chapter five and 
creating the material in chapter three that many critics view the dominant contemporary 
literary mode as confessional. And this mode is not without its detractors. Bleakley 
(2000), an important and incisive critic of this mode in chapter three, identifies the 
“primary voice” of the Enlightenment-based, unified ‘I’ as the personal confessional genre 
and further claims that “the secular humanistic, personal-confessional mode reifies, 
literalises, or concretises the T ”. He argues that personal narratives need to see the self 
as a social construction, formed in relation and response to others, not just the act of an 
independent self, striving for authenticity and autonomy. He quotes approvingly Smith’s 
(1995) w ork on autobiography. Smith says the tendency when autobiography, becomes 
primarily expressed in the confessional genre, through being, in Bleakley’s words,
“larded with pathos”, is that: “Both one’s history and one’s personality are exactly th a t -  
one’s own -  and one nurtures them like a sublime commodity with all the narcissistic 
gratification that implies.” Both Bleakley and Smith use the w ork of Derrida to argue 
that autobiography, though appearing as self-confession and self-revelation is, in fact, a 
means by which relationship to an other is created. This is certainly the case with my 
own autobiographical writing. The key relationship that the writing of the first twenty- 
one years of my life is aimed at is my parents. And the key relationship that the second 
piece of autobiographical writing is geared to  is ‘Simone’, the leader of ‘the Community’.
180
And the practice involved in the autobiographical writing was further aimed at eliciting 
response and relationship from those ‘others’.
Lasch (1979), likewise, is very critical of most confessional writing. He sees it dominated 
by self indulgence rather than self insight, full of psychiatric cliches, and grabbing 
attention through increasingly sensationalist self revelation and the recording of 
‘undigested’ experiences without further critical reflective detachment. Such writings are 
for Lasch further evidence of a predominantly narcissistic culture. He does not, 
however, entirely dismiss the confessional mode and is able to see possibilities in its 
form, though he thinks this is realised by precious few writers. He says:
“ But the best work in this vein attempts, precisely through self-disclosure, to  
achieve a critical distance from the self and to  gain insight into the historical forces, 
reproduced in psychological form, that have made the very concept o f selfhood 
increasingly problematic." (p. 17).
In response to  both Bleakley and Lasch’s trenchant critiques of the confessional 
autobiographical mode, and to refer forward to the criteria at the end of chapter nine, I 
aim to indicate the fragile, problematic, socially constructed nature of self-hood and to  
illustrate the influences shaping my identity. I aim to situate my personal autobiography 
of the first twenty-one years of my life in the social context of growing up in suburban 
London in the late fifties, sixties and early seventies. I also aim to  tell the story of my 
involvement with T h e  Community’ not just from a personal perspective and hopefully 
not over “larded with pathos” but also to  reflect upon the prevalence of similar stories 
as symptomatic of certain social milieus of the seventies and eighties. In chapter three, I 
then deal with the theme of the problematic, socially constructed, storied nature of the 
self from a theoretical, propositional, perspective not a personal confessional one.
The discerning reader will also note that the theoretical stories told about the self are 
not unrelated to the personal autobiographical narratives in chapter five. Informing the 
theoretical perspectives advanced in chapter three are the experiences described in the 
autobiographical writing. The ‘scholarly voice’ draws on and listens to the ‘personal 
autobiographical voice’. I am not meaning to advocate a simple crude one-to-one 
correspondence between the theories of the self in chapter three and my personal 
autobiography, but rather suggest and tease out the complex intertwining and patterning 
of ideas and experience. In this way, I am seeking to contextualise the ideas in chapter 
three in my personal history, but not reduce them in any kind of causal way or through
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‘cod-psychological’ theorising to issues of personal biography. Furthermore, the 
influence is not simply one-way from biography to  ideas. The ‘personal autobiographical 
voice’ of chapter five is likewise informed by and listens to  the ‘scholarly voice’. One of 
the key factors in extricating myself from ‘the community’ was to use the critical 
faculties of my ‘scholarly voice’ and the writing in section three of chapter five shows the 
influence of the ‘scholarly voice’ in sifting over and giving meaning to my experience.
Three of the more immediate connections that I make between chapters three and five 
are briefly outlined below. I hope the texts are ‘messy’ enough to suggest other 
connections to the reader, allowing multiple interpretations of the interweaving of the 
theoretical story and the personal story, or, in Heron’s (1992) terms, of the 
interconnections between propositional and experiential knowing.
Firstly, the critique of the dominant Cartesian view of the self and the associated narrow  
states of consciousness endorsed by the Newtonian-Cartesian worldview is informed by 
my experiences with LSD and also by my encounters with the natural world as alive, 
meaningful and interconnected with the human world. Likewise my profoundly 
disorienting experiences with LSD are now usefully informed by reading authors such as 
Christopher Bache (2000).
Secondly, the theoretical critique of humanistic psychology’s positing of a singular, 
authentic, ‘deep’ or ‘real’ self is linked to my experience of ten years training in a body- 
based therapy striving after such a self and my experiences of the dynamics and culture 
of the group of people involved in that training. This experience really brought alive the 
significance of the kinds of stories that can be told to construct selfhood and explain 
motivation. The experience of ‘the Community’ showed, too, the power of groups in 
shaping and maintaining the identity of their individual members through the 
construction of stories, which reinforce a particular view of the world and of individuals’ 
places in that world.
Thirdly, in chapter three, I describe, at a distance, the kinds of narratives elaborated by 
Frank (1995) to make sense of illness. Frank’s thinking became so vividly relevant and 
meaningful to  me because of my experience of the profound depression and ‘chaos 
narrative’ occasioned by the break-up of my second marriage, which I recorded in my 
journal at the time. His description of the ‘chaos narrative’ was very helpful to  me in 
being able to  further understand the nature of the experience I had been through.
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The ideas in chapter three and my life experience are connected in other ways, too. 
Many of the people whose ideas have significantly influenced me and who I refer to  in 
chapter three are people I know and have worked with. I was extensively involved with 
Ralph Stacey through the Complexity and Management Centre at the University of 
Hertfordshire between 1993 -1997. Patricia Shaw, Visiting Professor at the same 
Complexity and Management Centre and colleague and co-author of Ralph Stacey, is my 
second ex-wife and thereby also ‘Anna’ in chapter five.
I have met and talked with a number of authors referred to in this text at Schumacher 
College, through the context of my w ork as a facilitator on their courses. These people, 
in particular, James Hillman, are not simply the disembodied ideas and bibliographical 
references, which appear in my text, but living beings encountered, which has led to  a 
rich storehouse of memories and tales. The real life presence and my personal 
encounters with Paul Ekins, Paul Hawken, Karl-Henrik Robert, Hazel Henderson, Am ory  
Lovins, Wolfgang Sachs, Jonathon Porritt, Fritjof Capra, Thomas Moore and James 
Hillman have brought colour, life, particularity, story and personal meaning to the ideas I 
have tried to articulate in chapter three and elsewhere. In James Hillman’s case, for 
example, his ideas are forever associated with the grace and good humour by which he 
accepted my younger son being sick on his shoes as a result of my son’s first experience 
of teenage drunkenness at Schumacher College.
A t this point I want to return to the challenge posed by Jack Whitehead’s comments on 
my writing about ideas of the self which is referred to at the end of chapter three. To  
repeat this here:
“ I'll be fascinated to  hear if it does help you to  move onto being able to  say what is 
important to  you in your practice (as educator). Let's check out the validity o f my 
thinking that it won 't help you at all! I reckon that a move onto being able to  say 
what is important to  you in your practice as an educator will require a creative 
break with your propositional (mind) into a different epistemological and 
ontological relationship with your bodymind.”
Part of my response to  this challenge is contained in this chapter already, and questions 
the dualistic division Jack makes between ‘propositional mind’ and ‘bodymind’. That is, I 
have, in the previous section, tried to  show that the thinking expressed in my 
‘propositional mind’ (in chapter three) is not entirely separate from the lived 
experiences of my ‘bodymind’.
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But to  return to the nub of Jack’s question. Does the writing in chapter three help me 
articulate what is important to me in my practice as an educator? I will not answer this 
immediately but will return to  this question though discussing and writing about two  
different but related dimensions of my practice. In writing about my practice in the next 
part of the thesis, I will introduce a further voice into this thesis -  the ‘reflexive 
narrative voice of practice’.
Chapter seven will focus on my practice as an educator in the context of being a 
Programme D irector and Set Adviser for the two-year part-time postgraduate 
programme in People and Organisational Development at Roffey Park.
Chapter eight will examine my practice as an organisational change consultant and 
particularly focus on the inquiry question that emerged after my MPhil transfer paper, 
namely; ‘How can I work more effectively with self-organising processes in groups to enable 





Creating a living educational theory’
How can we reflect on the practice of say, ‘student-centred learning* in a way that 
captures its fundamentally subversive, unpredictable and, as it were, ‘erotic’ quality 
rather than representing it merely as a form o f technical accomplishment?” (p. 78)
Rowland (2000)
Section one: four vignettes 
One
It is about 6.30pm on Tuesday 12th November 2 0 0 2 .1 am sitting in a large upstairs 
training room at Roffey Park Management Institute near Gatwick meeting with five 
female participants who are students from the tenth intake of the People and 
Organisational Development post-graduate programme at Roffey Park.
A t one end of the room on four large sheets of white paper pinned to the wall is an ad 
hoc collection of pictures and representations of bridges that the fourteen participants 
present that morning have been asked to bring with them to the third residential event. 
The theme of the residential is ‘Bridges and Connections.’ Overall, at this stage, there  
are still technically eighteen participants on the programme, though the actual numbers 
of participants that day are in question. O ne participant did not arrive until lunchtime 
because of a major accident on the M23, which had delayed the start of the event. One  
person is unable to attend the residential at all as she is due to  give birth imminently. 
One person is leaving the course that day as she has been offered a new job in Thailand. 
O ne person has newly joined this group today having deferred from the previous year’s 
programme. Another person is not able to  attend the residential until the following day. 
And yet another is planning to leave the programme at the end of the residential. So a 
sense of changing and potentially uncertain membership is present.
Just in front of the collection of bridges at the west end of the room is a large semi­
circular, meccano-like, metallic structure, normally part of an exhibition stand, but today
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having been used in an afternoon’s workshop as a screen to create both a stage and 
back-stage area. In this area, people had been invited to explore the course assessment 
process in a different medium by appearing from behind the stage speaking about a silly 
object they had been asked to bring which they first were criticised for and then, on 
making a spontaneous change to what they said about the object, were accepted for. A t  
the other end of the room, eight pieces of large flip chart paper are clumsily joined 
together on the wall extending onto the ceiling, showing the messy diagram that 
participants had created that morning to map out the interconnections between the 
w ork that they are each doing in the next fifteen months. This w ork will create an 
overall portfolio for the MSc for each participant and is based on individual development 
agreements that they have very recently drawn up. In the middle of the room, close to  
the small circle of chairs that comprise our meeting space, is a vase of white lilies that I 
bought at the (particularly good) local florists that morning, following Thomas M oore’s 
(1992) precepts of bringing a Venusian quality into a room. Dotted around the room are 
photographs and artistic portrayals of various famous bridges downloaded from the 
internet by one of the people in the design team. On another wall are two flip charts 
detailing possible options including badminton, massage, and the cinema for the 
Thursday evening entitled T h e  Great Escape’. In the front of the room are the 
traditional props and paraphernalia of a training institution -  flipcharts, C D  player, 
overhead projector, boxes of felt-tip pens, blue-tack, post-it notes. The room is 
spacious, an unusual slightly dog-legged shape capable of sitting over forty people in the 
large comfortable chairs we are now seated in.
The five female participants meeting with me are the design group for this four-day 
residential. W e  have had tw o morning meetings, a conference telephone call, and 
various email exchanges in the previous tw o months leading up to  this residential event 
which is positioned as the third residential, ten months into a two-year programme. 
Prior to our meeting now, after the first day on the residential, the complete course 
group spent one hour in the smaller room next door talking about how we might 
continue to work together as a ‘community of practice’.
W e  are meeting at the end of the day to review how the day has gone and to discuss 
any issues arising from the day that might need our attention. From my perspective the 
previous course meeting has gone relatively well. My colleague, Diane, who is both a co­
set adviser with me in one of the three learning sets that the course is divided into, and 
also the recently appointed D irector for the MSc course at Roffey as a whole, facilitated 
the meeting with me. The other tw o set advisers were not present. Originally tw o of
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the design team who were responsible for organising the afternoon’s workshop with an 
external contributor were to  have facilitated the course meeting with me but they felt 
they wanted to be freer to participate in the meeting without the responsibility of 
facilitating it. Hence, I asked Diane to co-facilitate the meeting. In facilitating the meeting, 
we had followed a typical format of asking people to initially form three groups that 
mixed up the membership of the three different learning sets to  talk together about 
how to  continue to w ork together as a ‘community of practice’, and to then use their 
exploration in smaller groups as a stimulus for further discussion in the complete course 
group. Part of the purpose of this meeting, too, was to  consider whether to change the 
composition of the three learning sets. The membership of these sets had been decided 
by the participants in an activity on the first residential ten months previous. This self­
determining activity, as often happens, had been painful and difficult at times as 
participants faced, o r avoided, issues of inclusion, exclusion, personal risk and exposure. 
The discussion about potentially reconstituting the sets now had added weight and 
meaning because tw o people leaving the programme were from one set and another 
member of the same set was due to  have a baby. The general sense from discussions 
held earlier in each of the separate learning sets was that participants did not want to  
change the membership of these groups because they felt they had now built sufficient 
depth of knowledge of one another to enable fruitful working together for the next 
fifteen months. W hilst the three groups met for twenty minutes, I talked with Diane 
about our views of changing set membership. O u r general view was that there seemed 
no merit in changing composition of the sets if the participants did not want to, and that 
the arguments for not changing outweighed the arguments for change. W e  did, though, 
think it would be useful for the participants to  consider changing set advisers. Part of my 
thinking behind this was a comment made by a previous external examiner that the 
different sets on the programme develop, as all groups do, their own distinctive culture, 
and that in examining work, he could tell which of the sets the different pieces of work  
belonged too. I had wondered about the influence that the style of the set adviser 
inevitably has on the set and had already noticed patterns of interest evolving in one set 
that reflected the interests and expertise of their set adviser.
W hen the different groups reconvened to take their discussion further -  I deliberately 
avoided a formal report back from each of these groups as I wanted to encourage a 
more conversational and dialogical interaction -  a number of original ideas surfaced 
about how to w ork together across sets, whilst keeping the same set composition. 
These ideas included people assessing others’ w ork whom were not members of their 
set, and visiting other set meetings for part o r all of the time. I liked these ideas because
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they w ere creative responses to the challenge of working in depth in a small group but 
also allowing access to a wider network of ideas and resources. As the discussion 
evolved there seemed to  be no reference to any possible changes in set composition. I 
pointed this out and asked if the set whose membership had been depleted were  
comfortable to continue as a group of four, with the additional uncertainty of another of 
their members about to  give birth. They were keen to  continue as a group. A t this point 
the person who had newly joined the group, and who had been located in another set 
which she had already met, offered to change membership to  the depleted set to help 
even out the numbers of people in each set. One woman in the set she was already in 
commented that her move could be helpful as she wanted to undertake sensitive and 
possibly revealing w ork  about her organisation and she was concerned that the new 
person was from a competitor company. A t the same time, though, the set that the new 
person wanted to join contained (as the member about to give birth) someone from the 
same organisation as herself. H er offer to change sets was acknowledged but could not 
be resolved at the meeting. I then introduced the possibility of changing set advisers. 
Most people did not want to do this but one participant was vocal in her support for the 
idea. Also, in my recollection, near this point in the meeting the person who had newly 
joined the course expressed her frustration and criticised Roffey Park about needlessly, 
as she saw it, going through and repeating the same issues of changing set membership 
she had witnessed on her programme the previous year.
I have indicated at some length the circumstances of this meeting to offer some 
immediate context for the meeting of the design group that I began this account with, 
and to  give some understanding of the complexity of the course dynamics. Much of the 
initial part of the meeting is taken up with considering how to integrate the person who  
has recently joined the course group. A t 6.30 p.m., conscious that dinner is scheduled 
for 6.45 p.m., aware that there are a number of unresolved issues from the earlier 
meeting, and feeling somewhat tired from the day and a lack of sleep tw o nights before, I 
start to jot down on a flip chart, whilst the discussion continues, a list of currently 
outstanding issues. The first of these is about the question of set advisers changing sets. 
The remainder are the different suggestions that had arisen in the meeting about new 
ways of working across sets. I think it is important to address these issues before the 
end of the meeting. I therefore stand up by the flip chart and begin by saying that in 
relation to  the question of set advisers changing sets I will discuss this with the two  
other set advisers and, as Programme Director, I will make the final decision about that. 
Expecting that this will not be problematic, I get ready to  move to the next item on the 
list I have created. Immediately, one of the design team challenges me about moving on
189
so quickly and says she wants to talk more about what I have just said. O ther people 
come into the conversation saying that they are surprised and perplexed that I am taking 
on this decision and unhappy with the way I am doing this now. They comment that the 
sets were set up to give them responsibility as a group for choosing their membership, 
so why am I now taking away this responsibility? In addition, one person says that she 
understands my role and authority as programme director to  take action if the course 
was not working and there were serious problems to  be addressed. She believes that the 
general view is that people are satisfied overall with the development of the programme 
and that she has not heard me express any concerns that there are major issues, which 
need to be tackled.
This is a key moment for me on the residential. In retrospect, writing and thinking about 
it now, it is an example of a ‘critical incident’ (Schein, 1985) in any group when the 
authority of the leaders is directly challenged. Such moments have powerfully shaping 
influences on the culture of any group. I am surprised by the strength of reaction to my 
proposal. Also I am immediately reminded of an incident in the first residential when I 
had publicly, clumsily, crudely, and unilaterally exerted my authority on one of my 
colleagues. I have mixed feelings. Part of me thinks simply and primitively that: “I am the 
Programme Director and I will decide and you will do what I say”. On the other hand I 
am swayed by the arguments that are being used to challenge me. I note that the 
challenge whilst robust actually feels constructive. I also begin to realise that this 
challenge indicates a real sense of ownership of and commitment to the course rather 
than a means of usurping my personal authority. I also note in myself the contradiction 
between an espoused and genuinely held personal view about the value of building 
collaborative working relationships with participants, and my opposite behaviour in this 
instance. I therefore rescind my previous statement. I say that I will of course speak with 
my colleagues about what has happened but I will not then make a final decision about 
this. By now it is past the time for dinner so we head off to  the dining room.
Later that evening, the following question occurs to me: “If I am not to decide about 
changing set advisers, then who will decide and how will we decide?” I resolve to share 
this question with the design group when we next meet.
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Two
It is 7.55 p.m. the following evening, Wednesday the 13th of November 2002.
I have just met with one of the people in my learning set to  talk about his development 
agreement. I have then joined up with a group of participants in the bar at Roffey and 
then wallktojthe private dining room where we are to  eat that night in the company of 
tw o other men on the programme. W e  are slightly late for dinner. All the other 
participants are present in the room.
The room is beautifully decorated. People have been asked to bring along an eastern 
cushion and any eastern objects to  the residential, which have transformed a 
comfortable but bland training room into a delightful, colourful evocation of the orient. 
Attractive costumes and textiles hang on the walls. Candles float in bowls of water. 
People sit on the floor on bright cushions and in chairs draped with fabric. A  marvellous 
long Indian cloth structure hangs from the centre of the room. A  C D  of Moroccan 
music, T h e  Voice of the Atlas’, plays. An interest in eastern thought and its relevance 
to  personal development has been a theme of this programme from the first residential. 
The food is delicious. I have, in advance, spoken with the chefs at Roffey about the kind 
of food we want for that evening and they have responded inventively and with care.
There is a low hubbub of engaged conversation in the room. People are talking 
animatedly in twos, threes and fours. The atmosphere feels friendly, warm, intimate and 
inviting. In part of my mind, I log the thought that the creation of such an atmosphere is 
a good example of a self-organising process. Although there was direction to bring 
material for an ‘eastern evening’ the actual creation of the environment has happened 
spontaneously, very rapidly, and in a highly co-operative fashion in about one hour with 
no obvious leader. For most of this time I was not in the room where the decoration 
was happening. The creation of such an evening together is a key indicator to me that 
the programme is going well, as much as the rich quality of the discussion on the 
programme, or of the calibre of any outside contributors.
Three
I am having lunch on Thursday that same week at one end of a large table in the dining 
room with the three workshop leaders from Theatre of the Mind’. They are due to run 
the next session on the programme. I have arranged to talk with them togther with the 
member of the design group who is responsible for briefing and liasing with them. She
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and I sit on either side of the three workshop leaders. In addition, another member of 
the design team sits on my left. W e  begin talking to the workshop leaders about the 
themes that have arisen from the mapping of development agreements that we want 
them to  w ork  with. The member of the design team on my left joins the conversation 
and participates vigorously. I notice a very slight affronted reaction in myself that it is 
not her role to  do this. I counter this reaction with the more pleasing thought that this 
is a further example of a participant taking on naturally and spontaneously a leadership 
role on the programme.
Four
The workshop leaders from Theatre  of the Mind’ are working with us using a variety of 
games and activities from the theatre. One of them is called ‘Carnival in Rio’. The group 
stands in a large circle and someone peels off from the circle, walks around facing the 
other members in the circle and makes a noise and action they have to  copy. As they go 
around the circle training everyone in their particular sound and movement, the next 
person peels away and makes a different sound and movement that is then mimicked by 
the people they encounter. As this continues a rich cacophony of sounds and 
movements are built up. As this exercise is progressing, and after everybody has had 
one turn around the circle, an idea pops into my mind of what sound and movement I 
want to introduce to others. I peel away from my place in the circle and say to  
individuals loudly and angrily, “Shut the f**k  up”. This exact phrasing of words has been 
influenced by seeing again the short clip I used from ‘Pulp Fiction’ the previous day in a 
session on postmodern thought. I walk around the circle saying this to people in 
sequence and hearing them play it back to me. In the background the other sounds that 
are being generated continue. My final encounter is with a participant who refuses to  
copy my sound and movement and continues asserting the movement and sound she is 
already doing. I try three times to convert her to my movement but each time she 
responds more vigorously and assertively with her own sound and gesture. A t this point, 
the workshop leaders conclude the activity for a tea break. I have found the experience 
of doing this liberating and wonderfully exhilarating. But the questions do occur to me as 
I take a cup of water with a few participants by the water-cooler: “Is my behaviour 
appropriate? Is it professional?”
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Section two: self-managed learning
These four vignettes, written on 18 & 19 November 2002, describe moments that stood 
out as significant, which occurred during a four-day residential event of a postgraduate 
course from 12-16 November 2002 at Roffey Park.
This two-year part-time postgraduate course in People and Organisational Development 
has been a focus of my sustained research inquiries over the last three years with four 
different programme groups and across the range of different roles I have occupied in 
relation to  these groups.
To  understand the organisational and pedagogical context in which my inquiries are 
situated throughout this chapter, it is worth briefly describing the history and nature of 
the programme at Roffey Park, and locating it within certain educational philosophies 
and traditions.
An MSc in Management Development, as the programme was first named, was set up at 
Roffey Park by a group of staff, including myself, between 19 9 1 -93. The first intake of 
students (MSc I), with whom I worked as a set adviser, was in January 1993. Salford 
University, who offer a similar programme, validate the course.
A t an early point on the programme, the students divide themselves into learning sets of 
5-6 participants with a staff member as a set adviser. Typically membership of these 
learning sets, apart from people leaving the programme, remains the same throughout 
the tw o years, though revisiting the set configuration, and exploring whether to change 
composition, generally happens about nine months into the programme (as described in 
vignette one).
The programme is based on the educational philosophy of self-managed learning (SML). 
Ian Cunningham, who was chief executive at Roffey Park between 1987 and 1992, claims 
to  have originated this term. Self-managed learning is defined on a handout from Roffey 
Park as “an approach where individuals w ork out what they want to  learn and how they 
want to learn it.”
As an approach to learning it is based on values of autonomy, responsibility, self-control, 
and choice (Cunningham, 1994). Intrinsic to the approach is a holistic view of the 
person, which emphasises the role of emotion as well as intellect and cognition in 
learning. In his book on T h e  Wisdom of Strategic Learning’, Cunningham (1994) quotes
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approvingly a remark by Mike Dixon a journalist on the Financial Times that, “thinking is 
embedded in feeling” (p. 98). One of the aims of SML is to acknowledge and w ork with 
the emotional as well as the cognitive dimension of learning.
SML draws from and integrates a number of different traditions in education and 
management development. These include the ideas and w ork of Reg Revans (1980,
1983) who pioneered the use and philosophy of ‘action learning’ groups in developing 
managers. Revans’ approach was radical at the time as he linked theory and practice by 
connecting the learning and development of managers to  their day-to-day w ork and 
important organisational projects they were engaged in. One of Revans (1983) much 
quoted aphorisms is; “There can be no learning without action and no action without 
learning”. O ther important traditions influencing SML include learner-centred and self­
directed approaches to adult education, particularly based on the w ork of Rogers 
(1969); ideas and practices of experiential learning developed from the educational 
philosophy of Kolb (1984); the intensive group-based approaches (encounter groups and 
T-groups) arising from the personal growth and development movements inspired by 
humanistic psychology in the I960 ’s and I970 ’s; self-development groups (Pedler, 
Burgoyne, Boydell, 1978) in management education; Knowles’ (1986) w ork on adult 
learning and learning contracts; and open and distance learning.
Similar traditions of experiential learning, learner-centred approaches to education, and 
intensive psychotherapeutic group-based approaches were also at the roots of the 
diploma course I refer to in my autobiographical writings in section tw o of chapter five, 
which has been so influential in my own development and thinking about education. This 
diploma course has always inspired me and it has been a consistent intention of mine to  
try and create a similar learning climate on the MSc programmes at Roffey Park I have 
been involved with. It’s worth quoting my own words from section tw o of chapter four 
about the diploma course I followed to show again its vitality, and contrast with the 
traditional education I had received up until that point.
“The course was a crucible in which psychology, psychotherapy, politics, spirituality, 
feminism, artistic expression, and personal development met and mingled, not in a 
theoretical way, but through the lived interaction o f the people involved. There 
was a wild, mould-breaking aspect to  the course.......
 The course was an initiation to  a life-long journey of, fo r want o f a better
word, personal development and exploration o f the relationship between
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individuals, groups and organisation. It showed that learning could be involving, 
absorbing, personal, political, risky and exhilarating compared to  the abstract, mainly 
detached theorising I had encountered at Cambridge."
O ne of the more distinctive features of SML is the choice it gives participants to  define 
their own syllabus, and areas of study and inquiry. On the MSc programme at Roffey 
Park, students have to  engage in three defined pieces of w ork in their first nine months 
of the programme. These include a ‘position paper’ addressing the question: “ What has 
shaped and affected me in the way that I now work to develop people and organisations?” 
They also include a ‘critical review’ of the field of people and organisational 
development, which requires participants to  “offer a perspective or framing on the field of 
people and organisational development”, and a ‘development agreement’ whose purpose is 
to  “set out a portfolio of work that will be completed by the end of year two which will be 
assessed for the award of the MSc/. (All italicised quotes above are from the current 
programme handbook.)
In the first vignette presented at the beginning of this chapter, the development 
agreement is referred to  in the text a number of times, as that particular MSc course is 
at the stage of the programme of drawing up development agreements which determine 
the w ork they will be engaged in for the remaining fifteen months of the programme. 
This is, therefore, an important document as participants, within broad constraints, 
determine areas of study and development that are interesting, relevant, meaningful and 
challenging both to themselves and their respective organisations, and which also have 
to  meet the standards of a masters programme.
A  further distinctive feature of the MSc programme is that participants engage in self- 
assessment. Each piece of w ork they produce has to  be assessed by all the members, 
including the set adviser, of the learning set they are a part of. This requires set 
members to engage in the task of formulating and determining for themselves, with the 
assistance of the set adviser, the criteria for Masters standard and then assessing each 
other’s w ork against those criteria. This is, intellectually and emotionally, a challenging 
process, as it requires students to be making pass and failure judgements on their peers.
Having briefly outlined some of the institutional and educational background to this 
programme, I will now go on to describe and critically evaluate the processes of inquiry I 
have been engaged in whilst working on the programme.
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Section three: self-study inquiry
On further reflection, I can see - without it being my original starting point or conscious 
intention to  do so - that all the vignettes described at the beginning of this chapter 
portray aspects of my educational leadership role during the third residential event of 
the tenth intake on the MSc in People and Organisational Development. They all 
critically involve key issues of power and authority.
This particular programme began in January 2002. As I have engaged in the course, and 
followed my inquiry practice of writing about aspects of the programme, particularly 
following the residential events, and sending these accounts to  the participants on the 
programme, a key inquiry question has surfaced more clearly and pressingly over the 
past nine months. This is - how do I use the authority of my roles as overall Programme 
Director, and as Set Adviser to  one of the three learning sets on the programme, to  
build genuinely collaborative working relationships? A  supplementary and related 
question is - how much real co-creation is possible on a programme which is set within 
the academic, institutional framework, formal power relationships, and constraints of a 
Masters degree? A  third related and important question is - how do I make the activity 
itself of inquiring into these tw o earlier questions part of the process of building the 
collaboration and co-creation I want to  happen?
To begin with the third question from the paragraph above. W hen I started as 
Programme Director for MSc 10, I already had experienced over three years of working 
with other MSc groups and involving them in different inquiry questions. These 
questions, as indicated in chapter one, have continuously evolved over the course of my 
PhD. From this experience, I had come to better appreciate that my inquiry questions 
and the interests and agenda of MSc participants could be quite divergent. I needed to  
overcome my narcissistic tendencies that people on the MSc would naturally and 
inevitably be interested in what I was up to and find it endlessly fascinating. The 
challenge, therefore, as I began MSc 10, was to  find a way of genuinely engaging the 
participants in my inquiries in a way that they experienced as relevant, interesting and 
appropriate to them, and which added to their and my learning. In short, I wanted to  set 
up a situation in which I was researching with people not on them (Heron and Reason, 
2001).
I believe that the benefits of, and rationale for, conducting a self-study inquiry into my 
own practice on a two year programme in People and Organisational Development and 
sharing this inquiry with participants on the programme are clear and cogent. Using
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Peter Reason and Judi Marshall’s framework (1987), the benefit for ‘me’ is in reflecting 
on and improving my practice. For ‘us’, the course participants and myself, the benefits 
are in tracing and learning from the connections and overlaps between my roles as 
programme director and set adviser on the programme in helping to develop the 
participants, and participants roles in their respective organisations, which are likewise 
focussed on individual and organisational development. In other words, participants can 
learn from their experience of working with me in an educational leadership role on the 
programme about their own similar roles in their organisations. This experiential, often 
highly emotional learning from undergoing the processes of self and community 
development, what Rowland (2000) refers to  as the knowledge generated from the 
‘shared context’, is a vital and significant aspect of the programme. For ‘them ’, that is the 
people reading this account in my thesis, the benefits are the potential insights and 
learning generated for you as you engage in this narrative.
I was not, though, aiming to set up a form of co-operative inquiry (Heron and Reason, 
2001) in which, typically, people share an agreed similar underlying inquiry question, and 
also where formal authority relations do not exist. I was, though, aiming, to use the 
highly apt choice of wording coined by Delong (2002), to  set my inquiries “alongside” 
the interests and inquiries of the participants on the programme. I also understood that 
the process of building interest in my inquiries from the participants and indicating their 
relevance to them would progress over time, especially as my relationships with them 
developed. This illustrates further the point I have been emphasising throughout this 
thesis about the contextual, relationship-dependent nature of learning and knowledge 
creation.
Having outlined the inquiry questions at the beginning of this section which both 
underlie and arise from the vignettes, I now want to  trace back these inquiry questions 
and relate their evolution to earlier forms of inquiry practice with other MSc groups.
Section four: beginning inquiry
My inquiry process with regard to MSc groups formally began in February 2 0 0 0 .1 had 
been discussing with my supervisor, Jack Whitehead, the nature of any evidence 
required in order to show the educational influence I was having on my students. A t the 
time, I objected to what I perceived as the linear, causal explanation I thought inherent 
in Jack W hitehead’s concern with the educator tracking and evaluating their influence 
with their students in order to improve their practice.
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As a result of our arguments, I decided to  talk with the learning set on the MSc 6 
programme I had been working with over a two-year period to inquire into their 
perspective on the nature of my educational influence on them. This conversation took  
place on the last hour of our final meeting together on 18 February 2 0 0 0 .1 intended, 
too, that this conversation, as well as being of direct benefit to  me, by exploring over 
the period of the programme what the students had learned and my role in their 
learning, might also help them with the process of concluding the programme 
satisfactorily. I taped, then transcribed the conversation, and sent the transcript to  the 
four students with some additional comments triggered by reading the transcript. Re­
reading the transcript now, three significant themes emerge from the conversation. (The 
full transcript is on my web-site, www.minotaursegg.co.uk).
First, many of the comments that people made are highly personally affirming. I’m still 
touched and delighted by some of the remarks. As examples, four selected quotes, one 
from each person present, which touch on vital aspects of facilitative practice, are:
“  what impact your behaviour has had on us as someone who for me has
modelled the role as developer because we have had most frequent contact with 
you through the set system, as it were, and I found myself thinking about a number 
o f issues and I think it goes something like this that in my paper I wrote and I am 
still thinking about this - how does somebody manage a space in such a way that it 
is full o f possibilities so unbounded, if you like, and yet how do they manage it with 
boundaries so that it feels safe because learning for me has been a lot to  do with 
taking risks and experimenting and that’s where I feel that the learning has occurred 
and I don’t  know quite how you do it, but I think it is something to  do with having 
a repertoire o f skills to  be able to  draw upon and a sensitivity to  know when 
boundaries are important and when freedom is important and being able to  draw 
across a range o f things so that that space has felt, both o f those things fo r me at 
different times when I have needed it to  be bounded it has been bounded and 
when I have needed it to  be limitless and liberating"
“  but there are tw o times that have just sprung to  my mind as we have been
talking where you have taken completely different positions, both o f which have 
been important at the time and I think have shown flexibility in the way that you 
have worked with us. The first was this issue that we had over the equity o f
assessment because that was a difficult issue , I think it was around the
development agreements, when my development agreement didn’t  pass and in the 
same Set Meeting, Mike’s did and then we had, and then there was a discussion
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around whether o r not we were using equivalent criteria. And at the time for me, 
that could have been more difficult than it was made so I think that it was handled 
effectively but also that you realised that there was something wrong, that you 
didn’t  dig your heels in, that you went away and thought about it, and came back 
and also felt uncomfortable with what we had experienced, and re-addressed it 
and it would have been easy for you to  have taken a firmer position which would 
have been, I think, inappropriate, but you could have said, look, this is how it is, I 
am the Set Adviser, and that is how I say, and you didn’t, you went away, you re­
thought your own position and you reflected on what had happened and you took 
a different position and we all learned from that, you learned from it but we all 
learned from it as well, and I think that that showed greater integrity fo r me in 
facilitating us through that than had you have pulled rank o r used your position.”
“  because I have thought about the interaction and how you influence the Set,
not how you run it, because I never feel that you run it, I wrote down here that 
you always seem to  be part o f it, it’s never that your voice is more important and 
you’re just talking and giving your feelings and in a very honest way, but the thing 
which I really think well OK which has been a strength fo r you for me, fo r me
personally, is the commitment you have dem onstrated but its about this
commitment and it’s a kindness but I think you have to  be generous with spirit to  
take the time to  do things we’re busy people - generous with spirit - generosity o f 
spirit.”
”  it’s the fact that you don’t  try  and push your knowledge on us, but it’s sort
o f here it is and if you’re interested, then I’m prepared to  share it with you and I’ve 
really, really benefited from that ”
The second theme that emerges is about the nature of the overall learning participants 
thought they had gained over a two-year period. In the discussion, they were trying to  
go beyond simple ideas of instrumental learning concerned with acquiring new 
knowledge, skills and techniques to articulate more significant personal learning. For 
some of them, the learning was transformational and deeply connected to  themselves.
“ But how do you explain to  somebody. I would say I am a different person, I have 
learned a huge amount about me, I know something about a few subjects that I 
didn’t  know about before and I have picked those. I know something about the 
subjects that other people have looked at but they are almost peripheral - I could 
have probably discovered those things in another way, but the learning has come
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from within and with the Set It is the most extraordinary process and life-changing 
- now - how can you explain that to  somebody?”
"If you ask me what have I learned, I think that I have been given the self back, as it 
were, that I had lost contact with and that’s a very moving thing for me and I would 
have paid double, treble, if I had had it, fo r that but I wouldn’t  have known when 
we were in that room down the corridor [two years ago] that that was what I was 
going to  get and in fact if you’d have said that you were going to  get yourself back, 
I’d have said ‘get f* * * *d  I’m perfectly alright, thank you very much, clear o f f ’
A t the end of the transcript I added:
“ I was struck by the comments made by tw o  people about the whole experience 
leading to  a different sense o f self as I, too, felt a very different person myself at the 
end o f these tw o years than I did at the beginning. And then I wondered how 
much did my own personal journey influence the journey o f others even with little 
o f this journey being explicit to  others? Did my own turbulence and confusion at 
times give me greater empathy and ‘holding capacity’ to  enable others to  go 
through similar journeys? And conversely did the fact that others were going 
through transformational experiences also impact on me?”
In the questions posed above, I was anticipating a perspective that is central to this 
thesis. Put briefly, learning is relational, contextual and co-created. In the same way, 
returning to the themes of chapter three, and the overall title of this thesis, selves 
emerge in relationship and are co-created with others. Thus transformational learning 
and the emergence of self are intimately interconnected.
Furthermore, complexity science (Stacey, 2000) shows that in any complex adaptive 
system, such as a human group, simple linear links between cause and effect cannot be 
unequivocally traced. Influence is always mutual, not simply one way. The excerpts and 
the rest of the transcript give examples of where students account for the influence I 
have had on them, but this influence cannot be conceived in causal explanatory terms i.e. 
that because I did X , Y happened; therefore Y  is explained by X , and if I do X  again then 
Y will predictably happen.
The third theme from the transcript relates to the above paragraph and the inherent 
unpredictability of living systems. I was surprised, (and pleased), to  discover that some of 
my actions had, unbeknownst to me, exerted considerable influence on the students.
For example, one participant said:
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“ I kept a separate note and I think in every single Set Meeting, you said Tm reading 
a fascinating book at the moment’ and you told us o f the book that you’re reading 
and you told us o f the author and you told us who it’s published by and you have 
taken time to  explain why you think it’s interesting and what effect it’s had on you 
and quite a few o f those books I’ve taken and I’ve read ”
This, and other comments, indicated to me the unpredictable nature of learning and 
influence. I had not intended in mentioning the books to  stimulate others to read them. 
A t the time, I was simply, as part of the process of ‘checking in* at the beginning of each 
learning set, sharing my current reading with people. Yet this action on my part clearly 
had greater impact than I intended or was aware of.
The overall effect on me of this initial inquiry into my influence on others’ learning was 
to  strengthen my confidence, and help clarify what was important in my work. The  
excerpts chosen above demonstrate, in particular, two important values. The first is the 
value I place on fairness in regard to my treatm ent of students. In the course of a 
structured feedback activity on a very recent set meeting, using postcards to offer 
images to one another, one of the participants said to me that she thought I was ‘even- 
handed’. A t the time I registered the remark but did not think too much about it. O ver 
the next few days, though, the remark kept coming back to me and I realised how  
deeply complimented I felt by her comment. The second important value is the attempt 
to  realise the therapeutic potential of education. This is the edge where therapy and 
education meet. I suspect that good education is always deeply therapeutic. Similarly 
good therapy is deeply educational.
Section five: accounting for a residential
In June 2 0 0 1, following a three-day residential event based on the theme of “an Inquiry 
into the nature of creativity”, which I had, as programme Director, co-designed with a 
group of three participants from MSc 7, I w rote  a narrative account of my experience of 
the event. The purpose of this account was to  address the three inquiry questions 
(about self-organisation, creativity and presence) as they related to the residential that 
had emerged as the focus for the next phase of my w ork from the M Phil transfer paper. 
A  further aim of the account was to w rite it in such a way that in sending it to  the 
participants, it would serve to  stimulate their thinking and generate further learning 
from the residential.
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A  major theme of the account was about the role of leadership in enabling self- 
organising processes and creativity within groups. In the account, I reflected on my role 
and what I perceived as my failure on the residential to stimulate a creative engagement 
with the open-ended task of spending a day in London in any way whatsoever that 
would help understand more about the nature of creativity. I concluded the account 
with the following reflections, linking my experience in a leadership role at the 
residential to issues faced in organisational change.
•  “To what extent was the activity set up on the residential a reflection o f my interests
and preoccupations and to  what extent was it a genuinely shared creation o f the design
group. Certainly the idea o f taking time in London had genuinely emerged at the 
second o f our planning meetings and I had seen this as a good example o f a creative 
idea being generated through the interaction in a group.
•  I think that the lack o f full involvement o f Pauline [a participant from the programme 
who was also helping me design the residential] in the planning group had implications 
fo r the involvement and understanding o f her learning set. I think this is an interesting 
point about change and shows the ramifications o f not fully involving key people in a 
change process.
•  A  consequence o f the tw o  points above is that the extent to  which people felt 
committed to  the task o f spending time in London was hugely varied.
•  I had a vision o f the creative possibilities o f the residential. This vision was not shared 
by others and what happened was very different than what I imagined. I think this is 
what frequently happens with organisational visions. No matter how compelling, no 
matter how well communicated, people will make their own sense o f it, and implement 
it in very different ways than the originator o f the vision imagined.
•  That although people responded in very different ways than I had expected to  the task 
o f spending time in London, the way that they responded, and the opportunity to  
reflect on that and talk with others about their response gave them a significant 
opportunity for learning.”
The response to sending my ‘ruminations on the residential’, (as I titled my account), to  
the six participants and my colleague who had been present, and a participant who had 
not been able to attend, was very full. O ver the period of a few weeks, all of the
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participants and my colleague w rote to one another and me with their comments on my 
account. Many of their accounts used the narrative style I had employed. 
I was gratified by the capacity of my account to stimulate further thinking.
“ Did your paper enrich my learning from the residential? Yes, I cry! Very much.
It has taken me the better part o f a thoroughly absorbing day to  respond to  your 
account but it was time, I think, very well spent and I am grateful fo r the stimulus.”
“ I found your account challenging, thought-provoking and deeply touching. The 
responses that I have seen so far from both Maria and Spencer have really built on 
this theme o f openness. I value and admire your struggle with presence and your 
relationship with the broader group. The process o f reading your paper forced the 
pace on my own thinking and has caused me to  review my own role and action in 
a deeper way than I might have done - I have started learning more about personal 
responsibility and the power o f culture. I also intend to  use your written dialogue 
(as well as Spencer's and Maria's) to  add to  my research work.
The paper forced me to  a degree o f introspection about my own learning and my 
own handling o f group process that I have not achieved before.”
“Your account was provocative and certainly offers an extra insight to  you. It 
served to  increase the longevity o f the event and keep it as a subject fo r discussion. 
O ther residential normally 'die' after a short time.”
The person who had not been present commented:
“ I wasn't at the residential, but the piece provoked emotions such as: 
embarrassment, anger, shock, guilt, surprise, concern, dismay, sorrow and probably 
the overriding feeling o f having missed out.”
Some people also commented on the dynamics of leadership and self-organisation as 
they experienced them on the residential.
“W hy were we surprised that a residential on the theme o f chaos, complexity & 
creativity caused such a varied response? Was the tension between 'going with the 
flow' and attempting to  manage the best outcomes (tight and loose)? Should the 
discomfort felt to  varying degrees and at varying stages reflect the success o f the 
residential in invoking some sense o f the topic into individuals' actual experiences?”
203
“ How do people cope with their frustrations that naturally arise on a self-organising 
programme? How do we handle our dislike, disapproval, disagreement, fear, 
anxiety, uncertainty, our not knowing?”
The above comments, of course, are a very partial and highly selective representation of 
the rich responses to my account. (My full account and the detailed responses to  it can 
all be seen on my web-site, www.minotaursegg.co.uk). A t this point, I am making these 
selections to indicate the power of my writing to  stimulate thought, emotion and 
learning, and also to  highlight themes of leadership, self-organisation and self­
management which are critical to  the dynamics of each programme.
In reply to  the varied accounts that had been written, I w rote a further response. Re­
reading this now I am pleased with the overall quality of writing. This quality is itself, I 
believe, a reflection of the quality of response generated by my original account. In other 
words, it is an example of reciprocal, circular influence. I influence my students and they 
influence me, o r vice versa - my students influence me and I influence my students.
I quote from my further response below as it indicates the important unfolding theme in 
my practice of grappling with the tension and dilemmas in acting with authority on a self­
managed learning programme. I said:
‘‘Reading your reflections on the residential, what really stands out is the sheer
variety and difference o f response and learning to  the residential I know I
should not be surprised by such idiosyncratic responses but it really shows me how 
truly impossible it is to  predict o r control someone's learning.”
"  I think a key issue our writing is exploring is the nature o f authority in a
group/qualifications programme/organisation so the shift to  self-managed
learning is part o f this wider contextual shift towards being less dependent on 
traditional forms o f authority -  in the field o f education, encouraging students to  
find their own authority, manage their own learning, become active learners, more 
effectively learn h o w to  learn. I’m sure we all know the rhetoric! And I think the 
MSc is an opportunity to  explore over tw o  years what this rhetoric means in 
practice -  to  experience the frustrations as well as the joys o f this form o f 
learning ”
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“  But this emphasis on and advocacy o f self-managed learning does not o f
course instantly create high-performing, all-singing, all-dancing learners fo r the new 
millenium. A t the same time, as the attempt to  build more equal, less strictly 
hierarchical forms o f relating, there continue to  exist real differences in power and
position in both organisational and academic life W e are dealing with personal
development which has to  be fundamentally internally generated and evaluated and 
performance which is externally measured and assessed.”
The last sentence above illustrates a key tension on a self-managed qualification 
programme. This could also be understood in Habermas’ (1987) terms as the dialectic 
between the individual ‘life world’ of the participant with their unique subjectivity, 
cultural context, personal values and standards of judgement, and the ‘system w orld’ of 
academic institutions oriented to  consistency, outcomes and ‘means-ends functionality’. 
W hilst a tension on the MSc programme, though, (as it is indeed in this PhD too), this 
can also be a source of creativity. It is this tension, and the dilemmas engendered by this 
tension, that I have become interested in exploring further.
Section six: further inquiries on the postgraduate programme in 
People and Organisational Development
Following the activities described in the tw o previous sections, I undertook tw o further 
inquiries of a similar nature.
The first was with a learning group from MSc7. A t the end of their programme in 
January 2001, I had a discussion with three participants and their set adviser about how I 
had influenced them in my role as programme director. (The complete transcript for 
this conversation is on my web-site.) A t one point, the discussion took a particularly 
interesting turn and focussed on the effect of my ‘presence’, one of the three areas I 
had, from my MPhil paper, set out to inquire into. One participant described what she 
felt as quite an extreme range of ‘presence’ that she encountered. She referred to this 
as experiencing an ‘in’ Paul (internally focussed and preoccupied even whilst presenting 
to  a group) and an ‘out’ Paul (lively and fully engaged). O ne of the capacities of the ‘out’ 
Paul was my ability to fully enter into and participate in activities on the residential. (A  
good example of this is offered in vignette four at the beginning of this chapter). Re­
reading the transcript now, I think she goes on to make an interesting point about the 
nature of my participation.
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‘‘Can I make a distinction, actually I’m just thinking about when we went to  the
Tate Modern and I experienced you differently when we went to  The Tate
Modern, participating than I had experienced you participating in other events and 
the difference when we went to  The Tate Modern where I felt, personally, I found 
you to  be much more accessible as a person and communicative as a person.
Because I felt you were participating with me whereas when you were
participating in the theatre that you were participating in the event fo r yourself.... I
think that’s the distinction so I got a lot more from you at The Tate and the
walk to  The Tate, the journey up on the train and the walk to  The Tate.
O f course it was a smaller group - there were only three o f us - so that brings a
different quality to  it as well - it makes it easier and more personal but I felt that
you were with me, that you were hearing me and I was hearing you and we were 
much more readily able to  share and understand one another and that and your
writings afterwards really kind o f helped m e  that’s something that I would say is
a direct event that really helped my learning and what you wrote in particular 
about that event and how I had to  respond to  that made me really think and go 
that level deeper than I had at that point.”
I find her distinction helpful in thinking more carefully about the activity of participating 
in a group from a position of authority. Generally, in my professional practice, I think it 
is incumbent on me to participate with people. Occasionally, there may be value in 
modeling participating fully, just for myself and almost for the hell of it, to  encourage 
others to more fully participate, and to question traditional ideas of facilitation in which 
the position of the facilitator is conceived a in neutral, detached, objective manner. But 
mostly, as her comment suggests, greater learning is generated from a position of 
participating with, maintaining what Peter Reason and John Heron (2001) would call my 
“critical subjectivity.”
The second occasion of inquiry practice was when I was asked as an external 
contributor to run a one-day session on facilitation skills for MSc 8 at one of their 
residential events in February 2001. This was a group that I had no other involvement 
with. I followed the practice of writing an account of my w ork with them and emailing it 
to  all sixteen participants. On this occasion I had only one reply. This confirmed to me 
that people do not simply respond to  the material sent to them, but rather they 
respond in the context of the relationship that I have with them. On MSc 8, compared 
with MSc 7, that relationship was short-term and transient (for one day only), and did 
not generate sufficient commitment or interest to  respond to  my account.
Section seven: questions of values
Throughout 2001, as the inquiry practices described so far in this chapter were taking 
place, I was simultaneously writing the tw o autobiographical accounts now found in 
chapter five of this thesis. Part of the purpose in writing these accounts, especially the 
second one, was to  help clarify and identify the values that are important in shaping my 
practice. My supervisor, Jack Whitehead commented on reading the first of my 
autobiographical accounts, in an email dated January 25th 2 0 0 1:
“ I've re-read the paper for our last supervision group meeting. You hold my 
interest because o f the clarity o f the autobiographical descriptions. W here I start 
feeling some tension is when I ask myself questions about 'enquiry'/action 
research/professional practice. This is where I need your help. In many 
autobiographical pieces I read from action researchers, I can understand something 
about the human purposes and values the individual wants me to  use to  question 
them about their influence in the world and to  question them about their 
intentions to  live their values more fully in their practice. I really do need your help 
in understanding how you see your autobiographical account revealing something 
about the values you hold and use to  'guide' your enquiry.”
A t this point in the thesis, it is worth giving a brief account of Jack Whitehead’s ideas 
about ‘living educational theory’ and the key role of ‘values’ in his thinking. These ideas, 
and my ongoing critical engagement with them, have significantly influenced my thinking 
about, and practice of, action research inquiry.
Jack Whitehead’s w ork (1989, 1993, 1999, 2000, 2002) has been a rigorous, sustained 
attempt to  create a different form of educational theory. Since working as a teacher, and 
having initially been drawn to  finding an educational philosophy in the disciplines of 
philosophy, psychology, sociology and psychology of education, he came to realise that 
these disciplines, and the kinds of abstract theory they generated in the form of 
propositional knowledge, did not sufficiently directly relate to and help inform important 
dimensions of his own practice as a teacher. They were too detached from the kinds of 
judgements he was making every day in the classroom about the quality and worth of his 
educational practice. This experience, and his subsequent thinking and practice 
supervising masters and doctoral students, is clearly behind the comment he made to  
me about my w ork in the postscript of chapter three, which I refer further to in of 
chapter six, that:
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"I reckon that a move onto being able to  say what is important to  you in your 
practice as an educator will require a creative break with your propositional (mind) 
into a different epistemological and ontological relationship with your bodymind.”
Whitehead draws on Schon (1995) to  situate his w ork in a new epistemology of 
practice, distinct from traditional epistemologies. This is an epistemology connecting 
theory and practice, knowing and doing. Rather than impersonal, propositional 
theorising about education, Whitehead wants to  put the T  at the heart of educational 
theory. He sees this ‘I’ as experiencing itself as a ’living contradiction’. This contradiction 
happens through the person holding important values and then experiencing him or  
herself negating these values in their actual practice. As Atkinson (2000) has pointed out, 
this contradiction is similar to  Argyris and Schon’s (1974) view of the discrepancy 
between ‘espoused theories’ and ‘theories-in-use’.
The teacher or educator, then, as soon as they ask themselves the important question - 
“how do I improve what I am doing?” - becomes an action researcher as they inquire 
into their own practice in order to develop and improve it. Whitehead (2000) says that, 
arising from this question about how I improve my practice, a “distinctively ‘educational’ 
research methodology” can be developed. He (2000) characterises this methodology as;
“ Based on action reflection spirals o f the form:
I experience a concern when my values are negated in my practice.
I imagine a way fop-vard.
I act.
I evaluate.
I modify my concerns, ideas and actions in the light o f my evaluations.”
A  key part of W hitehead’s ( 1999) argument is that “the tension which moves the 
enquiry forward is focussed on the desire to  live values more fully in the face of the 
experience of their denial in practice.” He, therefore, places values at the heart of the 
educational enterprise. Education cannot be reduced to means-ends instrumentality. 
Values are not abstract, disembodied, solely linguistic entities but are expressed through 
their embodiment in practice. These values become the basis for the standards of 
judgement that practitioners use as they assess and consider how to improve their 
practice. Whitehead (2000) acknowledges the influence of Moira Laidlow (1996) in 
showing “that the meanings of the values I use as my educational standards are 
themselves living and developmental in the course of their emergence in practice.”
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I very much agree with Jack Whitehead and Moira Laidlow about the emergence of 
values in practice. This thesis, and especially this chapter, is an attempt to  track my 
values as they emerge in the course of my w ork as an educator on a Masters 
programme. I also like the idea that we better come to know what our values are by 
how we experience ourselves acting in living situations and by the discomfort caused 
when we realise we are negating our values in practice, rather then considering values as 
abstractions, rem ote from actual practice. Vignette one at the beginning of this chapter 
gives an illustration of my own experience of appreciating, through the challenge of 
others, how I was acting in contradiction to the values of participation and co-creation I 
had been espousing.
I further agree with the dialectical movement and logic Jack Whitehead sees underlying 
processes of inquiry and improvement. Such a dialectical logic is at the root of my thesis 
title. I also appreciate his emphasis and encouragement for each individual to explicitly 
create their own ‘living educational theory’, which represents their attempt to make 
sense of and improve their practice, and shows the living standards of judgement they 
use to  evaluate their practice.
O ver the years I have grappled with Jack Whitehead’s ideas, sometimes argumentatively, 
at other times in a more collaborative manner. The following excerpts from a long 
dialogue conducted through email, dated April 13th 2001, illustrates my attempt, as I 
engage with his ideas, to clarify aspects of my own thinking. (My comments are in Gill 
Sans light, Jack’s are in Times N ew  Roman, initiated with the letter J).
“ So this brings me to  the question o f what you mean by values. I agree with you absolutely 
when you say in your 1989 article, that “education is a value-laden activity” . In fact I would 
go as far to  say that life is a value-laden activity. Certainly business is; the justification o f 
business as being solely about the ‘bottom line’ is a statement o f value and thankfully is 
coming under greater challenge and scrutiny.......
I find at least three different ways o f thinking about values in your articles. In the 1989 
article, you describe values as;
“The human goals which we use to  give our lives their particular form. These 
values which are embodied in our practice, are often referred to  in terms such as 
freedom, justice, democracy, (Peters 1966) and love and productive work (Fromm 
I960).”
209
The values you list here seem very broad categories which we can all subscribe to  (like 
Motherhood and Apple Pie). I am not sure o f the usefulness o f such broad categories 
abstracted from the specific contexts in which they are manifest. They suffer from the same 
problems as the written statements organisations often create advocating values such as 
teamwork, openness, trust etc. In organisations these value statements create as much, if 
not more, cynicism as people experience their negation in practice rather than a drive fo r 
individual and organisational development.
J. Couldn’t agree more -  that’s why I wrote that ‘These values which are embodied... are 
often referred to in terms such as.... I wasn’t intending to communicate the idea that this 
was the way I wanted embodied values to be understood.
In your later article on Educative Relations in a New Era ( 1999), you offer a different sense 
o f values. Here the context is much more specific, that o f research supervision, and you 
state that “ my ‘intention’ is to  live the above values in my practice.” These ‘above’ values 
are stated as:
•  “ logics o f educational knowledge in creating a new discipline o f educational enquiry;
•  including T as a living contradiction in educational enquiries;
•  understanding educational enquiries as living processes o f self-creation and 
transformation which cannot be captured solely within an idea o f ‘structure’ or 
‘framework’;
•  recognising that important human values, such as the spiritual aesthetic and ethical 
values which motivate and form part o f educational explanations, cannot be 
communicated in solely linguistic form"
These look less like what would normally be understood by values and more like the 
condensed summary o f a sophisticated set o f hard fought for ideas which have emerged 
over a lifetime’s educational experience.
J. I like this. I increasingly see my values in terms of hard fought for ideas, which I use to 
give meaning and purpose to my life -  we’ll need to clarify what we are meaning by 
ideas -  I ’m including my feelings.
Later in the same article you refer to  the knowledge we create by asking “ How do I live my 
values more fully in my practice?” A t this point I feel closer to  your sense o f values because 
I think you are moving onto a notion o f practice as a form o f improvisatory self-expression
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(W inter, 1998b) in which values are co-created rather than the realisation o f previously 
conceived values held by separate individuals.
J. I see my values being expressed, communicated and developed through a process 
which involves both my actions to realise my values and my willingness to remain open 
to their development through my interactions and relationships with others.
I also question in the first definition o f values quoted earlier what you imply when you refer 
to  the word ’use’. This suggests a more conscious instrumental view than I think is how our 
lives are actually shaped. I think we may have recourse to  values as a way o f making sense 
o f our actions and what happens to  us. I think this is very different from claiming as you 
stated in our conversation at the supervision group that values explain our actions. In your 
article ( 1989) you make the same point in saying;
“When offering an explanation for an individual’s development these values can be 
used as reasons for action” .
By using the word ‘explanation’ you indicate a causal link between our values and our 
actions in which values become the motivational link to  what we do. My present action is 
seen as a result o f my past values. I think that values are constructed in retrospect as way o f 
understanding and making meaning in the messy complexity o f our lived experience.
J. I ’d say that I was offering an intentional connection rather than a causal connect in my 
use of the word ‘explanation’. I see explanations in terms of reasons for why something 
occurs. My own understanding of living educational theories is that they are constituted 
by the explanations offered by individuals for their own learning in enquiries of the kind, 
‘How do I improve what I am doing?’ Again, I think both processes are involved in 
developing living theories. My present actions can be explained in terms of a relationship 
between my past values and the values I am constructing as I engage in the creation of the 
future. I do think that our understanding of the values which help to constitute our present 
practices have been constructed in retrospect as a way of understanding and making 
meaning in the messy complexity of our lived experience.
Essentially I think the main area I differ from you is that I think you encompass the 
complexity and richness o f educational development (by which I would include self­
development) within an overly narrow framework o f a discussion about values.
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J. I think you are probably right here so there may not be a difference between us. We 
may differ in our perceptions about the positive implications of doing something about 
it.”
I reproduce this excerpt at some length because I want to give an illustration of the 
emergence of my thinking in a dialogical way though a deeply felt interaction with a 
‘significant other’. This is the point I have been constantly making and illustrating 
throughout the thesis - both my practice, and thinking about my practice, emerge 
through interaction and relation with others. As W in ter (1998a) says:
“ Because if thinking is crucially a matter o f finding an individual voice it is also about 
understanding oneself in relation to  the cultural traditions within which one finds 
oneself: it involves, therefore, thinking in dialogue with others. O ther people’s 
thinking, based on their experience, is a key resource in enabling us to  think 
creatively about our own, to  think critically about the thoughts we started with in 
order to  construct anew cognitive space, into which we might, provisionally, decide 
to  move.’’ (p. 67)
The dialogue quoted above was an important passage of writing and communicating for 
me which helped articulate some of the differences of view I had with Jack.
N o w  I would summarise these differences in tw o main ways. The first is constituted by 
the different places we would each draw the line between therapy and education, which 
I think is an expression of our different lived experiences and degree of com fort in these 
areas. The second is based on our different perspectives of the self. I understand Jack’s 
w ork to locate both values and the dialectical tension driving development as primarily 
within the individual. My own perspective is to locate values as emergent, co-created 
processes occurring between people.
This last point takes me back to the question raised by Jack at the end of chapter five 
and mentioned again earlier in this section about the connection between the 
theoretical perspectives I outline about the nature of the self (in chapter three) and my 
educational practice. I do think that the propositional theorising in chapter three is 
broadly helpful in indicating what is important to  me as an educator. It suggests the value 
of imagination, co-creation, relationship, and multiplicity in my practice. It also provides 
a good theoretical base on which to ground these values. W here  I agree with Jack is that 
to  demonstrate these values in my practice it is not enough to theorise abstractly about
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them. They need to  be shown in action. For Jack, this has led to experimentation with  
the possibilities of multi-media for different forms of representation of practice. For 
myself, it has led to  the creation and sharing of narrative accounts.
This demonstration of values in action is what I have been attempting in the earlier parts 
of this chapter. I will return to  this now as I continue to describe my w ork  on the 
Masters programme.
Section eight: ongoing work with MSc 10
Having already experimented with showing accounts of my practice to  people who had 
participated in working with me in a variety of contexts (both with the MSc and in other 
situations, as outlined in chapter one), I was keen to  build on this experience when I was 
offered the opportunity to be programme director of MSc 10, starting in January 2002. It 
was also decided that in addition to being programme director I would co-set advise one 
of the learning groups along with a colleague in order to offer her the opportunity of 
learning to w ork alongside me as a set adviser on the masters programme. Influenced by 
the conversations and written dialogues I had been having with Jack Whitehead about 
values in educational practice, I was now interested in tracking, as I worked with MSc 
10, the emergence of my values and their relationship to significant judgements I made 
throughout the programme.
Accordingly, in December 2001, I attempted to  outline what my educational intentions 
were, before beginning work for the programme. These were as follows:
•  To offer individuals a rigorous, sustained and ongoing engagement with issues relating 
to  the development o f people and organisations. The fact that the MSc exists over a 
tw o year period is important as it allows the time fo r issues to  surface, themes to  
develop, relationships to  be built up, and for learning to  unfold.
•  To help create an environment in which participants can explore the issues and 
questions relating to  people and organisational development that matter to  them.
•  To create an engaging, stimulating, challenging, inquiring atmosphere on the 
programme. This means that participants will find their experience o f the programme 
distinctive, noteworthy, impactful, taking them beyond their normal and habitual ways 
o f understanding and experiencing themselves, others, groups and organisations.
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•  That the ways o f working and overall approach are not abusive o r manipulative and 
respect the right o f individuals to  move through the programme at their own pace and 
in their own style within the constraints and demands o f a postgraduate programme.
•  For the programme to  act as a crucible within which the alchemy o f development can 
potentially occur for each participant
•  To engage the participants in an inquiring process about how to  create this crucible 
together and therefore not to  have overly pre-determined, fixed ideas about how to  
create the appropriate crucible. In other words to  work in a way in which the MSc is 
genuinely co-created between the teaching staff and the participants.
•  To encourage experiential learning which means engaging people at an intellectual, 
emotional, spiritual, physical and imaginative level. In particular to  find ways o f working 
that encourage greater imaginative freedom and expression and that help new forms 
emerge for people to  be able to  represent and account fo r their work and learning.
•  To understand and work with the MSc as a ‘rite o f passage' fo r participants. This 
involves thinking about the MSc using ideas and practices from mythology, story-telling 
and ritual.
•  For the experience o f being on and doing the programme to  be a significant source o f 
learning about developing people and organisations. For participants to  be able to  learn 
about themselves, relationships with others, group interaction, organisational dynamics 
and development from their lived experience o f this on the programme. This means 
developing good reflective practices as individuals, groups and as a total community to  
bring this about.
•  For participants to  develop a critical perspective on the field o f people and 
organisational development. That is to  be able to  think about the way that the field is 
constructed within wider economic, social and political settings, to  look at how power 
relations shape this field, and to  look at their own role in maintaining and changing 
power relationships within organisations.
•  For knowledge and learning to  be used in a liberating, emancipatory way and not just in 
an instrumental way to  make individuals and organisations more effective. That is
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helping free people from oppressive, subjugating definitions and social practices 
whether self-internalised or imposed by others.
•  To explore transparently, honestly and candidly the tension between participants
following a programme based on a self managed learning philosophy, which gives them 
power and control over their own learning objectives and methodologies, and the fact 
that the programme is set up within an organisational context and externally accredited 
University structure with given standards and authority about what is deemed 
acceptable o r not for the award o f a post-graduate degree.
Re-reading this list of intentions, it already begins to fill out the values of imagination, co­
creation, relationship, and multiplicity that I identified at the end of the previous section. 
It also embodies important other values such as transparency, openness, critical 
engagement and reflection, and emancipation. I trust that, without me needing to spell it 
out in detail, the reader is able to  see connections between this list and the 
autobiographical writings in chapter four. A  significant thread, which integrates the 
autobiographical writing in section three of chapter five with the underlying theme of 
the vignettes at the beginning of this chapter, is about the use of authority to  facilitate 
learning in groups.
I shared this list of intentions with the staff group I had helped recruit to the 
programme. Following the first four-day residential of this programme held on 5-8 
February 2002, which the programme staff designed and delivered, I w rote an account of 
the residential, which I circulated to all the participants and my colleagues who had 
worked with me on the residential. This rather long account (just over 7500 words) 
explained the purpose of sending this writing to the participants, situated it within the 
overall body of w ork I was doing for my PhD outlined the educational intentions for the 
programme, and then used this as a fram ework for assessing the residential. In 
particular, I focussed on how I believed ways of working on the residential had facilitated 
high levels of creativity and involvement. I concluded the first part of the account by 
saying:
•  “ I am going into some detail about the design and experience o f the first day 
because I believe that what happened on that day was influential in shaping the 
overall four days, which then become influential in shaping the culture that 
evolves on the programme. I believe that the way we designed the first and 
subsequent days helped shape the levels o f creativity and involvement that
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emerged in later parts o f the residential. In particular, I think high levels o f 
participation were shaped, in addition to  processes I have already elaborated, 
by
•  placing high value and priority on processes o f group formation and building 
rather than the presentation o f content
•  deliberately not having any external speakers involved in this residential and 
thereby laying more emphasis on the resources in the staff team and 
participant group
•  my colleague contacting people by email, in advance o f one o f the sessions, 
and giving a living demonstration o f the possibilities o f e-learning, by building 
her session around peoples’ response to  her email
•  including an Open Space session within the programme which allows the 
group to  self organise around issues o f relevance and importance to  them.
Yet I am not wanting to  posit an overly egotistical, simple cause and effect 
relationship between the actions that we took as a staff group and the outcomes I 
observed as high levels o f creativity and involvement. Ideas from complexity theory 
(Stacey 2000) suggest that in any complex adaptive system, such as a group o f 
people interacting, links between cause and effect are complex and multiple and 
cannot be traced. Was it the cleverness o f our design that facilitated the 
emergence o f creative engagement with the programme, o r were we fortunate to  
be working with a group o f highly motivated talented people who would have 
creatively engaged no matter what we did?
•  And, furthermore, by what standards o f judgement am I claiming that there 
were high levels o f creative engagement. This is my framing o f the situation. 
Perhaps for others the levels o f engaged creativity were normal o r even low. 
For me, these levels would be evidenced by:
•  the quality o f the participant presentations I have already mentioned
•  the level o f discussion in the different sessions
•  my lived, embodied experience during the four days o f a lively atmosphere 
which includes feeling stimulated and deeply engaged myself
•  noticing people by day three beginning to  spontaneously offer ideas and 
suggestions such as doing a drama together on a subsequent residential and 
offering a little black book to  write sayings from the course in
•  the responsive and active way in which participants took part in an Open 
Space session on the morning o f the last day
216
•  the willingness o f participants to  come forward at the end o f this residential to  
create a design team fo r the next residential
•  comments that were made at the review o f the residential on the last 
afternoon
•  the explicitly and frequently stated desire o f many participants to  ensure that 
the whole group worked well as a learning community; this was especially in 
response to  the uncomfortable self-managed process they had gone through 
to  create three small learning groups that would exist for at least eight months, 
and possibly fo r the duration o f the programme.”
In sending this account to participants, as well as using this as an opportunity to  critically 
reflect on the residential, I also intended the account itself to  be an intervention that 
helped foster an overall learning culture, to facilitate the programme becoming a 
’learning organisation’ (Senge, 1990). By candidly sharing my reflections on, and inquiry 
processes about, the residential, I hoped to both model and stimulate the capacity for 
others to engage in this way.
In the terms of Rowland’s (2000) framework, I was aiming to acknowledge and 
legitimate the third context and source of knowledge on an educational programme - 
this is the ‘shared context’; that is, the learning to  be gained from the experience of 
participating together in the overall process of the programme. Rowland contrasts this 
with tw o other contexts; the ‘public context’, which is the traditional content of 
knowledge available in public texts; and the ‘personal context’, which is the knowledge 
people have from their own experience and which they relate to  the ‘public context’. 
Rowland says all these three areas of context are critically interrelated, and different 
educational and therapeutic activities will tend to emphasise one or other of the three  
contexts. My previous experience of the masters programme had indicated to  me that 
some people found learning from the ‘shared context’ the most problematic and 
contentious of the three contexts. However, as the quotes from participants in sections 
four and five indicate, many participants over the years have indicated that it has been in 
the whole experience of the process of the programme, in learning sets and the total 
course group, rather than in any specific knowledge content or acquisition of 
development tools and techniques, that their most profound learning lay.
In addition, my account of the residential picked up tw o ‘critical incidents’ (Schein,
1985), or what John Shotter (1999) calls ‘striking events’ or ‘living moments’. These 
w ere incidents which had significantly emotionally impacted on me during the residential
217
and which had given me the most food for thought subsequently. Before writing my 
account of the residential I had written an email, dated 11 March 2002, to the 
participants outlining these incidents and asking them three questions as follows:
1. Can you remember and describe as fully as possible what you were feeling at 
the time o f these incidents?
2. W hat significance, if any, did these incidents have for you, and what do you 
think they might have had for the group as a whole?
3. Looking back now at the residential, is there a particular moment(s) or 
incident(s) that stand(s) out fo r you now?
I also said that:
“ My preference would be for you to  send your answers to  everyone but if you 
would rather just send them back to  me that is fine and I will treat your 
comments as confidential - 1 may refer to  them in my account o f the 
residential but I would not identify you."
In response to  this mail, nine of the seventeen participants replied. O f the nine 
responses, four were sent back to  me only and five were sent to the whole community.
I don’t  know how many of the mails that w ere sent to  me were a result of a conscious 
choice to restrict the comments to me only and how many were simply a matter of 
unreflectively and habitually pressing the ‘reply to sender’ button.
Both these incidents were concerned with the way I had used my authority on^two 
separate occasions. In the first incident, when I had overruled a colleague in mid-session 
and changed the timing of the session she was leading, I had felt very self-critical of, and 
rather surprised by, my behaviour. In the second, when I had strongly challenged a 
participant about a comment she made which I took to be devaluing of a final evaluation 
process, I was more ambivalent about what I had done. I was interested, in asking the 
three questions above to  participants, to find out the impact of these incidents on them. 
In the account I w rote about the residential after receiving participants’ answers to my 
questions above, I commented:
“ Overall in relation to  all the questions, I found peoples’ responses thoughtful, 
encouraging and perceptive. I was pleased with the very direct and open way
218
people had responded to  my questions. The comments themselves showed me 
that, as always, there is a wealth o f response to  any emotionally charged incident, 
and that people will make very different meanings o f it. There were also some 
interesting reflections on the role and dilemmas o f authority in a self-managed 
programme.”
I was also very heartened by tw o responses which affirmed my intention of encouraging 
and modelling an inquiring attitude on the programme, and indicating, as I said in my 
account, that “it was possible to co-inquire together into processes that effected all of 
us on the residential and that were significant to the role of a development 
professional.”
These tw o separate comments were:
"I was struck by and pleased that you asked us about this.”
“A  further comment I'd like to  make is that, on receiving this request for feedback, 
Paul, I felt very enthusiastic and excited that you were willing to  elicit feedback and 
'put yourself on the line', first. It means that I can feel willing, trusting and positive 
about doing the same in the future and that the door is open for a lot o f very real 
developmental work! (I hesitated whether to  put this, as I don't want it to  sound 
patronising or as if I'm trying to  'score points' with the course leader...but my 
feelings are a very strong and excited 'YES!!, this is great stuff and I want to  be a 
part o f it!')”
MSclO’s second residential was held on 26-28 June 2002. This three-day residential was 
designed by myself working with five participants drawn from the three different learning 
sets. A fter the residential I w rote an account which I sent to  all the participants and staff 
on MSc 10. I used a dialogical form to frame this account, consisting of a conversation 
between three characters: A, the protagonist; B, the questioner; and C, the cynic/critic. 
(C, this last character, is the same voice as the reviewer in chapter four.)
In this account, I continued to explore themes of co-creation, participation, involvement 
and authority, as they played out in this event. The following excerpt from this account 
illustrates these themes:
A. "That was a good residential
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B. On what basis do you say that? W hat standards o f judgement are you using? W hat 
does the fact that you thought it was good tell us o f your own values?
A. Slow down -  is this a dialogue or an interrogation?
C. Well, the participants said it was good by and large according to  their written 
feedback in the review at the end so it must have been OK. All's well that ends 
well.
B. Yes that is potentially one source o f evidence but just because the participants 
thought it was good does that mean it automatically was? If you just take that 
perspective, you are heading towards a customer services based view o f education 
where the customer is king (or queen). The point is also to  try  and discover what 
your judgement that an event is good might indicate about your values
A. OK. Let me try  and answer that. When I look back at the residential what stands
out?
Firstly, that I experienced the residential as a genuine act o f co-creation and co­
design between myself as the course director and the four participants who had 
chosen to  help design this residential. Compared to  my previous experience o f 
designing residential with participants on other postgraduate programmes, this 
residential showed higher ownership o f the event than any previous occasion. 
Additionally this was the first o f four residentials that the participants are involved 
in the co-design of, so it was especially significant to  create such high levels o f 
ownership for the first event. This seems important in creating an overall culture o f 
participation and collaboration which can be sustained throughout the rest o f the 
programme. These high levels o f ownership and involvement were evidenced 
throughout the event, but what I think was particularly significant was;
•  that one o f the participants (rather than me) wrote, together with others, the 
joining material and sent it out from her own organisation
•  that one o f the participants who was not in the design team offered to  lead a 
session herself. This was a relatively unconventional session involving dance and 
movement and potentially highly exposing fo r the person running the session. This 
session seemed to  be particularly appreciated and the participant received very 
heartfelt and warm feedback fo r the session and the way that she had run it
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•  that another participant started the residential and the whole o f the introduction to  
the residential which took over an hour and a half was managed by the 
participants. I did not lead this section at all
C. You seem to  have had an easy ride! W hat did you do?
A. I’ll come back to  that. But I was talking about the criteria fo r judging this a good
residential and emphasising that my first criteria is the ownership and leadership o f 
the residential by the participants in the design group.
The second criteria would be an overall coherence o f design.
B. W hat do you mean by this? W here did this come from?
A. This stemmed from the very first meeting o f the design group in one o f the
London Underground Infrastructure companies offices in Canary Wharf. I had 
started the meeting by asking the design team members what they wanted to  learn 
from their involvement in creating and delivering this residential. There was initially 
a rather cautious and inhibited atmosphere in response to  this and one participant 
expressed resentment that she had to  be involved in creating this residential when 
she was very busy. There was a danger o f the residential being seen as a necessary 
burdensome chore rather than an exciting opportunity. As we talked about this, 
and I asked questions to  surface the feelings people had about being involved with 
this, and tried not to  react defensively (in either a self-justifying o r aggressive 
manner) to  the perception o f the residential as a imposed burden, a shift began to  
happen in which the residential could genuinely be seen as a challenging and 
potentially creative opportunity. A  key turning point was the realisation that the 
residential could nourish both the participants and the members o f the design 
team. This was symbolised with the idea o f the theme o f the residential being ‘a gift 
to  ourselves’. “
After sending out this account, I did not receive any written response. I did hear two  
people in the learning set I was co-leading refer to my account in passing, which 
indicated to  me that they had absorbed and assimilated the content, and were  
referencing it to  other situations.
MSclO’s third residential was held from 12-15 November 2002. My account of this is 
represented in the vignettes at the beginning of this chapter. In response to  this account,
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I received three replies, all from people in the learning set I am working with. Their 
comments helped affirm the value of the process of sharing these accounts with them, 
especially in modelling openness and an inquiring attitude. They said:
"As always I really appreciate you sharing your writing. N o t only does it 
provide a great journal o f the residentials, but you manage to  write so 
honestly and reflectively."
"Thanks fo r this Paul - 1 very much enjoyed reading the vignettes and was 
struck once again by your honest reflection and critique o f self and others 
('again' ref. back to  the information from the first residential). Equally 
I am impressed by your openness in issuing something so personal to  a wide 
range o f MSc participants - I rememberthis creating a shift in my attitude 
to  the MSc following your first circulation - it certainly meant I was, and 
have continued to  be, more open about myself and my own reactions whilst 
participating in residentials or the learning set."
"My first thoughts on this piece is how honest you have been which has made 
the reading very engaging. I felt disappointed when it finished and would be 
interested to  read the rest o f the account from the residential. O f the 
three accounts you have now written this was the most enjoyable, due to  the 
detail and the honesty o f your own thoughts and observations."
Section nine: my ‘living educational theory’
So, at the end of this chapter, what do I conclude is my ‘living educational theory’? That 
is, what are the underlying embodied values and principles that inform my w ork as an 
educator of professionals in people and organisational development, as evidenced in the 
accounts and reflections in the previous pages?
I will frame my ‘living educational theory’ as a set of questions revolving around potential 
contradictions and paradoxes to  indicate they are not a static immutable set of 
principles, which I have now succeeded in resolving and mastering. These questions also 
provide a continuing way of “living life as inquiry” (Marshall, 1999). If preferred, they can 
be converted to statements, by taking away the ‘how to ’ at the beginning and adding ‘- 
ing’ to  the first verb.
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•  H ow  to  use my authority in the most influential way to encourage and enable others 
to  find their authority and become self-managing?
•  H ow  to contribute my knowledge, skills and talents fully to  a programme and at the 
same time co-create the programme with the participants?
•  H ow  to  fully participate and retain my ‘critical subjectivity’?
•  H ow  to  act fairly and ‘even-handedly’ to  all participants in the midst of a range of 
emotional responses to different individuals?
•  H ow  to  inspire people and demonstrate that education and learning are more than 
gaining a qualification and/or functional means to an end and/or the acquisition of 
knowledge-based tool kits whilst recognising that people want and need 
qualifications and also believe and feel they need tools in order to do their jobs?
•  H ow  to  create an environment that engages peoples’ imagination and touches their 
souls without this becoming another series of recipes and techniques for engineering 
creativity?
•  H ow  to challenge the status quo and existing entrenched patterns of thinking and 
dominant power relations whilst working within current organisational and 
institutional frameworks?
•  H ow  to  lead and facilitate self-organising processes?
This final question leads me into chapter eight.
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Chapter Eight 
W orking with self-organising processes
Introduction
Self-organisation is an important, recurrent theme in this thesis. This theme is expressed 
in both the process of writing the thesis as well as its contents. Regarding the process, I 
did not w rite  the entire draft thesis last autumn in a well-planned objective-driven 
manner with a pre-determined structure, (which is not to say that it lacks discipline). I 
have tried to  allow the form of the thesis to emerge in the writing of it, and let the 
activity of the writing itself, and the responses to  the draft thesis, shape the further 
stages of work. To  refer back to  the metaphor of a patchwork quilt: as the quilt is being 
crafted, each patch (chapter or section or sentence or word) sown is influenced by the 
emerging shape of the quilt (the overall thesis o r chapter or section or sentence) which 
is itself influenced by the next patch being created. Neither the whole (the quilt) nor the 
parts (each patch) are prior o r determining. Both shape or co-create one another. In 
relation to  the content of the thesis so far, there are many references to self­
organisation. This is, for example, at the basis of my email discussion with Chris Bache in 
chapter five, as well as being central to  vignette three in the previous chapter.
The emphasis in this chapter will be on illustrating and recounting stories of my practice 
in working with self-organising processes to  facilitate change. The main voice will be, as 
in the previous chapter, the voice of reflective narrative practice. Additional theoretical 
perspectives to the approach described in this chapter are given in appendix one, which 
is written, like chapter three, in a traditional, academic, propositional style -  what I have 
termed my ‘scholarly voice’.
Section one: self-organisation and paradox
Regarding the importance of self-organisation, Fritjof Capra (1997) says:
“ Indeed, self-organisation has emerged as perhaps the central concept in the 
systems view o f life, and like the concepts o f feedback and self-regulation it is 
closely linked to  networks. The pattern o f life, we might say, is a network pattern 
capable o f self-organisation.” (p. 82-3)
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Another significant emerging theme in the thesis is paradox. The theme of paradox 
appears in chapter tw o in relation to Simon’s (1996) article on case-study.
Furthermore, at the end of the previous chapter, I express my ‘living educational theory’ 
as a series of paradoxical questions or statements. In chapter three, I grapple with the 
paradoxical nature of the self in arguing that the self is both separate and related, 
singular and multiple, cognitive and embodied, concrete and imaginal. In the conclusion 
to  chapter three, I enumerate further paradoxes of the self: that the self is both ‘particle’ 
and ‘wave’ (Zohar, 1990); centre and periphery; both the process and product of its 
own organisation. A t the time of writing the chapter, I was still thinking within the 
fram ework of ‘both-and’ as a means of formulating paradox. Since then, in an email 
dated 17th November 2002, Professor Ralph Stacey commented on this chapter that:
“ In the conclusion you argue against taking an "either...or" view o f the tw o  
contradictory viewpoints and suggest that they point to  the paradoxical nature o f 
the self. However there is no explanation o f how we can think about these 
contradictory perspectives in paradoxical terms - are they really paradoxes o r just 
tw o  incompatible ways o f thinking? If the former then just how do they form a 
paradox?”
This comment led me to reading more carefully the writing of Ralph Stacey and his 
colleagues about the nature of paradox (Stacey, Griffin & Shaw, 2000; Stacey, 2 0 0 1; 
Griffin, 2002; Shaw, 2002). Stacey and his colleagues argue that by thinking of paradox in 
terms of ‘both-and’, the essential contradictory nature of paradox is thereby eliminated. 
They reason that the resolution, and thereby the effective elimination, of paradox by 
‘both-and’ thinking has its roots in Kant’s philosophy, which has been enormously 
influential in laying the philosophical foundations for the scientific method and current 
ways of thinking about systems. Rather than thinking in terms of ‘both-and’, Stacey and 
his colleagues draw on Hegelian philosophy and the w ork of G .H. Mead to argue for 
conceiving of paradox in terms of ‘at the same time’. Griffin (2002) says:
“ Holding this sense o f at the same time is to  become aware o f key paradoxes and 
it remains uncomfortable. The very essence o f such paradoxes is that they do not 
settle down to  a resolution.” (p. 13).
Stacey, Griffin and Shaw draw on the sciences of complexity to  argue that some strands 
of more radical thinking within this so-called ‘new science’ itself, particularly the w ork of 
the Nobel Prize winning chemist Ilya Prigogine (1984, 1989, 1997), and the biologist
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Brian Goodwin (1994), present a significant challenge to  the dominant scientific 
paradigm. This includes typical ways of thinking about paradox as well as how the nature 
of systems, the relationship between parts and wholes, cause and effect, predictability, 
and time are conceived. Griffin (2002) says ; “what is being challenged in the natural 
sciences by thinkers like Prigogine, is precisely the validity o f the elimination of paradox” 
(his emphasis).
Paradox has emerged as a defining and somewhat startling feature of complexity because 
of the discovery by Prigogine and others that complex adaptive systems (as they are 
called by complexity scientists -  Stacey et al use the phrase complex responsive 
processes instead of complex adaptive systems) exist in paradoxical states where order 
and disorder co-exist at the same time. Moreover these paradoxical conditions, what 
W aldrop (1994) evocatively describes as life existing at “the edge of chaos”, are critical 
to  the capacity for complex adaptive systems (including individuals, organisations and 
societies) to  adapt, learn, change and be creative. The sciences of complexity have, in 
addition, challenged traditional Cartesian-Newtonian ideas of predictability by showing 
that in living systems the future is inherently unpredictable. Life is always moving 
towards an open-ended future. This is what Stacey and his colleagues refer to as the  
further paradox of the ‘known-unknown’, in which the future is ‘perpetually under 
construction’, that is both radically unknowable, yet also at the same time recognisable. 
Stacey (2 0 0 1) says:
“ Movement is toward a future that is under perpetual construction by the 
movement itself. There is no mature o r final state, only perpetual iteration o f 
identity and difference, continuity and transformation, the known and the unknown, 
at the same time. The future is unknowable but recognisable, the known- 
unknown.” (p. 60).
There is, moreover, an important and critical connection between paradox and self­
organisation. It is precisely the capacity for self-organisation that enables complex 
adaptive systems to evolve to ‘the edge of chaos’ where order and disorder 
paradoxically co-exist. Stacey, Griffin and Shaw (2000) define self-organisation as follows:
“Very briefly, self-organisation is a process in which local interaction between parts 
o f an organisation produces emergent patterns o f behaviour o f a coherent kind in 
the whole, all in the absence o f any overall blueprint o r plan for that whole. Local 
interaction produces a global pattern that need not be designed.” (p. 18).
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In a recent conversation (26th November 2002), Patricia Shaw said to me that she and 
her colleagues now consider self-organisation and emergence to  be conceptually 
identical when systems are thought of as temporal processes rather than spatial entities. 
Self-organisation and emergence then describe and point to the same process. That is 
why she now refers to  processes of ‘self-organising emergence’, whilst acknowledging 
that this is a tautology.
Section two: working with ‘self-organising emergence*
I have for a long time been interested in and an admirer of the w ork of Ralph Stacey and 
the way it has evolved with his colleagues Patricia Shaw and Doug Griffin. Many writers  
and practitioners in management and organisational development (Wheatley, 1992; 
Morgan 1997; Brown and Eisenhardt 1998; Kelly and Allison 1999; Pascale, 1999) have 
used insights from complexity sciences to inform their work. Most of them, however, 
take models and analogies from the domain of the natural and other sciences and apply 
them uncritically and unreflectively to the human realm of organisational life. (All that is 
missing so far are titles such as T h e  seven habits of highly effective complex adaptive 
systems’ or ‘H ow  I learnt a few simple rules from complexity science and led my 
organisation to astonishing success’ or T h e  one-minute guide to complexity’). This 
application of ideas from complexity science, furthermore, is normally within, and 
therefore reinforces, the dominant organisational norms and paradigm of what Schon 
(1995) calls ‘technical rationality’. They serve to perpetuate notions of control that if 
certain actions are followed then certain consequences will result. Ralph Stacey is one 
of the few to  take seriously the challenge that complexity science offers to conventional, 
largely modernist ideas about the relationship between the individual and the 
organisation, leadership, predictability and control, uncertainty, and change. Appendix 
one elaborates further a critique of traditional ways of working with change and 
connects these to the assumptions of ‘modernity’.
Influenced, therefore, by these ideas and by my association with their progenitors, I 
have, over the time this thesis encapsulates, in a variety of contexts, worked with self- 
organising processes in my practice. One important context illustrated in the previous 
chapter is working participatively with self-organisation on a Masters programme. O ther 
contexts, that will be the focus of this chapter, are facilitating change as an organisational 
consultant.
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O ne of the three key inquiry questions raised in my MPhil transfer paper was: “How can 
I work more effectively with self-organising processes in groups to enable individual and 
organisational learning?”
I will now explore this question by giving some illustrations from accounts of my 
practice that I have written and shown to  others, of working with ‘self-organising 
emergence’. I will further comment briefly on what each of these illustrations conveys 
about the nature of working with change in this way.
Illustration one
This is a taken from the first meeting with a group of five people from the Masters in 
People and Organisational development to design the second residential event for MSc 
10. The first few lines of this have already been included in chapter six, but I repeat 
them here to give an overall sense of context.
“ I had started the meeting by asking the design team members what they wanted 
to  learn from their involvement in creating and delivering this residential. There was 
initially a rather cautious and inhibited atmosphere in response to  this and one 
participant expressed resentment that she had to  be involved in creating this 
residential when she was very busy. There was a danger o f the residential being 
seen as a necessary chore rather than an exciting opportunity. As we talked about 
this, and I asked questions to  surface the feelings people had about being involved 
with this, and tried not to  react defensively (in either a self-justifying o r aggressive 
manner) to  the perception o f the residential as a imposed burden, a shift began to  
happen in which the residential could genuinely be seen as a challenging and 
potentially creative opportunity. A  key turning point was the realisation that the 
residential could nourish both the participants and the members o f the design 
team. This was symbolised with the idea o f the theme o f the residential being ‘a gift 
to  ourselves'. Once this theme began to  be established, the whole atmosphere o f 
the meeting changed and there was a flurry o f creative ideas about how to 
organise a residential around this theme. W hat interested me was the way this 
subject emerged as an organising theme from the interaction we had, rather than 
being initially proposed by me or any one o f the participants. Once it had emerged, 
it could become the theme around which each o f us in the design team could act 
independently but with this theme and context in mind. It was the significance o f 
this theme, as a unifying Gestalt which unpredictably and spontaneously emerged,
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and to  which we all felt committed, which ultimately gave, I think, the residential its 
coherence.”
In retrospect, it was important at this meeting for me to  allow and pursue through 
inquiry the negative feelings about the task we had gathered to  do. The risk in so doing 
was to build up a resentful and demotivated atmosphere. Yet by doing this, the 
conversation began to be self-organised around the theme of people feeling under 
pressure. As this theme emerged, it then also became possible for this to  be 
transformed into a positive direction for the residential to  move into. It is also significant 
here, as I indicate in this account, that both the theme and its transformation emerged 
spontaneously from our interaction -  no one was ‘driving’ or intentionally facilitating this 
theme to appear. Therefore, when it emerged, no one felt special ownership of or 
resistance to it, yet all were committed to  it, and it became a highly viable fram ework  
for joint action.
Illustration two
This is taken from the work I did with MSc 8 in February 2001, also referred to  in the 
previous chapter. I had been asked to run a one-day workshop on facilitation and chose 
to  run it in a way that, as well as simultaneously teaching facilitation skills, also took time 
to  reflect at a meta-level on the way that I was facilitating the group moment-to- 
moment on the day. In other words, I wanted to utilise the ‘shared context’ (Rowland, 
2000), as referred to in the previous chapter, to  consciously make the participants’ 
experience of being facilitated part of the learning about facilitation. A fter the day, the 
following is part of the account I write to participants:
“ My aim in working with you on the day was to  set up the conditions in which an 
emergent order may arise -  one that was co-created and jointly designed rather 
than a framework for the day that I had planned in advance and imposed upon 
you. I was intrigued (and pleased) that by the end o f the day you had not even 
wanted to  see the tw o frameworks I had planned in advance for the day.
I think the critical periods that a shared and emergent order happened were the 
interval before lunch and the time between 3pm and 3.30pm when we heard back 
from each group your ideas on how to  proceed. It was during these times that we 
were engaged in deciding how to  organise ourselves and, from which, order in the 
form o f an agreed framework for the day could emerge.
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In the first o f these periods before lunch, in retrospect, I wondered if I was too  
active in shaping the subsequent activity. I am aware o f the potential in these open- 
ended, ambiguous situations fo r people to  become frustrated and that this 
frustration can be a disabling force fo r individual and organisational learning. To 
counter this, and to  respond to  what I interpreted as the need o f a number o f 
people in the group who were keen to  move to  action, I actively helped shape the 
next phase o f activity which was to  divide into small groups with a facilitator and 
come up with ideas fo r a framework fo r the afternoon. My concern about this was 
that this was one o f the options I had previously created on my planned agenda fo r 
the day. So how much was this really an emergent co-created order and how 
much was this the more or less subtle exercise o f my power in the role o f 
facilitator to  shape the day according to  the agenda I had already formulated?
W hen the large group reconvened at 3pm I was agreeably surprised at the speed 
and ease with which we were able to  hear back from the three small groups and 
then, from the many different ideas which arose, relatively quickly make a decision 
about how to  proceed. I think it is worth reflecting on what enabled this to  
happen, because it certainly is not always my experience that such speed and ease 
o f decision making is typical o f a large group. W hat led to  this? I think it was helped 
by my emphasising at the start o f this period the overall time boundaries in which 
we were working and suggesting a specific time period for this decision making to  
occur in. I consciously adopted a more active and focussed, rather than reflective 
and open-ended style. It was further helped by the similarities and clear links 
between the material, which each group produced. I think V.’s initial comment (as I 
said at the time) was very facilitative through clearly summarising the overall 
commonalities in each o f the three groups and suggesting a way to  proceed which 
gave both structure and flexibility, allowing others to  work within and fill out the 
framework she had outlined. And beyond this there was willingness in the group to  
build on and link with others’ suggestions in a way that created a ’flow ’ within the 
group, to  use an expression introduced earlier in the day. These would be my 
thoughts about how this was created and I’m sure you would each have your own 
perspective on what was significant in enabling this to  happen.
By now I was reassured because what had been jointly created was richer, more 
complex, more engaging, and more multi-facetted than anything I had previously 
thought o f on either o f my tw o pre-planned frameworks."
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In this illustration I am reflecting on the process of ‘self-organising emergence’ as it 
occurred with this group. I refer to  the ambiguity, uncertainty and general messiness 
that this way of working can produce. This, then, can engender feelings of frustration, 
anxiety and impotence. The first time this happened, I made a judgement to be more 
interventionist and, as I indicate, take the group down a path that was partially pre­
determined. A t a later point in the day, I contrast this with an occasion where I believed 
self-organising emergence occurred. I note, too, that one of the features of this is its 
spontaneity and genuine novelty.
Illustration three
The following excerpt is from my reflections arising out of a conference I attended in 
May 2000 at an International management institute, which I will refer to as ABC.
“ On the afternoon o f the first day there was a session which looked at the work 
ABC was doing in five different organisational contexts. There were maybe about 
40 people present at this session. The session was hosted by tw o  people who 
asked someone involved in each o f the different contexts to  speak for a few 
minutes about the work they were doing in each o f the different contexts. Having 
done this a procedure was introduced in which it was explained that people 
attending the session would have the opportunity to  talk more about each o f the 
projects they had heard outlined. Participants in this session were then given a 
number from one to  five by one o f the session leaders pointing to  people and 
getting them to  say their number. There was something alienating about this 
process. It raised some laughter and there were some humorous displays o f 
resistance to  this process, for example saying six after five rather than returning to  
one again. The aim o f this number allocation was to  divide the group into five 
smaller groups and give everyone the opportunity to  attend a discussion with each 
o f the people who had presented the five different projects. It was explained that 
this is what we would now do and that each small group would have a half an hour 
with each o f the five projects.
This procedure struck me as embodying a number o f conventional assumptions 
about organising and learning. First it was assumed that each person would want to  
spend equal time with each project and that each participant wanted to  attend all 
the different project discussions. It also embodies principles o f fairness and ensures 
that all the sessions should be attended. And it is a good idea to  create different 
conversations in small groups rather than five sequential presentations. But it does
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not allow for the group to  self-organise around their own particular interests and 
fo r some conversations to  develop longer than the time allocated fo r them. It also 
does not consider that some people might not have wanted to  attend all sessions 
and may have been interested in attending only one o r a few.
Interestingly what happened with this process was that it became increasingly 
difficult to  manage in tune with the original intention. For a start the procedure o f 
dividing the participants into five had some unexpected effects. I was part o f a 
group o f three and looking round the room there seemed to  be groups o f varying 
sizes. W e were not all neatly divided into groups o f equal sizes. A fter about half an 
hour we were encouraged to  move and already by now groups seemed to  be at 
different stages. Some moved immediately, others moved later. In the second 
group I was in, tw o  people joined the discussion in the middle o f the session. As 
we continued with trying to  move groups every half-hour, as far as I could see, this 
neat structure o f each group moving at regular pre-decided intervals was breaking 
down. A t different stages people wanted to  go and have coffee. Towards the end 
there seemed at one point only four groups operating. I think this was a result o f 
more self-organising processes taking over - people choosing to  stay longer in 
some discussions, not participating in others, getting involved in other conversations 
on the side over coffee. These self-organising processes were existing alongside the 
formal imposed structure as they do in organisations. To their credit, the people 
organising the session did not attempt to  re-impose their structure on this process 
and tried to  sensitively facilitate movement between groups more in participants’ 
own time rather than at the dictates o f their original structure.
A t the end there was an attempt to  pull the session together and ask what people 
had learnt. This was notable to  me fo r its lack o f energy. O f course people had 
learnt something from their conversations. But I think in these situations what is 
learnt is very specific and in the context o f the discussion taking place earlier so 
when it is taken out o f context and made more abstract much o f its meaning is 
lost. There seemed to  me a politeness in responding to  the questions about overall 
learning. Some o f the project presenters said they had found it valuable to  be 
asked questions about their projects -  one person described it as ‘free 
consultancy’. A fter some pushing by the session leaders, others admitted that yes it 
was interesting to  see how different designs o f a similar approach had been 
developed to  meet the needs o f the five different situations. I was curious about 
the lack o f energy at the end o f this process and thought it was partly created by 
the restriction o f the natural flow o f the self-organising processes.
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I thought that this situation could have been better handled by using some kind o f 
‘Open Space’ process where participants had the choice to  decide which table they 
wanted to  go to  and how long they wanted to  spend. W hat happened was that 
within an overall imposed structure, participants found ways o f exercising this 
choice but that the imposed structure kept reappearing as an obstacle that had to  
be subverted in different ways.
Another session I would like to  write about was a session called ‘An Inquiry into 
inquiry’, run by ‘B.’ an American consultant who is a senior affiliate at the MIT 
Centre fo r Organisational Learning. This session was held in a more informal 
environment than the session I have described earlier - a meeting room set out in 
a comfortable style positioned at the entrance to  one o f the accommodation 
wings. It was clear at the beginning that there were not enough chairs in the room. 
B. was very active and attentive to  reorganising the room so that everyone could 
sit comfortably in a circle. In doing this, he made the comment “ It’s called self- 
organising -  see if you can do it’’. This immediately struck me as a contradiction 
and that I was in a situation o f imposed self-organisation. O r better, that 
organisation was going to  be imposed on me but that this organisation would be 
given the name self-organisation so that it looks as if I (and others) are choosing it 
-  clever, huh?
Early in the group B. said he wanted us to  each find a question that was important 
to  us, in fact its importance was such that answering this question would provide a 
significant breakthrough in our professional lives and lead to  significant personal and 
professional transformation. He also commented that as we each asked our 
individual questions a pattern would emerge that would express the collective 
learning o f the group, and that this knowledge will be created in the centre o f the 
circle. Again I thought he is pre-empting genuine emergence -  he is assuming an 
emergent whole can be guaranteed to  arise, a universal theme which unites us all. 
And that this knowledge will arise in the centre rather than the periphery.
In the session people began to  articulate their individual questions. These were 
undoubtedly heartfelt and meaningful to  the individuals expressing them. B. 
occasionally suggested that there was a question underlying the initial question that 
was being asked. These underlying questions all tended to  point to  the fundamental 
existential question o f ‘what is the purpose o f my life?’
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And in fact this did seem to  be the theme that emerged. W hat are we all here for? 
This was the emergent whole that was produced. But at this level o f generality, I 
wonder about the value o f the theme. It is a unifying theme, but also somehow 
strips the individual questions o f their unique context, their particularity. The 
process does not allow for o r encourage the possibility that there might not be an 
emergent overall theme or that there could be a number o f divergent and 
contradictory sub themes; self organisation is presumed, is steered, is actively 
created and managed. The group does not really enter the potentially creative 
realm at the 'edge o f chaos’ where there is a real risk o f disintegration and where 
everything feels as if it could fall apart.
A t the end o f the session most people commented very favourably on the session 
and the depth o f the sharing that had taken place. I wonder about this. Can a 
group o f twenty odd relative strangers achieve a genuine intimacy in this time? O r 
are we just learning and expressing a new rhetoric o f ‘consultant-speak’, talking 
together in a group which has the appearance o f depth but is really only skimming 
the surface?"
In this account I am thinking about self-organisation in the context of being a participant 
in tw o workshops. The account of the first workshop illustrates the co-existence of 
emerging forms of self-organisation alongside formally structured organising procedures. 
This is similar to the distinction Ralph Stacey (2000) makes between formal and informal 
organisational systems. W h at is revealing in this account is the persistence and power of 
these informal, spontaneously arising self-organising systems. Indeed, it is with the same 
characteristics of persistence, flexibility and decentred power that these informal self- 
organising processes operate in organisational life. The account of the second workshop 
largely speaks for itself. This, to me, is an example of ideas of self-organisation being co­
opted into an instrumental pre-determined form of organising, which, it has to be said, is 
very popular (and reassuring).
Summary
So, what do these illustrations taken together and the accounts in chapter six and 
elsewhere tell me overall about my inquiry question? - “How can I work more effectively 
with self-organising processes in groups to enable individual and organisational learning?”
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This question is difficult, if not impossible, to  answer in the generality. A  typical general 
response reduces the answer to a list of near banalities. For example, I could say: be 
more confident; be present in the moment; know when to lead and when to follow; 
listen well; ask good inquiry questions; engage in and promote dialogical conversations; 
be aware of, and enable others’ awareness of, how situations are being socially 
constructed, maintained and transformed; be able to  tolerate ambiguity, uncertainty, and 
not knowing; be emotionally literate; be able to hold emotionally the discomfort, 
frustration and anxiety inevitably engendered in messy self-organising processes; make 
well-founded and well-timed interventions into group dynamics: have a good and wide 
repertoire of techniques and methods such as Appreciative Inquiry, Open Space, graphic 
facilitation, real time strategic change, future search etc.
Such a generalised list, whilst of some possible value, takes away the specifics of the 
particular person, situation and context. It is an example of what Toulmin (1990) 
describes as the replacement of the local, the particular, and the timely found in 
Renaissance humanism by the universal, the abstract and the timeless in the rise of 
modernist thought. (For a further exposition of Toulmin’s w ork  see appendix one). 
Rather than answer this inquiry question in the generality, I am aiming throughout this 
thesis to  show through narrative accounts the emergence and evolution of my practice.
A t the same time, over the period I have been engaged in my research practices, I do 
believe - without wanting to set up a ‘victory narrative’ (Lather, 1993) - that I have 
learnt to be more skilled in working with these processes. My main personal evidence 
for this is in the way that I have worked with MSc 10 and the levels of creativity, 
ownership and commitment generated. My aim and hope is that the accounts in chapter 
seven and in this chapter demonstrate this to the reader.
A  further claim for increased proficiency in this area is concerned with my ability to  
w ork  with networks. Complexity theory suggests that all living systems are composed of 
networks. In T h e  W eb  of Life, Fritjof Capra (1997) says that the network is “the central 
metaphor of ecology” (p. 10). He adds, (and I detect here echoes of anti-foundationalist 
post-modern thinking that he would not necessarily subscribe to):
“ In the new systems thinking, the metaphor o f knowledge as a building is being 
replaced by that o f the network. As we perceive reality as a network o f 
relationships, our descriptions, too, form  an interconnected network o f concepts 
and models in which there are no foundations.” (p. 39).
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Patricia Shaw (2002) shows how organisations are created, sustained and changed 
through complex, interconnected conversational network-based processes. She argues 
that the role of what has been traditionally termed ‘the change agent’, is to  enter into 
and, with awareness, or what John Heron and Peter Reason (2001) call ‘critical 
subjectivity’, fully participate in these conversational networks. This is with a view to  
both showing how patterns of meaning-making are perpetually being constructed 
through the normal everyday conversational activities within organisations and also 
enabling alternative forms of conversational sense-making to  emerge. She follows 
Shotter (1993) in arguing that organisational reality is enacted through conversation. 
Therefore, if different conversations can be facilitated, different realities can be enacted.
This all points to the significance of understanding and working with networks to enable 
change. In the next section of this chapter, I will give examples of working with 
networks in three different contexts. W h a t is important in each of these examples is 
that the starting point for change is the facilitation of evolving self-organising 
conversational networks, rather than a planned system-wide change initiative.
Section three: working with networks 
Example one
The first example is a relatively small example of using conversational networks to  
create a learning group.
I had been working as a mentor with J., a chief executive in the social housing sector, for 
over tw o years. W e  both began to  realise that our w ork could be more productive if 
the conversations we were having could be extended to  a small group of chief 
executives in similar positions. Accordingly, J. had a conversation with P., the chief 
executive of an organisation, which acts as an umbrella organisation within the social 
housing sector. P. then emailed me a list o f four names of chief executives from other 
organisations of a similar size and facing similar challenges to  J.’s organisation J. himself 
also suggested another person from an organisation out of the social housing sector but 
within the public sector. I then w rote to  these five people outlining the rationale for a 
learning group and inviting them to  an initial meeting at J.’s offices to discuss this further. 
All those invited bar tw o people attended. A t this meeting I introduced further the idea 
of a learning group, spoke about its potential benefits, and asked the people present to  
respond to this. As people spoke, interest in the idea grew and we agreed to  set up four
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meetings over the course of a year. As the group so far was composed of five white 
men (including myself) one of the participants suggested inviting a female chief executive 
he knew. This idea was well received, and led to six of us, tw o months later, gathering 
together at the first meeting of this learning group in a hotel room near Wakefield.
For me, this was a novel way of generating work. I had, of course, initiated the work, 
together with J., but the final form of the w ork emerged in the conversations at J.’s 
offices. I also noticed that this way of working created different sets of relationships with 
the participants. I felt my relationships with them were more direct, more transparent, 
more equal, and more personal than in other working contexts. This was expressed for 
instance in the question of fees for the w ork  where my initial fee structure was 
challenged and re-negotiated by the participants when another member joined the 
group.
Example two
In the autumn of 2000, I was asked by an English environmental organisation to w ork  
with one of their clients to help introduce sustainability into their organisation. 
Traditionally, this environmental organisation offered training programmes as a way of 
intervening in organisations but the chief executive knew something of the way that I 
worked, wanted to utilise a different approach, and judged that this approach would be 
suitable for this particular client.
I therefore met with the person responsible for helping the organisation develop more 
environmentally sustainable business practices. She explained the w ork that had already 
been undertaken within the business, which had consisted of a high profile training 
course on sustainability with a selected group of managers whose role now was to  
introduce and champion sustainability in their respective parts of the organisation. 
Together we came to a view that the next stage of w ork would be to support and 
develop those projects already in existence that w ere attempting to introduce 
sustainability into different business practices, and to foster the creation of new 
initiatives with the same purpose. My thinking, here, was to help develop a network of 
people engaged in promoting sustainability who could connect together, share their 
learning and practice, and support and challenge one another to  realise their different 
projects. I thought that the creation of such a network might lead to  unexpected 
emergent outcomes in terms of taking sustainability forward within the organisation. W e  
agreed that we would create tw o action learning groups of five to six people in each as
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one forum for this network. O ther forums included the setting up of a sustainability 
web-site on the company intranet, lunchtime events with external speakers, and an 
annual exhibition of sustainability projects held in the main reception area. The action 
learning groups met regularly for nine months. A fter an evaluation of this first phase of 
work, we set up another tw o groups, which also met regularly for a period of a further 
nine months.
I do not intend to  explore the detail of this w ork  here. W h a t I want to draw attention 
to  is how my thinking about, and interest in, creating networks as a way of facilitating 
organisational change was shaping my practice. In this instance, I was interested in 
helping foster informal self-organising networks that would help bring issues of 
sustainability into the different parts of this organisation’s business.
Example three
This is a recent example where I have been working to create an alumni group from the 
150 or so participants from the eleven different cohorts of the MSc in People and 
Organisational Development at Roffey Park. I will briefly describe the stages of creating 
this alumni group
The idea of an alumni group had been mooted for a while but it achieved a new focus 
when in July of 2002 my colleagues and I organised a tenth anniversary celebration 
meeting for all the participants who had attended the MSc.
In the invitation to this event, people were also asked if they would be interested in 
helping think about the setting up of an alumni group. There was a favourable response 
to  this and in June last year my colleague and I met with the group of people who had 
put themselves forward as being interested. W e  decided that we would test out some 
of the thoughts and ideas at the tenth anniversary meeting and agreed that each of the 
people present would help to  facilitate a small group at the meeting asking them 
questions about the setting up of an alumni group. These small groups met at the 
anniversary event and their discussions w ere then fed into a further meeting of the 
people who had initially expressed interest. O u t of this next meeting a decision was 
made to  set up a conference in early 2003 to  launch the alumni group. This would 
coincide with the opening of the new facilities at Roffey Park. I am currently working 
with a small group of self-selected alumni to  cost, market, design and deliver this 
conference.
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Again, I do not intend to go into all the details of this w ork here. The focus of the w ork  
is to  create a genuinely self-organising network of alumni. The way this is being formed 
is to involve the alumni in a participative self-organising manner in the creation of this 
network. I have found myself both leading and facilitating this network into being. This 
does raise interesting issues. For example, who is in charge of the network? Is it Roffey 
Park as represented by my colleagues and me o r is it the alumni? This is another 
paradox to  which the answer is ‘both at the same time’. That is, in the formation of the 
network, we are constantly negotiating and re-negotiating issues of power, authority and 
decision making. Actually resolving this paradox one way o r another could lose the 
creative tension and vitality generated by the paradox. And my sense is that if the 
network is to be really vital and innovative, it needs to allow the emergence of authority 
and decision making from the participants without this being rigidly controlled through 
Roffey Park. The network needs to allow the existence of multiple agendas within it, 
even if some if these might be competing, for example, independent consultants using 
the network to market their services in competition with one another and Roffey Park. 
Again there is a further paradox at the heart of the network -  the opposing dynamics of 
competition and co-operation, both at the same time. A  large part of the skill required 
in working with this network is to accept the paradoxes embodied in it and not try to  
resolve or eliminate the contradictions.
Section four: reprise
In the previous section, I give three examples of discrete areas or projects of work with 
self-organising networks. I also want here to re-emphasise that this perspective of 
working with ‘self-organising emergence’ in which the individual is seen as embedded in, 
and both shaping and being shaped by, the networks they live and w ork in, permeates 
the entire thesis.
My aim throughout the thesis is to  explore and illustrate the overall dialectic of “H ow  
do I and others create my practice and how does my practice shape me and influence 
others.” I have also wanted to explore this in practice not just in theory by evolving 
distinctive and original (at least for me!) forms of practice called ‘sharing my w ork with 
others’, which arise from and become further interventions into the different networks 
or ‘communities of practice’ that I both constitute and am constituted by. Such 
interventions, as shown in chapter one, necessarily produce unexpected outcomes. This 
form of practice and the interventions occasioned have represented my own form of 





Questions of epistemology and validity
“W hat is meant by ‘reality’? It would seem to be something very erratic, very 
undependable -  now to be found in a dusty road, now in a scrap of newspaper in the 
street, now in a daffodil in the sun. It lights up a group in a room and stamps some 
casual saying. It overwhelms one walking home beneath the stars and makes the silent 
world more real than the world of speech -  and then there it is again in the uproar of 
Piccadilly. Sometimes, too, it seems to dwell in shapes too far away for us to discern 
what their nature is.”
Virginia Woolf (1929)
“Social science that doesn’t break your heart just isn’t worth doing”
Ellis & Bochner (2000)
Section one: questions of epistemology
A questioning voice asks: ‘W hy is epistemology important?”
A ‘critical-cynical voice’ responds: “Because in order to get your thesis you have to write 
a section on epistemology and show you know what you are doing here. Also, whilst we 
are talking about rules, real or imaginary internalisations, don’t you have to write the 
thesis all in one type face which rather scuppers this little experiment?”
A  ‘scholarly voice’ takes up this challenge for most o f the remainder of this section.
Epistemology is important here because I see this thesis as an example of what Schon 
(1995) calls an ‘epistemology of practice’, in contrast to traditional views on 
epistemology, with its norms of, in Schon’s words, “technical rationality”. Traditional 
epistemology possesses what Ken Gergen at the September 2002 ‘ninth approaches to  
emerging inquiry conference’ called the “commanding presence” of Cartesian-empirical-
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positivistic thought. This has dominated western thinking since the mid-seventeenth 
century and is generally considered to establish the philosophical basis of modernism. 
Such an epistemology assumes that there is an objective world, knowledge of which can 
be progressively gained by empirically verifiable methods that guarantee truth and 
objectivity independent of the knower of it. This knowledge can be cast in the form of 
timeless general truths, independent of social, political, and personal context.
This worldview still provides what James Hillman (1996) once called the “mental 
furniture” that shapes and colours our thinking, and still actively dominates many fields.
It is, however, under increasingly trenchant critique from many fronts. Calas & Smircich 
( 1999), in a review of postmodern thinking in relation to organisational theory, refer to  
‘modernist exhaustion’. This alludes to the idea that modernity has now run its three  
hundred or so year course. W e  are currently living in an era where the old ways of 
making sense of the world and legitimating knowledge that have guided inquiry for 
centuries are no longer seen to be unquestioningly valid but no agreed new forms or 
discourses have established themselves in a dominant position. Others speak about 
‘paradigm proliferation’ and the ‘Balkanisation response’ (Donmoyer, 1996), ‘paradigm 
wars’ (Anderson and Herr, 1999) and the culture campus wars. Some key aspects of this 
critique of modernity have already been expounded in chapter three. A t this point, it 
suffices to  indicate the main sources of the critique from developments within science 
itself (quantum mechanics and complexity theory which fundamentally challenge notions 
of predictability, control and linear causation), and from the rich body of thinking 
generally referred to as post-modernism. This is characterised by, in Lyotard’s (1984) 
much quoted phrase, an ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’, an anti-foundationalist, 
anti-essentialist stance, analyses of discourses that demonstrate the inseparability of 
knowledge and power, and an insistence on the socially and historically conditioned 
nature of knowledge.
An epistemology of practice, in contrast to  traditional epistemologies, suggests that 
truth is made not discovered. Smith and Deem er (2000), in a discussion about 
relativism, state that “we must change our imageries and metaphors from those of 
discovery and finding to those of constructing and making.” W e  do not learn more 
effectively about the world and create valid knowledge by standing back from it in a 
detached objective manner -  and the further back the better and more valid the 
knowledge because of the increasing absence of bias. Instead, knowledge is created in 
active, participative engagement with the world, through different forms of individual and 
cultural practices. As Karl Marx said (1969), and later Marxists have emphasised, “ the
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point is not to  understand the world but to  change it”. This is also at the basis of Kurt 
Lewin’s (1 9 5 1) original formulation of action research -  it is in trying to change social 
situations that we best come to understand them. Epistemologies of practice, therefore, 
emphasise the practical and ethical grounds for knowledge.
This view draws attention to the dialectical relationship between theory and practice, 
what Marxists call ‘praxis’, and the different kinds of knowledge created in this way (of 
which this thesis is an example), which contrast with the idea of knowledge existing 
apart from the practices that create it. As I have indicated in the chapter two, this is 
also encapsulated in Judi Marshalls’ (1999) idea of ‘living life as inquiry’, W enger and 
Lave’s (1991) ideas of ‘situated learning’, and W enger’s (1998) notion of ‘communities 
of practice’ -  our forms of knowledge are inseparable from the forms in which we live 
and engage in life. A t its most radical this points too, as I also indicated in chapter two, 
to  the inseparability of ontology and epistemology, a distinction which has been central 
to  western philosophy since Descartes. It also profoundly connects epistemology and 
ethics. There are no morally neutral ways of knowing the world. All so-called ‘data’ and 
all observations are always theory-laden and all theory is grounded in values.
This ‘epistemology of practice’ opens the way to different ways of knowing in addition 
to  the propositional forms of knowledge privileged by traditional epistemology. Polanyi’s 
( 1958) formulation of ‘tacit knowing’ as the basis of practical knowing, contrasted with 
‘explicit knowing’, has been an influential concept, particularly in the field of 
organisational knowledge management. Likewise, Schon (1995) refers to the ‘knowing- 
in-action’ that practitioners use to guide and improvise their behaviour in circumstances 
o f ‘‘uncertainty, complexity, uniqueness and conflict”. John Heron (1992, 1996a) refers 
to  four forms of knowing organised hierarchically: practical, propositional, presentational 
and experiential. Feminist scholars (Belenkey, Clinchy et al 1986) have argued that an 
emphasis on propositional forms of knowing discriminates against more intuitive, 
emotional, bodily based and experiential forms of knowing that have been traditionally 
associated with female characteristics. Tsoukas (W arwick Business School Research 
Paper 171, undated) writes about the limits of propositional knowledge, which then 
need to be complemented by narrative forms of knowing, when describing situations 
that are not regularised and describable in terms of rules.
Enough already! How many more references can you find to different forms of knowing? 
Where is this heading? Is this not the ‘scholarly voice’ getting carried away with itself?
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Don’t  interrupt. I had not quite finished. There is a quote still to  be included from  
Tsoukas that is important which, links to Ralph Stacey’s (2000) ideas about the 
functioning of formal and informal organisation and connects to the theme of paradox in 
chapter seven of this thesis. Here it is;
“ Propositional knowledge is intrinsically related to  the institutional dimension o f 
organised contexts, while narrative organisational knowledge is intrinsically related 
to  the latter’s practice dimension. The tw o  pairs, however, are in conflict: for
practices to  endure they need to  be sustained by institutions to  whose corrosive
/
influence they are inescapably exposed. A t he same time, institutions cannot 
function unless they are supported by communal traditions’’ (p. 2)
Well why is that so important?
Because Tsoukas is drawing attention to  narrative forms of knowledge. These forms 
have been illustrated in chapters four (in autobiographical accounts), seven (in accounts 
of my ‘living educational theory’), and eight (in accounts of working with self-organising 
processes) of this thesis. He is also saying that propositional and narrative organisational 
knowledge knowing are in conflict, but also in a relationship of mutual dependence. You 
did after all want to interrupt me in the midst of a propositional flow.
Oh no not again! More tediously and tortuously clever self-referential stuff, commenting 
on the way the text is being constructed to make the very point contained in the text, what 
those post modernists would dignify with the term ‘reflexivity’. And, incidentally, I think 
this can be so much better done in film. Witness, for example, the recent film 
‘Adaptation’, which is cleverly constructed as a film about a scriptwriter struggling to 
write a film about an unfilmable book and the myriad ways the scriptwriter is implicated 
in the eventual film.’
Actually I do think ‘reflexivity’ is important. But you’ll have to wait for the discussion on 
validity in the next sections for that.
You still have not completely convinced me of the relevance of all this epistemological 
speculation.
By critiquing the tendency to  try to create ‘grand’ or ‘meta-narratives’, valid across time 
and place, postmodern thinking ushers in the possibility of validating different kinds of
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epistemology and knowing. These are more based, as Toulmin (1990) says on the local, 
the timebound, the particular, the oral and the concrete. Postmodern thought 
emphasises the significance of narrative and opens up options for diverse forms of 
representation of knowledge, what John Heron calls ‘presentational knowing’. Calas and 
Smirich (1999) understand the implications of this as follows.
“ Some o f what this entails is fo r authors to  specify the aspects o f the world with 
which they are trying to  engage and why; to  situate knowledge and to  de-reify it; to  
speak in a way that takes ownership o f their arguments; and be accountable fo r the 
choices made” (p. 650).
That is exactly what I have aimed to do in this thesis.
Section two: questions of validity
This next section will be in four parts. First, I want to discuss the impact on ideas of 
validity occasioned by the ‘postmodern’ turn in recent thought of the last thirty years or 
so. Then I want to look at other ideas of validity emanating from educational action 
research, self-study research and autobiographical writing. The third part will move on 
to explore the implications of the first tw o parts for my thesis and, by linking with my 
‘living educational theory’ created in chapter seven, suggest suitable criteria of validity 
for my own work. Finally, the fourth part will consider validity from the point of view of 
formal academic criteria laid down to assess a PhD.
Part one
In the earlier section of this chapter, and more fully in chapter three, I have been arguing 
that the poststructural, postmodern and deconstructionist critique of the traditions that 
have shaped western thinking particularly since the enlightenment have led to  a 
profound questioning and reassessment of the pre-eminence of scientific reasoning and 
methods alongside the way that such reasoning has defined notions of truth, knowledge, 
reason, objectivity and progress. As MacLure (1995) says;
“Think o f postmodernism as a kind o f undoing o f all the habits o f mind o f so-called 
western thought that have prevailed over the last tw o  centuries -the  decidability o f 
truth, the inevitability o f progress, the triumph o f reason, the possibility o f a 
universal moral code, the objectivity o f science, the forward march o f history, the
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existence o f the singular autonomous self. These foundational principles are all to  
do with making the world knowable, accountable, unambiguous, generalisable, 
predictable, coherent, manageable, mutually comprehensible.” (p. 106)
Similarly, Ken Gergen (1991), writing about the current turmoil in the American 
academic community in the preface to  T h e  Saturated Self, says:
“Virtually all the assumptions guiding both reason and research over the past 
century are coming under sharp question.” (p. ix)
Likewise Donm oyer (1996), writing about the difficulties of stepping into the editorship 
of a prestigious journal in the field of educational research and his role in influencing 
what qualifies as valid research, states:
“There is little consensus in the field about what research is and what scholarly 
discourse should look like” (p. 19)
W in te r ( 1998a), too, points out that this radical questioning of the grounds for 
knowledge is not purely of academic concern. As he says;
“ If the legitimation o f knowledge is open to  question, where shall we, as 
professional workers charged with authority, seek the necessary basis for exercising 
our responsibilities.” (p. 55)
O ne major consequence of all this is what Ken Gergen (1999) and Denzin (1997) call 
the ‘legitimation crisis’. If traditional ideas of the basis of what is to be counted as valid 
knowledge no longer apply, and science is no longer the absolute authority whose 
standards and epistemological modus operandi other disciplines have to emulate and 
aspire to, then by what authority, means and criteria is knowledge in all domains to  be 
judged? H ow  can we say, for example, to echo a relatively recent debate in literary 
criticism, that Keats is a better poet than Bob Dylan? O r, more pertinently, by what 
standards are we f e  judge this thesis?
Ken Gergen ( 1999) suggests that there are tw o broad emotional responses to this 
undoing of the overarching claims to  truth and knowledge that any meta-narrative, 
whether scientific, psychological, religious or political, has offered. One leads to the 
vertiginous despair and ‘dark night o f the soul’ caused by peering or falling into, what 
Maclure (1996) describes as “the abyss that threatens to engulf all appeals to coherence,
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wholeness, foundations and cores”. This ‘abyss’ is the profoundly disorienting 
experience of the groundlessness caused by the deconstruction of any claim to  establish 
transcendental universal foundations for truth and morality. This can lead to  moral 
relativism, the sense that, therefore, anything goes, and potentially conclude in cynicism 
and/or nihilism. As Yeats (1924) says, from his poem, T h e  Second Coming’.
“Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.”
The other response is a playful celebration of the ambiguity, fragmentation, diversity, 
complex pluralism, and the new possibilities ushered in by a view which does not 
privilege and give overriding authority to any one perspective on truth, the good, and 
the beautiful. This is the ‘invitation to  the carnival’, described by Gardiner (1992) as 
“Bahktin’s term  for a bewildering constellation of rituals, games, symbols, and various 
excesses which together constitute an alternative social space of freedom, abundance 
and equality.” This latter response is also politically significant because it allows equal 
status to voices that have traditionally been marginalised because of gender, ethnicity or 
other refusals to conform to mainstream, accepted ‘meta-narratives’.
Although the writing in the previous paragraphs outlines an impersonal exposition of 
Ken Gergen’s tw o responses, my thesis, also, in representing and accounting for my 
inquiry practice over the last six years, contains highly personal accounts of both of 
these responses. The second part o f my autobiography in chapter five describes the 
unravelling of the psychological ‘meta-narrative’ and set of relationships which sustained 
it that had been at the foundation of my life for ten years. The more optimistic response 
is shown too - to  some extent this whole thesis is, at its most upbeat, a celebration and 
attempt to give a multi-voiced form to  the complexity, diversity, uncertainty and 
fragmented nature of my own practice. I have struggled to resist being defined in uni­
dimensional terms as primarily a facilitator, o r an educator, o r a developer, o r a 
therapist, or a consultant. My practice encompasses all these.
The ‘crisis of legitimation’ that is at the heart of the exploration of validity in this section 
is further summed up in Denzin’s (1997) question ‘‘W h at do we do with validity and the 
legitimation question once we’ve m et critical poststructuralism?” One response to this 
is to attempt to develop different criteria of validity from within poststructural and 
postmodern thinking. From my reading of different discussions of validity in a 
postmodern context, Lather (1986, 1993) emerges as a significant figure.
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Lather (1986) initially coined the concept of ‘catalytic validity* to describe the 
emancipatory potential of any research. This was an attempt to rethink the political 
dimension of any research -  rather than going along with modernist ideas of neutrality 
as an ideal to  be attained, this criteria makes explicit the unavoidably ideological nature 
of research and judges that research according to  its capacity to liberate people. In a 
later w ork  (1994), Lather argues against any singular notion of validity and reframes 
validity as “multiple, partial, endlessly deferred.” Under the broad category of 
“transgressive validity”, she develops four new forms of validity: ironic, paralogical, 
Derridean rigour/rhizomatic, and voluptuous. Interestingly, and possibly even ironically, I 
found some of her discussion of these terms too  rooted in the particular specialised 
discourses of postmodernism and too  immersed in the esoteric ‘language games’ of a 
particular academic community to carry sufficient meaning and, therefore, validity for my 
own purposes. All of Lather’s four criteria seem related to the capacity of a tex t to  
create multiple representations, to undermine itself, to  refuse to appeal to authorities 
(especially patriarchal) outside of the text, to  resist linearity, consensus, closure and 
resolution, to  allow for complexity and to resist assimilation of the ‘other’. She makes an 
interesting point in elaborating ‘ironic validity’, in saying that;
“ A  strategy o f ironic validity proliferates forms, recognising that they are rhetorical 
and w ithout foundation, post-epistemic, lacking in epistemological support. The 
text is resituated as a representation o f its “ failure to  represent what it points 
towards but can never reach” (Hayles, 1990, p 261), an ironic representation o f 
neither the thing itself nor a representation o f the thing, but a simulacrum” (p. 677).
I like this idea of Hayles (1990) of the text failing to “represent what it points towards 
but can never reach”. As I have written this thesis, I have increasingly seen it as a 
continual circling around, almost a meditation in writing on, and a criss-crossing of, the 
themes of my practice, aided by and in association with others’ ideas and comments, 
experimenting with different forms and genres, that can never reach final conclusions 
and that simultaneously tries and fails definitively to  indicate what its ultimate purpose is.
Lather (1993) also makes a point about rhizomatic validity that relates to  the above 
sense of my thesis. She says that “rather than a linear progress, rhizomatics is a journey 
among intersections, nodes, and regionalisations through a multi-centred complexity”. 
This thesis attempts to realise a ’multi-centred complexity.’ Each of the previous 
chapters have been organised around a distinct theme, yet the themes of each chapter
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are interconnected, and much of the content is cross-referenced. Creating this has 
posed the not inconsiderable challenge of how to write a sustained non-linear thesis in 
the face of legitimate demands for the quality of argument to  be flowing, make sense and 
develop in some progressive fashion to create an overall coherence. It seems to me that 
even the most sophisticated and deconstructive postmodern writing is reluctant to  
dispense altogether with an internally consistent, high quality argument.
Smeurich (1996), also writing within a poststructural tradition, questions the whole 
concept o f validity itself, rather than, like Lather (1993) and Mishler (1990), looking for 
different criteria to validate postpositivist research. He states that “the essential meaning 
of validity came to  be, as Lincoln and Guba (1985) correctly surmised, the warrant of 
trustworthiness.” He goes on then to  argue that the function of validity is a policing role, 
which draws a boundary that divides good and bad research. Instead of attempting to  
redraw the boundary, Smeurich states that:
“ My contention, then, is that the various kinds o f validity, across both conventional 
and postpositivist paradigms are a civilisational project, an imperial project. Wearing 
many different masks, validity is a social practice drawn from the heart o f Western 
darkness. It is an either/or bifurcation line that divides the privileged Same from the 
yet untheorised Other, that establishes the “valid” domination o f the Same over 
the other, that delineates the conditions under which the O ther can be validly 
incorporated into the same” (p. 55).
Smeurich, though, is reluctant to  dispose of validity completely. He is searching for what 
he calls ‘new imaginaries of validity’ that do not express the dualisms of western 
epistemological thinking and are able to be genuinely appreciative and respectful rather 
than assimilating and colonising of ‘the O th er’. Although he sees possible examples of 
these in W h ite ’s (1991) notion of an epistemology of “attentive care” and Lather’s 
(1993) overall category of “transgressive validity” used to  describe her four forms of 
validity, he is still suspicious of how deeply entrenched the western “civilisational 
project” is preconceptually embedded in all patterns of thinking and action, including 
even these attempts to create alternative forms of validity.
Smeurich’s views are interesting here as they attempt to reposition the idea of validity 
and also convey similar points that Clark (2002) makes about Heidegger‘s thinking.
Clark describes the impetus of Heideggerian thought as an attack on the “absolutism of 
modernity’s drive to know” which has been the deeply rooted basis of the whole of
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western thought since the Greeks. For Heidegger, technologically and scientifically 
inspired, instrumental modes of knowing focussed on explanation have become, 
especially in contemporary society, simultaneously modes of domination and control 
over both people and nature. Heideggers’ response to this was to turn to  art and 
poetry, especially that of Holderlin, (whose poem inaugurates this thesis), as alternative 
forms of knowing.
This question of the basis of knowing, the dominance and privileging of instrumental 
reason, and the marginalisation of other forms of knowing returns the argument back to  
the first section of this chapter. In exploring this issue here, I am opening up the 
possibility that my thesis, as the account of my practice over the last six years is not 
founded or structured as an explanatory account. I am not claiming that because I did 
such and such at one point then such and such ensued, to re-create the “ If, then” logic 
of propositional knowledge (Tsoukas, undated research paper). I am not intending out of 
this thesis to build the much beloved ‘tool box’ of instrumental management and 
organisational development, or the ‘ten best tips to  changing organisations’ approach. 
Rather the question will be whether I can create a sense of space within the thesis that 
is open to  and suggests mystery, in which a ‘sense of O th er’ is present. Alternatively, 
does my thesis assimilate all the material to a drive to  know, what hooks (1992) calls 
“Eating the O th er’ and Nietzche (1973) describes as ‘the will to  power”?
Part two
Having explored validity in relation to  aspects of poststructural and postmodern 
thought, I want to first go on to look at some other general criteria that have been 
developed to assess validity in relation to educational research, self study research and 
autobiographical writing. In the third part of this section on validity, I will draw on both 
on the first tw o parts of this section and chapter seven on ‘creating my living educational 
theory’ to  develop the criteria of validity that I want to  be used to judge my thesis.
In their article about T h e  N ew  Paradigm W ars’, Anderson and H err (1999) ask three  
pertinent questions with regard to what they call “practitioner research”, (of which this 
thesis would be an example);
“ If we can't use current validity criteria to  evaluate practitioner research, how do 
we evaluate it? How do we distinguish ‘good’’ practitioner research from “ bad” 
research? Perhaps most, importantly, who should develop these criteria?” (p. 15.).
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They equate validity with rigor and offer five criteria for validity based on their own 
practitioner research, their w ork with others’ research, and their interaction with 
others’ ideas. One of these criteria is Lather’s (1986) notion of ‘catalytic validity’, which 
has already been discussed. The others are outcome validity, process validity, 
democratic validity and dialogic validity.
Outcom e validity is defined as “the extent to which actions occur which lead to  a 
resolution of the problem that led to the study”, and that, “outcome validity is 
synonymous with the “successful” outcome of the research project.” I find this idea 
problematic. It only appears to validate ‘victory narratives.’ It also seems to be overly 
situated in the instrumental problem-solving way of thinking that I explored at the end of 
the first part of this section. This thesis explores many possible dimensions of success 
and failure. As already stated in chapter two, if my overall intended research outcome 
was to end my sleeplessness once and for all, then clearly the thesis is a failure. If, on the 
other hand, it was to develop a more disciplined practice as a runner, then, following my 
recent completion of a half-marathon, I could claim success. If my ultimate outcome was 
to  have a more fulfilled life, then on what and whose criteria will that be judged? The 
counter argument would be that the thesis is deficient in not defining sufficiently 
rigorously its desired outcomes. Yet this counter argument is still located in an overly 
mechanistic paradigm, which assumes that is possible to  trace outcomes to causes in a 
simple, linear cause and effect manner. If, as I am claiming, that this thesis is an example 
of “living life as inquiry” then the outcomes from this approach cannot so unambiguously 
and neatly be defined.
Moreover, as Anderson and H err point out themselves, ‘outcome validity’ begs the 
question as to whose outcome is success defined for. Also they say that, in most action 
research over time, as indeed happened in my own inquiry, the initial problem is re­
framed in a more complex way, so that the initial problem and its associated outcome 
resolutions become less significant. This all makes ‘outcome validity’ problematic. In fact 
W in te r (1998a) says, when discussing valid criteria for action research, that, “realistic 
and usable criteria are ‘procedural’, (concerned with following a justifiable process), 
rather than ‘teleological’ (concerned with achieving correct outcomes).” (p. 62)
Anderson and H err say that process validity “asks to  what extent problems are framed 
and solved in a manner that permits ongoing learning o f the individual or system.” This 
issue of ongoing learning is certainly an important measure of the validity of this thesis.
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In fact, the theme of learning - mine and others - is one of, in Lather’s (1993) words, the  
“multiple centres” of the thesis, and will form the basis of one of the criteria of validity 
to be developed in the third part of this section.
Democratic validity is defined as “ the extent to  which research is done in collaboration 
with all parties who have a stake in the problem under investigation.” Again this still 
situates research as addressing problems. If multiple aspects of my living practice are the 
‘problems’ under investigation, then building collaboration, as I have found, is not easy or 
straightforward. Some people have refused collaboration yet I have still decided to  
include this aspect of my research in this thesis. Much of the practice I have evolved has 
been the attempt to create collaboration through circulating accounts of my work. In 
some situations, particularly as described in chapter seven, the research question itself 
and purpose of the w ork has been about building collaboration and it has not, therefore, 
been possible to achieve this at the onset of the research. I do agree, however, that this 
issue of collaboration is crucial, as was explored particularly in chapter seven.
Finally, dialogical validity is related to  the process of peer review in traditional academic 
settings. In practitioner research, peer review is provided by participation in practitioner 
research communities. For me, this has occurred through my participation in the 
CARPP community, especially the supervision group I have been a member of. It has 
also an important part of the latter phase of my inquiry practice, which involved 
circulating my draft thesis to others in the various communities I have already cited, and 
responding to their comments as outlined in the introduction.
H err and Anderson refer to the point of view of Torbert (1981) and Carr & Kemmis 
(1986) who insist that, in order to promote democratic and dialogic validity, practitioner 
research must be done as collaborative inquiry. My claim is that, regarding my own form  
of practitioner research, I am evolving a unique form of collaborative research based 
around a view of myself and my practice being located and mutually created in the 
network of relationships that sustain my life and its practices. By circulating my w ork to  
others, I am constantly testing and refining the democratic and dialogical validity of my 
work.
In their article, Bullough and Pinnegar (2001) are concerned with similar issues of validity 
regarding self-study educational research. They are initially concerned with the question 
of “when does self-study become research?” This is similar to the question I asked in the 
‘action research’ section of chapter tw o about the difference between simply living life
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and “living life as inquiry”. Their answer to  this question is to follow the work of W righ t  
Mills (1959) in saying that:
“W hen biography and history are joined, when the issue confronted by the self is 
shown to  have a relationship to  and bearing on the content and ethos o f a time, 
then self-study moves to  research.’’ (p. 15).
In my autobiographical writings in chapter five, I have attempted to situate my own 
biography within wider social and political movements. From the very start of the first 
autobiographical writing, ‘My first twenty-one years’, I include a reference to  
‘Marlborough Man’ in the year of my birth. My writings also, more significantly, 
encompass reflection, (as far as the libel laws allow me), on the key events described in ‘ 
My second twenty-one years’ as an illustration of a more general phenomenon 
characteristic of groups and communities at that time.
Bullough and Pinnegar continue to say that self-study;
“  does not focus on the self per se but on the space between self and the
practice engaged in. There is always a tension between those tw o elements, self 
and the arena o f practice, between self in relation to  practice and the others who 
share the practice setting. Each self-study researcher must negotiate that balance, 
but it must be a balance - tipping too  far toward the self side produces solipsism o r 
a confessional, and tipping too  far the other way turns self-study into traditional 
research.” (p. 15).
It is what Bullough and Pinnegar call the ‘space between self and practice* and what I 
would rather frame as the dialectic of self and practice that this thesis is concerned with. 
I am, moreover, trying, in the thesis - at its most radical - not to make the dualistic 
separation of self and practice that I think Bullough and Pinnegar retain but, instead, to  
consider the view that self and practice are a co-created dialectical unity, both in theory  
(chapters three and six), and in practice (chapters seven and eight) by exploring what 
this means as an action research activity.
Bullough and Pinnegar equate validity with quality and ask a further question that is 
relevant to this discussion of validity, especially as it will, in part three, move on to  
explore criteria of validity pertinent to this thesis. Their question is; “W h at makes a self- 
study worth reading?” They go on to develop nine guidelines for establishing quality in 
autobiographical self-study forms and a further five criteria for quality in
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correspondence, e-mail, and recorded conversations. These nine guidelines for 
autobiography in educational research that they believe “point towards virtuosity in 
scholarship” are best summarised in their own words.
“A  self-study is a good read, attends to  the ‘nodal moments’ o f teaching and being 
a teacher educator and thereby enables reader insight o r understanding into self, 
reveals a lively conscience and balanced sense o f self-importance, tells a 
recognisable teacher o r teacher educator story, portrays character development in 
the face o f serious issues within a complex setting, gives place to  the dynamic 
struggle o f living life whole, and offers new perspectives” (p. 19).
W hilst I find the formulation of Bullough and Pinnegar’s nine guidelines helpful in thinking 
about the issue of quality in autobiographical writing, I also think some of them  
repetitive and overlapping. They do not, too, obviate the need to make judgement. It is 
quite possible that one person reading my autobiographical writings will find them  
engaging, full of insight, and thoughtfully set in a broader social and cultural context; 
another may find them pretentious, self-indulgent and shallow.
Bleakley (2000) also considers autobiographical writing. In his thought provoking article, 
he is critical of the personal confessional style of much contemporary autobiographical 
writing. W hilst he generally welcomes the emphasis on more narrative forms of 
knowing in contrast to what he calls ‘logico-scientific knowing’, he is concerned about 
the dominant confessional style these forms are taking. He sees such a style as 
unreflectively producing ‘subjectivities’ based on critically unexamined ideas of 
authenticity and other naive assumptions from humanistic psychology. Chapter three 
explored the ways in which the popularity of such writing is one of many manifestations 
of a contemporary culture emphasising psychological growth and development that 
potentially well serve the interests of consumer capitalism. A t this point, I want to  look 
at the parts of Bleakley’s arguments that are relevant for this exploration of validity. 
Bleakley follows poststructural criticism in opposing the normal humanistic assumption 
that we w rite  to express our unique authentic selves and our deepest feelings in 
language. Rather, he argues it is language and the different genres that we use that 
constitute us, “where identities are constructed through confessional modes rather than 
confessional modes revealing identities” (p. 16.)
From this standpoint, Bleakley offers the following criticisms of this kind of writing.
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“ Such writing is, first, monological ratherthan dialogical, caught in a wash-and-spin 
cycle o f interminable introspection based (unreflexively) upon self-examination as
an idealistic cleansing and purging Second, such writing is characteristically
instrumentalised, as an extended curriculum vitae. Third it is often trivialised, or 
superficial, as an anecdotal account mistaking event fo r experience. Fourth, it is 
often cathartic but w ithout insight, leading to  a fascination with feelings and 
sentimentality. And fifth, it is characteristically inflated, o r narcissistic, returning us to  
a monologic bias” (p. 20).
Given this, Bleakley, asks:
“Can we then have a narrative writing as reflective practice w ithout a totalising 
‘subject’ o r authorial ownership? This would constitute an approach that 
appreciates the value especially o f written language’s inherent indeterminacy, and 
thus resists o r subverts notions o f closure, as explanation, in reflective practice”
(p. 15).
As well as being able to embody this kind of indeterminacy, the other criteria that 
Bleakley concludes are important for narratives is that they “need to be interesting, they 
need to have aesthetic depth, as well as ethical focus” (p. 23).
Part three
The discussion so far has largely been about attempts to  find general criteria of validity 
that are able to withstand the postmodern onslaught on traditional ideas of truth and 
validity. A t the same time, the thrust of postmodern thinking is to suggest that there 
cannot be any universal criteria of validity, independent of the context of their 
production. Calas and Smirich (1998) refer to  Lyotard’s proposition that “legitimate 
knowledge under postmodern conditions can only reside in ‘petits recits’. Knowledge 
can only be produced in ‘small stories’ o r ‘modest narratives’, mindful of their locality in 
space and time and capable of adapting or disappearing as needed” (p. 6 5 1). Ken Gergen 
made a similar point in his talk at the ‘ninth emerging approaches to  inquiry’ conference 
in September 2002 by saying that practices of truth can only be validated within the 
particular community and its ‘language games’. In his memorable words, “truth is a local 
practice”.
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Rather than, therefore, using solely externally generated criteria of validity from any of 
the authors cited in the previous part of this section to judge my thesis, the challenge is 
for my writing to generate, substantiate and argue for its own criteria that are valid for 
what it is trying to do and the ‘community of practice’ in which it is located. This raises 
one obvious issue. Communities are not so sharply differentiated, with their defined set 
of practices clearly demarcated from one another. People belong to  multiple 
communities. This thesis is positioned within the broad community of action 
researchers, but this community has many diverse streams to  it and differing views, as 
already evidenced, as to  what constitutes worthwhile and valid research. There is, 
therefore, no immediate, clearly bounded community, which I can turn to for their local 
criteria of validity. For example, do I locate this thesis as primarily first person research 
as Reason and Bradbury (2001) define it; o r as an example of W hitehead’s (1993) ‘living 
educational theory* within the field of self-study educational action research; as an 
instance of ‘interpretive ethnography’ (Denzin, 1997); o r as a contribution to  the field of 
organisational development in working with self-organising processes from a complexity 
standpoint? My aim is that this thesis should not be located solely in any one of these 
traditions as it refers to  my practice, which operates across these boundaries.
A t this point, in order to help create my own criteria of validity, I want to return to the 
arguments of chapter seven. In that chapter, following Jack W hitehead’s w ork (1993) I 
created my own ‘living educational theory’ by exploring what values w ere important to  
me as they had emerged, both from the autobiographical accounts in chapter five, and as 
I found them embodied in my practice as an educator on a postgraduate programme 
(chapter seven). On page 215, these values are summarised as: imagination, co-creation, 
relationship, multiplicity, transparency, openness, critical engagement, reflection and 
emancipation. These values were further realised in the intentions I outlined at the point 
of starting a new Masters programme in December 2 0 0 1 (pages 2 13 -2 15). These values 
permeate this thesis, at least in the scholarly, autobiographical and reflexive narrative 
voices, even if the critical/cynical voice does his best to subvert them.
Jack W hitehead argues that these values are embodied in our practice. They are not 
abstract, linguistic entities. A t the same time as we try to  more fully realise our values 
through experiencing their negation in our practice, simultaneously these values also 
become the living standards by which we make judgements about the worth of our 
work. Ontological values, thereby, become epistemological standards.
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These values are further elaborated at the end of chapter seven into a living educational 
theory as a set of inquiry questions, which, I will re-state here as a set of paradoxical 
value-based principles underpinning my practice.
•  Using my authority in the most influential way to encourage and enable others to  
find their authority and become self-managing.
•  Contributing my knowledge, skills and talents fully to a programme and at the same 
time co-creating the programme with the participants.
•  Fully participating and retaining my ‘critical subjectivity’.
•  Acting fairly and ‘even-handedly’ to all participants in the midst of a range of 
emotional responses to different individuals.
•  Inspiring people and demonstrating that education and learning are more than 
gaining a qualification and/or functional means to an end and/or the acquisition of 
knowledge-based tool kits whilst recognising that people want and need 
qualifications and also believe and feel they need tools in order to do their jobs.
•  Creating an environment that engages peoples’ imagination and touches their souls 
without this becoming another series of recipes and techniques for engineering 
creativity.
•  Challenging the status quo and existing entrenched patterns of thinking and 
dominant power relations whilst working within current organisational and 
institutional frameworks.
•  Leading and facilitating self-organising processes.
I, therefore, want to draw on the above values and principles, through connecting them 
to  the exploration of ideas already set out in this section, to  suggest the following eleven 




Trustworthiness has long been considered an essential feature of valid research. The 
starting point here - not withstanding Bleakley’s (2000) thoughtful critique of notions of 
authenticity - is linked to whether the reader believes the accounts in the thesis are 
authentic and believable. I have tried to make the accounts as open, honest and 
transparent as I can. The issue for the reader is whether the accounts ring true. A re  
they consistent with what the reader knows of me and my life? Is the reader persuaded 
by the veracity and authenticity of the writing?
In relation to  this criteria, Patricia Shaw, my ex-wife, commented in a letter dated 17 
January 2003 on my draft:
“ Is it trustworthy? As someone who has known you intimately for years it rings 
very true. It reads as honest, frank, riveting.”
2) Engaging and interesting
Many of the authors in the previous part of this section naturally make one test of 
validity for narrative based accounts as to whether they tell a good story. My intention 
for this thesis is to  engage and sustain the reader’s attention, to stir the reader 
intellectually and emotionally, to  create a lively, ‘good read’. I want the writing and the 
reading of the thesis to  have a sense of unpredictable vitality as it takes its own course. I 
want the thesis to generate learning for the author and reader in the midst of its 
production rather than being wearily predictable, stale, following pre-plotted routes and 
conventions, presenting already well-digested material. As Bleakley (2000) says, in 
relation to  ideas, does the thesis “prowl like an animal, bite back, die on you, grab your 
attention or walk away” (p. 12)? (If the thesis were an animal what kind of animal would 
it be?)
In other words, the thesis should activate the reader’s imagination and be what Ellis and 
Bochner (2000) call an “evocative narrative.” Its aims are, in their words to:
” ... activate subjectivity and compel emotional response.. .longto  be used rather 
than analysed; to  be told and retold ratherthan theorised and settled; to  offer 
lessons for further conversation ratherthan undebatable conclusions; and to  
substitute the companionship o f intimate detail fo r the loneliness o f abstracted 
facts” (p. 744).
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In relation to this criteria, Valerie G arrow  commented on my draft in an email dated 7 
March 2003:
“ I couldn't have ever imagined being 'gripped' by a PhD thesis (except my 
own perhaps) but I really did find myself absorbed in your w o rk ”
Professor Ralph Stacey w rote  in an email dated 31st January 2003:
‘‘I think it is interesting and easy to  read which cannot be said about many PhD 
theses.”
3) That the socially constructed nature of the self is apparent
This point here is to claim that the thesis is not overly self-referential and self-indulgent 
and that the autobiographical and other writings move beyond narcissistic confession 
and solipsistic introspection to show the wider social and cultural context of self­
creation. To  refer back to Mills’ point (1959), autobiography, culture and history need to  
be joined
4) Connection to others
As Ellis and Bochner (2000) say about ‘evocative narratives’:
‘The usefulness o f these stories is their capacity to  inspire conversation from the 
point o f view o f the readers, who enter from the perspective o f their own lives.
The narrative rises o r falls on its capacity to  provoke readers to  broaden their 
horizons, reflect critically on their own experience, enter empathetically into worlds 
o f experience different from their own, and actively engage in dialogue regarding 
the social and moral implications o f the different perspectives and standpoints they 
encounter” (p. 748).
My intention here is that the reader is stimulated to think about and make connections 
with their own life and practice and that the thesis opens out to  others in the way that 
Simon (1996) refers to in her exposition of the paradox of how a case study in focussing 
on the particular can illuminate the general.
Bassey (1995) says that: “A  singularity is a set of anecdotes about particular events 
occurring within a stated boundary, which are subjected to systematic and critical search
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for some truth.” This thesis, as an example of a ‘singularity’, claims to reach the truth  
that Bassey says “while pertaining to  the inside of the boundary, may stimulate thinking 
about similar situations elsewhere.” (p. I I I ) .
Throughout the thesis there have been many quotes where people have commented on 
the ability of my writing to evoke incidents and issues in their lives. Valerie Garrow  
commented:
“ I made endless connections with my own life - particularly o f similar 
experiences working in a 'community' and experiences as a social worker 
in Paris when I left University.”
5) Generates learning for the reader
This and the previous criteria are concerned with relationship to others and the ability 
of the thesis to co-create learning through its interaction with others .
Given my overall thinking about the thesis as a continuing intervention into the network  
of relationships that form the different communities of practice I am engaged in, it is 
important that the thesis has an effect on the reader’s practice and life, and that it 
generates further exploration and conversation. I have evidenced this process 
throughout the thesis and particularly in chapter seven.
6) Aesthetic depth
This is one of the dimensions suggested by Bleakley (2000). He complains, rightfully in 
my view, that “much academic writing in education can be said to lack body and image” 
(P. 12). This criteria means that the overall form of the thesis is aesthetically satisfying, 
and that there is congruence between its form and content. This criteria is further 
related to  the second of the inquiry questions that grew out of my MPhil transfer paper, 
namely: “how can I w ork with individuals and organisations in a way which makes fuller 
use of my and their creative imagination?” Again I am emphasising the value of 
imagination here and being able to  engage with the reader’s imagination as well as their 
intellect and emotions.
7) Resists overall explanation and tidy closure
This criteria combines the earlier discussion of Heidegger’s critique of instrumental 
modes of knowing, with Bleakley’s (2000) point about writing needing to  express the
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indeterminacy and ambiguity of language and the value-based principle of my ‘living 
educational theory’ that education is more than the instrumental acquisition of 
knowledge, skills and qualifications.
This also requires that the thesis is open to  multiple meanings and interpretations. In the 
introduction, I show how the draft thesis generated a range of responses in terms of a 
range of meanings that were evoked. It also requires that the thesis retains a sense of 
mystery -  not everything is explained.
In relation to this and the previous three criteria, Patricia Shaw commented:
“ I make connections to  my own life and work, am stimulated to  start inquiring 
again into aspects o f my experience, I cannot make a tidy closure and ‘explain’ the 
thrust o f the work but it has an aesthetic form that I am irresistibly moved by."
8) Non-linearity
This is akin to Lather’s (1993) notion of ‘rhizomatic validity’ and is linked to the previous 
criteria. (Actually it would be self-contradictory if it were not connected to other 
criteria!) This requires the thesis to read as if it has multiple inter-connecting centres 
and to represent a de-centred, inter-related network of ideas, emotions, impressions, 
and accounts in which no one overriding idea o r theory dominates.
The method of using different voices that are equally weighted and valued aims to  
decentre the thesis and move it away from a traditional academic form in which one 
voice is privileged.
9) Reflexivity
This arises from the critical examination of the nature of knowledge in postmodern 
times and is linked to the value I place on reflection and critical engagement. The point 
here is that the thesis shows an awareness of its own constructed and contingent 
nature, that it is able to critically reflect upon itself, and that it understands its own 
framing as one of many possible interpretations.
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10) Sound quality of the argument
Despite the arguments and openings for tension, contradiction, diversity, multiple 
epistemologies, poly-vocality, uncertainty, non-linearity, ambiguity, fragmentation and 
different representational forms born from the postmodern critique of traditional 
epistemology and propositional knowledge, there is still a requirement, and this links 
both to aesthetic depth and criticality of mind, that the thesis shows a high quality of 
thinking and rigorous argumentation. N o t anything goes.
I I )  Ethical
There are a number of dimensions to this criteria. The purposes for which the thesis is 
written need to  judged to be worthwhile i.e. that it has been worth doing and 
contributed to  some good. This is Bleakley’s (2000) point, that the thesis has an ‘ethical 
focus’. This requires that people been treated ethically in the course of the research 
inquiries.
It also raise the issues of what kind of person has the writing shaped me into being, what 
is the effect of the writings on others and what are the consequences and new 
possibilities of the different writings and inquiry practices in the thesis. This connects to  
the value I place on emancipation and lead me to want the consequences for me and 
others to be liberating and therapeutic in their broadest sense.
Part four
This thesis is also constituted within an institutional context, which has its own rules of 
judgement. It is not solely for me to  decide the criteria by which this w ork will be 
considered to have sufficient merit to qualify for a doctorate. For a PhD, the two  
primary criteria are that the thesis needs to  show ‘originality of mind’ and ‘critical 
judgement’.
Regarding ‘originality of mind’, I will claim that the thesis shows three main dimensions 
of originality. Firstly, I think the form of practice evolved, described and summarised as 
‘showing my w ork to others’ demonstrates an original approach to the creation of the 
thesis, by embedding it within the communities of practice to which it refers. This is an 
attempt to make the thesis a living document, a continuing intervention to generate 
further learning for others and myself, not simply a report at one step removed from
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the practice it is referring to. It is in this bringing together of the ideas of the self and the 
three-fold reciprocal shaping of self, world and practice that inform this thesis together 
with a practice that embodies those ideas where my initial claim to originality lies.
Secondly, I think the thesis has an original form in bringing and linking together the 
different voices and genres of traditional academic writing, autobiographical writing, 
accounts of my practice, alongside experimentation with other genres such as dialogical 
forms, the creation of a web-site and email correspondence.
Thirdly, I think some of the thinking in the thesis is original. I believe that the overall 
fram ework offered for different ideas of the self in chapter three in which many different 
theories can be located is an original formulation. Likewise, I think that the framework 
for conceptualising different approaches to  change in appendix one is also original.
Regarding critical judgement, I believe that this is demonstrated throughout the thesis in 
the critical appraisal of a wide range of ideas from different fields including action 
research, complexity, postmodern thinking, sociology and psychology as well as ‘high’ 
and ‘popular’ culture. It is further demonstrated in a critical assessment of aspects of my 
practice. It is this assimilation of a critical synthesis of others’ ideas and my own practice 
into my own form of reflective practice as exhibited in the PhD and then fed back into 
the different contexts of my practice that I believe demonstrates critical judgement -  
not just in theory but in practice.
A  further criterion for the award of a PhD is the “extent and merit o f the w ork’’. I think 
this has been demonstrated through the wide ranging nature of the inquiries engaged in 
and the theoretical material used alongside those inquiries.
A  PhD can also expected to contain material worthy of being published. The Complexity 
and Management Centre at the University of Hertfordshire are publishing chapter three 
and appendix one as working papers. Appendix one has been submitted to, and 
encouragingly received by, the Journal of Leadership and Organisational Development 
with some suggestions made for revision of the article appropriate to  its publication.
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Section three: dialogical postscript
I noticed that once you started writing about epistemology and then validity the other voices 
dried up.
Yes, the ‘scholarly’ voice started to  become dominant. The critical voice was present at 
the beginning but only found his way into the writing by piggybacking onto the ‘scholarly’ 
voice.
It’s interesting that other voices were silenced, even though you were writing about plurality and 
diversity. Why do you think that was?
I think that because of the articles on validity I had looked at, I was strongly influenced 
by the style of writing encountered in them and reproduced that style in my own work.
I do think, though, that in section three when introducing the criteria for validity that I 
want to put forward, a different style became available. This felt to  me like a creative 
combination of a more personal voice coupled with the critical and scholarly academic 
voice in me that was stimulated by reading the articles and enjoyed weaving together the 




 whether you succeed or not is irrelevant -  there is no such thing - making
your unknown known is the important thing -  and keeping the unknown always 
beyond you -  catching crystallising your simpler clearer vision o f life -  only to see it 
turn stale compared to what you vaguely feel ahead -  that you must always keep 
working to grasp -  The form must take care of its self if  you can keep your vision 
clear - 1 some way feel that everyone is born with it clear but that with most of 
humanity it becomes blasted -  one way or another.
You and I don't know whether our vision is clear in relation to our time or not -  No 
matter what failure or success we may have -  we will not know -  But we can keep 
our own integrity -  according to our own sense o f balance with the world and that
creates our form.
What others have called form has nothing to do with our form -  I want to create my 
own. I can’t do anything else -  if  I stop to think what others -  authorities or the 
public -  or anyone -  would say o f my form I’d not be able to do anything.”
Georgia O’Keeffe ( 1923)
I have tried to  take Georgia O ’Keeffe’s words to heart and mind in creating this thesis. 
O ne of the most empowering comments made to  me just before I embarked on writing 
the draft for this thesis was by Professor Susan W eil who urged me to free myself of 
trying to  meet what I imagined the expectations of my supervisor were. A t the same 
time, of course, whilst striving to create my original form, many people, ideas and genres 
have influenced me, consciously and unconsciously. I have striven to create a form which 
recognises and honours the multiple voices engaged in writing this thesis whilst at the 
same time recognising that these individual voices are not themselves isolated but 
mediated and shaped by cultural practices and the social forms of expression and genres 
available to  them.
Edward Said (1997) points out, when discussing the relationship between Valery and 
Mallarme, that the nature of influence is not simple. Said says that;
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“ Repetition, refinement, amplification, loading, overloading, rebuttal, overturning, 
destruction, denial, invisible use -  such concepts modify a linear (vulgar) idea o f 
influence into an open field o f possibility.” (p. 15).
Said’s words here, though from a different domain, resonate with ideas of non-linearity 
and circular causation from the sciences of complexity, which I have referred to  
throughout the thesis (Stacey, 2000). This thesis represents a sustained attempt to  
articulate and map out the ‘fields of possibility’ that shape and are shaped by my 
practice. It is out of this ongoing dialectic between self and other, gesture (sending my 
writing to  others) and response (receiving their replies), that my thesis and my practice 
have been created.
For this final part of the thesis, I will make use of the dialogical conversational form seen 
earlier in sections of chapters tw o  and seven. Similar characters will take part. A, the 
protagonist; B, the questioner; and C  the cynical critic.
B. W ell, overall, what have you made of it? H ow  satisfied are you?
A. I’m generally satisfied. I have felt that the writing has been able to take its own
course and the changing directions of the thesis, its stops and starts, its 
unexpected movements and moods have genuinely surprised me. I had a sense 
of an overall form emerging, in the writing of the draft, and have been delighted 
when, on occasions, I feel that threads are being spontaneously connected 
without me having to w ork so consciously and deliberately to do this. I enjoyed 
and appreciated the intensity of focus I was able to offer this w ork during the 
three months of last autumn. A t times, too, I have had a sense of the thesis both 
bringing together and drawing the curtain on a particular phase of my life, and 
this ending is tinged with sadness, as well as excitement about a less known 
future.
A t other times, I have really understood and experienced how writing can itself
be a powerfully enabling and emancipatory form of practice. This is Lather’s test
(1986) of ‘catalytic validity’, as it relates to my own empowerment through 
writing. In some obvious and some subtle ways, my confidence was increased 
through the writing of the draft thesis. Immediately after finishing the draft there  
was a new-found clarity to  my voice as I talked with clients and potential clients 
about w ork I was about to  do. In addition, during the three months of creating
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the draft, much of the writing directly impacted sessions I taught on the MBA 
and MSc programmes at Roffey Park. W hilst out running, and not consciously 
thinking about work, new ideas popped into my mind, and I was able to  imagine 
myself in an excited way running interesting sessions on research philosophy and 
methods. As I recounted, though, in the introduction, the confidence and 
enthusiasm of this more sanguine autumnal voice has shifted to  a more 
melancholic and cautious spring mood.
I’m now beginning to wonder what the critic might have to  say about the thesis.
C. Hmmmmmmmm. I was just waiting for the orgy of self-congratulation to  die
down. As the W olf, played by Harvey Keitel, memorably says towards the end 
of Pulp Fiction (Tarantino, 1994), having helped Jules (Samuel L. Jackson) and 
Vincent (John Travolta) out of a fix: “W ell, let’s not start suckin’ each other’s 
dicks quite yet.”
Also, I thought you said you didn’t  want to w rite a ‘victory narrative’.
So, let’s start with what could be a major flaw. It seems to me that you have not 
pursued in a truly systematic way any of the inquiry questions you have offered. 
Rather you have allowed the research to  drift in an ad hoc fashion from one 
question to another, picking up a different question when it suited you, and 
justifying this with a rather sloppy notion of ‘emergence’. W here  is the discipline 
and rigour in all this?
A. I agree that you have found a potentially serious criticism. I also notice in a way
that I have not properly registered before that you speak with the voice of a 
certain kind of patriarchal power and authority. I think you assert discipline in a 
very traditional, regulated, almost militaristic way. I think there is another kind 
of discipline at w ork in this text. That is the discipline of a life lived with genuine 
inquiry; a softer, more gentle, humane, less punitive, ongoing discipline in which 
threads are woven together, meanings formed and reformed, connections made, 
lost and re-made, in which the purpose of the thesis remains perpetually 
emergent, always changing but the thesis is not a purposeless account. This is 
the form of discipline Mary Catherine Bateson (1990) refers to and likens to a 
craft activity in ‘Composing a Life.’
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I’m trying in the thesis, as far as I can, to  give an account of life and w ork as it is 
lived, not the consequent post-hoc rationalisations, systematisations, and 
reconstructed explanations given with the benefit of hindsight. I think there is an 
unfolding discipline in the text, one based on internal, personal, aesthetic 
standards as well as on the externally imposed discipline of writing an academic 
thesis. It is out of the interaction of these tw o disciplines, what Heaney (1999) 
calls ‘creative intuition’ and’ conscious structuring’, and what Geoff Mead (2001) 
refers to as ‘mythos’ and ‘logos’, that the thesis emerges.
In addition, I refer to  the point made by W in te r (1998b) when he asks:
“The question at issue is how far the subsequent process o f professional 
development can be equated with the idea o f systematically applying theory to  
experience. The work o f Benner ( 1984) based on Dreyfus ( 19 8 1), emphasises that 
as one becomes more experienced, more ‘expert’, this process rapidly ceases to  
be ‘systematic’ and becomes instead intuitive, creative, elliptical.’’
C. O K . Maybe you have a point there about the nature of professional
development. But, what about the methodology? Surely there should be some 
system there? Shouldn’t  you be arguing for a particular set of methods, and 
convincing the reader of their appropriateness in relation to the inquiries you 
are conducting?
A. I have used a variety of methods in my inquiry practice. It is true that I have not
argued rigorously for their particular relevance - they have naturally and 
intuitively seemed appropriate to me, and I have further fashioned their use in 
the using of them. Does a carpenter have to  argue for the relevance of a 
hammer to bang in a nail? The more important question is whether the nail goes 
in straight. And I hope to have shown in the thesis that the methods I have used 
have born fruit.
Besides, I would also like to draw your attention to  the w ork of the philosopher 
of science, Paul Feyerabend. In his book, ‘Against Method’ (1988), he argues, 
through a careful, historical analysis of significant scientific breakthroughs, against 
the commonly held view that science progresses through scientists following in a 
standardised, systematic way the conventions and forms of what is held at any 
one point to be best scientific practice. He says:
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“The idea o f a method that contains firm, unchanging, and absolutely binding 
principles for conducting the business o f science meets considerable difficulty when 
confronted with the results o f historical research. There is not a single rule, 
however plausible, that is not violated at some time or other. It becomes evident 
that such violations are not accidental events, they are not results o f insufficient 
knowledge or o f inattention which might have been avoided. On the contrary, we 
see that they are necessary for progress.” (p. 14).
So I think you may be holding on to an illusion when you give so much weight to  
this idea of knowledge, even within the field of the natural sciences, being 
generated through the application of a systematic pre-ordained method.
C. Hmmmmmmmm. But what about a literature review? If you are not going to
w rite a conventional thesis following a sound, rigorous methodology, you at 
least have to show that you have critically engaged with the relevant academic 
literature.
A. Actually, I have no doubt the thesis has academic depth in terms of the range of
ideas and the quality of the argumentation used. Chapter three resembles most 
closely what could be termed a literature review. Even that, though, whilst being 
comprehensive, could not, because of its subject matter - the nature of the self 
-  claim to  be exhaustive.
But also, and importantly, and in the light of postmodern thinking about the 
intertwining of knowledge and power and the fragmentation between and within 
academic disciplines, who is to define what is the relevant literature, and by 
what criteria? I was struck by a passage in Stephen Rowland’s (2000) book, T h e  
Enquiring University Teacher’, where he refers to  tw o books on the subject of 
the outcomes of higher education teaching. One book references 132 authors 
and editors, the other 126. Despite this being a relatively narrow field, and also
that both books are well-respected within the field, they only have one
reference in common. My argument, therefore, is that for the subject matter of 
this thesis, which is far more wide-ranging than the subject matter of the books 
Rowlands mentions, there is not a clearly defined, universally agreed and 
accepted body of literature. I believe that my thesis both creates its own
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reference body of literature and also positions itself within that field of 
literature.
C. O K . I can go along with that (just about). But what about the way you have
included the more appreciative comments from others emails and excluded 
some of the more critical ones? I was particularly thinking of one comment that 
Ralph Stacey made after reading your draft.
A. W h at was that?
C. He said in his email of 3 Ist January 2003 alongside his positive comments on the
readability of your thesis that: “Going back to  your title I think you demonstrate 
how you and others create your practice but there is less indication of how  
your practice shapes you.” So how do you answer that?
A. I think the overall accumulated effect which my practice, and my increased
understanding of it through the methods described during the writing of this 
thesis, has had on me is to shift the trajectory o f my practice out of the current 
context of management and organisational development altogether in which I 
am working. I have become increasingly uncomfortable with the prevailing 
instrumental orientation of this field, as well as its unquestioning assumption of
ideas of growth and development, whether personal or economic, as I outlined 
in chapter three.
I cannot claim a ‘victory narrative’ and be able to  show unequivocally how my 
practice has improved these last six years, and, alongside that, my self has been 
developed. I cannot cast this thesis in the form of taking action, reflecting on it, 
taking further action to be more effective, reflecting on that and so on, all of 
which would accumulate to building a case for the sustained development of my 
practice. Rather the effect on me has been to  now want to find a new form of 
practice, or a way of practicing what I do in a different context. A t the moment 
this has led me to decide to leave part-time employment at Roffey Park in 
January 2004 and to consider doing VSO in September 2004. The rest is 
genuinely unknown.
B. In chapter nine, you set out your own criteria of judgement by which the thesis 
could be assessed. H ow  do you evaluate your w ork against those criteria?
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A. Actually, most of the criteria are set up to be best judged by others. Some
criteria can only be judged by others. For example, does it ‘help the reader make 
connections to his or her own life’, and ‘generate learning for the reader’?
Is it ‘trustworthy’, and ‘engaging and interesting’? As far as I know, and to the 
best of my intent, it is ‘trustworthy’. I still find parts of it interesting to  read, and 
I take that as an encouraging sign. All the comments received about my draft 
(some of which are included in the introduction) indicate that others found it 
interesting.
Does it illustrate ‘the socially constructed nature of the self? Again I think so in 
that I have both theoretically argued for such a position and also tried to locate 
my autobiographical writings in a w ider social, historical and cultural field.
Regarding the criteria concerned with form, I think the thesis is sufficiently non­
linear within the constraints of the overall written form. Certainly writing it, I 
found myself criss-crossing between the different chapters, and sections within 
each chapter. I did though have an unrealised ambition to try to break 
completely with linear form, modelled on Doris Lessing’s ( 1973) T h e  Golden 
Notebook’. In this remarkable novel, after a number of iterations of separate 
chapters detailing financial, literary, personal and political notes and observations 
recorded in separate coloured notebooks, she creates the chaotic fertility of the 
golden notebook in which all her previous arbitrary distinctions break down. I 
would have liked to be able to do something similar.
In relation to aesthetic depth, I feel mostly aesthetically satisfied with it. I find 
its overall form pleasing and congruent with the ideas within it.
I think the quality of the argument is generally sound. There w ere some places 
where that needed to be tightened up o r expanded and the different responses 
to  the draft gave me greater clarity about that. I also think that the thesis shows 
considerable reflexivity, without this becoming overly laboured or endlessly self- 
referential.
Does it ‘resist overall explanation and tidy closure?’ I hope so! Partly closure 
is militated against by the open-ended nature of completing a draft, sending it to  
others, engaging in their responses, and then further working on the thesis.
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C. W h a t about whether it is ethical? I think you could be on sticky ground there.
A. W h y  do you say that?
C. W ell at least one person, ‘Simone’, has explicitly refused her permission for you
to  publish your autobiographical account entitled ‘my second twenty one years’. 
W h at about other people referred to  in the thesis?
A. All the people from the MSc groups in chapter seven have given their
permission to w rite about them. W hen namied in my accounts they are given a 
fictitious name. I have checked the content o f  chapters seven and eight with the 
chief executive of Roffey Park to  ensure th a t she does not feel there is any risk 
of reputational damage to  Roffey Park.
All the people whose emails I quote have giv'en me their permission to  do so. I 
have checked with all the people involved in the examples and illustrations in 
chapter eight and they are comfortable with the accounts represented.
I have kept my word and not referred to any of the w ork I did over a fifteen 
month period with X Y Z  organisation. In so doing, I have, thereby, written off 
every one of the 20000 o r so words of my aiccount o f working in this 
organisation, which in terms of my practice, represents the most extensive and 
fully realised way of working with ‘self-organ ising emergence’ in enabling change 
in the context of a large, high-profile organisation.
So that leaves ‘Simone’. I believe I have gone to exceptional lengths to  avoid 
identifying her. I have also offered her the opportunity to include her voice in 
this text. H er refusal to grant me her permission to  publish the text ‘my second 
twenty one years’ (when I had not asked for it) and her threat of legal action, I 
regard as an act of intimidation. I do not warnt to be silenced in this way. Hence I 
have decided to make this account public, anid follow Foucault’s (1980) 
admonition to  ’’speak truth to power.”
Regarding Bleakley’s point that autobiographiical and other writing has an ‘ethical 
focus,’ I trust this is clear in my work. I have attempted to w rite  about ‘the 
community’ and other situations in a way thait explores the morality and values 
lying at the heart of them. Chapter seven shows how I have come to  understand
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my ‘living educational theory’ through the values that I have experienced 
emerging in my w ork as an educator of people and organisational development 
professionals. I have chosen not to  labour and make completely explicit the 
connections between my autobiographical writings and my ‘living educational 
theory’ because I trust in the ability of my writing to suggest these connections 
to  the reader. Also, I do not subscribe to a simplistic, psychologically based 
theory, which causally locates and explains present actions and values in past 
experience. I agree with Doris Lessing’s (1973) related comment in the preface 
to  ‘the Golden Notebook’, that my thesis “is alive and potent and fructifying and 
able to promote thought and discussion only when its plan and shape and 
intention are not understood, because that moment of seeing the shape and 
plans and intention, is also the moment when there isn’t  anything more to  be 
got out of it.” (p. 22)
So, in summary, as far as I am able to  judge, I have met the criteria.
B. Finally, in chapter one, you quote the following lines from Dante (1949) and
make a short comment on them, taken from your journal, dated February 1997.
“ In the middle o f the road o f my life 
I awoke in a dark wood 
where the true way was wholly lost.”
I don’t  know if it is too  much o f an extravagance to  hope that the research will 
enable the ‘true way' to  be rediscovered.”
To what extent has this research enabled you to rediscover the ‘true way’?
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A. W h at an impossible question! The self that I am now is undoubtedly both the 
same and different to the self who started this thesis nearly six years ago - 
echoing the lines of T.S. Eliot quoted in the prologue. And the self that I am now  
has been critically formed by the activities described in this thesis, including the 
writing of the thesis. The thesis has aimed to  show in practice, as well as in 
theory, what it could mean to  live and w ork with a different notion of the self to  
the conventional one i.e. more relational, more multiple, more embodied and 
more imaginal.
And in so doing, and, when the first draft was completed in Decem ber 2002, I 
felt more enriched, more present to  myself and others, more confident, more 




Abram, D. (1996) The Spell o f the Sensuous. N ew  York. Pantheon Books
Ansoff, I. (1965) Corporate Strategy. Harmondsworth: Penguin
Arendt, H. (1973) The Origins of Totalitarianism. San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich
Argyris, C. & Schon, D.A. ( 1974) Theory in Practice: Increasing Professional Effectivenes. 
N ew  York: Jossey-Bass
Arrien, A. (1993) The Four-Fold Way. HarperSanFrancisco
Assaglioli, R. ( 1965) Psychosynthesis: A Manual of Principles and Techniques. London: 
Aquarian/Thorsons
Atkinson, E. (2000) Behind the Inquiring Mind: exploring the transition from external to  
internal inquiry. Reflective Practice, Vol. I , no.2 pp. 14 9 -164
Bache, C.M. (2000) Dark Night, Early Daw.n Albany: State University of N ew  York
Bassey, M. (1995) Creating Education Through Research: A Global Perspective o f Educational 
research for the 21st Century. Newark: Kirklington M oor Press
Bassett, L. (2001) Life without Limits. Cliff Street Books
Bateson, M.C. (1990) Composing a Life. Plume
Bateson, G. (1979) Mind and Nature. Fontana/Collins
Belenkey, M.F., Clinchy B.M., et al (1986) Womens' Ways of Knowing. N ew  York: Basic 
Books
Benner, P. (1984) From Novice to Expert Menlo Park: Addison-Wesley
275
Berger, P. and Luckman, T. (1966) The Social Construction of Reality. N ew  York: Double 
day and Co.
Berne, E. ( 19 6 1) Transactional Analysis in psychotherapy. N ew  York: Grove Press
Berry, P. ( 1982) “An approach to the dream’ in Echos Subtle Body. Dallas: Spring 
publications
Bhaktin, M.M (1981) The Dialogical Imagination. (Ed. M. Holquist: trans. C. Emerson and 
M. Holquist) Austin, TX: University of Texas Press
Bhaktin, M.M (1984) Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics. (Ed. And trans. C. Emerson) 
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press
Bhaktin, M.M. (1986) Speech Genres and Other late Essays. Austin, TX: University of 
Texas Press
Bhaktin, M.M (1993) Toward a Philosophy of the Act (Trans. And notes by vadim 
Lianpov; ed. M. Holquist) Austin, TX : University of Texas Press
Billig, M. (1996) Arguing and Thinking: a Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Bleakley, A. (2000) W riting with Invisible Ink: narrative, confessionalism and reflective 
practice in Reflective Practice, Vol. I, No. I, p i  1-24
Bly, R. ( 1980) News of the Universe. Sierra Club Books: San Francisco
Bortoft, H. ( 1996) The Wholeness of Nature: Goethe’s way of Science. Edinburgh: Floris 
Books
Bourne, R.S. & Resek, C. (1999) The W ar and the Intellectuals. Hackett Publishing 
Company
Brandon, D. ( 1976) Zen in the Art o f Helping. London: Routledge 
Bradbury M. (2000) The History Man. Picador
276
Brown, S. L. and Eisenhardt, K. (1998) Competing on the Edge: Strategy as Structured 
Chaos. Boston Mass.: Harvard Business School Press
Bruner, J. (1986a) Actual Minds, Possible Worlds. Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press
Bruner, J. (1986b) Narrative and paradigmatic modes of thought In E.Eisner (Ed.), Modes 
O f Knowing. 97-115
Bruner, J. (1987) Life as narrative. Social Research, 54( I ), 11 -32 
Bruner, J. (1990) Acts of Meaning. Harvard University Press
Bullough, R.V. & Pinnegar, S. (2000) Guidelines for Quality in Autobiographical Forms of 
Self- Study Research. Educational Researcher Vol.30 No. 3 pp 13 -2 1
Bunker, B.B. and Alban, B.T. (1997) Large Croup Interventions. Jossey- Bass: San 
Francisco
Burckhardt, J. (1990) The Civilisation of the Renaissance in Italy. (Ed. Peter Burke) 
London: Penguin Books
Burke, K. (1945) A Grammar of Motives. N ew  York: Prentice Hall
Burke, W .W . (1992) Organisational Development Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley
Burr, V. (1995) An Introduction to Social Constructionism. London: Routledge 
Calas, M.B. & Smircich, L. (1999) Past Postmodernism? Reflections and Tentative 
Directions Academy of Management Review Vol. 24(4) pp. 649-671
Cameron, K.S. and Quinn, R.E. (1998) Diagnosing and Changing Organisational Culture: 
Based on the Competing values framework. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley
Cahoone, L.E. (ed.) (1996) From Modernism to Postmodernism: An Anthology. Oxford: 
Blackwell
277
Campbell, D. (2000) The Socially Constructed Organisation. London: Karnac
Campbell, J. (1972) The Hero with a Thousand Faces. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press
Carr, W . & Kemmis, S. ( 1986) Becoming Critical. London: Falmer Press 
Capra, F. (1982) The Turning Point Simon and Schuster 
Capra, F. (1996) The Web o f Life. London: Harper Collins
Casey, E.S. (1974) “Toward a phenomenology of the imagination, "Journal o f British 
Society Phenomenology 5
Casey, E.S. (1976) Imagining: a Phenomenological Study. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press
Chia, R. (1998) Postmodern Organising. Unpublished manuscript
Cilliers P. (1998) Complexity and Postmodernism. London and N ew  York: Routledge
Clandinin, D.j. & Connelley, F.M. (1995) Teachers professional knowledge landscapes. 
N ew  York: Teachers College Press
Clark, T. (2002) Martin Heidegger. London and N ew  York: Routledge 
Clarkson, P and Mackewn J ( 1993) Fritz Peris. Sage 
Clifton, L. (1991) Quilting. BOA Editions
Cohen, L. ( 1968) So Long Marianne From T h e  Songs of Leonard Cohen’
Cohen, L. ( 1992) Democracy From T h e  Future’
Collins, J. and Porras J.l. ( 1994) Built to Last' successful habits o f visionary companies. 
Harper Business
278
Connelly, E.M. and D.J. Clandenin (1990) Stories of experience and narrative inquiry. 
Educational Researcher, 19(5), 2-14
Connelly, E.M. and D.J. Clandenin (Eds.) (1999) Shaping a Professional Identity. N ew  
York: Teachers College Press
Crystal, G. ( 19 9 1) In search of excess: The overcompensation of American executives. N ew  
York: Norton
Cupitt, D. (1991) What is a Story? London: SCM Press
Dalai, F. (1998) Taking the Group Seriously. London: Jessica Kingsley Press
Daley, H .D . and Cobb Jr. J.B. (1989) For the Common Good. Boston: Beacon Press
Damasio, A. ( 1994) Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain. N ew  York:
Picador
Damasio, A. (2000) The Feeling of What Happens. Vintage
Dante, A. ( 1949) The Comedy o f Dante Alighieri, the Florentine, trans. Dorothy Sayers 
and Barbara Reynolds. Penguin Books
Daisey, M. (2002) 2 1 Dog Years: doing time at amazon.com. London: Fourth Estate
Delong, J. (2002) how can I improve My practice as a Superintendent of Schools and Create 
my own Living Educational Theory? PhD. University of Bath. In the Living Theory section 
of www.actionresearch.net
Dennett, D. (1991) Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown
Denzin, N.K. (1997) Interpretive Ethnography. London: Sage 
Derrida, J. (1978) Writing and Difference. Chicago; University of Chicago Press 
Derrida, J. ( 19 8 1) Positions. Chicago; University of Chicago Press
279
Dewey, J. (1962) Time and individuality. In H. Shapley (Ed.), Time and its mysteries, 141- 
59. N ew  York: Collier
Dixon, J. and L. Stratta. (1986) Textures of Narrative. Educational Review, 38(2), 103-11 I
Dollim ore J. (2001) Death, Desire and Loss in Western Culture. Routledge
Donmoyer, R. (1996) Educational Research in an Era of Paradigm Proliferation: W h a t’s 
a Journal Editor to do? Educational Researcher, Vol.25 No.2 pp. 19-25
Dreyfus, S. ( 19 8 1) Formal Models vs. Human Situational Understanding. Schloss 
Laxenburg: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
Duncan, Glen. (2000) Love Remains. London: Granta
Dylan, B. (1965) Love Minus Zero. W arn er Bros. Inc.
Egan, G. (1988) Change Agent Skills. San Diego, CA: University Associates
Elias, N. (1970) What is Sociology? N ew  York: Colombia University Press
Elias, N . (1989) The Symbol Theory. London: Sage Publications
Eliot, T.S. (1943) Four Quartets. Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch, Inc. and Faber and Faber 
Ltd London
Elkington, J. (1997) Cannibals with Forks. Oxford: Capstone
Ekins, Paul (Ed.) (1986) The Living Economy. London: Routledge
Erikson, E.H. (1950) Childhood and Society. N ew  York: Norton
Ellis, C. & Bochner, A.P. (2000) Autoethnography, Personal Narrative, Reflexivity: 
Researcher as Subject. In Denzin, N.K. & Lincoln Y.S (Eds.) Handbook of Qualitative 
Research. Sage Publications
Feyerabend, P. ( 1988) Against Method. London: Verso
280
Flynn, T. (1994) Foucault as parrhesia: his last course at the College de France (1984), 
in: J. Bernauer & D. Rasmussen (Eds.) The Final Foucault London: The M IT  Press
Foucault M. (1980) Power/Knowledge Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-7.
Edited by Colin Gordon. N ew  York: Pantheon Books
Foucault, M. (1981) The History o f Sexuality: Volume I An Introduction. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books
Foucault, M. (1987) The Use of Pleasure: The History o f Sexuality Volume 2. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books
Foucault, M. (1988) The Care of the Self: The History of Sexuality Volume 3. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books
Foulkes, S.H. (1948) Introduction to Croup Analytic Psychotherapy. London: William  
Heinemann Medical Books
Fowles, J. (1966) The French Ueutenant’s Woman. Vintage
Frank, Arthur. ( 1995) The Wounded Storyteller. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press
Freedman J. and Combs G. (1996) Narrative Therapy. N ew  York: W .W . Norton  
Company
French, M. (1985) Beyond Power: Women, Men and Morality. N ew  York: Summit Books
French, W .L . & Bell, C .H . (1995) Organisation Development, 5th ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall
Fromm, E. (I9 6 0 ) Fear o f Freedom. Routledge & Kegan Paul
Geertz, C. (1973) The Interpretation o f Culture. N ew  York: Basic Books
281
Gergen, Kenneth J (1985) The social constructionist movement in modern psychology. 
American Psychologist, 40: 266-75
Gergen, Kenneth J (1989) W arranting voice and the elaboration of the self. In J. 
Shotter and K.J. Gergen (Eds.) Text of Identity. London: Sage
Gergen, Kenneth J. (1991) The Saturated Self Basic Books
Gergen, Kenneth J (1996) Organisational Science in a Postmodern Context. Journal of 
Applied Behavioural Science 32: 356-378
Gergen, Kenneth J. (1999) An Invitation to Social Construction. London: Sage
Giddens, A. (1990) The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity
Gilligan, C., (1982) In a Different Voice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
Gleick, J. ( 1987) Chaos. N ew  York: Viking
Goleman, D. (1996) Emotional Intelligence. London: Bloomsbury
Goodwin, B. (1994) How the Leopard Changed its Spots. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson
Gorky, M. ( 1920) Reminiscences of Leo Nikolaevich Tolstoy, trans. S.S. Koteliansky & L. 
W oolf. N ew  York: B. W . Huebsch
Gramsci, A. et al ( 19 7 1) Selections from the Prison Notebooks o f Antonio Gramsci. 
Lawrence and W ishart
Grey, R. M. (1996) Archetypal explorations. London: Routledge
Griffin, D. (2002) The Emergence of Leadership. London: Routledge
Griffin S. (1978) Women and Nature: The Roaring Inside Her. N ew  York: Harper and 
Row
282
Grubbs, J.W. (2000) “Cultural imperialism: a critical theory of interorganisational 
change,” Journal of Organisational Change Management Vol 13 N o  2 p221 -234
Habermas, J. (1972) Knowledge and Human Interests. London: Heinemann Educational 
Books
Habermas, J. (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action.Vol. 2. Lifeworld and System: a 
Critique o f Functionalist Reason (trans. Thomas McCarthy). Boston, MA.: Beacon Press
Harman, W . ( 1988) Global Mind Change: The Promise of the Last Years of the Twentieth 
Century. Indianapolis, Ind.: Knowledge Systems
Harrison, R. and Stokes, H. (1992) Diagnosing Organisational Culture. San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass/Pfeiffer
Haraway, D. ( 19 9 1) Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. N ew  
York: Routledge
Harre, R. (1979) Social Being. Oxford: Blackwell
Harre, R. (1986) The Social Construction o f Emotions. Oxford: Blackwell
Harvey, A. (2000) The Direct Path. London: Random House
Harvey, D. ( 1989) The Condition of Postmodernity: An Inquiry into the Origins of Cultural 
Change. Oxford: Blackwell
Hassan, S. (1990) Combatting Mind Control. The Aquarian Press
Hawken, P. Lovins, A.B. and Lovins L.H. (1999) Natural Capitalism.
London: Earthscan publications
Hayles, N.K. (1990) Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in Contemporary Literature and Science. 
Ithaca,NY: Cornell University Press
Heaney, S. ( 1999) Beowolf. London: Faber and Faber
283
Heidegger, M. (1962) Being and Time. Harper and Row
Henderson, H. (1978) Creating Alternative Futures. N ew  York: Putnam
Henderson, H. (1995) Paradigms in progress. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler 
publishers
Henderson, H. (1999) Beyond Globalisation. Connecticut Kumarian Press
Heron, J. ( 1992) Feeling and Personhood: Psychology in another Key. London: Sage
Heron, J. (1996a) Co-operative Inquiry; research into the human condition. London: Sage
Heron, J. ( 1996b) Quality as Primacy of the Practical, Special Issue o f Qualitative Inquiry: 
Quality in Human Inquiry edited by Peter Reason and Yvonna Lincoln
Heron, J. & Reason, P. (2001) The Practice of Co-operative Inquiry: Research ‘w ith’ 
rather than ‘on’ People. In Reason, P. & Bradbury, H. (eds.) Handbook of Action 
Research. London: Sage Publications
Hillman, James. ( 19 7 1) Psychology: Monotheistic or Polytheistic? 193-208, 230-232 Dallas: 
Spring Publications
Hillman, James. (1975a) Re-Visioning Psychology. N ew  York: Harper & Row
Hillman, James (1975b) Loose Ends. Dallas: Spring Publications
Hillman, James. (1983) Healing Fiction. W oodstock, C T  : Spring publications
Hillman, James. ( 1995) A  Psyche the size of the earth In Roszak et al (Eds.) 
Ecopsychology San Francisco: Sierra Club Books
Hillman, James (1996) Lecture at Schumacher College, Dartington , Devon 
Hofstede, G. (1984) Culture’s Consequences London: Sage
284
Holman, P. and Devane, T. (1999) The Change Handbook San Francisco: Berrett- 
Koehler
hooks, b. ( 1992) Black looks: race and representation Boston: South End Press 
Homes, A. M. (2000) Alus/c for Torching. Anchor
Horkheimer, M. and Adorno, T. (1947) The Dialectics of Enlightenment London: Verso
Horkheimer, M ( 1993) “On the problem of tru th”, in A.rato, A. and Gebhardt, E. (Eds), 
The Essential Frankfurt School Reader N ew  York: Continuum p 407-443 (original w ork  
published 1935)
Husserl, E. (I9 6 0 ) Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
Huxley, A. (1970) The Doors o f Perception N ew  York: Perennial Library
Isaacs, W . (1999) Dialogue and the art of thinking together. N ew  York: Currency: 
Doubleday
Jameson, ( 1984) Postmodernism, or the cultural logic of late capitalism New left 
Review. 146, 53-92
Jung, C.G. (1948) The Spirit Mercurius in The Collected Works. 13:193-250 Princeton, 
N.J: Princeton University Press
Jung, C.G. (1970) Bollingen Series X X  edited by Read, H., Fordham, M., and McGuire,
W . The Collected Works. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
Kaplan, B. (1981) The development of language in relation to mental health. Paper 
presented at colloquia on The Development o f Language and its Relation to Mental Health, 
Cornell. University Medical College, N ew  York  City
Keleman, S. ( 1985) Emotional Anatomy. Berkeley, Ca.: Center Press
Kelly, S. and Allison, M.A. (1999) The Complexity Advantage. N ew  York: McGraw Hill
285
Klein, N . (2000) No Logo. Flamingo
Knowles, M. ( 1986) Using Learning Contracts. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
Kolb, D.A. ( 1984) Experiential Learning. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall
Kotter, J. (1995) “Leading change: why transformation efforts fail.” Harvard Business 
Review March-April 1995 p 59-67
Koestler, A. (1976) The Ghost in the Machine. London: Hutchinson
Kuhn, T.S. ( 1970) The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press
Laidlow, M. ( 1996) How can I create my own living educational theory as I offer you an 
account of my educational development? PhD. thesis, University of Bath. In the Living 
Theory section of www.actionresearch.net
Lancaster, B. (1999) The multiple brain and the unity of experience in Rowan J. and 
Cooper M. (Eds.) The Plural Self. London: Sage
Lasch, C. (1979) Culture of Narcissism. N ew  York: W .W . N orton Company
Lather, P. ( 1986) Issues of validity in openly ideological research: between a rock and a 
soft place Interchange 17(4) pp. 63-84
Lather, P. (1993) Fertile obsession: Validity after poststructuralism. Sociological Quarterly, 
34, 673-694
Lather, P. (1994) Textuality as praxis, paper presented to the Annual meeting of the 
American Educational Research Association, N ew  Orleans, April 1994
Lave, J. & W enger, E. ( 19 9 1) Situated learning: Legitimate peripheral participation 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Lerner, H.G. (1993) Dance of deception: Pretending, and truth-telling in women's lives. N ew  
York Harper Collins
286
Lessing, D. (1973) The Golden Notebook. London: Granada Publishing Ltd.
Lewin, K (1946) “Action Research and Minority Problems .” Journal o f Social Issues 2:34- 
36
Lewin, K ( 1951) Field Theory in Social Science N ew  York: Harper
Lewin, R. ( 1993) Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos. London: J.M. Dent
Levy-Agresti, J. and Sperry, R.W . (1968) ‘Differential perceptual capacities in major and 
minor hemispheres’, Proceedings of the national Academy o f Sciences. USA, 61:1 151
Lievegoed, B. ( 1985) Man on the Threshold. Stroud: Hawthorn Press
Lincoln, Y.S. & Guba, E.G. (1985) Naturalistic Inquiry. Beverley Hills, CA: Sage
Lincoln, Y.S. (1997) Self, Subject, Audience, Text' Living at the Edge, Writing in the Margins 
from William G Tierney and Yvonna Lincoln Representation and the Text re-framing the 
Narrative Voice. State University of N ew  York Press.
Linville, P.W. (1987) ‘Self-complexity as a cognitive buffer against stress-related 
illnesses and depression’, Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 52: 663-76
Locke, J. ( 18 2 5 /1959) An essay concerning human understanding. N ew  York: Dover
Lovelock, J. (1979) Gaia. Oxford University Press
Lovelock, J ( 19 9 1) Healing Gaia. N ew  York: Harmony Books
Lowen, A. ( 1975) Bioenergetics. N ew  York: Penguin
Lowen, A., & Lowen, L. ( 1977) The way to vibrant health. N ew  York: Harper Colophon
Lyons, J.O. ( 1978) The Invention of the Self The Hinge of Consciousness in the Eighteenth 
Century. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press
287
Lyotard, Jean-Francois. ( 1984) The Postmodern Condition - a Report on Knowledge. 
University of Minnesota Press
Macdonald, B. and W alker,R. (1975) Case study and the social philosophy of 
educational research. Cambridge Journal o f Education, 5 pp.2-11
Mackewn, Jennifer (1997) Developing Gestalt Counselling. London: Sage
Mac Lean, P.D. (1990) The Triune Brain in Evolution: Role in Paleocerebral Functions N ew  
York: Plenum Press
Maclure, M. (1996) Telling Transitions: boundary w ork in narratives of becoming an 
action researcher. British Educational Research Journal, Vol. 22, No.3, pp 273-286
Malcolm, J. (1994) Psychoanalysis: The Impossible Profession. Northvale, NJ: Jason 
Aaronson
Marcus, G.E. (1994) W h at comes (just) after “post”? The case of ethnography. In N.K. 
Denzin & Y.S. Lincoln (Eds.), The handbook of Qualitative Research, (pp.563-574)
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Margulis, L. (1989) “Gaia: The Living earth’, Dialogue with Fritjof Capra, The Elmwood 
Newsletter, Berkeley, Cal., Vol. 5, N o. 2
Marshall, J. (1984) Women Managers: Travellers in a Male World. Chichester: John 
W iley
Marshall, J, ( 1995) Women Managers: Moving On. London and N ew  York: Routledge
Marshall, J, ( 1999) Living life as inquiry. Systemic Practice and Action Research, 12 (2): pp. 
155-171
Marshall, J. (2001) ‘Self-reflective Inquiry Practices’ in Reason, P. & Bradbury, H. (2001) 
Handbook of Action Research. Sage
Marshall, J. (2002) Living Systemic Thinking. A  draft paper for Academy of Management 
meeting, Denver
288
Martindale, C. (1980) ‘Subselves: the internal representations of situational and personal 
dispositions’, in L. W heeler (ed.), Review of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. I, 
Beverley Hills, CA: Sage
Marx, K. (1969) Theses on Feuerbach. In Marx/Engels Selected W orks, Volume One  
Moscow: Progress Publishers
Maslow, A. (1962) Towards a Psychology ofBein. Princeton: Van Nostrand Reinhold 
Masson, J. (1989) Against Therapy. London: Collins
Maturana, H.R. & Varela, F.J (1980) Autopoeisis and Cognition. Boston: D.Reidel 
Maturana, H.R. & Varela, F.J. (1987) The Tree o f Knowledge. Boston: Shambhala 
McEwan, I. (2002) Atonement London: Vintage
McIntosh, M., Leipziger, D., Jones, K., and Coleman, G. (1998) Corporate Citizenship. 
Financial Times Pitman Publishing
McKenzie, J. (1996) Paradox: The Next Strategic Dimension. Maidenhead: Me Graw-Hill
Mead, G .D. (20 0 1) Unlatching the gate: Realising my scholarship o f living inquiry.
PhD. Thesis University of Bath. In the Living Theory section o f www.actionresearch.net
Mead, G.H. (1934) Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Mead, G .H. (1938) The Philosophy of the Present Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Meadows, D .H. and D.L., Randers, J. and Behrens, W . ( 1972) The Limits to Growth: A 
Report for the Club of Romes Project on the Predicament of Mankind.
Washington, DC: Potomac Associates
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962) Phenomenology of Perception. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
Merchant, C. ( 1980) The Death of Nature. N ew  York: Harper and Row
289
Mills, C .W . (1959) The Sociological Imagination. N ew  York: Oxford University Press 
Minsky, M. (Ed.) (1985) Robotics. N ew  York: Doubleday
Mishler, E.G. (1990) Validation in inquiry-guided research: the role of exemplars in 
narrative studies Harvard Educational Review, 60, pp. 4 15 -4 4 1
Moore, Thomas. ( 1992) Care o f the Soul. Piatkus
Moore, Thomas. ( 1990) The Essential James Hillman. London: Routledge
Morgan, G. (1997) Images of Organisation. London: Sage
Mumby, Dennis K. (1993) Narrative and Social Control. Sage Publications
Nevis, E.C. ( 1987) Organisational Consulting. Gardner Press
Novak, M. ( 19 7 1) Ascent o f the mountain, flight of the dove. N ew  York: Harper & Row
O ’Keeffe, G. (1923) Letter to Sherwood Anderson. Sherwood Anderson Papers, The 
New berry Library
Okely, J. & Callaway, H. (Eds.) ( 1992) Anthropology and Autobiography. N ew  York: 
Routledge
Owen, H. ( 1997) Open Space Technology: A User’s Guide. San Francisco: Berrett- 
Koehler
Pascale, R.T. (1999) “Surfing the edge of chaos.” Sloan Management Review 40,3: 83- 
95
Pedler, M., Burgoyne, J., Boydell, T. (1978) A Manager’s Guide to Self-Development. 
London: McGraw Hill
Pereja, S.B. (1986) The Scapegoat Complex. Toronto: Inner City Books
290
Peris, F. S. ( 1969) Gestalt Therapy Verbatim. Moab, UT.: Real People Press
Pert, Candace B. (1988) presentation at Elwood symposium, ‘Healing Ourselves and 
our Society’, Boston , December 9, 1989 (unpublished and quoted in Capra , 1996)
Pert, Candace B. ( 1998) Molecules of Emotion. Simon & Schuster Ltd
Peters, R.S. (1966) Ethics and Education. Allen and Unwin
Pinar, W illiam  F. (1997) Regimes of Reason and the Male Narrative Voice from W illiam  G 
Tierney and Yvonna Lincoln Representation and the Text re-framing the Narrative Voice. 
State university of N ew  York Press
Polanyi, M. (1958) Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul
Popper, K. ( 1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery. N ew  York and London
Porritt, Jonathon. (2000) Playing safe: science and the environment Thames and Hudson
Prigogine, I. and Stengers, I. (1984) Order out o f Chaos. Bantam Books
Prigogine, I. and Nicolis, G. (1989) Exploring Complexity: An Introduction. N ew  York: 
W .H . Freeman and Company
Prigogine, I. (1997) The End of Certainty. N ew  York: The Free Press
Proust, M. (2002) In Search of Lost Time: The Prisoner and The Fugitive. Volume 5 
Translated by Clark, C. and Collier, P. Allen Lane
Rappaport, L., Baumgardner S. and Boone G. (1999) Postmodern culture and the plural 
self, in Rowan J. and Cooper M. (Eds.) The Plural Self Sage
Reason, P. ( 1994) Participation in Human Inquiry. London: Sage
Reason, P. and Marshall J. (1987) ‘Research as personal process’, in D.Boud and V.Griffin 
(Eds.) Appreciating Adults' Learning from the Learner's Perspective. London: Kogan Page
291
Reason, P. Political, Epistemological, Ecological and Spiritual Dimensions of Participation (paper 
given out on CARPP programme)
Reason, P. & Bradbury, H. (2001) Handbook of Action Research. Sage
Reich, W . (1949) Character Analysis. N ew  York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux
Reich, W . (1948) The Discovery o f the Orgone, Vol. II, The Cancer Biopathy. Translated by 
Theodore P. W olfe. N ew  York: Orgone Institute Press
Revans, R. ( 1980) Action Learning. London: Blond & Briggs
Revans, R. (1983) ABC of Action Learning. Chartwell-Bratt Ltd
Richardson, L. (2000) Writing: A  method of inquiry. In N .K . Denzin & Y.S. Lincoln (Eds), 
Handbook of Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks, CA; Sage
Ricouer P. (1980) Narrative Time. In W.J.T. Mitchell (Ed.), On Narrative, 165-186. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Rogers, C.R. (1969) Freedom to Learn. Ohio: Charles Merrill
Rorty, R. ( 1980) Philosophy and the Mirror o f Nature. Oxford: Blackwell
Roszak, T., Gomes, M.E., and Kanner, A .D . Ecopsychology. (1995) San Francisco: Sierra 
Club Books
Rowan, J. (1990) Subpersonalities: The People Inside Us. London: Routledge
Rowland, S. (2000) The Enquiring University Teacher. Buckingham: Open University 
Press
Rumelhart, D.E. and McClelland, J.L. (1986) Parallel Distributed Processing: explanations in 
the microstructure of Cognition, 2 vols. Cambridge, Mass.: M IT  Press
Sachs, W . (Ed.) (1995) The Development Dictionary. London: Zed Books
292
Said, E.W. (1997) Beginnings: Intention and Method. London: Granta
Sartre, Jean-Paul (1956) Being and Nothingness. Philosophical Library
Sartre, Jean-PauI (2000) Nausea. N ew  edition. Trans. Robert Baldick. Penguin Books
Saussure, F. de (1974) Course in general Linguistics. London: Fontana
Schein, E. (1985) Organisational Culture and Leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
Scheman, N. (1983) “ Individualism and the Objects of Psychology”, in Discovering 
Reality, ed. Harding,S., and Hintikka, M. 234-235 Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company
Scheurich, J.J. (1996) The masks of validity: a deconstructive investigation Qualitative 
Studies in Education. Vol.9 No. I pp 49-60
Schon, D.A. (1983) The Reflective Practitioner. N ew  York: Basic Books
Schon, D.A. ( 1987) Educating the reflective practitioner: Toward a new design for teaching 
and learning in the professions. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
Schon, D.A. (1995) T h e  N ew  Scholarship requires a new Epistemology’ Change Nov- 
Dee 1995
Schumacher, E.F. (1975) Small is Beautiful. N ew  York: Harper and Row
Schwandt, Thomas A. (1997) Qualitative Inquiry: A Dictionary of Terms. Sage
Senge, P.M. (1990) The Fifth Discipline. N ew  York: Doubleday
Senge P.M. et al (1994) The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook.. Nicholas Brealey
Serres, M. (1983) Hermes: Literature, Science, Philosophy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press
293
Shakespeare, W . (1988) The Complete Works (Compact Edition), ed. Stanley W ells and 
Gary Taylor Oxford: Clarendon
Shapiro, S.B. (1976) The Selves Inside You. Berkeley, CA: Explorations Institute 
Shaw, P. (2002) Changing the Conversation in Organisations. London: Routledge 
Sheehy, G. (1984) Passages. Bantam Books
Shiva, V. (1988) Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development London: Zed Books
Shotter, J. ( 1989) Social accountability and the social construction of “you”. In Shotter, 
J. and Gergen K.. (Eds.) Texts of Identity. London: Sage
Shotter, J. (1993) Conversational Realities. London: Sage
Shotter, J. (1999) Life inside dialogically structured mentalities in Rowan J. and Cooper
M. (Eds.) The Plural Self. Sage
Sheldrake, R. (1988) The Presence of the Past Fontana/Collins
Simon, H. (1996) “The paradox of case study” Cambridge Journal o f Education 26(2): pp.
225-240
Skilbeck, M. (1983) Lawrence Stenhouse: research methodology. ‘Research is systematic 
inquiry made public’, British Educational Research Journal, 9(1), pp. I 1-20
Smith, J.K. & Deemer, D.K. (2000) The Problem of Criteria in an Age of Relativism. In 
N.K. Denzin & Y.S. Lincoln (Eds), Handbook o f Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks, CA; 
Sage
Smith, R. (1995) Derrida and Autobiography Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Spretnak, Charlene. ( 19 9 1) States of Grace. San Francisco: Harper
Srivistva, S. and Copperrider.D. (1999) Appreciative Management and Leadership. Euclid, 
Ohio: Williams Custom Publishing
294
Stacey, R. (2000) Strategic Management and Organisational Dynamics. London: Pearson 
Education
Stacey, R., Griffin D., and Shaw, P. (2000) Complexity and Management London: 
Routledge
Stacey, R.D. (2001) Complex Responsive Processes in Organisations. London: Routledge
Stein, M. (1992) Organisational Life as Spiritual Practice in Stein, M. and Hollwitz, J. 
(Eds.) Psyche at Work. Illinois: Chiron
Stern, D .N . (1985) The Interpersonal World of the Infant N ew  York: Basic Books
Stern, D .N . (1995) The Motherhood Condition: A Unifed View o f Parent-Infant 
Psychotherapy. N ew  York: Basic Books
Stevens, W . (1978) The Collected poems of Wallace Stevens. N ew  York: Alfred Knopf
Stolorow, R., Atwood, G. and Brandchaft, B. (1994) The Intersubjective Perspective. 
Northvale, NJ: Jason Aaronson
Storr, Anthony. (1997) Feet of Clay. London: Harper Collins
Tannen, D. (1990) You Just don’t Understand: Women and men in Conversation. N ew  
York: Ballantine Books
Tarantino, Q . (1994) Pulp Fiction. London: Faber and Faber
Tarnas, R. (1991) The Passion o f the Western Mind. N ew  York: Ballantine Books
Torbert, W .R. ( 19 9 1) The Power of Balance. Newbury Park CA: Sage.
Torbert, W .R. (1995) Personal and Organizational Transformations: The True Challenge o f 
Continual Quality Improvement. McGraw-Hill
Torbert, W .R. (2001) T h e  Practice of Action Inquiry’ in Reason, P. & Bradbury,
295
H. (2001) Handbook o f Action Research Sage
Toulmin, S. (1990) Cosmopolis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Trompenaars, F. and Hampden-Turner, C. (1998) Riding the Waves o f Culture. N ew  
York: McGraw-Hill
Trompenaars, F. and Hampden-Turner, C (2000) Building Cross-Cultural Competence. 
Chichester: John W iley
Tsoukas, H. (undated) Forms of Knowledge and Forms of Life in organised contexts. 
Warwick Business School Research Bureau. Paper no. 171
Varela, F.J. et al (1995) The Embodied Mind. Cambridge, Mass: M IT  Press
Voloshinov, V .N . (1976) Freudianism: a Critical Sketch. Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press
Voloshinov, V .N . (1986) Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. (Trans. L Mateja and
I.R. Titunik) Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press
W aldrop, M.M. (1994) Complexity. Penguin Books
Wallace, W . (1910) Descartes. Encyclopedia Britannica I I th ed., N ew  York
Watkins, M (1986) Invisible Guests. Boston: Sigo Press
W eick, K. E. (1995) Sensemaking in Organisations. California: Sage
W eisbord, M.R. and Janoff, S. (2000) Future Search. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler
W enger, E. ( 1998) Communities o f Practice: Learning, Meaning and Identity. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press
Wheatley, M.J. (1992) Leadership and the New Science. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler
Wheelwright, P. (1959) Heraclitus. Princeton: Princeton University Press
296
W hite, S.K. (1991) Political Theory and Postmodernism. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press
W hitehead A .N . ( 1925) Science and the Modern World. N ew  York: N ew  American 
Library
Whitehead, J. (1989) Creating a Living Educational Theory from Questions of the Kind, 
‘H ow  do I improve my practice?’ Cambridge Journal o f Education. Vol. 19, No. I, pp. 41- 
52
Whitehead, J. ( 1993) The Growth of Educational Knowledge: Creating your own living 
educational theory. Bournemouth: Hyde
Whitehead, J. (1999) Educative Relations in a N ew  Era. Pedagogy, Culture & Society Vol. 
7, No. I, pp.73-90
Whitehead, J. (2000) H ow  Do I Improve My Practice? Creating and legitimating an 
epistemology of practice. Reflective Practice V o l.I, No. I pp. 91-104
Whitehead, J. (2002) Have we created a new disciplines approach to educational theory? Am 
I doctor educator? Paper presented at the British Educational Research Association, 
Annual Conference, University of Exeter, 14th September 2002
W hitman, W . (1992) Song of Myself. Petrarch Press Edition
W ilber, K. (2001) A Theory of Everything. Dublin: Gateway
W innicott, D .W . (1971) Playing and Reality. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books
W inter, R. ( 1998a) Finding a Voice -  Thinking with Others: a conception of 
action research Educational Action Research Vol 6, N o  I pp. 53-68
W inter, R. (1998b) Managers, Spectators and Citizens: where does ‘theory’ 
come from in action research Educational Action Research Vol 6, N o  3 pp. 3 6 1 - 
376
297
Wittgenstein, L. (1963) Philosophical Investigations. N ew  York: Macmillan
Wittgenstein, L. (1980) Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, vols. I and 2, Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell
W olfe, T. ( 1982) Tom Wolfe: The purple decades: A reader selected by Tom Wolfe. N ew  
York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux
W olfe, T. ( 1988) The Bonfire o f the Vanities. Picador
W oolfe, V. (1929) A Room of One’s Own. N ew  York: Harcourt, Brace & W o rld
W o rld  Commission on Environment and Development. (1987) Our Common Future. 
O xford University Press
Yeats, W .B. ( 1924) The Poems ofW.B. Yeats: A New Edition. Edited by R.J. Finneran 
Macmillan Publishing Company
Zeldin, T. (1998) Conversation. The Harvill Press: London 
Zohar, D. (1990) The Quantum Self. London: Bloomsbury
298
Appendix One 
Beyond traditional ways of working with 
Organisational Change
Introduction
Consider the following scenario, which is familiar to  me both through my own practice 
as an organisational development consultant and from the accounts of other managers 
and consultants.
A  senior management team has set time aside from their usual operationally driven 
concerns and agenda-packed meetings for an ‘awayday’ or ‘off-site’ meeting. It is thought 
that some ‘quality’ time needs to be invested in creating a different kind of organisational 
culture and a genuinely shared vision for the way the team will w ork together in the 
future. On the ‘awayday’, time is spent forging a compelling vision, using creative right- 
brain based techniques (eg visualisation, making a collage) as well as more traditionally 
based analytical techniques (eg S W O T, data from questionnaires, market research).
Often an overarching vision can indeed be created on occasions like this, one which 
appears to have the support of all team members. This can create genuine energy, 
passion and excitement. The team then use their newly minted vision to  agree a 
strategy, which will take them from where they are now, the current state, to  where 
they want to be (their future state). This might include agreements about how they will 
begin to work together differently. The team return to their w ork initially enthused by 
their new vision. As time goes on, though, patterns of behaviour and ways of working 
that were the target for change persist. Plans that had been set do not materialise. 
People express cynicism about the intended changes. The initiative fizzles out.
This appears to be a relatively common scenario (Beer, Michael and Eisenstat, 1990). 
Various reasons can be put forward to explain the apparent failure of such initiatives to  
create lasting change. Typical reasons often given include:
•  team members were not really signed up to the change
•  key stakeholders in the change were insufficiently involved o r were excluded
•  the proposed change was poorly communicated
•  the change was not sufficiently well led and/or sponsored
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•  key leaders failed to  ‘walk the talk’, that is to embody the change in their behaviour.
These are all potentially valid ways of making sense of how change did not occur in this 
scenario. But what if the reasons for the failure are to be found in the overall 
orientation to and way of thinking about change that this scenario embodies, rather than 
lying in any of the specific reasons outlined above?
‘Modernity*
This article will argue that the dominant and most common approaches to  organisational 
change and development are rooted in a set of assumptions and practices whose 
underlying and deep-rooted rationale and legitimacy can be found in the worldview  
associated with ‘modernity’. ‘Modernity’ is used here to  refer to  the particular 
combination of technological, economic, cultural and institutional features ushered in by 
the scientific and philosophical revolutions of the seventeenth century and the social 
revolutions of the eighteenth century (Jameson, 1984,'Giddens 1990,'Toulmin 1990; 
Gergen 1999).
Different writers locate the genesis of ‘modernity’ at different points (Toulmin, 1990). 
Yet most could subscribe to the description of ‘modernity’ offered by the critic 
Cahoone ( 1996) as;
“The positive self-image modem western culture has often given to  itself o f a
civilisation founded on scientific knowledge o f the world and rational knowledge o f 
value, which places the highest premium on individual human life and freedom, and 
believes that such freedom and rationality will lead to  social progress through 
virtuous self-controlled work, creating a better material, political and intellectual life 
fo r all.”
This worldview, originating in the seventeenth century in the scientific w ork  of Newton, 
Galileo and Bacon and the philosophical thought of Descartes has had a profound effect 
on shaping the patterns of thought and social institutions of the western world (Tarnas, 
1991).
In the field of organisational development, such a worldview leads to an underlying 
perspective and set of related assumptions that change and development in organisations
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can be made to happen through the application of a set of rationally based principles, 
processes and practices.
In organisational change programmes and methodologies this typically takes the form  
sketched out in the scenario at the beginning of this article and summarised as follows. 
First create a vision of the organisation’s future state. Such a vision should not just be 
analytically sound and intellectually rigorous and challenging but also serve to  capture 
the hearts of organisational members. Then analyse and diagnose exactly the current 
state of the organisation - where the organisation is now. N ext develop a change 
programme which will take the organisation from where it is now to the desired future 
state. This is the basis of many change models over the decades including force field 
analysis (Lewin, 1951), Gap Analysis (Ansoff, 1965), Egan’s model A  and B (1988), and a 
variety of organisational culture change questionnaires that aim to identify both the 
existing and the preferred culture (eg Harrison and Stokes, 1992; Cameron and Quinn, 
1998).
This underlying way of thinking finds further elaboration in K otter’s (1995) influential 
model of change in which organisational transformation is characterised as moving 
sequentially through a predefined sequence of eight stages.
The underlying assumptions informing this way of thinking about change can be 
summarised as follows;
1. “Change can be engineered.”
Change is a process that can be actively planned and guided, and needs to be led by the 
most senior people in the organisation; it is best managed in a staged, linear sequence. 
The key point here is that change is a process that is done to  an organisation - the 
underlying metaphor is of engineered change.
2. “Change can be usefully described in general universal theories.”
There are a set of universally applicable general principles, such as K otter’s (1995) 
model, which can be cast in an abstract, propositional form that can be schematically 
used to guide organisations through change.
3. “Change is brought into being through creating a future vision.”
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Change occurs through the positing of a preferred future state, a compelling vision, 
which is used to  provide the “creative tension” (Senge, 1990, 1994), impetus, inspiration 
and energy to  take people from the present to the desired future.
4. “Processes of organisational change can be described in politically and morally neutral, 
value-free terms.” Such ways of thinking about and working with change as described in 
the above three assumptions are politically neutral in that they do not serve any 
particular ideological positions.
These assumptions are not separate but interlinked. They w ork  to  reinforce one 
another. They usually remain unquestioned. W e  are so familiar with them. They have 
established themselves as the typical mental infrastructure in which we think and act. 
They provide the usual starting point from which programmes of organisational change 
are initiated, designed, implemented and evaluated.
And yet these assumptions are being increasingly questioned. The whole edifice of 
‘modernity’ has been under a sustained critical attack in the twentieth century. 
Philosophically, the whole movement described as ‘postmodernism’ (Derrida, 1981; 
Lyotard, 1984; Harvey, 1989) has challenged and deconstructed the philosophical basis 
on which ‘modernity’ was founded. Postmodernism is not, of course, a unified 
movement. Chia ( 1998) characterises postmodern thought as;
“A  loosely-clustered pot-pourri o f ideas for grasping, amidst the unquestioned 
achievements o f modern science and technology, the accompanying sense o f loss, 
foreboding, rootlessness, fragmentation, and malaise precipitated by the very 
instruments o f modernity over the past tw o  hundred years or more.”
W ithin science, too, the developments first of quantum science in the early part of the 
twentieth century and chaos and complexity sciences in the latter half of the twentieth  
century have cast doubt on the mechanistic certainties of traditional scientific thinking.
In organisational development, there is, now, linked to this powerful critique of 
‘modernity’, a growing body of organisational theory and practice arising which 
challenges the taken for granted nature of the four assumptions outlined above and the 
ways of working they both foster and are fostered by.
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In this article, each of the four assumptions will be taken in turn and the basis of the 
theoretical challenge to  them outlined. From this, some emerging directions for practice 
will also be indicated.
Assumption I: “change can be engineered”
The basis of most organisational change programmes is guided, purposeful change. In 
fact at the heart of most definitions of the whole field of organisational development is 
the idea of planned change. Burke (1992) defines organisational development as “a 
planned process of change in an organisation’s culture through the utilisation of 
behavioural science technologies, research and theory.” Change programmes are 
expected to realise planned outcomes and much effort and energy is expended on 
ensuring that this happens. This is believed to be the basis of managing change well.
Underlying this is a view of an organisational world that can be ordered, predicted and 
controlled, and that certain actions can be taken which will have predictable and definite 
outcomes. And further underlying this view of organisational reality is the scientific 
worldview of modernity, a world of identifiable cause and effect linkages, which can be 
modelled and explained using the linear equations discovered by Isaac Newton. The 
guiding metaphor for this world is that of a mechanism, whether that mechanism is that 
of ‘clockwork’ as originally formulated by Descartes (Capra, 1982) or more 
contemporary manifestations of this in computer-based information processing systems.
In recent decades, first the sciences of chaos, and then of complexity, have offered a 
fundamental challenge to  this worldview of predictability and order. Instead, complexity 
scientists working across many disciplines (Waldrop, 1992; Lewin, 1993) have 
emphasised the unfolding, open-ended, inherently unpredictable, self-organising nature 
of living systems existing in far-from-equilibrium conditions (Prigogine, 1984). The well 
known “butterfly effect” (Gleick, 1987) shows how tiny, apparently negligible, 
disturbances in one part of a living system can lead to  significant unpredictable change in 
the whole system through continually iterative amplifying processes of positive feedback.
Despite this fundamental challenge to  ideas of engineered change, most change 
methodologies still persist with the idea that certain actions if sufficiently well planned 
and well communicated will lead to guaranteed outcomes. Even Peter Senge who has 
done much to introduce ideas of systems thinking into organisations still persists, in T h e  
Fifth Discipline’ (1990), with the idea that by understanding systems archetypes,
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managers will be better able to control and manage the systems they are part of. He
quotes Archimedes approvingly saying “give me a lever long enough and single-
handed I can move the world”.
Many of the ideas from chaos and complexity are now entering discourses about 
organisational change ( Wheatley, 1992; Morgan 1997; Brown and Eisenhardt 1998;
Kelly and Allison, 1999; Pascale, 1999). Yet many of these theorists remain within an 
underlying frame of reference of control in which these ideas are still used in an 
instrumental way - at their crudest they are simply converted into yet another series of 
recipes o r blueprints for organisational success.
Stacey, Griffin and Shaw (2000), in contrast, have used ideas from complexity to develop 
a different perspective. They argue that ideas from the sciences of complexity, many of 
which have been developed through computer simulations, cannot simply and 
uncritically be imported into understanding organisational life. They enrich thinking from  
complexity with ideas drawn from relational psychology, social constructionism and 
Hegelian philosophy to  offer a perspective on organisations as socially constructed, self- 
organising processes of patterned, communicative action. Such a perspective draws 
attention to the way organisations are continually being made, sustained and 
transformed through self-organising ‘complex responsive processes’ of people relating 
together, and that the primary medium in organisational life through which this is taking 
place is through conversation.
Such a perspective has profound implications for practice. Shaw (2002) demonstrates 
how her organisational change practice is concerned with participating in the fluid, 
moment-to-moment, self-organising, daily ongoing conversational processes in which 
organisational life is being created and recreated. She stresses the importance of 
spontaneity and the paradox of both continuity and difference as intrinsic to the nature 
of change. From this perspective any notion of planned change is an oxymoron.
Assumption 2. “Change can be usefully described in general universal 
theories.”
It has become an axiomatic modus operandi of western thought to  think in theories, 
which offer generalisations across different instances and specific contexts. W estern  
scientific methods have been developed and achieved great success through making 
general deductions from observation and testing general hypotheses through further
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specific controlled experiments. One of the defining characteristics of ‘modernity’ has 
been the value placed on scientific inquiry and the belief that such inquiry provides 
rigorous, ideologically untainted and value-free grounds for knowledge which can be 
progressively developed and used for the good of humanity.
In his book ‘Cosmopolis’, subtitled T h e  Hidden Agenda of Modernity’, Toulmin (1990) 
provides a historical account of the social conditions in which modernity arose. He dates 
a critical dimension of modernity in the I630 ’s arising from the concerns of thinkers like 
Descartes in logic and epistemology, and Galileo in science, to establish rationality and 
certainty as the firm foundations for knowledge and unequivocal criteria to base and 
implement decisions regarding human welfare. He argues that the key shift these 
thinkers, and then others such as Newton, Kepler, Locke and Leibniz, made was;
“ From a style o f philosophy that keeps equally in view issues o f local, timebound 
practice, and universal timeless theory, to  one that accepts matters o f universal, 
timeless theory as being entitled to  an exclusive place on the agenda o f 
philosophy.” (p. 24)
In a similar vein, he also says of these thinkers that;
“The three dreams o f the rationalist thus turn out to  be aspects o f a larger dream. 
The dreams o f a rational method, a unified science and an exact language, unite 
into a single project. All o f them are designed to  “ purify” the operation o f human 
reason, by decontextualising them: i.e. by divorcing them from the details o f 
particular historical and cultural situations.”
For Toulmin, the scientific modernity ushered in during the seventeenth century makes 
a decisive break with the earlier more literary Renaissance humanism of the sixteenth 
century represented by figures such as Montaigne, Rabelais and Shakespeare who could 
have provided an alternative and complementary foundation for a different kind of 
modernity. Toulmin sees these literary figures advocating a more practically oriented 
sceptical philosophy, which is tolerant of the ambiguity, uncertainty and diversity that 
Descartes and others wanted to  eliminate.
Toulmin’s historical reflections may at first sight seem a long way from pragmatic 
concerns about organisational change. But it is precisely his critique of the quest for 
certainty and rationality in the form of universal timeless principles that has subsequently
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dominated western science and philosophy and his reassertion of the relevance of the 
oral, the particular, the local and the timely found in Renaissance humanists that is also 
surfacing in the practice of organisational development. For example, an emphasis on the 
oral mirrors the concerns of others to  place conversation at the centre of organisational 
(Isaacs, 1999; Shaw, 2002) and civic (Shotter, 1993; Zeldin, 1998) life.
The thrust of postmodern thinking, particularly exemplified in the w ork of Lyotard 
(1984) and Foucault (1980), has relentlessly challenged the grounds on which any theory  
can claim to provide universal, timeless general knowledge. Lyotard (1984) is sceptical of 
all, what he terms ‘meta-narratives’, whether these are scientifically, theologically, 
politically, economically, psychologically or sociologically defined. He resists the claims of 
any discipline, scientific o r otherwise, to  set up the ultimate grounds for knowledge 
from which all epistemological claims have to be validated.
Cilliers (1998) offers a useful summary of Lyotard’s thinking.
"Different groups, (institutions, disciplines, communities) tell different stories about 
what they know and what they do. Their knowledge does not take the form o f a 
logically structured and complete whole, but rathertakes the form o f narratives 
that are instrumental in allowing them to  achieve their goals and to  make sense o f 
what they are doing. Since these narratives are all local, they cannot be linked 
tog the rto  form a grand narrative which unifies all knowledge. The postmodern 
condition is characterised by the co-existence o f a multiplicity o f heterogeneous 
discourses.” (p. I 14)
As with Toulmin’s writing, there is a similar emphasis on the local, and the refusal to  
subordinate the local and specific to the universal and general.
This postmodern critique is important because it challenges the assumptions on which 
much organisational theory is based. Many theories of change are cast in similar but, less 
over-arching, meta-narratives. To  use the example of K otter’s model again, eight steps 
o r principles of change are identified and put forward which are believed to be valid 
across all organisations at all times. The specific instances, the particular dynamics, 
emotional atmospheres, personalities and contexts are suppressed and subordinated to  
the general principles. Yet in actually working with organisational change, it is precisely 
the specific dynamics and contexts that are constantly met. K otter’s model, despite
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being one of the more sophisticated of its type, seems a pale reflection of the colour and 
complexity of organisational life.
For example, I have been working on a relatively small assignment (in terms of 
consulting days allocated) with an organisation on the apparently straightforward task of 
helping to  create a professional development programme for a team of people involved 
in a relatively high profile project. These people are employed on a freelance basis 
rather than a salaried basis. This task, in addition, occurs in the context of recent 
changes in senior people within a significant partner organisation, and an impending 
restructuring of the division in which the project is based. Furthermore this project 
embodies important gender and ethnic issues. The holder of a significant post in the  
division has been away for tw o periods o f maternity leave. H er replacement whilst away 
has been tw o people job sharing. The system of roles and relationships constituting this 
project is then further coloured by the particular alliances and disagreements, patterns 
of liking and enmity, and unresolved tensions, which characterise any organisational 
network of relationships. Any attempt, (such as the one that is now being made), to  
describe any particular situation in suitably abstract and decontextualised terms, and that 
does not break confidentiality or refer to  the specific personalities of the key people 
involved, gets only a limited way to  illustrating the real themes, issues and vitality of 
helping to facilitate change in this project.
By promulgating, or in the case of major consulting businesses, actively marketing and 
selling general, universally applicable, theories and methodologies of change, a particular 
view of thinking about change is set up - it is this way of thinking associated with 
modernity that is being addressed in this article. This treats thinking, in the words of 
Clark (2002), from his introduction to the w ork of the German philosopher Martin 
Heidegger, like a “kind of inner tool kit, containing ‘ideas’ to  be picked up and employed 
on problems as occasion requires.” These forms of thinking are so engrained it seems 
heretical or inviting ridicule to  question them. Clark argues that Heidegger’s critique of 
modernity was a lifelong battle against “the technical interpretation of thinking”, that is 
subordinating thought to the principles of overall technical rationality which have come 
to  dominate western philosophy. This point will be returned to  and elaborated later in 
this paper.
A  further significant dimension of western thought is that its concepts are cast in the 
form of propositional logic. This way of thinking goes back to Aristotelian logic in which 
any proposition had either to be true or not true. Tsoukas (1995) shows how this kind
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of logic has dominated organisational thinking despite the existence of other kinds of 
dialectical o r paradoxical logic in which a statement can also contain its opposite. 
Tsoukas contrasts propositional forms with narrative forms. These are the forms by 
which people in organisations go about understanding themselves, their relations with 
others, and the context in which they work. Organisational life is then understood as a 
vast array of different, overlapping , competing and co-validating stories clamouring for 
attention. The ways that certain stories are told and permitted and others are silenced 
and marginalised is a social and political process.
All this points, in practice, to the significance of stories and narrative sense-making in 
organisations (Weick, 1995). There is a growing emphasis in working with organisational 
change to  encourage people to tell their specific stories. For example, in the method of 
appreciative inquiry (Hammond and Royal, 1998), people are encouraged to  tell detailed 
stories that exemplify what works well in their organisation. This is both a corrective to 
the traditional modernist mindset which looks for problems to  fix, rather than 
appreciating what is working well, and also a means to further learning by recounting 
very specific stories. The value of the learning is often to  be found in the precise 
specificity of the story and others’ particular responses to it rather than the attempt to  
extrapolate a general principle from it to be ‘rolled out’ to others or embodied in an 
organisational change programme.
Assumption 3: “Change is brought into being through creating a 
future vision.”
A t first sight it seems self-evident that change is brought about through combining a 
sense o f dissatisfaction with the present together with the ability to  envision an 
alternative. This is, for example, the basis of the formula attributed to  David Gleicher 
(Beckhard and Harris, 1987) for assessing whether change is possible. Kotter (1995), 
too, emphasises the importance for leaders of organisational change to generate 
dissatisfaction with the present. Furthermore, the imaginative capacity to  generate and 
shape alternative futures is a much celebrated aspect of the human spirit.
It is, however, worth scrutinising and critically examining what can happen when future 
visions are used to define organisational change efforts.
In these instances, as sketched out at the beginning of this article, the process of 
creating a vision is often creative and energetic. A t best, it can provide an opportunity
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for genuinely imaginative and innovative activity and a more open-ended exploration of 
personal aspirations, future strategic directions and alternative scenarios. W hat can then 
happen, however, is that the process of creating this vision (or mission statement) 
becomes ossified into a product which then has to  be rolled out o r communicated or 
implemented across the rest of the organisation. The fluid activity of imaginative thinking 
together becomes literalised into a concrete product, which has then to  be sold, 
marketed and promoted like any commodity.
In order to  overcome this separation of vision/strategy formulation and implementation, 
a whole range of methods have been developed (Holman and Devane, 1999), of which, 
perhaps the most well-known are Open Space (Owen, 1997) and Future Search 
(Weisbord and Janoff, 2000). They are often described as large group interventions or 
whole system change (Bunker and Alban, 1997) and they have been devised precisely to  
enable significant numbers of people to shape the future of their organisations or 
communities in a way that promotes ownership, participation and involvement in change 
processes.
But there are further profound and more hidden difficulties with the way that future 
visions are used. As has already been outlined, the future vision acts as a reference point 
in relation to the current state of the organisation to enable a planning process to be 
conducted which focusses on how a course can be steered to take the organisation 
from the present to  the future. This typically assumes the paradigm of planned change 
that has been critiqued earlier in this article and this runs into problems because the 
future, like the weather, at least in England, is constantly changing.
Furthermore, it also assumes a strongly linear perspective on time. Instead of the future, 
as Stacey (2001) points out, following Mead (1938), Husserl ( I9 6 0 ) and Wittgenstein 
( 1980), being “perpetually constructed” from the present, that is arising and emerging 
from the present which itself is perpetually arising from the past, it is set apart from the 
present and the past, and dissociated from them. The future in most change models is 
meant to  act as a guiding beacon, a stretching and inspiring challenge, a suitably “big, 
hairy, audacious goal” (Collins and Porras, 1994). Senge (1990), for example, sees the 
“creative tension” between this kind of desired future and the limitations of the present 
as providing the motivation to bring about change.
This projection of a preferred future to  be realised through rationally based methods is 
a fundamental aspect of the intellectual heritage of the enlightenment and a further
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illustration of how much thinking and writing about change remains steeped within this 
tradition.
Some writers (Horkheim er and Adorno, 1947; Arendt, 1973; Foucault, 1980) have 
shown that this very way of thinking, rather than leading to  social progress, has, in the 
twentieth century, equally well led to forms of totalitarianism and misplaced utopianism. 
Rather than the ideal future providing the light of a beacon, the desire to  realise this 
ideal acts as an oppressive force subordinating the present to the demands of the future. 
Even on a personal level the positing of a preferred future - to  be fitter for example - 
can lead to a continual sense of dissatisfaction with the present, and can w ork counter- 
productively as a change strategy.
To be clear at this point, I am not, in this article, advocating the need not to think about 
the future nor to plan in advance. That would clearly be stupid. I am though trying to  
make a point about how the future is thought of in organisational change programmes 
and its relation to  the present and the past. As with the other assumptions outlined in 
this article, thinking about this differently has profound implications for practice.
Rather than trying to create a preferred future, methods such as Appreciative Inquiry 
(Srivistva and Cooperrider, 1999), social constructionist approaches (Campbell, 2000) 
and Gestalt based approaches to organisational change (Nevis, 1987) focus on what is 
happening in the present. Rather than needing to posit a future over and above the 
present, these methods draw attention as to how the present is actually being 
experienced and constructed and show how, paradoxically, by paying close attention to  
the ongoing present, the future can be changed. Through this people can indeed 
participate in the shaping of the future but from the basis of a focus in the present 
rather than extrapolating backwards from a preferred or ideal future.
Assumption 4: “ Processes of change can be described in politically and 
morally neutral, value-free term s.”
Most theories of organisational change, again taking K otter’s (1995) model as a prime 
example, are presented in value-free terms. They argue for the best o r instrumentally 
most effective way to bring about change. They are assumed to  represent an objective, 
unbiassed view of organisational life and not to favour the interests of any particular 
group.
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In so doing, like the other assumptions discussed in this article, they lie within the 
traditions of ‘modernity’ which assume that it is possible to investigate social and 
organisational reality using the methods and philosophy of traditional positivistic 
scientific inquiry. This places high emphasis on rational inquiry as the basis for all valid 
knowledge.
As already indicated, postmodern thought has challenged the basis on which scientific 
reasoning has established itself as the primary grounds and criteria of valid knowledge. In 
addition, feminist writers (Gilligan, 1982; Spretnak, 1991) have pointed out the gendered 
conceptions of this view of knowledge and how it serves to  marginalise and silence 
other more traditionally female forms of knowing.
By arguing that there are no absolute grounds for truth (Lyotard, 1984), that all 
knowledge is socially constituted and constructed (Gergen, 1999), that knowledge and 
power are inseparable (Foucault, 1980), and by following Kuhn’s (1970) lead in showing 
how scientific knowledge does not proceed as closer and closer approximations to an 
empirically verifiable truth, postmodern thought argues that knowledge cannot be 
divorced from human interests. Knowledge is always coloured by the assumptions, 
values, and worldview of the individual and the social context in which it is produced. 
There is no neutral place from which to construct objective, value free knowledge about 
the world. W ithin quantum science itself, Schrodinger demonstrated that the very act of 
observation changes what is being observed.
Habermas (1972) has shown how different kinds of human interests generate different 
kinds of knowledge. He differentiates between empirical-analytic knowledge based on a 
technical or instrumental interest, hermeneutic knowledge based on understanding and 
intelligibility, and critical knowledge based on an emancipatory interest. Habermas, here, 
is following and developing the w ork of an earlier generation of social theorists from  
what has commonly come to  be known as T h e  Frankfurt School.’
A  key focus of the w ork  of the Frankfurt school was the critique of instrumental reason, 
what Grubbs (2000) calls “the production of purposive-rational knowledge by positivist 
social science”. Horkheim er (1993) argued that instrumental reason, following the 
tenets of positivistic science, separated knowledge from human values. This leads to a 
preoccupation with means -  with efficiency and effectiveness -  and a loss of the 
connection between means and ends. In so doing it assumes knowledge is universal and 
in the interests o f all. In this way, far from being objective and politically neutral,
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instrumental reason serves the interests of the status quo and the dominant groups and 
elite in society.
Horkheimer, like others referred to  in this article, is offering a profound critique of 
instrumental reason which has become the dominant way of making sense of and 
working in social institutions such as businesses and the not-for-profit sector. The 
argument of this article has been that thinking in terms of this kind of instrumental 
reason or technical rationality lies at the basis of most approaches to organisational 
change.
A t the same time, though, that this kind of instrumental business and managerial 
language and way of thinking has come to  dominate the public as well as the private 
sector, there is a growing groundswell of opinion that is challenging the preoccupation 
with means and exclusive focus on organisational efficiency and asking questions about 
the overall purpose of business organisations. This takes many forms in practice ranging 
from the militant activism of some N G O ’s around environmental and social justice 
issues to  the rapidly growing field of corporate citizenship (McIntosh, Leipziger, Jones 
and Coleman, 1998) within business itself. It is beyond the scope of this article to  
describe this in any depth but I will mention in brief tw o significant aspects here.
W riters  such as John Elkington (1997) are arguing that the ultimate purpose of business 
should not be confined solely to the financial bottom-line. He advocates a “triple bottom  
line” embracing social and economic bottom lines as well as financial profitability.
There is too a growing critique of the supposed political neutrality of business. The 
increasingly vocal anti-globalisation movement claims that, far from bodies like the W T O  
and large transnational companies being politically neutral in their promotion of world 
trade and a free market economy, they are advocating the interests of the rich and 
powerful against the powerless.
Conclusion
This article has aimed to  show how the most common and dominant ways of working 
and thinking about change can be traced to a perspective and set of assumptions linked 
to  the worldview of ‘modernity’.
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In many intellectual disciplines, this worldview has been substantially critiqued, leading to  
what Gergen (1999) has called the triple crises of representation, value-neutrality and 
rationality. Similarly in the field of organisational development the assumptions and 
practices stemming from this worldview are being questioned. Given the nature of the 
challenge to  modernist thinking, especially the critique of instrumental reason and 
totalising theories, it is not possible to group together all these new practices under the 
umbrella of a new grand theory or ‘meta-narrative’ in the form of a blueprint o r set of 
recipes for change. This article has instead had the more modest ambition of indicating 
how different forms of organisational development practice are beginning to emerge that 
are not situated within the modernist tradition.
313
